Order: This revision is brought firm the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur, confirming on appeal the judgment of’ the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kadur, in a case under sections 448, 427 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, convicting the petitioner-accused for those offences and sentencing them each to pay a fine of Rs. 100 and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. 2. The prosecution case emerged out of a family dispute because A-8 to A-10 being brothers of P.W. 1 who is their sister wanted to perform the marriage of her daughter P.W. 6 with A-4, but P.W. 1 instead performed the betrothal ceremony with some other boy of her own choice. It was stated that on Friday the 29th of April, 1973 the bridegroom party arrived for betrothal. These accused intercepted and raised their objections. Thereafter on the next day, that is, on Saturday the 21st of April, 1973, P.W. 1 and her husband P.W. 3 called a panchayati and wanted to settle the affair in that panchayati. On the following day which was Sunday dated 22nd April, 1973, P.W. 3 went to the police outpost and got a police complaint written by one Govindappa, but he was referred to Ajjampura police station. Thereafter, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Ajjampura, deputed the Constable P.W. 11 and he arrived in the village sometime on the evening of 22nd April, 1973 when the betrothal ceremony was performed. Since these accused had their objections right from the begining they became infuriated and A-2 and A-5 went to the house of the police patel P.W. 4 and assaulted him as the latter had facilitated the betrothal ceremony. Thereafter, these accused went to the house of P.Ws. 1 and 3 and created a sort of rampage there. They not only assaulted P.Ws. 1 and 3 and a few others, but also damaged the personal effects kept in the house. They threw away the movables and also edibles and Created almost a panic. Injuries were caused to P.Ws. 1, 3, 8 and 10 the latter two being present at the time of the incident. Subsequently, these four persons were produced before the Doctor P.W. 2 and the injury reports were obtained. It was also stated by the witnesses that the assault was actually made over P.W. 1, P.W. 3 and P.Ws. 5 to 10, the remaining P.Ws. 1, 3, 8 and 10 the latter two being present at the time of the incident. Subsequently, these four persons were produced before the Doctor P.W. 2 and the injury reports were obtained. It was also stated by the witnesses that the assault was actually made over P.W. 1, P.W. 3 and P.Ws. 5 to 10, the remaining P.Ws. did not receive discernible injuries so that they required any medical assistance. It was stated by P.W. 1 that her elder brother A-8 beat her with a chappal and thus dishonoured her within the meaning of section 355 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. For this incident the First Information Report was instituted on the next day and the offences imputed against the thirteen accused were under sections 448, 427 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, and against A-8 also under section 355 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. The prosecution produced several witnesses including the persons made subject to assault namely, P.Ws. 1, 3 and 5 to 10. Besides these witnesses, P.W. 4 the police patel was also examined. P.W. 11 the police constable came to state about his being deputed to facilitate the betrothal ceremony. P.W. 2 was the Doctor and he proved the injury reports.-P.Ws. 12 and 13 were the investigating officers. 5. The defence of the accused was one of denial and they did not produce any witness. 6. The learned Magistrate believed the persecution case and convicted the seven petitioner-accused under sections 448, 427 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. He sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment from three months to four months simple imprisonment and with various amounts of fine from Rs. 100 to Rs. 303 for individual offences. However, the substantive sentences of imprisonments were to run concurrently. The seven accused came in appeal before the learned Sessions Judge and their appeal for the offences under sections 448, 427 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, was dismissed although the sentences were reduced to Rs. 100 fine for each count. The appeal filed by A-8 however succeeded in so far as the offence under section 355 of the Indian Penal Code, was concerned. He was acquitted of that charge. The seven accused have now preferred the present revision against their convictions and sentences. 7. 100 fine for each count. The appeal filed by A-8 however succeeded in so far as the offence under section 355 of the Indian Penal Code, was concerned. He was acquitted of that charge. The seven accused have now preferred the present revision against their convictions and sentences. 7. As observed by their Lordships in Duli Chand v. Delhi Administration1 the jurisdiction of the High Court in a criminal revision application is severely restricted and it cannot embark upon a reappreciation of evidence. It is only in rare and exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice that the Court will adumbrate on appreciation of evidence. In short, the perversity or the illegality of the order made by the Court is the question with which the High Court is essentially concerned. If the argument merely extends so that an attempt is made to point out a discrepancy here and there, and it is submitted that although some evidence was there but it was not sufficient to record a finding of conviction, perhaps that would be outside the domain of the restricted jurisdiction under revision to be exercised by the High Court. In the instant cast the learned Counsel took me through the entire evidence and his entire attempt was to point out one discrepancy of the other which according to the learned. Counsel was the material discrepancy although according to the two Courts below these discrepancies were only of a minor detail and could only lead to a vague suggestion for one aspect or the other raising in the case. Thus, in my opinion, the efforts of the learned counsel would not go to invoke the revisional jurisdiction for which severely restricted considerations for re-appreciation of evidence are laid down by the Supreme Court. 