Judgement BHATTACHARJEE, J. :- The suit which has wended its way to this Court in this appeal was filed in the Court of the District Judge, Sikkim at Gangtok, by the plaintiff-landlord against the defendant tenant for the recovery of arrears of rent and for the ejectment of the defendant from the premises held by him under the plaintiff as described in the schedule of the plaint, being "one shop-room with two rooms behind it with a verandah at the, fourth storey (third floor) of an R. C. C. building situated at Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Gangtok Bazar". The suit has been decreed by the learned District judge by his Judgement dated 19-10-1978, whereby the claims of the plaintiff for the ejectment of the defendant and also for the arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 450/- have been allowed and the defendant has preferred this appeal against the aforesaid judgement and decree. 2. The case of the plaintiff, stated briefly, is that the plaintiff is the owner of the premises in dispute, hereinafter referred to as the suit-premises, and the defendant is a tenant under him at a monthly rental of Rs. 150/- only; the further case of the plaintiff is that originally the defendant took the tenancy for a period of one year only from 1-3-68 and executed a written agreement to that effect on 7-3-68 and that, after the expiry of the said period, when the plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the possession of the premises, the defendant requested him to allow the defendant to continue possession of the suit-premises on the same rent as before on the understanding that the defendant would vacate the same as and when the plaintiff would need the premises and would ask the defendant to vacate the same. The plaintiff's case is that he began to request the defendant to vacate the premises since the month of Dec., 1974, but that the defendant refused to comply with his request and as a result the plaintiff served a notice dated 10-10-1975 upon the defendant asking him to deliver possession of the premises within two months and also to clear off the arrears of rent due up-to-date. But, the plaintiff alleges, instead of vacating the premises and paying off the dues, the defendant started depositing the rent and electric charges in Court; the amount so deposited has covered the rent and electricity charges for the months of Oct. and Nov., 1975, and the defendant having already paid the rents up to the month of June, 1975, an amount of Rs. 450/- being the rent due for the months of July, Aug. and Sept., 1975 has remained due. 3. The plaintiff's further case, as made out in paragraph 9 of the plaint, is that the plaintiff reasonably and bona fide needs the suit-premises and the case of the plaintiff for such requirement is based mainly on two grounds. The first ground is that as per the approved plan of the building in question, only four storeys were completed and the plaintiff has now been served with a notice by the Bazar Department to complete the construction up to the fifth storey in accordance with the original plan and that as the flight of steps leading from the fourth storey as per the approved plan would have to be constructed from inside the suit-premises, the construction of the fifth storey cannot be proceeded with unless the defendant. vacates the premises The second ground made out by the plaintiff is that apart from two married daughters and one unmarried daughter, the plaintiff has three sons, of whom the eldest one Chiranjilal is aged about 22 years and the second son Khemchand is aged about 20 years and they "want to start their own independent business". 4. The defendant has contested the suit by filing written statement, admitting therein that he took the tenancy originally for a period of one year only as alleged by the plaintiff and executed a written agreement to that effect. But the case of the defendant is that after the expiry of the period of one year there was an understanding between the parties that the tenancy in question would continue as long as the defendant would continue to pay rent regularly. The defendant has admitted depositing of rent and electricity charges in Court and has denied that the amount of Rs. 450/- is due from him to the plaintiff as arrears of rent as alleged in the plaint. The defendant has admitted depositing of rent and electricity charges in Court and has denied that the amount of Rs. 450/- is due from him to the plaintiff as arrears of rent as alleged in the plaint. The defendant has further denied that the proposed steps for the construction of the fifth storey are to be constructed from within the premises in his occupation and has also denied that the plaintiff requires the suit-premises on any ground as alleged and has asserted that the grounds so alleged are only false pretexts to eject the tenant. 5. On the pleadings of the respective parties the learned District Judge framed the following issues :- (1) What amount by way of arrears of rent is due from the defendant to the plaintiff ? (2) Whether the plaintiff requires the premises for bona fide personal necessity ? (3) Relief. 