Judgement SADANANDASWAMY, C. J. :- Common questions of law are involved in these three writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. The facts are also similar. In C. R. 419/70, the petitioner derived income in the assessment year 1962-63 from two firms, namely, M/s. Ganeshdas Sreeram and M/s. A. V. Morello and Co. The major income was from M/s. Ganeshdas Sreeram which is a registered firm. Respondent 1, the Income-tax Officer A-Ward, Shillong, assessed the petitioner on the return filed by the petitioner under S. 141 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. and found a total income of Rs. 72.102/- and demanded an amount of Rs. 36,961.39 P. as tax including a sum of Rs. 3,881.39 P. as interest under S. 139. Thereafter respondent 1 made the final assessment under Section 143 (3)/154 of the said Act and found the total income of the petitioner to be Rs. 91,174/-. In pursuance of the said assessment order, respondent 1 issued a demand notice dated 27-3-67 for payment of a sum of Rs. 57,735/- as tax for the assessment year. Out of this amount Rs. 36,961/-was paid. A demand notice for Rupees 20,774/- was issued. This included an amount of Rs. 7,351/- as interest under Sec. 139 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Against the imposition of interest on the petitioner for filing the return beyond the specified time allowed under S. 139, the petitioner filed a petition for waiver of the interest as provided under R. 117-A of the Income Tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 1964. That petition was rejected on 30-5-69. The firm M/s. Ganeshdas Sreeram of which the petitioner is one of the partners, filed an appeal against the assessment order and the demand notice issued to the firm before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax who fixed the income of the petitioner at Rs. 74,704/- for the assessment year 1962-63. Respondent 1 issued a fresh notice of demand. According to this assessment the petitioner had to pay Rs. 38,766/- out of which Rs. 36,961/- had already been paid. The demand notice was therefore issued for Rs. 1,805/-. The tax of Rupees 38,766/- demanded from the petitioner included interest, under Sec. 139 of Rs. 4,071/-. 2. Respondent 1 issued a fresh notice of demand. According to this assessment the petitioner had to pay Rs. 38,766/- out of which Rs. 36,961/- had already been paid. The demand notice was therefore issued for Rs. 1,805/-. The tax of Rupees 38,766/- demanded from the petitioner included interest, under Sec. 139 of Rs. 4,071/-. 2. It is the first contention of the petitioner that he had not filed any application for extension of time for filing the return and that therefore no interest can be charged under Section 139 (4). 3. The registered firm M/s. Ganeshdas Sreeram was treated as an unregistered firm for purposes of charging interest under sub-cl. (a) of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139 and the firm was charged interest on the amount of tax which would have been payable if the firm had been assessed as an unregistered firm. Under the provisions of the Income Tax Act the partners of an unregistered firm are not liable to pay any tax on the income derived from the unregistered firm. The said income is included in the partners total income only for the purpose of fixing the rate. It is the second contention of the petitioner that since the registered firm of which he is a partner has been treated by respondent 1 as an unregistered firm, the petitioner is not liable to be charged with interest. The demand notices dated 18-2-70 and 26-3-67 by which interest has been charged and demanded have been challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. The facts in the other two writ petitions are similar. 4. The demand notices dated 18-2-70 and 26-3-67 by which interest has been charged and demanded have been challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. The facts in the other two writ petitions are similar. 4. The relevant part of S. 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act, reads as follows:- "139 (1) - Every person if his income or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax, shall furnish a return of his income or the income of such other person during the previous year in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed- (a) in the case of every person whose total income, or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act, includes any income from business or profession, before the expiry of six months from the end of the previous year or where there is more than one previous year, from the end of the previous year which expired last before the commencement of the assessment year, or before the 30th day of June of the assessment year, whichever is later; (b) in the case of every other person, before the 30th day of June of the assessment year: Provided that, on an application made in the prescribed manner, the Income-tax Officer may, in his discretion, extend the date for furnishing the return- (i) in the case of any person whose total income includes any income from business or profession the previous year in respect of which expired on or before the 31st day of December of the year immediately preceding the assessment year, and in the case of any person referred to in Cl. (b), up to a period not extending beyond the 30th day of September of the assessment year without charging any interest: (ii) in the case of any person whose total income includes any income from business or profession the previous year in respect of which expired after the 31st day of December of the year immediately preceding the assessment year, up to the 3lst day of December of the assessment year without charging any interest; and (iii) up to any period falling beyond the dates mentioned in Cls. (i) and (ii) in which case, interest at six per cent per annum shall be payable from the 1st day of October or the 1st day of January, as the case may be, of the assessment year to the data of the furnishing of the return- (a) in the case of a registered firm or an unregistered firm which has been assessed under Cl. (b) of S. 183, on the amount of tax which would have been payable if the firm had been assessed as an unregistered firm; and (b) in any other case, on the amount of tax payable on the total income, reduced by the advance