Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the Secretary or Mulakulam Panchayat Service Cooperative Society, Ltd, No. 209. The affairs of the Society are vested in a Managing Committee consisting of 11 members There was some fued among the members of the Managing Committee. A complaint was filed by the petitioner against one P I Mathew in the Munsiff-Magistrate's Court. This has resulted in bitter animosity between the petitioner and the said Mathew. It is averred in the petition that a complaint was filed against the petitioner by the said Mathew to wreak vengeance against him before the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The complaint contained allegations of misappropriation of funds. The Deputy Registrar visited the society on 12 111973 and made physical verification of the cash. He addressed the President of the Society to tender explanation, after such inspection, pointing out the irregularities discovered by him. The Managing Committee sought explanation from the petitioner. He submitted a detailed explanation, Ext. P1. This explanation was accepted by the Managing Committee and Ext. P2 resolution was passed by majority vote accepting the petitioner's explanation. 2. While the matters stood thus, the President of the Society received a letter Ext. P3 dated 30 41975 from the 1st respondent-Registrar of Co. operative Societies, Trivandrum, with two enclosures, Exts. P4 and P5. Ext. P3 directs action to be taken against the petitioner. The enclosures are two copies of letters from the Secretary to the Government, to the first respondent. The President of the Society declined to take action. Ext. P-6 is the letter by the President of the Society. Ext. P-6 also was approved by the majority of the members of the Managing Committee, which resulted in Ext. P7 resolution. The petitioner has come to this Court with two prayers: (1) to quash Exts. P-3, P-4 and P-5 and (2) quash all proceedings taken against him in crime No. 9 of 1974 initiated by the 3rd respondent, the Director of Vigilance Investigation, Trivandrum. 3. The society, I am told, was superseded and administrators were appointed for the governance of the Society. Thereafter a new committee came into existence. The 4th respondent is the Society. Respondents 5 and 6 are members of the Committee who are opposed to the petitioner. Respondents 1 and 2 oppose the application and this opposition is supported by respondents 5 and 6 4. Thereafter a new committee came into existence. The 4th respondent is the Society. Respondents 5 and 6 are members of the Committee who are opposed to the petitioner. Respondents 1 and 2 oppose the application and this opposition is supported by respondents 5 and 6 4. The 4th respondent has filed a counter-affidavit supporting the petitioner's stand. The learned counsel for the 4th respondent-Society submitted before me that in spite of the fact that a new Committee came into existence, be had no instructions against the stand taken by the Society in the counter-affidavit already filed and therefore it has to be presumed that the society sticks to the original stand taken in the counter-affidavit. 5. The stand taken by the Government Pleader is that the first respondent is, in law, justified in issuing the directions to the Society to take appropriate action against the delinquent and that Ext. P-3 is in conformity with law and that it cannot, be called in question in this Court in a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution. 6. Alternatively, it is contended that the petitioner has a remedy by way of appeal against Ext. P3 under S.87 of the Co-operative Societies Act and not having resorted to this alternative remedy, this writ petition abates and has to be dismissed. 7. Additional respondents 5 and 6 have echoed these contentions before me. 8. Regarding the prayer for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated against the 3rd respondent, the petitioner's counsel did not press this prayer, perhaps for obvious reasons. I do not think that in this case criminal proceed-ings legally initiated by the Investigating machinery can be quashed. The only alarming situation is that though the complaint appears to have been filed as early as in 1974, nothing has been done so far and the charge-sheet has not yet been filed. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. If investigation was completed with expedition and charge-sheet laid, the petitioner would have been without any remedy and this writ petition would have ended in dismissal without much of an argument. But since the investigation is allowed to lie over and kept in suspended animation for more than 3 years, the petitioner's case against Exts P-3, P-4 and P-5 needs consideration on merits. 9. It cannot be disputed that the appointing authority of the petitioner is the society. But since the investigation is allowed to lie over and kept in suspended animation for more than 3 years, the petitioner's case against Exts P-3, P-4 and P-5 needs consideration on merits. 9. It cannot be disputed that the appointing authority of the petitioner is the society. Suspension of the petitioner has to be ordered by the society, the employer. Ext. P-3 read with Exts. P-4 and P-5, would indicate clearly that the authorities wanted to pressurise the society to pass a suspension order against the petitioner though the society was unwilling to do so. 10. It was contended by the Government Pleader that the Registrar or the person authorised by him has powers under S 66(5) to direct the society by an order is writing to take such action as may be specified within the time mentioned in such order.1 have no quarrel with this contention. But the question is as to whether Ext. P-3 is an order in exercise of the powers contained in S.66(5) of the Act. Ext. P-3 directs the President of the Society to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent on the basis of the report received by the Director of Vigilance Division, Trivandrum The Society was not willing to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. The Vigilance Division had initiated criminal proceedings against the petitioner which are pending. At the time when this petition was filed, the petitioner was not suspended. He was suspended subsequently by the society apparently under the stress of Ext P-3. On my finding that Ext. P-3 cannot be said to be a direction in writing under S.66(5) to suspend the petitioner, the question whether the exercise of power by the society in suspending the petitioner pursuant to Exts. P-3, P-4 and P-5 was illegal has to be examined. 