6. The plaintiff in support of his case has examined three witnesses including himself while the defendant has examined himself only in support of his case. 7. After recording the evidence and after hearing the plaintiff on whose behalf a written argument was submitted and hearing the defendant through his lawyer, the learned District Judge has decreed the suit by his judgement as aforesaid. On the first issue relating to the arrears of rent, the learned District Judge has held that the defendant was in arrears of rent for Rs. 450/- for the months of July, Aug. and Sept., 1975 and has anted a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the said amount. On the second issue as to the requirement of the premises by the plaintiff, the learned District Judge has held that the plaintiff requires the premises in dispute for bona fide necessity of his dependents and has accordingly granted a decree for ejectment of the defendant from the suit-premises. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgement of learned District Judge, the defendant-appellant has preferred this present appeal. 9. I have gone through the records of the case and have examined the evidence on record and have also heard the par ties appearing in person, who have also put their submissions before us in writing. 10. From the evidence on record I am satisfied that the decision of the learned District judge on the first issue as to the amount of rent in arrears is correct. 10. From the evidence on record I am satisfied that the decision of the learned District judge on the first issue as to the amount of rent in arrears is correct. From Ext-D 1 it appears that the defendant paid rent for the month of June 1975. The deposit of rent in Court made by the defendant is admittedly for the months of Oct. and Nov., 1975 and there is nothing on record, oral and documentary, to show that the rents for the months of July, Aug. and Sept., 1975, have been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. The case of the defendant that there was an amount of Rs. 300/- lying as security deposit in the hands of the plaintiff and was to be adjusted by the plaintiff towards the rent cannot be accepted as it is clear from Ext-P. 1, which is the written agreement dated 7-3-68 executed by the defendant, that the amount of Rs. 300/- so deposited was to remain with the plaintiff as security deposit till the suit-premises were vacated by the defendant, and as such I find no substance in the contention of the defendant that the said security deposit of Rs. 300/- was to be adjusted by the plaintiff with the rent of the premises as and when such rent would fall due or be in arrear. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the finding of the learned District Judge that the defendant in fact failed to pay or deposit rents for the months of July, Aug and Sept., 1975 is justified and his granting a decree for the amount of Rs. 450/- as arrears of rent for the aforesaid three months is also not wrong. But as it is the admitted case of the plaintiff also that Rs 300/- was lying with him as security deposit made by the defendant, and as the learned District Judge has decreed the suit not only for arrears of rent but also for ejectment, the learned District judge should have, in my view, directed that the said amount of Rs. 300/- was to be adjusted by the plaintiff towards the arrears of rent as aforesaid and should have passed a decree of Rs. 300/- was to be adjusted by the plaintiff towards the arrears of rent as aforesaid and should have passed a decree of Rs. 150/- only and I would have modified the decree accordingly if I was satisfied that the decree for ejectment granted by the learned District Judge was also correct and could be sustained. But as I am of the opinion that the decree granted by the learned District judge relating to ejectment of the defendant from the suit premises cannot be sustained and is to be set aside, the decree for the entire amount of Rs. 450/- as has been granted by the learned District judge, need not be disturbed. 11. This brings me to the most material issue in this case, being Issue No 2, as framed by the learned District Judge. I have already noted that on this issue the learned District judge has held that the plaintiff requires the premises in dispute for bona fide necessity of his dependents and I have already indicated that in my opinion this finding of the learned District Judge is erroneous and the appeal is to be allowed to that extent and the decree so far it relates to the ejectment of the defendant, is to be set aside. For the purpose of this appeal, I will proceed on the basis that the law relating to eviction of tenants of premises is contained in the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956. In Jokhiram v. Mangturam Agarwalla (1977-1, Sikkim LJ 30) it was urged before us that the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956 does not and cannot apply to any premises. Relying on the provisions of Section 1 (iii) of the said Act, which provides that the said Act extends to "all buildings and constructions situated within the area of Gangtok Bazar