JUDGMENT M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit for possession over two houses and for recovery of damages for illegal use and occupation. The brief facts are these :- 2. One Kaushalya owned two houses - One bearing No. 14, situated at Daraganj and the other bearing no. 14. Old Miragali, Allahabad. She made a gift of these two houses in favour of her daughter Sukhdei in October, 1933 but shortly after the said gift, Sukhdei died and the property reverted to Kaushalya again. By her will dated 7th March, 1941, Kaushalya bequeathed the said houses in favour of her grand-daughter Smt. Champi who happened to be the daughter of the deceased Sukhdei. It was alleged that a portion of the said property happened to be in possession of the said Smt. Champi and the rest was in the occupation of the tenants. The rent from the tenants was mostly realised by Champi herself but sometimes the defendants who were her relations realised the rent from the tenants and paid house taxes on her behalf. It was alleged that by a sale deed dated 10th October, 1961, the said Champi sold the said two houses to the plaintiff-appellant and thus she became the owner of the said property. It was further alleged that due to some mistake the names of the defendants-respondents were entered in the Municipal Records but subsequently the mistake was corrected and Champi's name was entered in the said records. The plaintiff by the aforesaid sale deed not only acquired title but she was given possession also by the seller, namely, Champi. Lastly, it was alleged that in January, 1962, the defendant wrongfully took possession over the said two houses and did not vacate the same in spite of the plaintiff's notice dated 6th April, 1962. Hence the suit had to be filed for the aforesaid reliefs. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement in which they alleged that they had been in possession all along to the knowledge of the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff. They claimed that they had been in adverse possession for more than 12 years and had perfected their title by prescription. The suit was said to be time barred under Articles 142 and 144 of the Old Limitation Act. A Plea of estoppel was also raised in defence. They claimed that they had been in adverse possession for more than 12 years and had perfected their title by prescription. The suit was said to be time barred under Articles 142 and 144 of the Old Limitation Act. A Plea of estoppel was also raised in defence. The defendants contested the plaintiff's allegation that the houses belonged to Kaushalya. They also questioned the aforementioned transactions, namely, the gift deed by Kaushalya in favour of her daughter Sukhdei and the will executed by the former in favour of her grand-daughter Champi. The defendants contended that the alleged predecessors of the plaintiff had never been in possession over any of the said two houses. It was claimed that the defendants themselves realised the rents from the tenants and paid taxes for the said properties and this was done by them as owners of the property and not on behalf of Champi or any one else. It was denied that the defendants had obtained possession in January, 1962 as alleged by the plaintiff. 4. The trial court dismissed the suit on the findings that even though the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff were the owners of the two houses, they had lost their title due to the adverse possession of the defendants. The afore-mentioned gift deed and the will were held to have been genuinely executed by the original owner Kaushalya but the said documents were of no avail inasmuch as the defendants had remained in adverse possession for more than 12 years and had perfected their title to the said properties by such adverse possession. The plaintiff's allegation that she was wrongfully dispossessed in January, 1962 by the defendants was disbelieved. The lower appellate court affirmed the trial court's decree. The plaintiff has now come up in the instant second appeal and in support thereof I have heard her learned counsel Sri K. N. Tripathi. In opposition Sri G. P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the defendants-respondents, has made his submission. 5. A short pedigree set out hereinafter will reveal the nature of the relationship between the parties :- 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case. Article 144 of the Old Limitation Act was applicable and not Article 142 of the said Act. 5. A short pedigree set out hereinafter will reveal the nature of the relationship between the parties :- 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case. Article 144 of the Old Limitation Act was applicable and not Article 142 of the said Act. He conceded that in the plaint the plaintiff alleged her dispossession in January, 1962, but the finding recorded by both the courts below was that she was never in possession of the suit property. In this situation. Article 144 of the repealed limitation Act was applicable and not Article 144. He contended that the burden of proving adverse possession over the statutory period of 12 years lay on the defendants and they had failed to discharge that burden. It was pointed out that in their written statements, the defendants did not disclose any particular date from which their alleged adverse possession started. It was further contended that the