JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– Sen, J.: In this appeal, the plaintiff is challenging the validity of an order dated July 19, 1976, passed by the Learned Judge, 10th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 181 of 1976 whereby the Learned Judge directed the plaint to be returned to the filing lawyer for presentation before the appropriate court on the view that the said court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 2. In terms of a contract entered into between the plaintiff/appellant and the first respondent (defendant No.1) the plaintiff supplied to the said respondent some amount of G. S. wire. Under the terms of the said contract, the plaintiff was entitled to 100% payment against the railway receipt along with other necessary documents presented through the bank on furnishing a consolidated bank guarantee for 10% value of the order from a scheduled bank of India duly executed in terms of the agreement. Admittedly such a bank guarantee was furnished by the plaintiff and the defendant/respondent No.2 Allahabad Bank for a sum of Rs. 91,900/- on January 28, 1975. The guarantee bond provided that in consideration of the premises the guarantor undertakes that the contractor shall duly supply the materials of correct quantity and strictly in accordance with the contract failing which the guarantor shall pay to the purchaser on demand such amount or amounts as the guarantor may he called upon to pay to the maximum aggregate of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 91,900/-. The bond further provided that the guarantor shall pay to the purchaser on demand the aforesaid sum without demur and without requiring the purchaser to invoke any legal remedy that may be available to it to compel the guarantor to pay the same or to compel such performance by the contractor provided that where the guarantor considers the demand of the purchaser unjustified it shall nevertheless pay the same though under protest to the purchaser and shall not withhold any payment on that account. 3. A dispute arose between the plaintiff/appellant and the first respondent on the point as to whether the plaintiff/appellant had duly fulfilled its obligation under the contract and strictly in accordance therewith or not and the first respondent forfeited the bond and called upon the guarantor defendant/respondent Allahabad Bank to remit the aforesaid sum of Rs. 91,900/-. 3. A dispute arose between the plaintiff/appellant and the first respondent on the point as to whether the plaintiff/appellant had duly fulfilled its obligation under the contract and strictly in accordance therewith or not and the first respondent forfeited the bond and called upon the guarantor defendant/respondent Allahabad Bank to remit the aforesaid sum of Rs. 91,900/-. In the aforesaid background, the plaintiff/appellant instituted the aforesaid suit, being Title Suit No. 181 of 1976 in the City Civil Court of Calcutta. The plaintiff pleaded that there had been due compliance on his part of the terms of the contract, and as such, there exists no ground for forfeiting the bond. It was alleged on the other hand that bills to the tune of Rs. 1,53,101.10 presented by the plaintiff/appellant stood unpaid by the first respondent. Accordingly, it was claimed that the first respondent "is not entitled to enforce and/or to give effect to the bank guarantee dated 28.1.1975 and to realize the amount as covered under the bank guarantee from defendant No.2 in giving effect to the bank guarantee". The plaint then proceeded to recite "In view of the circumstances the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for declaration, that the defendant is not entitled to enforce and/or to give effect to the bank guarantee executed between the parties to the suit on 28.1.1975 and to realize the amount as covered under the bank guarantee from defendant No. 2 in giving effect to the said bank guarantee. The plaintiff is further entitled to get a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.1 from enforcing and/or giving effect to the bank guarantee executed between the parties to the suit on 28.1.1975 and from realizing the amount as covered under the blink guarantee from defendant No.2 in giving effect to the said bank guarantee". On the pleadings as aforesaid, the plaintiff prayed for declaration and injunction on terms, as aforesaid. The suit was valued at Rs. 200/- and in the valuation statement it was stated that for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction the suit is valued at Rs. 200/-; the suit is for declaration and injunction and the plaintiff values the relief at Rs. 200/- and that the plaintiff gives its own valuation under section 7(iv)(b) of the West Bengal Court Fees Act and the court fee is paid accordingly. 4. 200/-; the suit is for declaration and injunction and the plaintiff values the relief at Rs. 200/- and that the plaintiff gives its own valuation under section 7(iv)(b) of the West Bengal Court Fees Act and the court fee is paid accordingly. 4. The court below entertained doubt as whether the suit had been properly valued and whether it had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit or not. Having heard the plaintiff on that issue, the court took the view that when the suit is one for injunction restraining the defendant No.1 from enforcing or giving effect to a bank guarantee the value of which is Rs. 91,900/-, the valuation as given by the plaintiff cannot be accepted. It was, therefore, held that the court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit and accordingly the plaint was directed to be returned obviously in terms of Order 7 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Cede and such an order is being challenged in this appeal. 