which may be fixed from time to time by the Sikkim Darbar", it was urged before us in that case that the said Act does not and cannot apply to any premises as the area of "Gangtok Bazar" has never been fixed by the Sikkim Durbar or by the State Government at any time. In that case it was, however, held that whether or not the said Act applied, the suit for ejectment was to fail for want of notice of the termination of tenancy in accordance with the agreement between the parties and it was not, therefore, necessary for us to decide the question as to the applicability of the said Act and we left that question open. We, however, pointed out in the said Jokhiram's case that even if the Act of 1956 was not applicable to any premises in the absence of any fixation of the area of Gangtok Bazar by the Sikkim Durbar or the State Government under S.1(iii) of the said Act, the earlier law contained in the Notification No. 6326-600/H and WB dated 14th Apr., 1949 would continue to apply and that the said law also contains provisions relating to ejectment of tenant which are similar to those contained in the Act of 1956. The same question came up before this Court in Smt. Shakuntala Bai v. K.N. Dewan (1977-1 Sikkim LJ 33), a case decided by my Lord the Chief justice sitting singly and it appears that in that case also the point was not expressly decided and it was only observed relying on Jokhiram's case, that even if the Act of 1956 was not applicable, the similar provisions contained in the aforesaid Notification of 1949 would continue to apply. I, however, feel that this Court should, as early as possible and once for all, decide the said question so that all concerned may know with certainty as to which of the two provisions of law are really applicable and I decided to do so in this case. But on further consideration, I have refrained from doing so because none of the parties in this case has raised that point in any way and I would like to decide this point in a proper case in which the point is directly and specifically raised and after receiving the assistance of learned lawyers, if any, appearing for the parties. But on further consideration, I have refrained from doing so because none of the parties in this case has raised that point in any way and I would like to decide this point in a proper case in which the point is directly and specifically raised and after receiving the assistance of learned lawyers, if any, appearing for the parties. As the said question has neither been raised in this case, directly or indirectly, and as neither of the parties is represented before us by any lawyer, I have, though reluctantly, decided not to deal with or determine this point and as in this case both the parties have, both in the trial Court and also before us, proceeded on the basis that the Act of 1956 applied to the case, I have also decided to proceed on such basis. But I would, however, still like to examine the provisions of the said Notification dated 14th Apr., 1949 and to decide whether the appeal would succeed or fail if the provisions contained in the said Notification would have applied to this case. 12. I, therefore, proceed to examine the relevant provisions of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956. The Act ex facie deals with the difficult problem of scarcity of accommodation and, as the provisions thereof will clearly demonstrate, is more protective of the interests of the tenants than of the landlords. The Act professes to control premises, tenancies and the rents therefor and the eviction of the tenants therefrom. The Act restricts and puts an embargo on the power of the landlord to let or to rack rent or evict tenants at their sweet-will. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in D.N. Sanghavi and Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuvan Das (AIR 1974 SC 1026 at 1028), construing the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, that "the direct and immediate object of the Act is to ensure occupation of accommodation by them who are in need of it" and that "broadly speaking, a construction which fulfils this purpose should be preferred to the alternative construction which frustrates it." In the light of the observation of the Supreme Court, let me now read S.4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956 which contains the material provisions for this appeal. Section 4, therefore, is quoted herein below :- "A landlord may not ordinarily eject any tenant. When however, the whole or part of the premises are required for the bona fide occupation of the landlord or his dependents or for through overhauling (excluding additions and alterations), or when the rent in arrears amounts to four months' rent or more, the landlord may evict the tenant on filing a suit for ejectment in the Court of the Chief Magistrate." 