tax, if any, paid or by any tax deducted at source as the case may be, (1A) ................. (2) In the case of any person who, in the Income-tax Officers opinion is assessable under this Act, whether on his own total income or on the total income of any other person during the previous year, the Income-tax Officer may, before the end of the relevant assessment year, serve a notice upon him requiring him to furnish, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, a return of his income or the income of such other person during the previous year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed: Provided that on an application made in the prescribed manner the Income-tax Officer may, in his discretion, extend the date for the furnishing of the return, and when the date for furnishing the return, whether fixed originally or on extension, falls beyond the 30th day of September or, as the case may be, the 31st day of December of the assessment year, the provisions of sub-cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) shall apply. (3) ................. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) shall apply. (3) ................. (4) Any person who has not furnished a return within the time allowed to him under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) may before the assessment is made furnish the return for any previous year at any time before the end of four assessment years from the end of the assessment year to which the return relates, and the provisions of sub-cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-section (1) shall apply in every such case, (5)............ (6) .......... (7) .......... (8) ..........." The proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139 enables the Income-tax Officer to extend the date for furnishing the return if an application is made in the prescribed manner. Clauses (i) and (ii) of the proviso provide the period up to which extension can be granted by the Income-tax Officer without charging any interest. Clause (iii) provides that if the period is extended beyond the dates mentioned in Cls. (i) and (ii) interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum shall be payable from the date specified therein. Hence reading sub-s. (1) alone along with its proviso, interest is chargeable only in cases where an application has been made by the assessee and the Income-tax Officer extends the date for furnishing the return beyond the dates specified in Cls. (a) and (b) of sub-s. (1). Sub-sec. (4) enables the assessee to file the return at any time before the four assessment years from the end of the assessment year to which the return relates, in case he has not furnished return within time allowed to him under sub-ss. (1) and (2). In such a case, the provisions of sub-cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) has been made applicable. The question therefore to whether interest is chargeable if the return is filed under sub-s. (4) even though no application for extension of time has been filed by the assessees. According to the petitioner, interest is chargeable in such a case only if an application for extension of time has been filed. Since the petitioner filed no such application, his contention to that no interest is chargeable. On the other hand, the contention of the respondent to that interest to chargeable in such cases even if no application for extension of time has been filed by the assessees. 5. Since the petitioner filed no such application, his contention to that no interest is chargeable. On the other hand, the contention of the respondent to that interest to chargeable in such cases even if no application for extension of time has been filed by the assessees. 5. The Division Beach before which these petitions came up for hearing observed that the main point raised in these cases was covered by the decision of this Court reported in 93 ITR 19 : (1973 Tax LR 768), (Ganesh Das Sreeram v. I. T. O., Shillong), but that this decision may require to be reconsidered and they were referred to a larger Bench. That is how they have come up for hearing before us. 6. In Ganesh Das Sreeram v. I.T.O. (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that when an assessee furnishes the return under S. 139 (4), an application by the assessee and a consequent order extending the time for furnishing the return are not conditions precedent for authorising the I.T.O. to charge interest under Cl. (iii) of the proviso to S. 139 (1). The decisions in 95 ITR 372: (1974 Tax LR 326) (Orissa) (Biswanath Ghosh v. I.T.O. Orissa), (1976) 105 ITR 230 (Guj), (Chhotalal and Co. v. I.T.O. Guj), 86 ITR 566: (1972 Tax LR 547) (Mys), (Indian Telephone Industries Co-op. Socy. Ltd v. I.T.O., Mys) and 99 ITR 32 : (1975 Tax LR 553) (Kant), M. Nagappa v. Income-tax Officer (Kant) also take the same view. This may be called the first view. 7. As against this, it has been held that an application for extension of time is a condition precedent to enable the Income-tax Officer to charge interest where the return is filed under sub-s. (4) of S. 139 in (1971) 82 ITR 660 (Andh Pra), (Kishanlal Haricharan v. I. T. O. AP), 102 ITR 443: (1976 Tax LR 84) (Pat), (C.I.T. v. Bahri Bros, (P) Ltd. Pat), 97 ITR 639: (1975 Tax LR 374) (Delhi), (Garg and Co. v. C. I. T. Delhi) and 107 ITR 382: (1977 Tax LR 97) (J and K), (Mulakh Raj Bimal Kumar v. I.T.O., J and K). This may be called the second view. 8. The leading case in support of the first view is the decision in (1976) 105 ITR 230 (Guj) (Supra). v. C. I. T. Delhi) and 107 ITR 382: (1977 Tax LR 97) (J and K), (Mulakh Raj Bimal Kumar v. I.T.O., J and K). This may be called the second view. 8. The leading case in support of the first view is the decision in (1976) 105 ITR 230 (Guj) (Supra). A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court observed as follows while dealing with this question:- "In our opinion the only way of construing S. 139 (4) is to hold that those provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139 which provide that interest at nine per cent per annum shall be payable from the 1st day of October or from the 1st day of January, as the case may be, of the assessment year to the date of the furnishing of the return apply whenever the return is not filed within the time allowed to the assessee