5. Mr. Basu appearing in support of this appeal has raised two points. Firstly, it had been contended by Mr. Basu that until the liability of the plaintiff/appellant is adjudicated upon either in a suit or in an arbitration proceeding nothing would be payable to the first respondent and the first respondent had no right to forfeit the entire bond and claim the amount to be paid by the guarantor to the said respondent. Strong reliance is placed by Mr. Basu on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC 1265 and it is contended that on principle there is no difference between the said case and the case now under consideration. Secondly, Mr. Basu has contended that the learned judge in the court below went wrong in thinking that the value of the suit would be Rs. 91,900/- wholly overlooking the fact that there being no objective standard of valuation, the plaintiff/appellant was within his rights to put his own valuation under section 7(iv) of the West Bengal Court Fees Act, 1970. According to Mr. Basu the suit could not have been valued on any pre-estimate of the plaintiff/appellant's liability under the contract which had not been adjudicated upon. 6. The two points, thus raised by Mr. Basu has been contested by Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the first respondent. According to Mr. Basu the suit could not have been valued on any pre-estimate of the plaintiff/appellant's liability under the contract which had not been adjudicated upon. 6. The two points, thus raised by Mr. Basu has been contested by Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the first respondent. According to Mr. Gupta, the learned judge in the court below was well justified in coming to his conclusion that the relief claimed by the plaintiff in the present case is capable of being valued and such value must be Rs. 91,900/- since such is the amount which the plaintiff claims the first respondent is not entitled to realize from the guarantor who holds the same as security. According to Mr. Gupta, it is not a case where there is no objective standard of valuation so that the court was well justified in revising the valuation as put by the plaintiff/appellant. 7. In our opinion, it is the second point raised by Mr. Basu which has some importance and bearing on the issue now under consideration. So far as the first point raised by Mr. Basu is concerned, in Raman Iron Foundry's case the Supreme Court was interpreting clause 18 of the contract involved in the said case which in prescribing a mode of recovery provided that whenever any claim for payment of a sum of money arises out of or under the contract against the contractor the purchaser shall be entitled to recover the same by appropriating in whole or in part the security, if any, deposited by the contractor or by appropriating any sum due or which at any time thereafter become due to the contractor under the contract or any other contract with the purchaser. It was held that the term 'any claim for payment of a sum of money' in the said clause really meant claim for a sum which is presently due and payable by the contractor and not merely a claim for damages for breach of the contract. Here, however, the terms of the contract are materially different and I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Basu that of principle there is no difference between the case now under consideration and the one under consideration by the Supreme Court. That apart, in our opinion, on the plaint and on the reliefs claimed in the present suit, the aforesaid point has no material bearing. Basu that of principle there is no difference between the case now under consideration and the one under consideration by the Supreme Court. That apart, in our opinion, on the plaint and on the reliefs claimed in the present suit, the aforesaid point has no material bearing. In this suit, the plaintiff has not come with any prayer for a declaration that in the absence of any adjudication of the plaintiff's liability the first respondent is not entitled to forfeit the bond or realize any amount. On the other hand, the plaintiff's specific case is that on his part there has been due compliance with the terms of the contract, and as such, there exists no ground for forfeiture of the bond at all. The plaintiff has accordingly prayed for a relief by way of a declaration that the first respondent is not entitled to enforce the guarantee or to realize the amount covered by the bond from the guarantor and for a permanent injunction restraining such enforcement and realization and the question is as to whether the court can revise the plaintiff's valuation of such a relief. 8. In our opinion, the germane issue is as to whether the valuation of the relief so claimed was validly revised by the Court or not. The suit undoubtedly comes within the purview of section 7(iv) (b) of the Court Fees Act, as aforesaid, and the plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation to the relief claimed by him. It is also not in dispute that for the purpose of jurisdiction the valuation would be the same as for the court fees in view of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. Though the plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation for the reliefs claimed in a suit coming under section 7(iv) (b), he cannot put any arbitrary valuation of his own and the valuation so put would be subject to revision by the court under section 11 which provides that if the court is of opinion that the subject matter of any suit has been wrongly valued it may revise the valuation and determine the correct valuation and may hold such enquiry as it may think necessary for such purpose. 9. It is well settled that the valuation is to be determined on the basis of the plaintiff's pleading and with reference to the relief claimed by the plaintiff. 9. It is well settled that the valuation is to be determined on the basis of the plaintiff's pleading and with reference to the relief claimed by the plaintiff. It is also well settled that if there be no objective standard of valuation of the relief, notwithstanding the power of the court to revise the valuation, the court will never do so for the simple reason that the court would have no material before it from which it can adjudge the valuation as given by the plaintiff to be erroneous. Such being the accepted principles involved, the short question that arises for our consideration is as to whether on the plaint it can be said that the relief claimed can be valued with reference to any objective standard. Mr. Basu has contended that there is no objective standard. On the adjudication sought for by the plaintiff, according to Mr. Basu, the plaintiff's liability may be considered to be nil or Rs. 5,000/- or Rs. 10,000/- or any other amount. Therefore, there cannot be any genuine pre-estimation of the plaintiff's liability with reference to which the relief can be valued. We are, however, unable to accept this contention of Mr. Basu. How far a plaintiff's claim would succeed or the extent to which the relief claimed would be admissible is not the criterion of valuation. In our opinion, if the value of the entire relief claimed in the suit can be assessed and found out that would be the value of the relief irrespective of to what extent such relief would be admissible to the plaintiff on final adjudication. Here, in the present case, reading the plaint in its substance it is quite evident that the plaintiff is seeking to avoid forfeiture of a sum of Rs. 91,900/- which on the terms of the contract the first respondent had forfeited. When the plaintiff is seeking to avoid forfeiture of such a liquidated amount, that amount really represents the value of the relief claimed. 