JUDGMENT 1. THE opposite party instituted a suit against the petitioner for his ejectment from the suit premises, which was held by him under the said opposite party as a monthly tenant at a monthly rent of rs. 40/- payable according to English calender month, on determination of the tenancy. The petitioner entered appearance in the suit being Title Suit no. 247 of 1947 in the Court of Third munsif at Alipore on January 9, 1975 even though no summons was served on him. Thereafter he filed an application under section 17 (2) and 17 (2) (A) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act on January 14, 1975 raising some dispute in regard to the payment of rent. He further prayed that he should be permitted to deposit the amount as would be determined by easy monthly instalments. The said application was allowed on December 17, 1975 directing the petitioner to deposit the sum of Rs. 850. 80 P being the arrears of rent with interest by 12 monthly instalments. The said order was passed on consent. 2. ON November 28, 1975 the opposite party filed an application under section 17 (3) of the Act praying for striking out the defence against the delivery of possession on the ground that the petitioner defendant had deposited the rent in the name of one of the co-owner plaintiffs and as such the deposits were invalid. This application was heard on contest by the learned Munsif who by his order No. 36 of July 23, 1976 held that the defendant petitioner had duly complied with section 17 (1) of the Act by depositing the rent equivalent in the name of biswanath Seal, plaintiff in his both capacities for self and as a Trustee. By order of the said date the application under Section 17 (8) was dismissed. The plaintiff thereupon filed an appeal against the said order before the District Judge. Alipore and by his order dated 9th November. 1976, the learned District Judge held that the appeal before him was maintainable in view of the decision in Iswar Singh kripal Singh and Co. vs. Rajputana Trading co. Ltd. 77 C. W. N. page 326 and there was nothing in the decision in amin Chand v. Mamalbai 80 C. W. N. 740 which bars such appeal. 1976, the learned District Judge held that the appeal before him was maintainable in view of the decision in Iswar Singh kripal Singh and Co. vs. Rajputana Trading co. Ltd. 77 C. W. N. page 326 and there was nothing in the decision in amin Chand v. Mamalbai 80 C. W. N. 740 which bars such appeal. On merits the learned Judge held that the deposits were illegal and ineffective as the deposits admittedly were made in the personal name of Biswanath Seal. Accordingly the appeal was allowed and the plaintiff opposite party's application under section 17 (3) was also allowed striking out the defence against the delivery of possession. The present Rule has been obtained by the defendant petitioner against this order. 3. THERE can to be no dispute that the appeal is a creature of the statute and unless an appeal is provided in law, no appeal is available against any order. The order under section 17 (3)passed by the Trial Court has not been made subject to any appeal in law even though at the hearing of the appeal from the degree as may be passed in the suit, the appellant may challenge such an order as an interlocutory order in the suit under section 105 (1) of the code of Civil Procedure. The learned appellate court has relied on the decision in Rajputana Trading Co. Ltd. ' s case in which the appeal was entertained from an order of the Trial Judge under section 17 (3) of the Act in a suit of the Original Side of this Court as a part determination of the substantial rights of the parties. This order was accepted by the appeal court as a judgment as defined in clause 15 of the Letters Patent which in the earlier part governs the procedure in the Original jurisdiction of this Court and an appeal is provided therein against a judgment of one Judge. The above provisions of this clause cannot be availed in the proceedings before courts which are not courts in the Original jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly it is obvious that this decision has no application to such proceedings in courts not in the Original jurisdiction of this Court. The above provisions of this clause cannot be availed in the proceedings before courts which are not courts in the Original jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly it is obvious that this decision has no application to such proceedings in courts not in the Original jurisdiction of this Court. It is clear therefore that the appeal before the lower appellate Court was not maintainable in absence of any provision in law in respect thereof and the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose the appeal before him. In fact this position has not been disputed before me. 4. MR. Radhakanta Bhattacharyya learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff opposite party, has drawn my attention to several decisions in which the High Court has suo motto interfered with an order in revision passed by the trial court even if the appellate order there from was without jurisdiction. In soma Sundaram vs. Muthu Manicka nadar A. I. R. 1932 Madras 714 it was held that High Court is entitled in the proper case to interfere in revision even without an application to it by the party interested in that case. It was further held that where the Trial court passed an erroneous non-appealable order and the appeal there from is however, entertained, the High Court can revise the original order while setting aside the appellate order. In this case the Division Bench of the Madras high Court relying the earlier decisions modified the order of the learned munsif in proceedings under order 23 (1) of the Code in respect of the cost, adding a default clause to the effect that if the costs were not paid by the plaintiff as directed the suit would stand as dismissed with cost. In Avinah ouseph vs. Karthiyani, A. I. R 1965 kerala 179 it was held that entertaining an appeal against an order when the order itself is not appealable and its disposal are both illegal and void. Though the revision in such case against the appellate order can be allowed on the short ground that the appeal filed was without jurisdiction and the order of the appellate court is also void and passed without jurisdiction, the High court in exercising its power suo moto under Section 115, may investigate the question whether the order of the trial Court itself was legal or not. Strongly relying on the aforesaid decisions, Mr. Strongly relying on the aforesaid decisions, Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that the order of the learned Munsif on the plaintiff's application under section 17 (3)of the Act was patently erroneous and this Court should interfere with the order suo moto and pass appropriate orders. In this connection i may refer to the decision in Rathindra Nath vs. Jyoti Bikash A. I. R. 1975 Calcutta 377 wherein I took the view that the revisional powers of this court does not extend to correct the order passed when the party disputing the propriety of the order has not legally and validly brought the impugned order in this Court in accordance with law, the matter coming to this court at the instance of the other party challenging the appellate order therefrom when the appeal itself was incompetent. The position has further to be considered from two aspects. The order of the learned Munsif, which is now assailed before me by the plaintiff opposite party, was not an order passed without jurisdiction but it may be an erroneous order which does not nonsuit any party and it will be possible for the plaintiff in law to challenge in an appeal against the decree if passed against him, though such challenge may not be effective in the particular case. Further under Article 131 of the limitation Act, 1963 a specified time limit has been provided for moving the high Court in revision under the Code and when the period elapses the interlocutory order acquires a finality between the parties in so far as the proceeding before the trial court is concerned. Accordingly, exercise of suo moto powers of revision under the Code, which again is not provided therein, if it can at all be exercised must be circumscribed under those limitations. For all these reasons it is not possible to interfere with the order of the learned munsif which is otherwise within jurisdiction and at this stage, as submitted by Mr. Bhattacharyya. The Rule accordingly succeeds and is made absolute. The impugned appellate order is set aside. There will be no order for costs. Let the records be sent down at once. Rule made absolute.