under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) but is filed before the assessment is made within the period of four years from the end of the assessment year under consideration. It also follows that in the case of a registered firm, interest will be charged on the amount of tax which would have been payable if the firm had been assessed as an unregistered firm. It was contended that in order to appreciate the correct impact of Clause (iii) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 139, we must take note of the fact that the provisions of Cls. (i) and (ii) of the proviso to S. 139 (1) have to be looked at in order to find out the significance of the dates, 1st day of October and 1st day of January, occurring in Cl. (iii). In our opinion, the legislature has incorporated by reference the provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) in S. 139 (4) and once those provisions are read as having been so incorporated, so much of these provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso have to be read in S. 139 (4) as may be applicable and as may be consistent with the language of the two provisions. Under these circumstances, on a mere construction of the provisions of S. 139 (4) read with the third clause of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of 8. (iii) of the proviso have to be read in S. 139 (4) as may be applicable and as may be consistent with the language of the two provisions. Under these circumstances, on a mere construction of the provisions of S. 139 (4) read with the third clause of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of 8. 139, it must be held that an assessee who does not furnish his return within the time mentioned in sub-s. (1) of S. 139 or within the time given to him under the notice under S. 139 (2) may file his return before the assessment is made so long as it is filed within the period of four years from the end of the assessment year under consideration. But such belated filing would attract the provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) and would compel the Income-tax Officer to levy penal interest as mentioned in Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1)." 9. The leading case in support of the second view is the decision in 97 ITR 639 : (1975 Tax LR 374), (Garg and Co. v. Commr. of I. T.). A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court while considering this question observed as follows (at p. 376 of Tax LR):- "Mr. Kirpal then contended that sub-s. (4) does not apply the whole of the proviso to sub-section (1) to the case, It is the interest part of the proviso, which alone is relevant in the context of the language of sub-s. (4), which according to him, would apply. This contention again is without merit. Sub-clause (iii) torn from its context, in itself, would hardly make much sense. It would remain an incomplete sentence. Sub-cl. (iii) has to be read along with the opening part of the proviso, which says that the Income-tax Officer may in his discretion extend the date for furnishing the return, up to any period falling beyond the date mentioned in Cls. (i) and (ii), in which case interest at 9% per annum shall be payable. The part of sub-cl. (iii) which requires the assessee to pay interest comes into operation only in case the extension of the date for furnishing the return beyond the prescribed dates is given by the Income-tax Officer in his discretion. This power is exercisable only when an application is made in the prescribed manner. The part of sub-cl. (iii) which requires the assessee to pay interest comes into operation only in case the extension of the date for furnishing the return beyond the prescribed dates is given by the Income-tax Officer in his discretion. This power is exercisable only when an application is made in the prescribed manner. Various parts of the proviso including sub-cl. (iii) are so inter-dependent that no one part can stand by itself. We, therefore, hold that interest could be demanded from the assessee only in case an application in the prescribed manner had been made by him and the Income-tax Officer in his discretion had extended the date for furnishing the return. Mr. Kirpal contended that in order to make the section work, it is necessary to read the language of the proviso in the manner suggested by him. He submitted that a literal reading of the proviso would render sub-s. (4) completely unworkable. This contention of the learned counsel has no substance. We are not privileged to read the language of a section in a manner different from the one in which the language is incorporated in the section. We cannot incorporate words in the statute which the legislature in its wisdom has not incorporated, nor can we ignore the words which the legislature has incorporated. This is more so when the statute to be interpreted is a fiscal statute. It is now well settled that the language of such a statute has to be construed in its strict sense. The assessee is always entitled to the benefit of doubt, if any, left in the language of the statute, Sub-section (4) applies the provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to the cases falling under it. The phrase in which case, occurring in Cl. (iii) makes the subsequent portion of the clause dealing with interest dependent on the earlier portion of the clause, which read with the opening part of the proviso makes the making of an application in the prescribed manner and the actual grant of extension by the Income-tax Officer, conditions precedent for the payment of interest. There may be a lacuna in the language, which we are afraid, we cannot fill up. There may be a lacuna in the language, which we are afraid, we cannot fill up. We are fortified in this view by the subsequent amendment effected by the Finance Act, 1972, by which the lacuna has been filled up by substituting the old sub-s. (8) by a new sub-sec. (8), which reads as follows:- (8) (a) Where the return under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) or sub-s. (4) for an assessment year is furnished after the specified date, or is not furnished, then whether or not the Income-tax Officer has extended the date for furnishing the return under sub-s. (1) or sub-sec. (2) the assesses shall be liable to pay simple interest at twelve per cent per annum, reckoned from the day immediately following