JUDGMENT 1. IN this Rule, the petitioner has impeached an appellate order in Annexure "d", arising out of a proceeding initiated and determined under section 5a of the West Bengal estate Acquisition Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act. 2. ONE Kedar Nath Guria, Respondent No. 4 had 2 wives and the petitioner Atal Behari Guria is the son by his first wife. Sri Santosh Kumar guria is another son by the second wife of the said Respondent No. 4. It has been stated that in 1358 B. S. as there were ill feeling between the 2 step brothers, the father. Respondent No. 4 for the purpose of bringing about peace and amity between them. Had got them separated and for the purpose of making provision for maintenance of the sons, he gave them about 36. 33 acres of agricultural lands including scane bastu and other lands. It appears that possession of those lands were delivered to the sons and since then the petitioner has alleged to have used, enjoyed and possessed his share of lands independently and without any interruption from others. The properties as mentioned hereinbefore along with other properties belonging to the Respondent No. 4 were not duly partitioned among the co-sharers, so no registered documents in respect of those properties could be effected. It has also been stated that since the petitioner was possessing his share of lands, they were duly recorded in his name in the finally published revisional record of rights and he has been paying rents duly and regularly to the State of West Bengal. In fact he has paid such rents upto 1371 B. S. 3. THE petitioner has alleged that thereafter he learnt from the Tashildar concerned, that the State was going to settle the lands in question with others treating them as vested and being the surplus lands of Respondent No. 4 and perhaps he would be disposessed from those lands. On such information, admittedly a Title Suit being Title Suit no. THE petitioner has alleged that thereafter he learnt from the Tashildar concerned, that the State was going to settle the lands in question with others treating them as vested and being the surplus lands of Respondent No. 4 and perhaps he would be disposessed from those lands. On such information, admittedly a Title Suit being Title Suit no. 551 of 1966 in the First Court of the learned Munsiff, Diamond harbour, was instituted against the State of West Bengal represented by the Collector, 24 Parganas and also by the collector of Midnapore, as lands belonged to and under the 2 districts, for declaration of his title to the lands in question, which as aforesaid was settled with him by a registered deed dated july 29, 1955, executed by the Respondent No. 4, who incidentally was made a proforma respondent in the said suit. In the suit a prayer for permanent injunction, restraining the State of West bengal, from interfering with the possession of the petitioner herein, was made. Such suit was admittedly filed after due service of notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. THE said suit, as filed, was admittedly decreed on contest against the state of West Bengal, by the learned munsiff on January 25, 1968, holding inter alia amongst others that the deed in question was a genuine and bonafide one and thus the petitioner's title to the properties in suit as situated in both the districts of 24 Parganas and Midnapore, were declared and the State of west Bengal was permanently restrained from interfering with in any way, with the properties as covered by the deed of settlement in question. In the suit, the State of West Bengal, which as aforesaid was a defendant and more particularly defendant No. 1 filed a written statement contending, inter alia, amongst others that the settlement or gift as involved was improper, irregular, invalid and furthermore the same was never acted upon. It has also been an admitted fact that from such determination, no further appeal was taken by the defendant State of West Bengal and as such the determinations as made became final and binding on all the parties to the suit. 5. It has also been an admitted fact that from such determination, no further appeal was taken by the defendant State of West Bengal and as such the determinations as made became final and binding on all the parties to the suit. 5. THEREAFTER, a proceeding under section 5a of the said Act being Sonarpur Settlement Camp Case No. 216 of 1968, was initiated by the Revenue Officer concerned and the transfer in question was held to be a bonafide one by an order dated April 29, 1970 (Annexure B. Admittedly after such determination, the petitioner had paid rents to the State of West Bengal, in respect of the entire lands covered by the deed in question and he had been possessing them duly. While he was in such possession and owning the lands, the Revenue Officer, Settlement b Camp, Contai, Midnapore, Respondent No. 3 initiated a fresh proceeding under section 5a of the said Act, in respect of the lands in the district of midnapore. Initiation of such proceeding was objected to by the petitioner contending, inter alia, amongst others that the matter or the right in the instant case having been decided finally by the Civil Court and when considering the deed in question, the transfer in respect of lands at 24 Parganas having been found to be bonafide on initiation of a proceeding under section 5a of the said Act, the initiation as made by the Respondent No. 3, was improper and in any event he was not entitled to entertain or try once again any dispute or any matter connected with the deed in question, thereby trying to interfere with the determinations as made duly by the Civil Court, indirectly. It was submitted that since no appeal was taken from the determination as made by the learned Munsif, the matter in issue between the parties, became final and the Revenue Officer concerned had no right or authority, either to investigate or interfere with such, determination or to bye pass and effect the same, adversely by any proceeding initiated under section 5a of the said Act. In short, it was submitted that the Respondent No. 3, was not entitled to have the effect of the decree by the Civil Court made nugatory indirectly as he could not have the same done directly. In short, it was submitted that the Respondent No. 3, was not entitled to have the effect of the decree by the Civil Court made nugatory indirectly as he could not have the same done directly. It appears that such submission of the petitioner did not weigh with the Revenue Officer concerned, and he by his order dated february 26, 1969 (Annexure C), made a determination against the petitioner. 