M. N. SHUKLA, J. This is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent. The suit was dis missed by the trial court but on appeal the decree was set aside and the lower appellate court decreed the plaintiffs suit. 2. The parties were at issue on a number of points and the findings recorded by the trial court were that there was no relation ship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants 2 to 4, that the defendants did not make any material alterations in the accommodation in tenancy, that the defendants 2 to 4 were not the tenants, and that the defendants did not commit and default in payment of rent. These findings were reversed by the lower appel late court and hence this appeal. 3. The first point which was canvassed before me on behalf of the appellants was that the relationship of landlord and tenant had not been established between the plaintiff and defendants and the contrary finding of the lower appellate court was illegal. Sri Gaur mainly attacked the finding of the court below relating to the receipts on which it had relied for holding that such relationship existed bet ween the parties. This argument was based on mere technicalities and had no substance. He emphasised the fact that the alleged sig natures on the receipts had been denied on behalf of the defendants and the court had not recorded a clear finding to the effect that the signatures had been made, as alleged, by the Plaintiff. It was also stressed that the receipts on which the court had relied had not been actually exhibited by the Court below, i. e. , no exhibit marked were v noted on them This again is a mere technicality. if the execution of the receipts has been proved by requisite evidence in law mere omission to place exhibit mark does not in any manner detract from the evidentiary value of the receipts. Plaintiff Champa Lal, exa mined himself as P. W. 1 in the case and deposed that the receipts of rent used to be issued in the names of all the four defendants but signatures of any one of them were obtained on the counter-foils of the receipts. These receipts contain the signatures of the defendants and their father. Plaintiff Champa Lal, exa mined himself as P. W. 1 in the case and deposed that the receipts of rent used to be issued in the names of all the four defendants but signatures of any one of them were obtained on the counter-foils of the receipts. These receipts contain the signatures of the defendants and their father. The plaintiff actually deposed that he was ac quainted with those signatures and formally proved the execution of the receipt in like fashion. He proved receipt No. 34 which was signed by Mohd. Umar (D. W. 4), son of Ramzani. This receipt is date: December 23, 1949. It is remarkable that although Mohd. Umar had been examined in the case, he has not denied his signature on the receipt. On the other hand, the signatures had been denied by Abdul Zahoor. I also find on record receipt No. 31 dated January 3, 1945 thumb marked by Abdul Aziz alias Mimma, who was one of the parties to the rent note dated December 13, 1930. This had al ready been duly proved by Champa Lal, Plaintiff. Apart from this, the court below rightly relied on the rent note (Exhibit 3) dated December 13, 1930 which was executed by Abdul Aziz alias Mimma and Ramzani. Mohd. Umar (D. W. 4) is the son of Ramzani and he had admitted the title of the plaintiff. In my opinion these receipts were sufficiently proved according to law and they established the "fact of payment of rent open after the expiry of the term of the re gistered lease. From the oral and documentary evidence on record the court below rightly came to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord and tenant had been established between the parties. 4. It was next submitted on behalf of the appellants that ex hibit 3, being a fixed term lease, it automatically came to an end after the expiry of five years and the court below was in error in holding that thereafter the defendants were holding over. It was contended that Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act was not attracted and there was no evidence of any overt act on the part of the lessor to prove the act of holding over. There is no force in this submission. It was contended that Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act was not attracted and there was no evidence of any overt act on the part of the lessor to prove the act of holding over. There is no force in this submission. I have already held above that the receipts evidencing payment of rent after the expiry of the period of original lease had been filed and proved. This acceptance of rent, therefore, by the lessor is positive proof of holding over as contemplated by Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may also be noted that in the grounds in the memo of appeal filed in this court no such ground was taken. The appellants did not challenge either the proof of the aforesaid receipts or any illegality caused by the omission to put an exhibit mark thereon and the point was for the first time argued at the bar in the second appeal. 5. I am also not satisfied that the positive finding of the lower appellate court on the defendants failure to prove adverse posses sion suffers from any infirmity. There is no evidence in the case that the defendants at any time asserted any hostile title to the plain tiff or did any act to prove their adverse possession and it was for the first time in the reply to the notice given by the plaintiff on September 18, 1968 that they came out with the plea of adverse posses sion. In view of the plaintiffs categorical statement to the contrary and positive evidence of acceptance of payment of rent after the ex piry of the period of the fixed term lease, the theory of adverse possession must be rejected and I affirm the finding recorded by the court below which is not tainted by any illegality. 6. As regards the denial of title of the plaintiff, again the find ing of the lower appellate court in the plaintiffs favour is well-founded. It is based of documentary as well as oral evidence and in second appeal it is not open to me to disturb the finding based on appraisal of evidence. 7. Having held that the plaintiff was the owner of the property and the defendants were the tenants, the court below addressed it self to the question as to whether the defendants were liable for ejectment. 7. Having held that the plaintiff was the owner of the property and the defendants were the tenants, the court below addressed it self to the question as to whether the defendants were liable for ejectment. It answered the question in the affirmative and based the decree for ejectment on two grounds, viz. , (i) material alteration in the accommodation in the tenancy and (ii) default in payment of rent. As regards material alteration the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants was that on the allegations made in the evidence no material alteration within the meaning of Section 3 (1) (c) of U. P. Act No. III of 1947 was made out and, therefore, the decree for ejectment was illegal. The statement of the plaintiff was to the effect that originally four Kachcha Kothas were let out to the defendants but they demolished the same and built Pucca Kothas. Relying on the decision of Dhawan, J. , in Ch. Anup Singh v. Chajjan 1964 A. W. R. 616, it was submitted that the conversion of a Kotha from Kachcha to Pucca did not amount to a material alteration in the accommoda tion within the meaning of Section 3 (1) of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. That case is clearly distinguishble because there the Kotha, originally let out, having fallen down due to heavy rains, thereafter the tenant had reconstructed it without changing its areas, height or shape, etc. In the instance case, on the other hand, the defendants themselves demolished the existing Kachcha Kothas which were initially let out and built Pucca Kotha. This establishes a clear case of malerial alteration without the permission of the land lord and forms a valid ground for ejectment. 7. As regards default in payment of rent also, in my opinion the finding of the lower appellate court was correct. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on a deposit made by Mohd. Umar in proceedings under Section 7-C of U. P. Act No. III of 1947. Mohd. Umar stated that he had remitted rent by money order which was refused by the plaintiff, therefore, he made the deposit under Section 7-C. It has been noticed by the court below that Mohd. Umar did not file any refused money order coupon to show a locus stand to deposit the rent. Mohd. Umar stated that he had remitted rent by money order which was refused by the plaintiff, therefore, he made the deposit under Section 7-C. It has been noticed by the court below that Mohd. Umar did not file any refused money order coupon to show a locus stand to deposit the rent. It is well known that Section 7-C can be resorted to only when the specific (conditions of that provision are fulfilled. There is nothing in the present case to show that the defendant was legally justified in making the deposit, and hence the view of the court below was sound. Secondly, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that since Section 7-C proceedings were still pending, no finding should be recorded by this court on this point. The contention is wholly untenable. If the defendants wanted to take advantage of any order passed in proceedings under Section 7-C, a copy of the order should have been filed in the present case. If no such order was forthcoming, surely the court should have proceeded to decide the issue of default, independently of the plea of Section 7-C. The ejectment suit would not await the decision of the proceedings under Section 7-C and once such defence is raised by the tenant, the court is competent to decide the issue. In these circumstances the case of default was clearly made out and the appellants have failed to show that any of the findings recorded by the court below was erroneous. There is no substance in this second appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. The stay order dated April 6, 1971 is vacated. .