the specified date to the data of the furnishing of the return or, where no return has been furnished, the date of completion of the assessment under S. 144, on the amount of the tax payable on the total income as determined on regular assessment, as reduced by the advance tax, if any, paid, and any tax deducted at source. Provided that the Income-tax Officer may in such cases and under such circumstances as may be prescribed, reduce or waive the interest payable by any assessee under this sub-section......... The very fact that sub-s. (8) has been amended shows that the legislature became conscious of the lacuna that had been left in the language of this section before its amendment and which has now been removed by introducing the amendment. The assessee, therefore, was entitled to the benefit of the said lacuna, and could not be called upon to pay interest, unless he had applied for extension of time and the extension sought for had been granted." 10. The first view appears to be based on the assumption that it was the intention of the legislature to charge interest in cases falling under sub-s. (4) of S. 139, whether an application for extension of time is filed by the assessee or not. But in order to proceed on that assumption, the intention of the legislature must be clear. A plain reading of sub-s. (4) would make applicable the entire provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139. Unless some words in Cl. But in order to proceed on that assumption, the intention of the legislature must be clear. A plain reading of sub-s. (4) would make applicable the entire provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139. Unless some words in Cl. (iii) of the proviso are treated as redundant it is not possible to adopt the first view referred to above. If no part of Cl. (iii) of the proviso is treated as redundant, then the provisions of sub-cl. (iii) must be read long with the opening words of the proviso, namely- "Provided that, on an application made in the prescribed manner, the Income-tax Officer may, in his discretion, extend the date for furnishing the return." Hence if no part of sub-cl. (iii) is treated as redundant, then interest will be chargeable only if an application has been filed for extension of time and the Income-tax Officer does extend the date for furnishing the return. 11. The Act as a whole must be construed in case there is ambiguity. Under S, 271 of the Act penalty can be levied on the assessee only if he has failed to furnish the return within the time specified under sub-s. (1) of S. 139 or by notice given under sub-s. (2) of S. 139 or within the time allowed and in the manner required by sub-s. (1) of S. 139 or by such notice, as the case may be. Hence if the return is filed within the time extended by the Income-tax Officer on an application made under the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139, no penalty can be levied on the assessee for the delay in filing his return under S. 271 of the Act, Sub-s. (4) of S. 139 applies to cases where the return is not filed within the time allowed under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of S. 139. If an application is filed by the assessee for extension of time either under the proviso to sub-s. (1) or under the proviso to sub-s. (2) and if the return is filed within the extended time, then such return must be deemed to be a return within the time allowed under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2). Hence to such cases sub-s, (4) of S. 139 does not apply. Hence to such cases sub-s, (4) of S. 139 does not apply. Thus an assessee who files application for extension of time under the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139 escapes the liability to pay penalty under Section 271. But an assessee who files his return beyond the prescribed time under sub-s. (1) of S. 139, but within the time specified under sub-s. (4) and has not filed any application for extension of time does not escape the liability to be proceeded with for levy of penalty under S. 271 of the Act. Hence the intention of the legislature may be to levy penalty only on the assessees who file their returns late, but within the period specified in sub-s. (4). Hence it cannot be assumed that it was the intention of the legislature to charge such assessees with interest also. It may be the intention of the legislature to charge interest on assessees who get the benefit of exemption of the levy of penalty and to exempt assessees who are liable to penalty from the liability to pay interest. 12. Thus it cannot be said definitely that the intention of the legislature was to charge interest also on assessees who are liable to be proceeded with under S. 271, that is, assessees who had neither filed any application for extension of time for filing the return nor had been granted such extension of time. Hence the construction cannot be put on sub-s. (4) of Sec, 139 incorporating the provisions of sub-cl. (iii) of the proviso by omitting some of the words in that sub-clause. Such, an artificial construction cannot be put unless the intention of the legislature is clear. 13. In AIR 1965 SC 1358 (I. T. Commr. v. Ajax Products) the rule of construction of a taxing statute was considered and it has been observed as follows (at p. 1361):- "The rule of construction of a taxing statute has been pithily stated by Rowlatt, J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commrs., (1921) 1 KB 64 at p. 71, thus: In a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room or any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. There is no room or any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. To put it in other words, the subject is not to be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation. Equally important the rule of construction is that if the words of a statute are precise and unambiguous, they must be accepted as declaring the express intentions of the legislature." 14. In AIR 1973 SC 2524 : (1973 Tax LR 1565) (I. T. Commr., W. B. v. Naga Hills Tea Co.) it has been observed as follows (at p. 1567 of Tax LR):- "If a provision of a Taxing Statute can be reasonably interpreted in two ways, that interpretation which is favourable to the assessee, has got to be accepted. This is well accepted view of law." 15. In Craies on Statute Law, 7th edition at page 113 the rules on interpretation of a Taxing Statute have been stated as follows quoting Lord Cairns in (1869) 4 HL 100 (Partington v. Att-Gen.)