6. FROM such determination, the petitioner admittedly preferred the appeal being No. 89 of 1969 in the court of the learned Special Judge, midnapore, and in fact such appeal has also been rejected by the judgment and order dated September 13, 1973. It appears that in the appeal, the petitioner herein duly argued the question of application of the principle of res judicata or principles analogous thereto, in support of his submissions that in view of the earlier determination made on merits, between the same parties, the authorities concerned had no right or competence and jurisdiction to maintain a proceeding as initiated under section 5a of the said Act. Such submissions have of course been rejected by the Respondents concerned and maintained in the appeal in question. It has further been observed that the gift in the instant case, being within the mischief period and made in favour of parties or relations who would come within the mischief of section 5a (7) (i) land (ii) of the said act, the transfer in question was held not to be bonafide and in terms of section 3 of the said Act the subsequent initiation as aforesaid, was authorised. Mr. Mitra appearing in support of the Rule, apart from repeating the submissions as recorded hereinbefore, and which were made in the connected proceeding upto appeal, submitted that although the gift in question was admittedly within the mischief period, yet in view of the determinations duly made by the Civil Court, on proper evidence and contest, would be res judicata in the instant case, as parties to the proceeding in the suit and the proceeding initiated subsequently under the said Act, were the same and there were determinations on merit. He further submitted that either section 3 of the said Act or the scheme of the said Act itself, cannot take away or authorise the authorities under the said act to have the effect of a due determination made by the Civil Court, ineffective. 7. He further submitted that either section 3 of the said Act or the scheme of the said Act itself, cannot take away or authorise the authorities under the said act to have the effect of a due determination made by the Civil Court, ineffective. 7. MR. Sarkar appearing for the respondents placed great reliance on section 3 of the said Act, which provides for overriding the effect to the all other laws etc., and to the following effect :-S. 3.-Act to override other laws, etc. The provisions of this act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or in any contract express or implied or in any instrument and notwithstanding any usage or custom to the contrary. Provided that nothing in this act shall apply to any land held by a Corporation, not being a local authority or a Company, established by or under any law for the time being in force: provided further that nothing in this Act shall affect any land possession of which was taken by the State Government before the date mentioned in the notification issued under section 4, in furtherance of any proposal for acquiring such land, whether any formal proceedings for such acquisition were started or not, and proceedings for acquisition of such land may be continued or commenced as if this act had not been passed. He also referred to the language of section 5a and sought to interpret: that the provisions of section 3 read with section 5a of the said Act, would empower the authorities under the said act to initiate proceedings under the said Act and for the purpose of finding out whether the transfer effected within the mischief period, was a bonafide one or not even inspite of a due determination by the competent Court. In fact, he submitted that on proper interpretation and construction of the two sections as aforesaid, it must be held that they provide for ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Court in a matter like this. He also submitted that the principles of res judicata or principles analogous thereto, would have no application in the instant case, because the earlier determination in the Title suit was not between the same parties, as the prescribed authorities under the said Act, were not made parties in the suit in question, although the State of west Bengal was made a party. In fact on a reference to the averments in the petition, Mr. Sarkar submitted that since contravention in the light of the submissions as made now, has not been alleged so there should not be any interference by this Court. In effect and in short, he further argued that res judicata or principles analogous thereto would have no application in the instant case and those principles would not be available in a proceeding as initiated under the said Act or against the authorities under the said act, who initiated such preceding. 8. IN support of his submissions on the question of application of res judicata or principles analogous thereto, Mr. Mitra relied on the determinations in the case of Raj Lakshmi dasi v. Banamali Sen, 1953 S. C. A. 22. In that case it has been observed that: whether a question of title was necessarily and substantially involved in a land acquisition proceeding for arriving at a decision on the question of apportionment of compensation money and was finally decided by a Court having jurisdiction to try it, the decision operates as res judicata and estoppes the persons against whom the decision was given from reagitating the question in a subsequent suit between the parties. The binding force of a judgment delivered under the Land Acquisition Act depends on a general principles of law and not upon section 11 of the code of Civil Procedure. If it were) not binding, there would be no end to litigation. The test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases. When a plea of res judicata is founded on general principles of law, all that is necessary to establish is that the court that heard and decided the former case was a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not seem necessary in such cases to further prove that it has jurisdiction to hear the later suit. A plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of