Judgment :- 1. These two Revision Petitions arise out of an order passed in Appeal, by the University Appellate Tribunal, Trivandrum; CRP. No. 2431 of 1977 being by the Manager of a private College, The Loyola College of Social Science, Sreekariyam, and CRP No. 2927 of 1977 being by a Lecturer of the said College. The controversy relates to the termination of the term of probation of the Lecturer in question, who is the second respondent in CRP No 2431 of 1977, and the petitioner in the other CRP. Against the order terminating her probation, she filed an appeal to the Tribunal, which was allowed, setting aside the order of termination and directing her reinstatement in service. While doing so, the Tribunal directed that in view of the requirement that the probationary period must be one year within a period of two years, and the impossibility of complying with this requirement on the proved facts, she will have to be on a fresh period of probation. Against the order of the Tribunal allowing the Lecturer's appeal and directing her reinstatement, the management of the College has preferred its revision; and against that portion of the order holding that the Lecturer will be on fresh probation for a period of one year, the Lecturer concerned has preferred the other CRP. No. 1431 of 1977. The 2nd respondent herein, namely, the Lecturer in question, was appointed on 171974. According to the terms of the statute to be referred to presently, she had to be on probation for a period of one year. On 28-4-1975, Management issued a show-cause notice for termination of her probation. On 6-5-1975 she showed cause. On 28-6-1975 the Management discharged her with effect from 30-6-1975. The date from which the discharge was to take effect be it noted marks the expiry of her normal period of probation. Against the termination of her probation, the 2nd respondent preferred Appeal No. 3 of 1975 before the University Appellate Tribunal. She also preferred O. P. No. 3113 of 1975 questioning her discharge. The Original Petition was dismissed on the ground that the appeal was pending. The Appeal to the Tribunal was dismissed in the first instance. I.A. No. 1581976 for review was allowed. The appeal was re-heard; and after re-hearing, was allowed directing reinstatement with a direction for fresh probation. 2. The Original Petition was dismissed on the ground that the appeal was pending. The Appeal to the Tribunal was dismissed in the first instance. I.A. No. 1581976 for review was allowed. The appeal was re-heard; and after re-hearing, was allowed directing reinstatement with a direction for fresh probation. 2. A preliminary objection was taken by counsel for the 2nd respondent that the revision is not maintainable. The revision is preferred under S.60(9) of the Kerala University Act, 1974, which reads: "60. Conditions of service of teachers of private colleges. (9) Any person who objects to an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (7) may, within sixty days from the date on which a copy of such order is served on him, prefer a petition accompanied by court fee stamps of the value of ten rupees to the High Court on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal has either decided erroneously, or failed to decide, any question of law. And sub-section (7) reads: (7) Any teacher aggrieved by an order passed after the commencement of this Act in any disciplinary proceeding taken against him may, within sixty days from the date on which a copy of such order is served on him or within sixty days after the Appellate Tribunal has been constituted under this Act, whichever period expires later, appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and after such further enquiry as may be necessary, pass such order thereon as it may deem fit, including an order of reinstatement of the teacher concerned. Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal presented after the expiration of the said period if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the said period." The above provisions have to be coupled with S.59 (8) of the Act, which is as follows: "59. Probation. (8) A probationer who is discharged or reverted under sub-s. (6) or who is discharged or reverted before the prescribed period of probation otherwise than on the ground of want of vacancy shall be entitled to appeal against the order of discharge or reversion to the Appellate Tribunal and the provisions of S.60 shall, mutatis mutandis apply to such appeals." And sub-section (6) reads: "(6) If. on the expiry of the prescribed period of probation, the educational agency decides that the teacher is not suitable for continuance in the post in which he is appointed, it shall discharge him from service or revert him to his original appointment, as the case may be, after giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him." It was contended that a revision will lie under S.60 (9) only against an order in disciplinary proceedings passed under sub-section (7). Therefore, it was stated that, as the discharge of a probationer on the ground or unsuitability is not a disciplinary proceeding, the same could not be attracted by S.60 (7), and would not ex hypothesi fall under S.60 (9). The contention is fallacious. Against the discharge of a probationer under sub-section (6), the provisions of S.60 are mutatis mutandis attracted. To apply the litera scripta of clause (7) of S.60 to S.59 (8) and to hold that a revision against the order would be attracted only if the order of discharge was by way of disciplinary proceeding, would be to make a mockery of S.59 (8). The difference by way of discharge of a probationer for unsuitability and termination by way of disciplinary action is well-known in service terminology and service parlance. Whils the provisions of S.59 extracted above, speaks of discharge of a probationer, the said provision would be stultified if we were to read into it the requirement that the same should be by way of disciplinary proceeding as provided under S.60 (7), in order to attract the right of revision under S.60 (9). To put such a construction, would be to ignore the significance and the implication of the term "mutatis mutandis" occurring in S.59 (8). 