- "In Partington v. Att.-Gen., Lord Cairns said: I am not at all sure that, in a case of this kind - a fiscal case - form is not amply sufficient; because, as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible, in any statute, what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you simply adhere to the words of the statute". In other words, if there be admissible, in any statute, what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you simply adhere to the words of the statute". Again at p. 114 the following observations in I.R.C: v. Wolfson (1949) 1 All ER 865, 868, have been quoted:- "It is not the function of a court of law to give to words a strained and unnatural meaning, said Lord Simonds, because only thus will a taxing section apply to a transaction which, had the legislature thought of it, would have been covered by appropriate words. In I.R.C. v. Saunders, Lord Reid said: It is sometimes said that we should apply the spirit and not the letter of the law so as to bring in cases which, though not within the letter of the law, are within the mischief at which the law is aimed. But it has long been recognised that our courts cannot so apply taxing Acts." 16. Hence the best that can be said in favour of the respondent is that both the first view as well as the second view are possible on the interpretation of sub-s. (4) of S. 139. Even on that assumption, the rule of construction referred to above has to be applied, namely, the interpretation which is in favour of the assessee has to be adopted. We must therefore adopt the second view referred to above, namely, that interest is chargeable only in cases where the assessee has applied for extension of time for filing the return. 17. The next question to be considered is whether the petitioner is not liable to be charged with interest on his share of the income of the registered firm. For the purposes of assessing tax under the Act, a registered firm as well as a partner of such registered firm are separate entities. Both the registered firm as well as its partner can be assessed to tax independently, the registered firm on its income and the partner on his share of the income of the registered firm, the income in each case being computed under the provisions of the Act. Under S. 139 both the registered firm as well as its partners individually are liable to be charged with interest. Under Cl. Under S. 139 both the registered firm as well as its partners individually are liable to be charged with interest. Under Cl. (a) of sub-clause (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139 a registered firm is liable to be charged with interest as if it had been an unregistered firm. But merely because the registered firm has been treated as an unregistered firm for the purposes of charging interest, the liability of the partner of the registered firm to be charged with interest on his share of the income does not cease. It is only if the registered firm had been treated as an unregistered firm for assessment of tax under the Act that the liability of the partner to be assessed to tax would cease. But in this case it is only for the purpose of charging interest under S. 139 that the registered firm is treated as an unregistered firm. For the purposes of assessment of tax under the Act the registered firm continues to be treated as a registered firm and its partners continue to be similarly treated. Hence the mere fact that for the purpose of charging interest, the registered firm is treated as if it is an unregistered firm does not take away the liability of the partner of the registered firm to be charged with interest on his share of the income under Cl. (a) of sub-cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139. Hence this contention of the petitioner is to be rejected. 18. Hence, since the petitioners succeed on the first point, these petitions are to be allowed and the impugned notices in each of these petitions are to be quashed. The petitioners would be entitled to costs from the respondents in each of these petitions. Advocates fee is assessed at Rs. 100/-. 19. SARMA, J. :- I have had the privilege of going through the judgment just read by My Lord the Chief Justice (Acting) and with great respect I regret my inability to agree with My Lord in regard to the first point which fell for our determination. So far as the second point is concerned, I respectfully agree. I now propose to give the reasons for my inability to agree with My Lord in regard to the first point. 20. So far as the second point is concerned, I respectfully agree. I now propose to give the reasons for my inability to agree with My Lord in regard to the first point. 20. The relevant facts have been set out in the judgment of My Lord and need no repetition. The two points which fell for our determination in the three writ petitions are:- (i) Whether the Income-tax Officer can charge interest under sub-s. (4) of S. 139 of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the absence of any application by the assessee to the Income-tax Officer for extension of time to file his return; and (ii) Whether the partner of a registered firm is liable to be charged with interest for his share of income from such firm if it was treated as an unregistered firm and assessed with interest accordingly under sub-cl. (a) of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of a 139 of the Act. 21. There is conflict of judicial opinion of different High Courts on the first point. Some of the High Courts, including ours, have taken the view that no application by the assessee for extension of time to file his return is necessary to enable the Income-tax Officer to charge interest under S. 139 (4) of the Act. Reference may be made in this regard to the decisions in Ganeshdas Sreeram v. Income-tax Officer, Shillong, 93 ITR 19: (1973 Tax LR 768) (Gauhati); Biswanath Ghose v. I.-T. Officer, 95 ITR 372: (1974 Tax LR 326) (Orissa); Chhotelal and Co. v. Income-tax Officer, (1976) 105 ITR 230 (Guj); Indian Telephone Industries Co-operative Socy. