( 1 ) THIS second appeal has come up before us upon a reference made by venkataramiah, J. ( 2 ) THE facts which are not now in dispute are these: The appellants are legal representatives of one Kamil B. Alfanso. On 14 th Feby 1934, kamil and J. Gopaiacharya together executed a mortgage deed hypothecating their individual properties in favour of one Shantaram Mangesh kuilkarni and obtained a loan of Rs. 6,500. On default to redeem the mortgage, shantaram filed a suit OS. 86 of 1940 against the executants and obtained a decree for Rs. 9,080 together with future interest at 6 per cent per annum. The final decree in the suit was made on 17th Octr 1942. ( 3 ) WHEN the said decree was under execution, the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief act, 1947 (Bombay Act 28 of 1947) (shortly called 'the Act'), came into force and the execution proceedings consequently, stood transferred to the Court constituted under the Act ('badr Court' ). In the proceedings before the BADR Court, Kamil was held to be a debtor within the meaning of the said Act, but Gopalacharya was not. Consequently, the liability of Kamil under the decree in question and also in respect of another decree was scaled down to Rs. 4320 and the decreeholder was held entitled to recover from Kamil only the said amount. , kamil was also permitted to pay the said amount by 12 annual instalments, which he accordingly paid. ( 4 ) SINCE Gopalacharya was not adjudged to be a debtor under the act, the decree-holder proceeded against him and realised a total sum of rs. 15,993 said to be the balance of the decretal debt. The said amount was deposited by Gopalacharya on 7th January, 1964. ( 5 ) THEREUPON, Gopalacharya sued the legal representatives of his co-judgment-debtor, i. e. , Kamil, since deceased, to recover the entire amount deposited by him towards the full satisfaction of the aforesaid decree. His case was be was compelled to discharge the decretal debtalthough he did not receive any benefit under the mortgage. So he said that he was entitled to get back the amount deposited by mm by way of contribution from the assets ot Kamil. the defendants resisted the sun on various pleas which may not be necessary to set out herein. So he said that he was entitled to get back the amount deposited by mm by way of contribution from the assets ot Kamil. the defendants resisted the sun on various pleas which may not be necessary to set out herein. Suffice it to state, that the Courts have decreed the suit to one half of the plaintiff's claim holding that the plaintiff and Kamil had jointly executed tne mortgage deed and the plaintiff was entitled to sue lor contribution. Aggrieved by the decision, the defendants have preferred the second appear, and the legal replesen. atractives of the plaintiff ,since deceased, have also preprered cross-objections. ( 6 ) THE contention urged for the appellants rested on S. 34 of the act. It was urged that in view of the award made by the BADR Court, karnil was not nable to pay anything more than the amount of debt scared aown thereon, as the poruun of the debt in excess of the amount scarea aown was statutorily extinguisned. it was fruther urged that since the nabailty of Kamn in excess of Rs. 4,320 under the aecree stood. extinguished, the plaintiff's suit for constitution was also not maintainable. ( 7 ) THE argument, though attractive at the first sight, really lacks in substance, it over-icons the two-fold decretal nabullity of a co-judgment- debtor. The co-judgment-debtors are in the position of joint promisors each of them is jointly and severally liable to the decree-holder, and also inter se liable to each Other to contribute towards discharge of the decretal debt. The joint ana several liability or each of the co-judgment-debtors is quite difterent from their liability inter se. The liability of Kamil under the hrst category was no aoubt disenarged upon tne payment of the award amount determined by the BADR Court, But it could in no way affect the mutual liability ot the second category. ( 8 ) THE position perhaps, would have been different if both the judgment debtors, were adjuaged as debtors within the meaning of the Act. But, as we have earlier observed that in the proceedings belore the BADR court, only Kamil was adjudged as debtor entitled to the benefits under the Act and not Gopalacharya. ( 8 ) THE position perhaps, would have been different if both the judgment debtors, were adjuaged as debtors within the meaning of the Act. But, as we have earlier observed that in the proceedings belore the BADR court, only Kamil was adjudged as debtor entitled to the benefits under the Act and not Gopalacharya. The decree in question was therefore kept undisturbed against Gopalacharya and the decree holder was free to realise the decretal amount from the Batter, less the amount paid by Kamil under the award oi the BADR Court, Since Gopalacharya was compelled to pay the balance of decretal amount, he could, therefore, proceed against kamil, or his legal representatives for contribution by the principles provided by section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 9 ) OUR view finds support from the decision in Janakibai v. Rama manaji Dhangar, AIR. 1148 Nag. 292. wherein a similar question came for consideration on tacts lying in close parallel. It was observed at page 293 :"as soon as a decree was passed, the co-judgment-debtors were in the position of joint promisors, each of them being liable jointly and severally to the aecree holders and mutually liable to one another to contribute towards the performance of the promise. The applicants before the Relief Court in which the debt was discharged are not absolved from their liability to their joint promisors. This liability between the joint promisors is no doubt latent until one of them satisfies the decretal amount, but on satisfaction of the decree, as was done in the present case on 12-4-1944, that liability becomes patent and can be enforced against other joint promisors and It is in no way affected by the discharge obtained by that joint promisor from the creditor either under an agreement or under the Relief Act. " ( 10 ) THIS takes us to the question of determining the exact liability of the defendants. The trial Court has s'ated that the plaintiff has paid rs. 15993 towards the full satisfaction of the decree and Kamil has paid rs. 4,320. It has given set off to the payment made by Kamil from the total decretal debt and directed the recovery of one half of the balance out of the asse's of Kamil, row in the hands of his legal representatives. But the lower appellate Court appears to have adopted slightly a different principle. 4,320. It has given set off to the payment made by Kamil from the total decretal debt and directed the recovery of one half of the balance out of the asse's of Kamil, row in the hands of his legal representatives. But the lower appellate Court appears to have adopted slightly a different principle. But, the correct approach to the problem, in our opinion, is that the defendants would be liable to one half of the decretal amount excluding the amount paid by them pursuant to the award of the BADR court. They should, however, not be saddled with the interest which has accrued on the default of the plaintiff's share under the decree. Counsel on both sides have agreed with this principle and produced before US a memo of calculation which is set out below : ( 11 ) IN the result, we allow the appeal in part, and in modification of the decree of the Courts below, there shall be a decree against the defendants for Rs. 5857 with future interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of suit till realisation. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the decretal amount from the assets of deceased Kamil, received by his legal representatives. In view of the conclusion that we have reached, the cross-objections preferred by the respondents is dismissed. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs in this appeal. --- *** --- .