13. The provisions of S.4, as quoted above, clearly go to show that a landlord may evict a tenant only on one or more of the three grounds mentioned therein, namely : (1) that the whole or part of the premises are required for the bona fide occupation of the landlord or his dependents; (2) that the whole or part of the premises are required for thorough overhauling; (3) that the rent in arrears amounts to four months' rent or more. 14. As the preamble of the Act shows the very purpose of the Act is to control eviction of the tenants and the first sentence of S.4 reading "a landlord may not ordinarily eject any tenant'' would give rise to an irresistible impression that the law-making authority regarded continuity of tenancies as the ordinary and desired state of affairs and termination of tenancies as something extraordinary, or, to put it in other words, "once a tenant, always a tenant" and non-ejectment of tenant as the rule and eviction of tenants as the exception. Relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal (AIR 1974 SC 1596 at 1602), while dealing with similar restrictive provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and in Neta Ram v. Jivan Lal (AIR 1963 SC 499 at 502), while construing similar restrictive provisions of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Rent Restriction Ordinance, I would like to hold that the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956 has imposed a restriction on the right of the landlord to evict and on the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree for eviction against a tenant and that the onus of proving the conditions, on proof of which alone the tenant may be evicted, lies on the landlord and that the very purpose of the Act would be defeated if the landlords were allowed to come forward and to get tenants turned out on the bare plea that they want more accommodation for their occupation or want to reconstruct the house. In the light of the aforesaid observations let me, therefore, see whether on the evidence on record the landlord can be said to have discharged his onus and has been able to prove that the case as made out by him has satisfied and of the three conditions, on proof of which alone he can be awarded a decree for ejectment. 15. Neither in the plaint nor in the evidence, the landlord had made out any ground that the suit premises are required for "thorough over-hauling" or that any reconstruction or even repairs, whether major or minor, is or are required so far the suit premises are concerned. The only case of the landlord on this aspect is that as per the original plan of the building, it was to be constructed up to the fifth storey and that the Bazar Department has also directed him to do so by its letter dated 19-12-1975 marked as Ext-P 7. The only case of the landlord on this aspect is that as per the original plan of the building, it was to be constructed up to the fifth storey and that the Bazar Department has also directed him to do so by its letter dated 19-12-1975 marked as Ext-P 7. I need not go into the question as to whether Ext-P 7 can be said to have been duly proved or properly admitted or whether the Bazar Department has a right to compel anyone to add a fifth storey to a fourth storeyed building simply because in the original plan as approved by the Department, a fifth storey was also proposed to be constructed and that without such a fifth storey, the building "looks odd and ugly". But even assuming that a fifth storey was required to be constructed, I am of opinion that the learned District Judge was right in holding that the same does not make out a legal ground for the ejectment. The learned Judge has observed in his judgement that "in Section 4, however, additions and alterations to a building have been specifically excluded and, therefore, it is not contemplated as a ground of ejectment in S.4 of the Act. It is only when the landlord requires a premises for thorough over-hauling that he can claim ejectment of the tenant. In the present case it is not at all alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff wanted to thoroughly overhaul existing premises in dispute and, therefore, the defendant should be ejected from the premises. I agree with the finding of the learned District Judge. 16. The plaintiff has not also claimed ejectment on the ground that "the rent in arrears amounts to four months' rent or more", as his own case is that a sum of Rs. 450/- only, which amounts to three months rent only, is in arrears and has only claimed recovery of the said amount. I have already observed that the learned District Judge was right in holding that the said amount was due, I have already noted that the learned District Judge has granted a decree for ejectment also and has at the same time found that a sum of Rs. 300/- was lying in deposit with the plaintiff as security for the rent. I have already observed that the learned District Judge was right in holding that the said amount was due, I have already noted that the learned District Judge has granted a decree for ejectment also and has at the same time found that a sum of Rs. 300/- was lying in deposit with the plaintiff as security for the rent. As I have already observed, if the learned District Judge was right in granting a decree for ejectment, he should have ordered the aforesaid amount of Rs. 300/- lying with the plaintiff to be adjusted towards the arrears of rent and should have granted a decree for Rs. 150/- only. But as, for the reasons to be stated hereafter, I am of opinion that the decree of ejectment cannot be sustained, I would not disturb the decree for Rs. 450/- for the arrears of rent as according to the terms of Ext-P 1, the said deposit of Rs. 300/- is to remain in deposit until the defendant vacates the premises. 