Judgment :- 1. For arrears of rent the 1st respondent-decree-bolder obtained a decree for sate of the leasehold. The final decree was passed on 10 11966. It is not disputed before me that the decree in question is not one to which Order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is not attracted Pursuant to the said decree the leasehold was brought to sale on 5121966. The same was sold on that day for a portion of the decree amount. However, as is seen from the first court's order and as submitted before me, the sale has not yet been confirmed. 2. It appears that after the leasehold was said as aforesaid, the appellant-judgment-debtor filed an application to set aside the sale invoking R.90 of Order XXI of the Code. While the said application was pending, the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, was amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, which came into force on 111970. On the coming into force of the amending Act, the E P. as well as the application for setting aside the sale under R.90 of Order XXI were dismissed. The decree-holder preferred an appeal against the dismissal of the execution petition but the judgment-debtor did not prefer any appeal against the dismissal of the application for setting aside the sale. The decree-holder's appeal, A S. No. 64 of 1970 on the file of the Sub Court, Ottappalam, was allowed on 22 11972. Pursuant to the decision in the appeal the E. P. was thereafter restored. Thereupon the appellant filed I. A. No. 315 of 1973 invoking S.73 (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, as amended by the amending Act of 1969. It is also submitted that the appellant has filed another application, E. A No. 128 of 1976 before the lower court invoking R.5 of the Order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The last mentioned petition is, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, pending before the lower court. 3. S.73 (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, enables a judgment-debtor against whom a decree or order has been passed for the recovery of arrears of rent that accrued due prior to 151968, to get such decree or order amended in accordance with the provisions of sub-S. (1) of S.73. 3. S.73 (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, enables a judgment-debtor against whom a decree or order has been passed for the recovery of arrears of rent that accrued due prior to 151968, to get such decree or order amended in accordance with the provisions of sub-S. (1) of S.73. By the earlier portion of sub-S. (3) of S.73, a decree-holder-landlord can enforce the decree for arrears of rent that accrued due prior to 151968 only to the extent of the amount due to him (the landlord) under sub-S. (1). It is not necessary in this case to go into sub-s. (1) itself in so far as the question before me is as to whether the application field by the appellant invoking S.73 (3) of the aforesaid Act for amending the decree is maintainable. 4. The lower courts dismissed the application as aforesaid, the first court holding that the only remedy available to the judgment-debtor tenant is the one provided under S.130 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, which enables a judgment-debtor coming within the purview of that provision to seek a sale held in execution to be set aside provided the sale was for arrears of rent that accrued due before 151968 and he had not been dispossessed from the property that was sold in execution; the lower appellate court dismissed the application under the mis-apprehension that the sale held on 5121966 was confirmed. The lower appellate court seems to have been of the view that such a petition as the one filed by the appellant would have been maintainable but for such confirmation. 5. S.73 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, read as a whole appears to confer certain benefits on a tenant who is in arrears of rent. The crucial date mentioned in that section is 1 51968; by sub-s. (1) thereof the landlord is precluded from recovering towards such arrears anything more than what has been specified in the Table contained in that sub-section. Sub-s. (2) of S.73 provides that where any suit, appeal, revision or application involving a claim for arrears of rent accrued due prior to 151968 is pending, such suit, appeal, revision or application shall be disposed of in the manner stated therein. What is to be noted is that under that sub-section the order has to specify the amount which the landlord is entitled under sub-section (1). What is to be noted is that under that sub-section the order has to specify the amount which the landlord is entitled under sub-section (1). Sub-section (3) dealing with arrears of rent that had accrued due prior to 1-5-1968 as aforesaid precludes any decree-holder-land-lord from enforcing his decree to any extent beyond the rent specified in subsection (1). It is in that connection that sub-section (3) by latter portion thereof provides that the parties to the decree or order may approach the court and apply for getting the decree or order, as the case may be, amended. On the language of sub-section (3) the power of the court to amend any case coming under sub-section (3) is wide. There is also nothing on the face of the said provision which would preclude a judgment-debtor-tenant