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, 86 ITR 566: (1972 Tax LR 547) (Mysore) and M. Nagappa v. Income-tax Officer, 99 ITR 32: (1975 Tax LR 553) (Kant). The view taken in these decisions has been referred to as the first view in the Judgment of My Lord. A contrary view has been taken in Kishan Lal Haricharan v. Income-tax Officer, (1971) 82 ITR 660 (Andh Pra); C.I.T. v. Bahri Bros. (P) Limited, 102 ITR 443: (1976 Tax LR 84) (Patna); Garg and Co. v. C.I.T., 97 ITR 639: (1975 Tax LR 374) (Delhi) and Mulakh Raj Bimal Kumar v. I. T. O., 107 ITR 382: (1977 Tax LR 97) (J and K). (P) Limited, 102 ITR 443: (1976 Tax LR 84) (Patna); Garg and Co. v. C.I.T., 97 ITR 639: (1975 Tax LR 374) (Delhi) and Mulakh Raj Bimal Kumar v. I. T. O., 107 ITR 382: (1977 Tax LR 97) (J and K). The view taken by these High Courts has been referred to as the second view by my Lord in his Judgment. For the sake of convenience I also propose to refer to these two views as the first view and the second view, respectively. 22. The relevant provisions of Section 139 of the Act have been quoted in extenso in the Judgment of My Lord and I do not propose to repeat. From the provisions of Cls. (a) and (b) of sub-s. (1) it is seen that every person having income assessable under the Act has got to file his return before the expiry of six months from the end of the previous year or before the 30th day of June of the assessment year, as the case may be. Under these two clauses the statute itself, without any application from the assessee gives time for filing the return, as above. Then there is the proviso under the said sub-section enabling the Income-tax Officer to grant further extension of time, in his discretion, on an application made in the prescribed form in that behalf. There are three clauses under this proviso. Clause (i) and Cl. (ii) enable the Income-tax Officer to extend time up to certain dates, as mentioned therein without charging interest and Cl. (iii) enables the Income-tax Officer to extend time up to any period falling beyond the dates mentioned in Cls. (i) and (ii) but subject to payment of interest at 6 per cent (at the relevant time) from the first day of October or first day of January, as the case may be, of the assessment year up to the date of furnishing of the return. Cl. (iii) of the proviso with the opening words reads as below:- "Provided that, on an application made in the prescribed manner, the income-tax Officer may, in his discretion, extend the date for furnishing the return:- (i) xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx (iii) Up to any period falling beyond the dates mentioned in Cls. Cl. (iii) of the proviso with the opening words reads as below:- "Provided that, on an application made in the prescribed manner, the income-tax Officer may, in his discretion, extend the date for furnishing the return:- (i) xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx (iii) Up to any period falling beyond the dates mentioned in Cls. (i) and (ii) In which case, interest at 6 per cent per annum shall be payable from the first day of October or first day of January, as the case may be, of the assessment year to date of furnishing of the return," Sub-section (4) of S. 139 is in the following terms:- "(4) Any person who has not furnished a return within the time allowed to him under sub-s. (I) or sub-s. (2) may before the assessment is made furnish the return for any previous year at any time before the end of four assessment years from the end of the assessment year to which the return relates and the provisions of sub-cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) shall apply in every such case." Now, the High Courts which have taken the second view are of the opinion that in terms of sub-s. (4) of Section 139 of the Act, if interest is to be charged on the basis of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1), the entire proviso along with the opening words, namely, "provided that, on an application made in the prescribed manner the Income-tax Officer may, in his discretion extend the date for furnishing the return" must be read as forming part of sub-s. (4) of the Act. In other words, according to this view, the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139 cannot be dissected into three separate parts, various parts of the proviso, including sub-cl. (iii), are so inter-dependent that no one part can stand by itself. In this view of the provisions of sub-s. (4) of S. 139 of the Act it has been held that interest could be demanded from an assessee only in case an application in the prescribed manner was made by him as contemplated in the proviso and the Income-tax Officer in his discretion extended the date for furnishing such return. 23. With great respect I am unable to agree with the above view. 23. With great respect I am unable to agree with the above view. If the entire proviso with the opening words are to be read along with sub-s. (4) of S. 139 it will make no sense. As has been pointed out by Devan, C. J., speaking for the Gujarat High Court in Chhotelal and Co. v. Income-tax Officer, (1976) 105 ITR 230, sub-s. (4) of S, 139 contemplates a situation which is altogether different from the situation contemplated by the proviso, Cl. (iii) to sub-s, (1) of S. 139. Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) enables the Income-tax Officer to grant extension of time up to any period beyond the dates mentioned in Cls. (i) and (ii), subject to payment of interest at 6 per cent from the first day of October or the first day of January, as the case may be, of the assessment year to the date of furnishing of the return. Under this clause the Income-tax Officer cannot go to charge interest if an assessee having obtained extension of time from the Income-tax Officer up to some date beyond the dates mentioned in Cls. (i) and (ii) failed to file his return within the time so extended but filed his return sometime beyond the extended period. In such a case interest can be charged only under sub-s. (4) read with Cl. (iii) to sub-s. (1) if the necessary conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. It is thus evident that incorporation of the entire proviso to sub-s. (1) in sub-s. (4) or literal application of the entire proviso to cases coming under sub-s. (4) is not possible and if made it will make no sense. 