17. The only point which now remains for consideration is whether the learned District Judge was right in holding that the plaintiff requires the said premises for bona fide occupation of his dependents and in granting a decree for ejectment on that ground. 18. As already seen, under the provisions of Section 4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, requirement of premises, to sustain the decree for ejectment, must be for the "bona fide occupation of the landlord, or his dependents". The plaintiff must, therefore, prove that he "requires" the premises and not merely wishes or desires or intends to have the premises; that such requirement is for the "bona fide occupation'', that is, the need or necessity for such occupation is genuine and honest; and that such occupation is necessary for the landlord or for his dependents or, I may add, for both the landlord and his dependents. Though the apparently disjunctive word "or has been used in the expression "bona fide occupation of the landlord or his dependents", there cannot be any doubt that the requirement for the bona fide occupation to justify a decree of ejectment need not be of the landlord only or his dependent or dependents only but may also be a combined requirement of the landlord and his dependent or dependents and the word "or" is also to be read and construed as "and" whenever or where-ever necessary. 19. I am aware of the long catena of the cases of the different High Courts construing the expression "landlord", or "for the occupation of the landlord", or "his occupation", or "his own occupation" and similar expressions in the different enactments relating to eviction of tenants of premises prevailing in other States and that the preponderance of those authorities is in favour of the proposition that such expressions would not only mean or relate to the landlord himself but would include his family and dependents and such person or persons as may be essential and necessary for the purpose of such occupation. In fact, there is a myriad of precedents on this point laying down that such expressions are to receive and to be given a fair and liberal construction. It is not possible, nor do I propose or think it necessary, to refer to those numberless decisions urging uniformly for a fair and liberal construction, but failing, for obvious reasons, to lay down any uniform standard therefor. The Calcutta High Court in Pushpalata v. Dinesh ((1950) 85 Cal LJ 74 at 79) has held that "the expression 'his own' does not necessarily mean of the particular individual alone but must be interpreted to include the individual's family and dependents and such person or persons who may be essential and necessary for the purpose of such occupation. In determining what is family or dependent or a person essential or necessary for occupation, it is not only permissible but it is proper and desirable for the Court to bear in mind the context of social order, the habits and ideas of living and the religious and socio-religious customs of the community to which the individual concerned belongs". In determining what is family or dependent or a person essential or necessary for occupation, it is not only permissible but it is proper and desirable for the Court to bear in mind the context of social order, the habits and ideas of living and the religious and socio-religious customs of the community to which the individual concerned belongs". This Calcutta case has been quoted with approval and relied on by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Bidhu Bhusan Sen v. Commr., Patna Division (AIR 1955 Pat 496), where it has been held by Kanhaiya Singh, J. that the expression "his own occupation" or "his own business" should be given a wider and liberal connotation so as to include persons who, though not members of the family of the landlord, are living with him and are dependent upon him. In the said Division Bench case, Das C.J. (as his Lordship then was), in his concurring judgement also held that the expression his own occupation" does not mean "only the occupation of the landlord himself but includes the occupation of other persons who live with the landlord and are economically dependent on him" The aforesaid Calcutta case has also been quoted with approval and relied on by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Nanak Chand v. Tara Devi (AIR 1953 Punj 156). The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court also in B. Balaiah v. Chandoor Lachaiah (AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435) appears to have quoted and relied on the observations of the aforesaid Calcutta case, without, however, expressly referring to it, and has also referred to and relied on several other decisions of the other High Courts including the Patna decision above referred to and also to two English decisions and has held that ''the expression 'landlord' or 'his' must include all normal emanations of the landlord, for instance, if the landlord is a married man, he must be entitled to include with himself his wife and children" and that "one cannot construe the said expression strictly as applying physically only to the landlord himself" and "must include any normal emanations of the landlord" and finally held that it a major son of the landlord, who is a coparcener of the landlord's Hindu Joint Family, intends to start a business, the requirement therefor shall be regarded as a requirement of the landlord. 