from invoking the power of the court to amend the decree under that provision, whether pursuant to the decree sale has taken place or not. The only thing that matters so far as exercise of that power is concerned is that the decree should not have been satisfied or in other words, there should not remain any further steps to be taken for entering satisfaction of the decree by and pursuant to the sale If all proceedings pursuant to the sale has been completed and the sale has become absolute by the court passing an order to that effect as contemplated by R.92 of Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, it cannot be said that the decree is still enforceable and therefore, the decree has to be amended. On these aspects there cannot be any dispute. The question that arises in this case is as to whether the sale having not been confirmed till now, the appellant is entitled to invoke the power of the court to amend the decree under subsection (3) of S.73. 6. The contention advanced on behalf of the respondents before me is that in so far as the appellant had invoked R.90 of Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and failed, he cannot invoke the power conferred on the court to amend the decree as envisaged by S 73(3). 6. The contention advanced on behalf of the respondents before me is that in so far as the appellant had invoked R.90 of Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and failed, he cannot invoke the power conferred on the court to amend the decree as envisaged by S 73(3). The submission is that once a petition under R.89 or 90 of Order XXI is dismissed, the execution court is bound to make an order confirming the sale and even without making such an order as contemplated by R.92 it should be taken that the sale has become absolute and irrevocable. In that connection the learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that in such cases R.5 of Order XXXIV of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, would also be not attracted. 7. It appears to me that there is no foundation for the aforesaid argument advanced on behalf of the respondents. It is only on the sale becoming absolute by the court passing an order in that behalf that the purchaser, be he the decree-holder auction purchaser or stranger auction purchaser, acquires title to the property sold. This is evident from R.92 which says that the court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. The earlier portion of R.92 says that such an order can be passed only where no application has been made under R.89 to 91 of Order XXI or where such application has been made and disallowed. Rub 92 contemplates an order of the court confirming the sale and it is only then that the sale shall become absolute. On the sale becoming absolute, under S.65 of the Code the property sold shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property was sold and not from the date of the order confirming the sale. In other words, though on confirmation of the sale by force of the provision of S.65 of the Code the property shall vest in the auction purchaser retrospectively from the date of sale, till an order confirming the sale is made by the court no title to the property sold passes to the auction purchaser. This view is supported by the decision of the Privy Council in Raghunandan v. Commr, Income-tax (AIR. 1933 PC. 101) considered by Madhavan Nair J., in Govinda Kymal v. Velu (1961 KLT. 951). This view is supported by the decision of the Privy Council in Raghunandan v. Commr, Income-tax (AIR. 1933 PC. 101) considered by Madhavan Nair J., in Govinda Kymal v. Velu (1961 KLT. 951). The Board said: "The decree is only a step towards realisation, and the date of the decree is therefore plainly not the date of realisation. Nor on the date of the sale does the purchaser obtain an indefeasible right, for under 0.21, R.89, 90 and 91 the sale may be set aside on various grounds. It is only where no application is made under these rules or where such application is made and disallowed that the Court under 0.21, R.92, makes an order confirming the sale, whereupon'the sale shall become absolute'. It is then that the process of realisation is completed and any profit or income is realised by the decree-holder. This is so whether the property is purchased by the decree-holder himself or by a third party, for the right of set-off conferred on the purchasing decree-holder must also be dependent on the sale being rendered absolute by confirmation. No doubt S.65 of the Code provides that 'where immovable property it sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute', but this provision does opt come into operation unless and until the sale has become absolute. The actual date of realisation is not affected by this retrospective vesting of the property". (Emphasis by underline by me) The statement of law by the Board as aforesaid is clear and unambiguous; the property vests only retrospectively and that, by the court making an order confirming the sale. 8. The learned judge in the aforesaid decision of this Court, Govinda Kymal's case, has also discussed the decision of the Madras High Court in Nataraja Pillai v. Rangaswamy Karamundar (AIR. 1942 Madras 119) and of the Lahore High Court in Magha Ram v. Moti Ram (AIR. 1944 Lahore 325). The said decisions are also to the same effect. 