24. Sub-section (4) of S. 139 is attracted, as we have already seen, when a person submits his return beyond the time allowed to him under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2). It has already been noticed that time is allowed to a person in two ways for furnishing his return, namely, (i) by the statute itself and (ii) by the Income-tax Officer on an application made by him. The language of sub-s. (4) does not spell out that this is to be applied only in cases where the assessee files an application for extension of time and the Income-tax Officer grants such extension. The language of sub-s. (4) does not spell out that this is to be applied only in cases where the assessee files an application for extension of time and the Income-tax Officer grants such extension. The words "shall apply in every such case" occurring at the end of this sub-section mean in all cases where the assessee who failed to submit his return within the time allowed under sub-ss. (1) and (2) (both by the statute itself and on application) furnishes his return for any previous year before the assessment is made at any time before the end of four assessment years from the end of the assessment year to which the return relates. To interpret the provisions of this sub-section as having application only under such cases where the assessee already applied for extension of time and the Income-tax Officer has granted the same will amount to doing violence to the language used by the legislature, 25. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a person who files his return late beyond the time allowed under sub-ss. (1) and (2) is liable to pay penalty under S. 271 of the Act and, therefore, it is difficult to believe that the legislature intended to put such a person in double jeopardy by making him liable to pay interest as well. According to him, it was not the intention of the legislature in enacting sub-s. (4) to charge interest on such person. It was further contended that if two views are possible, one favourable and the other unfavourable to the assessee, the view which is favourable to the assessee is to be accepted. 26. The above argument is not at all convincing. As already noticed, one of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that sub-s. (4) is applicable only in a case where the assessee applies for extension of time and the Income-tax Officer has granted him such extension. The other contention, which conflicts with the first contention is that it is not the intention of the legislature to charge interest for such belated submission of return as the persons concerned in such a case are liable to pay penalty under S. 271 of the Act. The other contention, which conflicts with the first contention is that it is not the intention of the legislature to charge interest for such belated submission of return as the persons concerned in such a case are liable to pay penalty under S. 271 of the Act. If extension of time for submission of return is prayed for and granted by the Income-tax Officer and the return is filed within such time, the question of liability to pay penalty would not arise as, in that case, there would be no default. In such a case sub-s. (4) is not attracted at all. This sub-section is attracted if the return is not filed within the time allowed to an assessee under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2), but is filed before the assessment is made and before the end of the four assessment years from the end of the assessment year to which the return relates. Section 271 of the Act will have application in such a case as there is clear default in filing the return in time. Thus, if the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, namely, that sub-s. (4) is applicable only when an assessee filed an application for extension of time and the same is granted by the Income-tax Officer is accepted, the assessee will be liable to be charged with interest as well as penalty. If, on the other hand, it is held, accepting the second argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that it is not the intention of the legislature to charge interest on such assessee for his belated return as he is liable to pay penalty under S. 271 of the Act, sub-s. (4) of S. 139 of the Act will become otiose. 27. On a plain reading of the provisions of sub-s. (4) of S. 139, it is clear that the manifest purpose of the legislation is to charge interest in cases of belated returns coming within the purview of that sub-section. "The first business of the courts is to make sense of the ambiguous language, and not to treat it as un-meaning, it being a cardinal rule of construction that a statute is not to be treated as void, however oracular", (from Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition page 95). "The first business of the courts is to make sense of the ambiguous language, and not to treat it as un-meaning, it being a cardinal rule of construction that a statute is not to be treated as void, however oracular", (from Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition page 95). As Viscount Simon L. C. observed in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (1940 AC 1014 at p. 1022), "if the choice is between two interpretations the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we would avoid construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the broader construction based on the view that the Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result." As observed by Maxwell in his book "Interpretation of Statutes," 12th Edition at page 228, "where the main object and the intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsmans unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity or the absolute intractability of the language used." 28. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioner that if the first view is taken, the opening words of the proviso as well as of Cl. (iii) itself will have to be treated as redundant and that a court while interpreting statute is not entitled to do so. This contention is not well founded. "The Court of law will reject words as surplusage if it appears that by attempting to give a meaning to every word, we should, as Coleridge, J. said in R. v. East Ardsley (Inhabitants), have to make the Act of Parliament insensible, or if it is clear that otherwise the manifest intention of the legislature will be defeated." 