20. 20. I can understand that if the enactment in question providing for ejectment of tenants on the ground of a requirement of the landlord uses the expression "occupation of the landlord" or "his own occupation" or other similar expressions referring to the landlord only, like the enactments which were considered and construed by the Calcutta High Court in Pushpalata's case and the Patna High Court in Bidhu Bhusan's case, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Balaiah's case, such expressions may be required to be construed as not applying strictly or exclusively to the landlord himself, but as including his family or dependents or other normal emanations. But where, as here before us, the relevant enactment, being the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act 1956, uses both the expressions "landlord" and also "his dependents" and expressly provides, as one of the exceptions to the general legislative principle of non-ejectability of the tenants as declared in the opening of S.4, that a landlord may evict a tenant when the whole or part of the premises are required for the bona fide occupation of the landlord, or his dependents only, I am afraid that it will neither be proper nor be permissible to allow the expression "landlord" to expand and emanate indefinitely and thus to include members of his family or any other Person, whether dependent upon him or not, as that would amount to adding words to the provisions of the enactment and thus to redraft the same. Nor do I think that I can or need construe the expression "landlord" in S.4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956 in the way in which the expression "his own occupation" has been construed by the Patna High Court in Bidhu Bhusan's case, namely, to include such members of his family or others, who live with him" and "are economically dependent on him' as such a construction would make the expression "or his dependents" in S.4 of the Act entirely redundant and otiose I am, therefore, of the opinion that under the provisions of S.4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, requirement for the occupation of any person other than the landlord himself can be a ground of ejectment thereunder only if such a person, whether a wife or a son or a daughter, is "dependent" on the landlord. 21. 21. As I have already noted, the learned District Judge has granted a decree for ejectment holding that, "the plaintiff requires the premises in dispute for bona fide necessity of his dependents". I have noted before that the case of the plaintiff is that his two sons have given up their studies and want to start business. I have already pointed out that in order to justify a decree for ejectment under S.4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956 on the ground of requirement for bona fide occupation of any person other than the landlord, such person must be a dependent of the landlord. A son, whether a major or minor, may not necessarily be a dependent on the father and I do not find that the learned District judge has any where held that the two sons of the plaintiff were also his dependents and I also do not find any clear or Clinching evidence on this point. Though I feel that before granting a decree for ejectment in this case, the learned District Judge should have adverted to and considered the question as to whether the two sons of the plaintiff have been proved to be his dependents, yet I do not propose to reverse the finding of the learned District judge on this ground, as it appears that the defendant, who was represented by a lawyer in the Court below, has not at any stage during the trial disputed that the two sons of the plaintiff are his dependents and has not also challenged the decree on any such ground in his memorandum of appeal. 22. But I, however, feel that there an some other serious infirmities in this case for which the decree for ejectment cannot be sustained and ought to have been set aside. 23. I have already summarised the legal position hereinbefore and I may point out that the same view hag also been adopted by my Lord the Chief Justice in Sakuntala Bai v. K.N. Dewan, already referred to, which is also a case under this Act (and has now been reported in 1977-1 Sikkim LJ 33) where it has been observed by my Lord (at page 36, Para. 10) that "the landlord can have the building vacated if it is required for 'his personal occupation or 'for occupation of his dependents' ". 