8. The learned judge in the aforesaid decision of this Court, Govinda Kymal's case, has also discussed the decision of the Madras High Court in Nataraja Pillai v. Rangaswamy Karamundar (AIR. 1942 Madras 119) and of the Lahore High Court in Magha Ram v. Moti Ram (AIR. 1944 Lahore 325). The said decisions are also to the same effect. Therefore, f should in this case proceed on the basis that title to the property sold in court sale has not vested in the decree-holder auction purchaser in so far as, admittedly, the said sale has not till now been confirmed. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents brought to my notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh (AIR. 1967 SC. 608). In that case an ex parte decree was passed against the respondents before that Court In execution of the ex parte decree his properties were sold pursuant to attachment. Thereafter the judgment-debtor made an application to set aside the ex parte decree. The ex parte decree was set aside. During the proceedings to set aside the ex parte decree, all proceedings pursuant to the auction sale stood stayed. After the setting aside of that ex parte decree and the stay was lifted the auction purchaser sought to have the sale confirmed. The lower courts allowed the same but the High Court refined it on the ground that the ex parte decree has been set aside. This was held to be wrong by the Supreme Court and in that connection that Court pointed out that so long as there is no application under R.89 to 91 of Order XXI, or when any application under any of the said provisions has been made and disallowed, "the Court has no choice in the matter of confirming the sale and the sale must be made absolute" and there can be no dispute about it. The question before me is entirely different and that is, whether before confirmation of a sale in execution the judgment-debtor is entitled to get the decree amended As earlier pointed out the power in that behalf has been conferred on the court by S.73 (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. That is a legislation which came subsequent to the passing of the decree and even the execution sale. That is a legislation which came subsequent to the passing of the decree and even the execution sale. The only embargo on the exercise of that power can only be that if the decree has been partly satisfied by an execution sale, to that extent, and, if fully satisfied, to that extent the proceedings are complete and the court may have no power of amendment since to such extent as has been satisfied there is no enforceable decree and S.73 (3) does not empower the court to divest the auction purchaser of his title to the property purchased by him. As stated by the Privy Council in the Raghunandan"s case it is only on the sale becoming absolute by an order passed by the court confirming the sale that the process of realisation of the decree debt or portion thereof, as the case may be, is completed, and it is wiped off. It is necessary to distinguish between the three jural concepts of 'cause of action', its 'merger in judgment and decree', and 'recovery of the decree debt or the realisation of the relief granted by the judgment and decree'. The cause of action on which a relief is sought, on judgment and decree merges therein and all things done in relation to the enforcement of the decree are steps taken to recover the relief which the court has judicially declared as the decree-bolder is entitled to. This process is complete so far as a decree for a debt is concerned only on the debt being satisfied, and if for realisation of such debt, the judgment debtor's property is sold, on the title thereto passing from the judgment-debtor to the auction purchaser. Even after sale of the judgment-debtor's property but before title thereto passes to the auction purchaser he may abandon further steps necessary for the passing of title (See R.85 and 91 of Order XXI) and in such cases it cannot be said that the debt has been recovered, and the decree is satisfied. The decree is still a live one. So also where judgment-debtor successfully impugns the sale under R.89 or 90 of Order XXI the decree is still a live decree since though the cause of action has merged in the decree relief has not been recovered. The decree is still a live one. So also where judgment-debtor successfully impugns the sale under R.89 or 90 of Order XXI the decree is still a live decree since though the cause of action has merged in the decree relief has not been recovered. If the legislature enables a judgment-debtor to get the decree against him amended and confers power in that behalf on the court, he will be within bis rights to invoke that power so long as the decree subsists and there remains some further steps to be taken to extinguish the decree. In that view, the decree-holder's right to have the sale confirmed will be subject to the newly conferred right of the judgment-debtor to have the decree amended, though it the judgment-debtor does not avail of that right, the court will have to confirm the sale whereafter the judgment-debtor would be precluded from invoking the amending power conferred on court by S.73(3). S.73(3) enables the court to undo the merger of the cause of action in judgments and decrees in cases to which that section is attracted and to make the decree in conformity with S.73(1) of the Act. I am not, in this case, concerned with a stranger auction purchaser who may, perhaps, stand on a different level 1 make it clear that I am not deciding that question in this case So tar as a decree-holder auction purchaser is concerned, it appears to me that so long as he has not become the owner of the property purchased by him pursuant to confirmation of the sale and the sale becoming absolute, there is something more to be done in order to enter satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, a tenant coming within the purview of S.73(3) can avail of that provision and seek the decree for arrears of rent against him amended. 