10. Strong reliance is placed by Mr. 91,900/- which on the terms of the contract the first respondent had forfeited. When the plaintiff is seeking to avoid forfeiture of such a liquidated amount, that amount really represents the value of the relief claimed. 10. Strong reliance is placed by Mr. Basu on the Full Bench decision of this court in the case of (2) Narayanganj Central Co-operative Society v. Majizuddin, 38 CWN 589 in support of his contention that the present suit being one answering the description specified in section 7(iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the valuation put by the plaintiff should be accepted as final and the court cannot revise it since no standard for such revision have been laid down by framing of appropriate rules under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. The Full Bench decision has to be read very carefully to appreciate the true import thereof. The Full Bench approved that-amongst the dissenting views according to which the court had the power to revise or correct the valuation given by the plaintiff in his plaint. No doubt it was also held that though possessed of such powers until the actual standards are laid down by appropriate rules framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, it would not be possible for the court to exercise this power except in those classes of cases falling under the clause in which the valuation made by the plaintiff is illegal, palpably absurd, manifestly illogical and arithmetically wrong. The exceptions pointed out by the Full Bench are important and they make it abundantly clear that there may be cases coming within the aforesaid clause of section 7 where even in the absence of appropriate rules being framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, the court may revise the valuation if the court finds on the plaint the valuation given by the plaintiff to be palpably absurd or manifestly illogical. The above Full Bench decision came to be considered by this court in the case of (5) Kumdini Kanta Mukherji v. Municipal Commissioner of Barasat Municipality, 42 CWN 315 and (4) Mohitosh Mukherji v. Satya Ranjan Chatterji, 53 CWN 340 where it was pointed out that if there is an objective standard available, the court can make an enquiry under section 8(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, which corresponds to section 11 of the present Act and correct the valuation of the plaintiff in accordance with this objective standard. As a matter of fact, S. K. Ghosh, J. one amongst the learned Judges constituting the Full Bench deciding the case of Narayangange Co-operative Society in a later case himself revised the plaintiff's valuation even though the suit was one within the purview of the aforesaid clause of section 7 (See––(5) Urmila Bala Biswas v. Binapani Biswas––42 CWN 192). 11. Such being the position, the Full Bench decision of this Court relied on by Mr. Basu is no authority for a proposition that in case of a suit of the present nature, the valuation given by the plaintiff would always be final or binding on the court irrespective of all consideration. On the other hand, if it can be found on an objective standard available to the court that the valuation as given by the plaintiff bears no relation to the real value of the relief then certainly the court can revise the valuation. It can legitimately be said that where the relief sought can be found to have a real money value which can be objectively ascertained that value is the value of the relief and any other value ascribed to it is arbitrary and manifestly illogical. This court in (6) Harihar v. Shyamlal, ILR 40 Calcutta, 615 observed, "It has been contended that the court could not question the value put on the reliefs claimed. I think that this cannot be argued where it is shown on the face of the plaint that the value put on the relief is too small". This court in (6) Harihar v. Shyamlal, ILR 40 Calcutta, 615 observed, "It has been contended that the court could not question the value put on the reliefs claimed. I think that this cannot be argued where it is shown on the face of the plaint that the value put on the relief is too small". Applying the principle as above, it must be held that this case is not one where there is no objective standard for valuing the relief because for reasons given by us we find the relief claimed is in respect of a liquidated amount and to value such relief at any figure other than the said amount would be patently illogical. 12. The view we take finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (7) Shamser Singh v. Rajinder Prasad, AIR 1973 SC 2384 relied on by Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the respondents. In this case it was held that a suit by a Hindu son against his father and the mortgagee decree-holder for a declaration that the mortgage executed by the father in respect of the joint family property was void with consequential relief is a suit in which ad valorem court fee is payable on the amount due on the mortgage though it comes under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act 1870. Mr. Basu wanted to distinguish this decision of the Supreme Court by pointing out that it was not a case of valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction at all but it should be remembered that the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction would be the same as for the court fees. What is important in this decision of the Supreme Court is the fact that the Supreme Court did not accept the valuation as put by the plaintiff though the suit was one under section 7(iv)(c) but upheld the revision thereof with reference to the objective standard available. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court did not rest its decision on the local amendment but proceeded to find out the value of the relief with reference to its objective standard by reading the plaint in its substance. 13. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court did not rest its decision on the local amendment but proceeded to find out the value of the relief with reference to its objective standard by reading the plaint in its substance. 13. Such being the position, we feel no hesitation in upholding the view taken by the learned judge in the trial court that the valuation as arbitrarily put by the plaintiff in the present case at Rs. 200/- is not acceptable to the court and the court was well within its power to revise the same looking at the substance and assessing the relief with reference to the objective standard which is well evident on the plaintiff's pleading itself. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 15. As prayed for, let the operation of this order remain stayed for a period of four weeks from date. Ray, J.: I agree.