courts of exclusive jurisdictions like revenue courts, land acquisition courts, administration courts, etc. These courts are not entitled to try a regular suit and they can only exercise special jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute. A plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of courts of exclusive jurisdictions like revenue courts, land acquisition courts, administration courts, etc. These courts are not entitled to try a regular suit and they can only exercise special jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute. The doctrine of res judicata is biased undoubtedly on general principles of jurisprudence and in terms of the determination of the Supreme Court as aforesaid the binding force of a judgment depends on general principles of law and not upon section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure alone. Under section 5a of the said Act, restrictions on certain transfers have been imposed and consequently transfers made within, the mischief period and in favour of restricted degrees or relations as mentioned thereunder would be void. Such transfers in terms of section 5a (7) (iii) would mean and include transfer by sale, mortgage, lease, exchange on gift. Thus, ordinarily the transfer as in the instant case would be hit by the provisions of section 5a of and the said sub-clauses thereunder. In section 3 of the said Act, which as quoted hereinbefore, provides for overriding other laws or in any other provisions of the said Act, a suit is not barred. Thus when a determination has been made in such a suit, although the transfer in question is hit by the provisions of section 5a and several sub-clauses as referred to above, the principles of res judicata or principles analogous thereto would have application as otherwise there would be no finality for any end to the litigations and mare particularly when the underlying doctrine of res judicata is that one should not be vexed twice for the same case land there should be finality of litigation. This Rule also rests on public policy. The basic principle of rule of res judicata is that the cause of action for the second proceeding being merged in the first, it does not any more survive. Res judicata is sometimes treated as estoppel by judgment and it ousts the jurisdiction of the Court and is a rule of evidence. It is for the party raising it, to establish res judicata and the same will have made to be determined by reference to the pleadings, issues and judgment. Res judicata is sometimes treated as estoppel by judgment and it ousts the jurisdiction of the Court and is a rule of evidence. It is for the party raising it, to establish res judicata and the same will have made to be determined by reference to the pleadings, issues and judgment. The rule of res judicata applies not only to appeals but also to miscellaneous proceedings as it does to original suits. The principle of res judicata are also applicable and available to a matter outside in a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been observed in the case of Daryao and Ors. v. State of U. P., A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1457, that when the decision is pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Rule of res judicata is neither irrelevant nor inadmissible even in dealing with the fundamental rights under article 32, when a writ petition under article 226 is dismissed by the High court. It appears further that and as held in the case of Kamalapat v. Commissioner of Income-tax, A. I. R. 1950 allahabad 249 that in Income-tax matters decision as to previous year, which settle rights or title and which affects the assessment of the other years, in res judicata. It should also be remembered that the doctrine of res judicata should be entertained and applied liberally and such application of the said Rule should not be influenced by technical considerations or form but by matter of substance within the limits allowed by law. The condition for availability of res judicata or principles analogous thereto being (1)identity of matter in issue, (2) identity of parties, (3) same title, (4) concurrence of jurisdiction land (5) final decision, and such conditions in the instant case having been duly satisfied, I am of the view that the principles of res judicata or principles analogous there to would be available to the petitioner and as such, the relevant authorities, who are Respondents herein, could not initiate the proceedings under section 5a of the said Act or make the determination in the appeal and in the manner, which they did. I am further of the view that there is no substance in the submissions of Mr. I am further of the view that there is no substance in the submissions of Mr. Sarkar that those principles of res judicata would not be available, as the prescribed authorities under the said act were not parties in the earlier suit when it cannot be denied that the State of West Bengal, which was and is a necessary party was duly impleaded and in fact contested the said suit. I am also of the view that ordinarily section 3 should not be construed as creating a specific ouster or bar in respect of a suit for a declaration of the type, which was filed in the instant case and which was decreed on contest. I further find that the respondent State of West Bengal having allowed the decree at the stage of determination by the learned Munsif and having allowed such determination to have the character of finality viz., by not having impeached the said determination in Appeal, should not be allowed to say now that they are not bound by those determinations. If such action is allowed, now then the effect of a decree duly passed or made would be frustrated and that too indirectly by an authority who has not got such power directly. That being the position, the arguments of Mr. Mitra succeed, so also the Rule. Let appropriate writs be issued quashing the impugned order in annexure 'd' and the initiation of proceeding under section 5a of the said act. Civil Rule No. 4086 (W) of 1973 since the points of law and the facts involved in this case are the same and similar to Civil Rule No. 4085 (W)of 1973, the order which I have proposed in the said Rule, would also govern civil Rule No. 4086 (W) of 1973. Stay of operation of the order as prayed for is refused. Rule made absolute.