10. It was then contended that the only remedy available to the appellant-tenant is that conferred by S.13C of the Act. Under that section a tenant whose property has been sold for arrears of rent that accrued due prior to 151968 but has not been dispossessed can get the sale set aside by depositing in court an amount equal to the amount which he is liable to pay under S.73 by an application filed in court in that behalf within six months of 11 1970 when the amending Act came into force. (Immediately on the coming into force of the amending Act, the E. P. itself was dismissed and it was revived only in 1972. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that since the E. P. itself was dismissed, the appellant was led to believe that there was no need to invoke S.13C and file a petition to set aside the sale). The submission is that only that provision is available to a tenant whose leasehold has been sold but has not been dispossessed. The learned counsel for the respondents in that connection referred to me the decision in E. S. A. No. 155 of 1975, a Short Note report whereof is to be found as case No. 101 in Vijayan v. Madhavan (1976 KLN 109). I have perused the full text of the judgment in that case. In that case the sale was confirmed on 6-1-1970 Thereupon the auction purchaser applied for delivery of the property purchased by him and the learned Munsiff ordered delivery. The judgment-debtor then moved the court for a declaration that the auction purchaser is not entitled in law to execute the sale certificate. That contention was upheld by the learned Munsiff in consequence of which the application submitted by the auction purchaser seeking delivery was dismissed. The lower appellate court reversed the order of the executing court whereupon the judgment-debtor approached this Court by preferring the aforesaid appeal. In that connection the learned judge pointed out that once the property has been sold in execution of the decree, the remedy of the judgmmt-debtor-appellant in that case was only to invoke S. I3C of the Act. It was so held after overruling the contention that the confirmation of the sale after 111970 was bad. Note that the sale was confirmed in that case wherefore the title to the property sold vested retrospectively from date of sale in the auction purchaser. S.13C therefore, as per the decision cited, confers power on the court to set aside even sales which have been confirmed and thus to divest the auction purchaser of his title to the property sold, revesting the same in the debtor, and this, perhaps, accounts for the time limit of six months from 111970 fixed under that provision for invoking the power of the court thereunder. 11. 11. I do not think that the decision aforesaid has any beaming on the question raised before me in so far as, as pointed out in the beginning of this judgment, the sale in this case has met yet been confirmed and as earlier stated if the sale has been confirmed the position would have been different. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents also invited my attention to a decision of this Court in Sankaranarayanan Nair v. Appukuttan (1969 KLT. 87). That again has in my view no application to the question raised in this case. In that case it was observed by Madhavan Nair J. that proceedings for confirmation of sale would not amount to proceedings for recovery of arrears of rent for realisation of which the sale was held so that S.5 of the Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1967, was not attracted to such proceedings. In that case in execution of the decree for arrears of rent the tenancy right was purchased by the decree holder on 27 31967 and it appears that while the judgment-debtor's application to set aside that sale under Order XXI R.90 CPC., was pending, and necessarily, therefore, before confirmation of that sale, the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1967, came into force on 30 71967. S.7 of that Act enabled like S.13C of the Land Reforms Act, 1963, a tenant whose holding had been sold before the commencement of the Ordinance that preceded that Act but has not been dispossessed, to deposit the decree amount with interest in court and to apply for setting aside the sale within three months of the commencement of that Act, but the tenant judgment-debtor in that case did not avail of that right. However, in the mean while the execution court bad stayed the enquiry on the application under Order XXI R.90, and thereupon on the motion of the decree-holder a receiver was appointed to the properties sold. This receiver was discharged by the lower appellate court, and