JUDGMENT.- This is an appeal by the State against the two respondents who are father and son. The 1st respondent was charged under clause 3 (1) of the Food -grains Dealers’ Licensing Order read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The 2nd respondent was charged with the offence under clause 8 (2) of the Sugar Dealer’s Licensing Order. The former was a Foodgrains Dealer’s Licensee and the latter was a Sugar Dealer’s Licensee. They were however doing combined business. On 4th November, 1973, P.W. 3 the Inspector inspected the shop and found discrepancies between the actual stocks lying in the shop and the stocks as entered in the stocks register for wheat, rice and super etc. He seized the stocks and handed them over to the appropriate authorities. The charge-sheet was laid on 31st December, 1974. 2. The defence was that these charges were not provided and that in any case the prosecution was tarred by limitation as per the provisions of section 468 (2) (6), Criminal Procedure Code. The contentior in regard to limitation is that the new Code of Criminal Procedure applies because the charge-sheet was filed on 31st December, 1974 and since it was laid more than ore year after 4th November, 1973 and as the inspection and seizure were made contrary to section 468(2)(b) the prosecution was barred by time. The prosecution endeavoured to get over this difficulty by relying on section 484, Criminal Procedure Code, which by repealing the Code of 1898 provides in clause (a) of sub-section (2) that if, immediately before the date on which this Code comes into force, there is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending then, such appeal, application, trial, inquiry investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 as in force immediately before such commencement (the old Code), as if this Code had not come into force. The lower Court, however acquitted the accused on the ground that the prosecution was barred by limitation though it recorded a finding that the accused had violated the provisions of the Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order and the Sugar Dealers’ Licensing Order for not showing the stocks correctly in the stock registers. 3. The lower Court, however acquitted the accused on the ground that the prosecution was barred by limitation though it recorded a finding that the accused had violated the provisions of the Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order and the Sugar Dealers’ Licensing Order for not showing the stocks correctly in the stock registers. 3. The learned Public Prosecutor relied on section 484(2)(a) and contended that since the investigation started on 4th November, 1973 and continued till 3lst December, 1974 when the charge sheet was filed which act would come within the scope of investigation, the Code of 1898 would apply. If that applied, there was no bar of limitation at all as is now provided in section 468 of the present Code. Reliance in this behalf was placed on H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi1 and State v. Haridas Mundra2. 4. Before I refer to these two decisions, I would like to test through the Statutory provisions the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that the laying of the charge sheet also is part of the investigation, so that in this case it would be stated that the investigation continued right up to 3lst December, 1974 when the charge-sheet was laid. Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code, requires that every investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay. This is Subsection (1). In sub-section (2) it is stated that as soon as it (obviously meaning investigation) is completed the offcer-in-charge of the Police Station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report a report in the form prescribed by the State Government giving certain particulars as mentioned in subsection (2). Therefore the very section contemplates the filing of the charge-sheet only on the completion of the investigation. It is stated in so many words in sub-section (2). Therefore it cannot be said that filing of charge sheet is part of investigation. 5. In this case there is no evidence that the investigation continued right upto the filing of the charge-sheet. On the other hand from the record we see that the accused claimed the seized property before the District Revenue Officer and he, by his decision dated 28tb January, 1974 held that they should be handed over to the accused. This order of the District Revenue Officer is Exhibit D-4. On the other hand from the record we see that the accused claimed the seized property before the District Revenue Officer and he, by his decision dated 28tb January, 1974 held that they should be handed over to the accused. This order of the District Revenue Officer is Exhibit D-4. Thus Exhibit D-4 shows two things: firstly that the matter had been decided by the District Revenue Officer before this charge-sheet has been laid, and secondly, that investigation had been completed before the District Revenue Officer rendered his decision. Therefore it cannot be said that the investigation was continued so that the prosecution would take advantage of clause (a) of section 484 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code. 6. I do not think that the Supreme Court decision in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi1 helps the prosecution in this regard. It was clearly held in that case that the final step in the investigation was as to whether or not there was a case to place the accused on trial the formation of the opinion when the investigation comes to an end. The formation of the opinion should have been made even before the charge-sheet was filed. The Special Bench in State v. Haridas Mundra2, tries to define the scope of the words “trial pending” in section 484 (2) (a). That offers no assistance to the learned Public Prosecutor because no trial was pending in this case when the charge-sheet was filed. In fact the case would start only with the filing of the charge-sheet. Therefore these decisions do not help the prosecution. 7. On the other hand I may take note of the decision one which is that of the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in H.N. Bhavsar v. State of Gujarat3. The Full Bench held: “It must be noticed that what are saved under sub-section (2)(a) (section 484) are only the pending proceedings. If a proceeding is instituted subsequent to the commencement of the Code in respect of the act or omission committed prior to the coming into force of the new Code. It would only be Governed by the provisions of the new Code.” The learned single Judge of the Patna High. Court held in Vasudeo Agrawal v. State of Bihar4. If a proceeding is instituted subsequent to the commencement of the Code in respect of the act or omission committed prior to the coming into force of the new Code. It would only be Governed by the provisions of the new Code.” The learned single Judge of the Patna High. Court held in Vasudeo Agrawal v. State of Bihar4. “Thus a Police investigaion initiated under the old Code has to be completed in accordance with the old Code, but on completion thereof any further step in the prosecution has to be taken according to the provisions of the new Code” While coming to that conclusion the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court has been relied on by the learned Single Judge. These decisions support the view I have taken. 8. What are saved under section 484(2)(a) are only pending appeals, applications, trials, inquiries or investigations. The investigation in this particular case was completed. Even if it was pending only that will have to be continued in accordance with the old Code. But the charge-sheet and the conduct of the trial will have to be in accordance with the new Code. Now that it is common ground that the charge-sheet was laid on 31st December, 1974 more than one year after the inspection and seizure on 4th November, 1973, the prosecution is barred by the provisions of section 468 (2) (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, I uphold the view taken by the lower Court with regard to limitation. The consequence is that the lower Court has rightly acquitted the accused. The appeal by the State is therefore dismissed.