10) that "the landlord can have the building vacated if it is required for 'his personal occupation or 'for occupation of his dependents' ". There cannot be any difference, either etymologically or in law, between the expression "personal occupation" and "his own occupation". In D.N. Sanghavi's case, already referred to hereinbefore, the Supreme Court has observed (AIR 1974 SC 1026 at 1030-31) that the expression "his occupation" or 'his own occupation" "connotes the idea that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation". In that case, the case of the plaintiff was that he required the suit-premises for his business it was, however, found that the plaintiff was only one of the several partners of the said business and there was nothing on record to show that the plaintiff had any active hand or role in the management of the said business. The Supreme Court, while pointing out that a decree for ejectment could be passed in favour of a landlord for "his own occupation" or "his business", observed that there was nothing on record to show as to what was the actual role of the plaintiff in the said partnership business and whether he had any active role in the management of the said business and that as such it could not be held that the accommodation for such a business is necessary "for his own occupation" or "for his business". In the case before us, in the plaint and throughout the trial the case of the plaintiff is that the business which his sons "want to start" would be their "own" "independent" business and that being so, any requirement for such a business in which the plaintiff admittedly would have no role or share or interest cannot be regarded as a requirement for the occupation of the plaintiff-landlord according to the ratio of the Supreme Court case or for "his personal occupation" as the said expression has been used in Sakuntala Bai's case. 24. Let me, therefore, examine assuming that the two sons of the plaintiff are his dependents, whether it has beep proved that the suit-premises are required for the bona fide occupation for the business which the said two sons "want to start''. 24. Let me, therefore, examine assuming that the two sons of the plaintiff are his dependents, whether it has beep proved that the suit-premises are required for the bona fide occupation for the business which the said two sons "want to start''. In Mattulal's case already referred to, (AIR 1974 SC 1596) the Supreme Court, after observing that the onus of proving the conditions, on proof of which alone, a decree for ejectment can be granted, lies on the plaintiff, has observed (AIR 1974 SC 1596 at 1602-03) that "it must be observed that the mere assertion by the landlord that he requires..… the premises in the occupation of his tenant raises no presumption that he genuinely requires the premises for his use". It was further observed that "it is now well-settled by several decisions of this Court including the decision in Sarvate T.B.'s case 1966 MPLJ 26 (SC) and Smt. Kamla Soni's case, C. A. No. 2150 of 1966, dated 26-9-1969* that mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires..…the accommodation in the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of starting or continuing his business is not decisive. It is for the Court to determine the truth of the assertion and whether it is bona fide. The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one and merely because a landlord asserts that he wants . . . the accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his business, that would not be enough to establish that he requires it for that purpose and that his requirement is bona fide The word 'requires' signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord, must show-the burden being upon him-that he genuinely requires . . . . . . the accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business. Similar observations have also been made by the Supreme Court in Pheroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandra Kanta M. Patel (AIR 1974 SC 1059 at 1063) while construing the word "requires". *Reported in (1969) 2 SCWR 679. 25. In the case before us the plaintiff landlord, P.W. 1, has stated in his evidence that his sons said to him that they did not want to continue their studies and want to start some business separately. *Reported in (1969) 2 SCWR 679. 25. In the case before us the plaintiff landlord, P.W. 1, has stated in his evidence that his sons said to him that they did not want to continue their studies and want to start some business separately. Shri Chothmull Joshi, P.W. 2, has deposed that when the two sons of the plaintiff Chiranjilal and Khemchand, discontinued their studies, he tried to persuade them to continue their studies. P.W. 2 has further stated that Khemchand, however, said to him that "he did not want to continue his studies and I should rather prevail upon the plaintiff that he should get him some business started." P.W. 2 has further stated that the eldest son of the plaintiff also left his studies and that the said son, that is, Chiranjilal, also told P.W. 2 that he wanted to start an independent business. The only other witness on behalf of the plaintiff, Dharamlal Prasad, P.W. 3, has stated nothing on this point. 