29. Having regard to the language of sub-s. (4) of S. 139 of the Act and the scheme of this section, I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Devan, C. J., in Chhotelal and Co. v. Income-tax Officer (1976) 105 ITR 230 (Guj) (supra) that "the legislature has incorporated by reference to the provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139 (4) and once these provisions are read as having been so incorporated, so much of these provisions of Cl. v. Income-tax Officer (1976) 105 ITR 230 (Guj) (supra) that "the legislature has incorporated by reference to the provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139 (4) and once these provisions are read as having been so incorporated, so much of these provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso have to be read in S. 139 (4) as may be applicable and as may be consistent with the language of the two provisions. In this view of the provisions of S. 139 (4) read with Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139, it has got to be held that an assessee who does not furnish his return within the time mentioned in sub-s. (1) of S. 139 or within the time given to him under the notice under sub-s. (2) of S. 139 may file his return before the assessment is made so long as it is filed within the period of four years from the end of the assessment year under consideration, subject, however, to the condition that such belated filing would attract the provisions of Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) and would make the assessee liable to pay interest as mentioned in the said clause. Filing of an application for extension of time by the assessee and grant of such extension by the Income-tax Officer are not the conditions precedent for application of sub-s. (4) of S. 139 of the Act There is no scope for taking any other view, of the matter in my opinion. Hence the first point, mentioned earlier, must be decided against the petitioner who has challenged the charging of interest under S. 139 (4) of the Act, relying on the second view and I decide accordingly. 30. In the result, the petitions in all the three Civil Rules fail and are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I, however, leave the parties to bear their own cost. 31. 30. In the result, the petitions in all the three Civil Rules fail and are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I, however, leave the parties to bear their own cost. 31. N. IBOTOMBI SINGH J.:- I have had the advantage of reading the Judgment of my Lord, the Honble Chief Justice (Acting) and that of my Lord Sarma J. I agree fully with the reasoning of my Lord Sarma J. but I would like to add a few words which, in my view, lend support to the construction that my Lord Sanna J. has put on sub-s. (4) of S. 139 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in regard to the interest imposable on the assessee in the case of belated filing of return, although no application is made to the Income-tax Officer for extension of time. 32. Sub-sec. (4) of S. 139 of the Act is intended to meet a different situation, not covered by sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of S. 139 of the Act. That is to say, the assessee can file his belated return, which is valid, within the period stipulated therein, although he makes no application to the Income-tax Officer for extension of time or he fails to file the return within the extended time allowed by the Income-tax Officer. To such a belated return, interest is leviable on the assessee under provisions of Cl. (iii) of proviso to sub-s. (1) which is incorporated in sub-s. (4). 33. The merit of legislation by incorporation is brevity, Cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1), which is incorporated by reference into sub-s. (4) of S. 139 of the Act, becomes part and parcel of the latter sub-section; and Cl. (iii) so bodily transposed is quite independent of sub-s. (1) of S. 139 of the Act, What is transposed by reference under sub-s. (4) is only the Cl. (iii) of proviso to sub-s. (1) and not the entire provisions of the proviso of sub-s. (1). Proviso to sub-s. (1) speaks of (a) making of an application by the assessee to the Income-tax Officer for extension of time, (b) granting of extension of time up to a certain period without interest and (c) with interest at the prescribed rate from the first day of September or first day of January, as the case may be, under Cl. (iii). 34. As only Cl. (iii). 34. As only Cl. (iii) has been transposed to sub-s. (4), as stated above, the other parts of the proviso to sub-s. (1), which are not so brought in by incorporation, cannot be read as to limit the clear meaning of Cl. (iii) or to control Cl. (iii), namely, levying of interest in the case of belated return filed by the assessee under sub-s. (4) of S. 139 of the Act. 35. In the case of Portsmouth Corporation v. Smith. (1885) 10 AC 364, the House of Lords at p. 371, observed: "Where a single section of an Act of Parliament is introduced into another Act, I think it must be read in the sense which it bore in the original Act from which it is taken, and that consequently it is perfectly legitimate to refer to all the rest of that Act in order to ascertain what the section meant, though other sections are not incorporated in the new Act. I do not mean that if there was in the original Act a section not incorporated, which came by way of a proviso or exception on that which is incorporated, that should be referred to; but all others, including interpretation clause, if there be one, may be referred to." 36. On the principle of law above, where only Cl. (iii) and no other portions of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 139 of the Act, has been transposed to sub-s. (4) of S. 139 of the Act, there is no escape from the conclusion that the interest as provided in Cl. (iii) is imposable on the assessee, in the case of belated filing of return, even though no application is made by the assessee for extension of time to the Income-tax Officer. 37. I however, agree with the reasoning of my Lord, the Chief Justice (acting), on the other question. 38. In the result, I would dismiss the three writ petitions and I make no order as to costs. ORDER 39. Judgments delivered separately. 40. In view of the opinion of the majority, these writ petitions are dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs in the three writ petitions. Petitions dismissed.