3. Counsel for the 2nd respondent invited our attention to the two earlier judgments of this Court in C R.P. No. 2936 of 1977 and C.R.P. No. 2619 of 1977. The orders which were there carried up in revision were both against orders of appointment under S.57 (10) of the Act against which there was no provision for a right of revision under S.60 (9). Those decisions therefore have no application. We overrule the preliminary objection, and proceed to the merits. 4. The orders which were there carried up in revision were both against orders of appointment under S.57 (10) of the Act against which there was no provision for a right of revision under S.60 (9). Those decisions therefore have no application. We overrule the preliminary objection, and proceed to the merits. 4. S.59 (1) of the Act requires Teachers of Private Colleges to be on probation for a period of one year within a period of two years, with a right of extending the probation in exceptional cases for a period not exceeding one year. Sub-section (3) and sub-section (7) of S.59 may be noted: "59 Probation. (3) The educational agency may, at any time before the prescribed period of probation, terminate the probation of the probationer for want of vacancy and discharge him from service if he was appointed by direct recruitment or revert him to his original appointment if the appointment to the new post was by transfer or promotion." (7) Where the post held by the probationer is substantively vacant and before the expiry of one month from the prescribed period of probation he is not confirmed under sub-s. (5) or is not discharged or reverted under sub-s (6), he shall be deemed to have been confirmed in that post." Counsel for the revision-petitioners contended that the statute itself contemplated termination of a probationer even during the currency of a probation, otherwise than for want of vacancy. This was emphasised by reference to the words in S.59(8) which we have already quoted,: "who is discharged or reverted before the prescribed period of probation otherwise than on the ground of want of vacancy". There is no mistaking these words. But they are for the purpose of providing a right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against the order of discharge. Where the termination on the specified ground cannot itself be located under the provisions of the Act, the right of appeal, to that extent, becomes otiose and inoperative. The provision is therefore not helpful to find a right of termination as such during the currency of the probation otherwise than for want of vacancy We reject the contention that S.59 sanctions and recognizes termination during the currency of probation otherwise than for want of vacancy. 5. The above view receives support from V. Rev. Mother Provincial & others v. State of Kerala & others (1969 KLT. 5. The above view receives support from V. Rev. Mother Provincial & others v. State of Kerala & others (1969 KLT. 749), where, a Full Bench of this Court, of which one of us (myself) was a member, speaking with respect to the Kerala University Act, 1969, which contained S.55, substantially similar to S.59 of the present Act, observed at page 773: "39. S.55 provides for the continuance of a teacher after satisfactory completion of probation and seems to us quite necessary for securing fair conditions of service for the teachers while at the same time ensuring their suitability, and for preventing abuses of the kind referred to in the counter-affidavits of the respondents which it is unnecessary to detail, but which it is a matter of common knowledge do exist in smaller or greater degree. The provisions of the section are similar to provisions for probation and confirmation in the rules for government servants, and we are satisfied that they only ensure that security of tenure essential for a contented service they are no more than a safeguard against malafide, arbitrary or capricious discharge. Objection has been taken to sub-section (6) of the section which requires the managing body to make up its mind as to the suitability of a probationer within a month of the expiry of the period of probation. This, we think, is an eminently reasonable provision, for, after having watched the work and conduct of a person for the prescribed normal period of one year, it should not take the managing body more than a month to decide whether that person is suitable or not. If it does not pronounce him unsuitable within that time, there is nothing wrong in presuming that it has found him suitable. It should not be open to the managing body to postpone its decision indefinitely with the Damoclean sword of discharge hanging over the probationer's head. That would do the institution no good. It is pointed out that the section makes no provision for discharge before the expiry of the period of probation and it is said that this compels the retention, to the detriment of the institution, of a teacher who has earlier proved his unfitness. That would do the institution no good. It