26. Neither Chothmull Joshi, P.W. 2, nor Dharamlal Prasad, P.W. 3, was a summoned witness. I should not be under stood to mean that an unsummoned witness cannot be relied on; but I only propose to take this fact into consideration in assessing the credibility of this witness P.W. 2. P.W. 2 has further stated that the plaintiff has only two rooms and a kitchen in his possession while it is the definite evidence of the plaintiff, P.W. 1, himself that he is in possession of the three storeys of the four-storeyed building. This is again a fact which, I think, I should take into consideration in deciding the credibility of this witness. But everything apart, what strikes me most in this case is that it is not the case of the plaintiff at any stage that he requires the suit-premises as he genuinely intends to establish his sons in business but his case all-through is that his sons have said that they want to start separate and independent business and the suit-premises are necessary therefor. The two sons, Chiranjilal and Khemehand, have not come or been examined as witnesses in this case and the only evidence about their intention to start business is that they said so to P.W. 1 and also to P.W. 2. The two sons, Chiranjilal and Khemehand, have not come or been examined as witnesses in this case and the only evidence about their intention to start business is that they said so to P.W. 1 and also to P.W. 2. I am afraid that unless these two sons themselves come forward and depose that they genuinely and honestly intend to start a business, the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 that they told them that they wanted to start separate business must be rejected *****. I have already pointed out that the plaintiff has nowhere stated that it is he who has decided to settle his sons in business and different considerations might have arisen if the plaintiff could and did say so. But as the plaintiff has nowhere said so and the so-called evidence of the plaintiff and P.W. 2 as to the intention of the two sons to start business is to be rejected as hearsay, I am afraid that there is nothing on record from which I can conclude that the suit-premises are genuinely and bona fide required for any business which the two sons are alleged to have intended to start. Non-examination of the two sons, who would have been the best witnesses to state as to whether they genuinely and honestly intend to start separate business and that the suit premises are required therefor, without any explanation for their non-examination, cannot but raise an adverse inference against the plaintiff's case. I, therefore, hold that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the suit-premises are required for his bona fide occupation or for the bona fide occupation of his dependents and the decree for ejectment granted by the learned District judge cannot, therefore, be sustained and must be set aside. 27. Before parting with this case I would, however, like to observe one thing more. As I have already pointed out at the out-set, I have proceeded an the basis that the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956 applies to this case. I have also pointed out that this Court has both in Jokhiram's case (1977-1 Sikkim LJ 30) and in Sakuntala Bai's case (1977-1 Sikkim LJ 33) held that even if the said Act of 1956 is not applicable, the suit for eviction of tenants would be governed by the provisions of law contained in the Notification No. 6326-600/HandWB, dated 14th Apr. 1949 and that the provisions of law as contained in the said notification are also more or less similar. But I should, however, point out that in Para. 2 of the Notification of 1949, the ground of ejectment is requirement of the premises for the "personal occupation" of the landlord, while as I have already noted, under the Act of 1956 the ground of ejectment is requirement of the premises for the bona fide occupation of the landlord or his dependents. I have already pointed out, relying on the Supreme Court case of D.N. Sangavi v. A.T. Das (AIR 1974 SC 1026), that the expression "personal occupation" must connote the idea that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for the occupation of the landlord and I have already pointed out hereinbefore that even if the occupation of the suit-premises was necessary for starting independent business for the two sons, that would not have been a case of requirement "for the personal "occupation" of the landlord". That being so, the plaintiffs claim for ejectment of the tenant must also fail even if the provisions of law contained in the aforesaid Notification of 1949 were to apply to this case. 28. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the Judgement of the learned District Judge, so far it relates to the ejectment of the defendant, is set aside and the Judgement, so far it relates to the claim for arrears of rent, is affirmed and the judgement shall stand modified accordingly. But under the circumstance, there will be no order as to costs. MAN MOHAN SINGH GUJRAL, C.J. :- I agree.