it was this order that was sought to be revised in that case. This Court held that 'the stay ordered by the court below under S.5 of the Act IX of 1967 is, in so far as it affects the enquiry of the judgment-debtor's application under Order XXI R.90, CPC., ultra vires of the Act and therefore a nullity'. This Court held that 'the stay ordered by the court below under S.5 of the Act IX of 1967 is, in so far as it affects the enquiry of the judgment-debtor's application under Order XXI R.90, CPC., ultra vires of the Act and therefore a nullity'. In that connection the learned judge observed: "Counsel for decreeholder-landlord was not certain if this case is not hit by S.5 of the Act. as the court-sale has not been confirmed so far. I am afraid, he has not addressed himself whether a decree holder can take any steps to recover or claim the arrears of rent covered by an unconfirmed Court-sale. If he cannot, it is obvious that the proceedings for confirmation of the Court-sale are not "for the recovery of arrears of rent" but are for ascertaining the validity of the Court-sale. It may be said that if the sale is held invalid, proceeding for recovery of the same arrears of rent as was covered by the sale may get revived; but that is different from saying that an enquiry on the validity of the sale under Order XXI R.90 is a proceeding for recovery of arrears of rent." Note that the proceedings in that case had not reached the stage of taking steps for confirmation of sale under Order XXI R.92 of the Code in so far as an application under R.90 of that Order was pending. There can be no doubt that the proceedings under R.90 for setting aside the sale were not'proceedings for recovery of arrears of rent' and therefore, they were not proceedings which, as held by this Court, ought to have been stayed. The question as to whether proceedings under R.92 for confirmation of sale would be within the staying provision did not as a matter of fact arise in that case. Note also that no such provision similar to S 73(3) of the Land Reforms Act, 1963. came up for consideration in that case. It was in these circumstances that the learned judge said that if the sale is held invalid proceedings for recovery of the arrears of rent as was covered by the sale may get revived. Relying on this statement made in that decision, it is contended that by sale the decree is satisfied and on the sale being held invalid the decree revives. Relying on this statement made in that decision, it is contended that by sale the decree is satisfied and on the sale being held invalid the decree revives. I do not think that that statement made is an entirely different context is susceptible of being understood as meaning that after sale and before confirmation of it, the decree is extinguished. That decision, in my view, is not of any assistance to the learned counsel for the respondents.1 have already adverted to the question as to what is the effect of a sale which has not been confirmed and relying on the Privy Council decision and the decision of the same learned Judge, Madhavan Nair J., in Govinda Kymal v. Velu (1961 KLT 951) held that the title to the property sold vests in the judgment-debtor till the sale is confirmed, whereupon only the title to that property passes to the auction purchaser, doubtless, with effect from date of sale. 13. In this connection it is advantageous to take note of R.5 of Order XXXIV of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. This is so because admittedly, the decree in this case is one to which the provisions of the said Order are attracted. Under R.5 aforesaid before the confirmation of a sale made in pursuance of the final decree for sale of the mortgaged property the defendant-mortgagor is entitled on payment of the amounts mentioned in sub-rules (1)and (2) thereof to have bis property to himself and the auction purchaser is not entitled to the same. This appears to be, as submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants, on the basis that the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship subsists till the confirmation of the sale. So far as the case on band is one to which the provisions of Order XXXIV are attracted, it appears tome that the learned counsel for the appellant-judgment-debtor is well-founded in his submission that his client is entitled to get the decree amended by invoking the power vested in the court under S.73(3) aforesaid. I hold that the appellant is entitled to invoke S.73(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, and get his decree amended Under that provision on a motion being made in that behalf the court has to determine the amount payable by the appellant before me and in accordance with the determination as aforesaid amend the decree. I hold that the appellant is entitled to invoke S.73(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, and get his decree amended Under that provision on a motion being made in that behalf the court has to determine the amount payable by the appellant before me and in accordance with the determination as aforesaid amend the decree. I direct the first court to determine the correct amount payable and amend the decree accordingly. No other directions are called for. The appeal is allowed as aforesaid. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Allowed.