is pointed out that the section makes no provision for discharge before the expiry of the period of probation and it is said that this compels the retention, to the detriment of the institution, of a teacher who has earlier proved his unfitness. That is not so, for, there is nothing to prevent the removal of such a teacher, since proved unfitness, even if it be due only to incompetence, is a proper ground for what is commonly known as disciplinary action. It is really only a question of degree a greater degree of incompetence will ordinarily be required for a removal. In the one case, the teacher has to prove his fitness; in the other, it has to be proved that he is unfit; and it is only fair that a man should be given at least a year's trial to prove his fitness." The above exposition clearly brings out the object of insisting on one year's period for a probationer to prove his fitness, and for the management desisting to judge the suitability of the probationer during that period. In Benedict Mar Gregorios v. State of Kerala (1976 KLT. 458), speaking with respect to the provisions of S.59 of the 1974 Act, on behalf of the Full Bench, I observed: "There may be nothing wrong on principle to concede a right of appeal against discharge of a probationer. But to throw open the entire field regarding suitability of the probationer may well trench on the minority's right. Suitability from the point of view of the minority's interests would be the proper consideration." (para 16) 6. It was then contended that in any event, on the facts disclosed, termination had resulted only on the normal expiry of the period of probation, namely, on 30 61975, and that therefore the 2nd respondent can have no cause for grievance. We are unable to see either from the provisions of the Section or from the object and the purpose of these provisions as explained by the decisions noticed, why preliminary steps for termination of the probation cannot be taken during the currency of the probation, so long as the termination of the probation itself is to take effect only from the normal expiry of the term, and not earlier. That is precisely what has happened in this case, as the 2nd respondent's probation was terminated only with effect from 30-6-1975 on which date it would have normally ended. We see nothing, on the facts disclosed in this case, to forbid, the preliminary steps such as clearing the decks or raising the hand before the Guillotine actually descends, so long as the actual descent is only on the dead line, and not before. The provisions of S.59 (7) which we have quoted earlier only serves to emphasise this view. That enacts that quiescence beyond one month from the expiry of probation in confirming the probationer, will result in automatically clamping an order of confirmation on the probationer. For the period of one month after expiry of probation, if a probationer dodges a notice of termination of probation, he is to get automatically confirmed which only strengthens the view that preliminary steps may well start before expiry of the term. Especially would this be unobjectionable if there is readiness to take into account any spurt of good conduct on the part of the probationer between the date of taking the preliminary steps and the termination of probation. We are of the opinion that the termination of the probation in this case was not wrongful and did not offend the provisions of the Act; and the Tribunal was wrong in holding otherwise. 7. We allow this revision petition, and direct that Appeal No. 3 of 1975 to the University Appellate Tribunal, will stand dismissed. We make no order as to costs. C. R. P. No. 2927 of 1977. The Tribunal was clearly wrong in directing the 2nd respondent to restart her probation. We see no power in the Tribunal to direct this to be done under the provisions of the statute or otherwise. The revision-petitioner's grievance in this revision is legitimate and justified. We would have allowed her revision and directed the discharge of the direction to allow her to be on probation for a fresh period of one year; but as we have allowed CRP. No. 2431 of 1977 and directed that the appeal to the University Appellate Tribunal would stand dismissed, we can only direct that this revision will also stand dismissed. We do so. But make no order as to costs. These revisions were argued on the 8th and judgment was reserved. No. 2431 of 1977 and directed that the appeal to the University Appellate Tribunal would stand dismissed, we can only direct that this revision will also stand dismissed. We do so. But make no order as to costs. These revisions were argued on the 8th and judgment was reserved. We had proposed to Counsel for the Management and for the Lecturer concerned, that it was best, in the interests of both, to settle the matter; and had even suggested the terns for settlement to take back the probationer and assess her suitability for a period of six months, at the end of which, it found unsuitable, she may be discharged. The Counsel for the Lecturer was agreeable to the course, but the Management wanted time to consider. On the 9th, counsel for the Management submitted that the Management could not agree to take back the Lecturer even for six months; but that it was prepared to pay her, her salary even for a period of 12 months, without taking her back. Counsel who appeared for the Lecturer wanted to put this proposal to the Lecturer. We intimated that, if agreeable, we may be informed today (the 11th); and if not, judgment shall immediately follow. As there was no settlement, we have delivered our judgment in these revisions.