8. The learned Counsel proceeded with his argument in that connection and pointed out that the prior incidents of Friday and Saturday were not properly placed before the Court. According to him, a police complaint was instituted in respect of those incidents probably on the morning of 22nd April, 19/3 and that police complaint was not filed before the trial Magistrate. It was further contended by the learned Counsel that in Exhibit P-5 the First Information Report, the incidents which took place on Friday and Saturday were not mentioned. According to him, a police complaint was instituted in respect of those incidents probably on the morning of 22nd April, 19/3 and that police complaint was not filed before the trial Magistrate. It was further contended by the learned Counsel that in Exhibit P-5 the First Information Report, the incidents which took place on Friday and Saturday were not mentioned. Similarly the learned Counsel contended that P.W. 12 the Sub-Inspector of Police did not say that P.W. 11 was deputed to go and facilitate the performance of the betrothal ceremony. In answer to these arguments the learned State Public Prosecutor relied on the statements of P.Ws. 1 and 3 besides the statement of P.W. 11 the police constable himself. P.W. 1 no doubt stated for the incident which took place on Friday as well as the panchayati which was called on Saturday. P.W. 3 although did not state about the panchayati as he was not asked to state about it, but did state about the Friday incident. P.W. 11 the police constable no doubt stated that he was deputed to go and attend to the betrothal ceremony. The statements of these witnesses were believed both by the trial Magistrate and by the first Appellate Judge. This Court does not find any cogent reason to discard these statements. If the defence in any manner depended upon the previous police complaint, they could as well summon it from the police record. It could not be the case of these accused that these incidents did not take place at all. It was not suggested that some other persons besides these accused committed this act of vandalism or assaulted these four persons. There is only a bare denial on the part of the petitioner-accused. The mahazar Exhibit P-6 that was prepared immediately after the occurrence as well as the statements of the other witnesses decidedly established that the entire house was rampaged. It could not be denied that a few persons were also assaulted and visible injuries were received by their. Thus, it could not be stated that simply because the previous First Information Report was not filed, that circumstance should go to believe the entire occurrence. 9. The learned Counsel then pointed cut that P.W. 3 the husband was held by A-9 and A-10 and so he could not have seen. Thus, it could not be stated that simply because the previous First Information Report was not filed, that circumstance should go to believe the entire occurrence. 9. The learned Counsel then pointed cut that P.W. 3 the husband was held by A-9 and A-10 and so he could not have seen. P.W. 1 being beaten and that P.W. 1 although stated that A-8, A-9 and A-10 assaulted her, yet the latter two could not have assaulted her because they were holding P.W. 3. The learned Counsel further pointed out that although P.W. 4 did not go to the house as he was himself assaulted by A-2 and A-5, yet he stated that P.Ws. 1 and 3 were beaten by A-8 and A-12. Similarly, the learned Counsel submitted that P.W. 6 although stated about the assault made by A-8 upon P.W. 1, but did not state about the other assault made by the different accused as she probably went inside the kitchen. As stated by the learned Sessions Judge, all these witnesses were not expected to see every detail of the occurrence. They stated before the Court whatever they themselves saw and might have inferred from what they heard from others. That is why they gave such statements. It could not be stated that there were in fact any discrepancies in their statements. Even if some discrepancy here and there is detected, the same is decidedly a minor one. Above all, the learned trial Magistrate as well as the learned First Appellate Judge appreciated all these discrepancies which were pointed out before them. They have assessed the evidence keeping regard to these discrepancies. I do not think that it can be stated that the deductions made by them were in any manner perverse or illegal and hence this Court will have no hesitation to accept them. As J have remarked above he entire argument was based on these discrepancies and in fact re-appreciation of evidence was sought for, which, to my mind, could not be done unless anything material was pointed out. It appears the entire village where this Occurrence took place consisted of 7 to 9 houses and as such it was not difficult to have identified each and every accused when they went and committed the assault of this description. It appears the entire village where this Occurrence took place consisted of 7 to 9 houses and as such it was not difficult to have identified each and every accused when they went and committed the assault of this description. Thus, there could be no dispute that the petitioner-accused did go and commit the assault after trespassing inside the house and also created a great mischief. As such, they were rightly convicted by the two Courts below and no other view could be taken. 10. The revision is therefore devoid of any merit and the same is dismissed.