11. The petitioner's counsel contended that the discretion vested in a judicial or quasi-judicial authority has to be exercised without reference to any extraneous considerations and without being influenced by any outside authority. The authority entrusted with a discretion should not, in such exercise of its discretion, act under the dictation of another body or person. If the society on being told, that the petitioner had misappropriated money suspended him on its own accord, the petitioner could not have complained about such suspension. When Ext. The authority entrusted with a discretion should not, in such exercise of its discretion, act under the dictation of another body or person. If the society on being told, that the petitioner had misappropriated money suspended him on its own accord, the petitioner could not have complained about such suspension. When Ext. P3 order was received by the President, the president sent Ext.P-6 reply wherein he requested the first respondent to keep the matter in abeyance. From the materials available before me I find that one Mr. John, a clerk in the society, was dismissed on identical charges. Perhaps, the society was satisfied that the petitioner was not guilty of misappropriation of money from the society. That perhaps accounts for the disinclination on the part of the society to initiate proceedings against the petitioner. 12. The question that falls for consideration in this case is whether Ext. P-3 order by which the first respondent directed the society to take action against the petitioner among other things to suspend him is valid. The suspension order passed against the petitioner at the instance of the Registrar, it is contended, is bad since it was influenced by an extraneous authority. In support of this contention, the petitioner's counsel has brought to my notice the cases reported in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas (AIR. 1952 SC. 16), Mahadayal v. Commercial Tax Officer (AIR. 1958 SC. 667), Purtabpur Company v. Cane Commissioner, Bihar (AIR. 1970 SC. 1896 and Velayudhan v. Director of Public Instruction (1977 KLT. 989). 13. In AIR. 1952 SC. 16, a person who was given a licence to run a cinema by the Commissioner of Police was subsequently told by the Commissioner of Police that the permission granted was suspended subsequently followed by another communication that the Government had directed the Commissioner of Police to inform the petitioner therein that the permission to erect a cinema granted has been cancelled. The question arose whether the discretion exercised by the Commissioner of Police could be cancelled at the dictation of the Government. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation was not an order by the Commissioner but only an intimation of an order passed by another authority and since the cancellation can be done only by the Commissioner there was no valid order of cancellation. 14. In AIR. 1958 SC. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation was not an order by the Commissioner but only an intimation of an order passed by another authority and since the cancellation can be done only by the Commissioner there was no valid order of cancellation. 14. In AIR. 1958 SC. 667, a commercial tax officer without exercising his own judgment in the matter of assessing the appellants asked for 'instructions' of the Assistant Commissioner. The assessment was carried out not by independent judgment of the Commercial Tax Officer but on the directions of the Assistant Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the order which the Commercial Tax Officer ultimately passed showed that he was merely voicing the opinion of the Assistant Commissioner without any conviction of his own, and held that it was not valid. 15. In AIR. 1970 SC. 1896, the matter related to allotment of lands for sugar cane cultivation. This power was originally vested in the Central Government. The said power was delegated to the State Government of Bihar as well as to the Cane Commissioner, their jurisdiction thus being coordinate. The Cane Commissioner made allotment of certain villages originally to the appellant therein. This did not find favour with the Chief Minister. At the instance of the Chief Minister, the said allotment was varied. The Cane Commissioner carried out the orders of the Chief Minister although orders were issued in the name of the Cane Commissioner. It was held that the power exercised by the Cane Commissioner is a statutory power which he alone could exercise and be cannot abdicate his responsibility in favour of any one, not even in favour of the Chief Minister. The allotment made at the instance of the Chief Minister but under the name of the Cane Commissioner was directed to be quashed. 16. In O. P. 255/1977-L (1977 KLT. 989), my learned brother Poti J., had to consider the power of the District Educational Officers and the Assistant Educational Officers to grant approval or refuse to grant approval to the appointment of teachers. It was held, referring to the authorises mentioned above, that the discretion must be exercised in regard to each and every case independently and cannot be dictated by any other authority, however high that authority might be. 17. It was held, referring to the authorises mentioned above, that the discretion must be exercised in regard to each and every case independently and cannot be dictated by any other authority, however high that authority might be. 17. The principles enunciated in the above decisions clearly show that the discretion to be exercised by an authority invested with such discretion in law has to be exercised uninfluenced by directions of any extraneous authority. Without Ext. P3, the Managing Committee would not have suspended the petitioner. The petitioner has been kept under suspension for more than 2 years. The committee itself has been superseded perhaps because it did not act up to the directions contained in Ext. P3. The authorities could have, if they had powers under the Act to act independently, suspended the petitioner instead of directing the Managing Committee to suspend the petitioner by communications like Exts. P3, P4 and P5. They have acted in disregard to the principles of law and I have therefore no hesitation to quash Exts. P3, P4 and P5. 18. The right course available in this case for the authorities is to direct finalisation of the investigation so that the petitioner could be proceeded against legally. The long delay in this matter does speak well of the steps taken by the authorities concerned and perhaps speaks in favour of the society and the petitioner. This writ petition is therefore allowed to the extent indicated. I quash Exts. P-3, P-4 and P-5. The parties are directed to bear their costs. Allowed.