statements of P. W. 1 Kulloo and P. W. 2 Triloki Nath were misread by the courts below. Attention was drawn to the Statement of D.W. 1 Jamuna Prasad wherein he stated that no forcible possession of the said properties was taken by the defendants. It was next contended that the defendants' possession should be presumed to be permissive and not adverse in view of closeness of relationship between them and predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff. A reference to the aforesaid pedigree would disclose that Alopi was the common ancestor of the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest and the defendants-respondents were descendants from the said common ancestor. So far as the documentary evidence was concerned, it was emphasised that during the quinquennial assessment from 1945 to 1950, the name of Smt. Champi stood mutated in respect of both the houses. This is clear from Exts. 4 and 5 which are certified copies of the extracts of the Municipal assessment list relating to the said property. Attention was invited to Ext. A-43 dated 10-3-1950 whereby the Municipal tax was paid for the year 1-4-1949 to 31-3-1950. Attention was also invited to Ext. A-37 dated 28-11-1960 whereby Municipal Tax was paid for the period from 1-4-1950 to 31-3-1951. Both these receipts are in favour of Champi and are in respect of house no. 14, Daraganj. The payments of the taxes, however, seems to have been made by the defendants. Attention was also invited to Ext. A-37 dated 28-11-1960 whereby Municipal Tax was paid for the period from 1-4-1950 to 31-3-1951. Both these receipts are in favour of Champi and are in respect of house no. 14, Daraganj. The payments of the taxes, however, seems to have been made by the defendants. Counsel emphasised that certain rent notes such as Ext. A-46 etc. relied on by the defendants have been found to be not genuine. Reference was also made to Ext. A 56 which is the reply dated 13-3-1949 to the notice dated 2-3-1949 which was sent on behalf of Champi. Reliance has been placed on the following cases :- 1. AIR 1948 Allahabad 31, Budhram Rai v. Banarsi Rai. 2. AIR 1952 Madhya Bharat 177, Mt. Chandelinju v. Raghunath Singh. 3. AIR 1964 SC 1254 , S. M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina. 4. AIR 1970 Allahabad 289 (FB), Qadir Bux v. Ram Chand. 7. Sri G. P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the defendants-respondents contended that from 1945 to 1961, the entire Municipal Taxes were paid by his clients. He drew attention to Exts. A-53, A-54 and A-56 which are the notices which were exchanged between the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff and the defendants. Learned counsel contended that the said correspondence clearly showed that his clients were denying the title of the predecessor-in-interest even as far back as in 1949. It was next contended that the rent notes Exts. A-46 to A-52 were not discarded by the lower appellate court but on insufficient grounds, their genuineness was doubted by the said court. Attention was invited to Article 139 of the old Limitation Act which laid down as under :- "139. By a landlord to recover possession from a tenant Twelve years When the tenancy is determined. 8. Reliance was placed on Section 28 of the said Act and on Dr. Mohammad v. Mt. Sakina Bibi (AIR 1922 Allahabad 392). 9. The only question involved in this appeal is whether the courts below were right in throwing out the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the defendants had perfected their title by adverse possession. It is well known that there has been a wide divergence of judicial verdict in respect of the interpretation and scope of Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act. The two Articles lay down as under: "142. It is well known that there has been a wide divergence of judicial verdict in respect of the interpretation and scope of Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act. The two Articles lay down as under: "142. For possession of immovable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession. Twelve years The date of the dispossession or discontinuance. "144. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specially provided for. Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. 10. The disagreement related to various aspects of controversy - whether the allegations in the plaint would determine the application of either of the two Articles or whether the ultimate findings recorded by the court after trial would govern such application of either of the said two Articles, whether a suit based on title fell under Article 142 or a suit based simply on prior possession would be governed by the said Article. Whether a suit in which the plaintiff specifically alleged dispossession by the defendant before the institution of the suit but in the trial failed to prove such dispossession or prior possession at all would be governed by Article 142 or Article 144? These and many other connected controversies have been examined from time to time by different Bench in the various High Courts of this country and the answers returned have been strikingly contradictory. For example the latent Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Qadir Bux v. Ramchand ( AIR 1970 All. 289 ) is contradictory to the recent Full Bench decision of the Mysore High Court reported in Jivubai v. Ningappa (AIR 1963 Mysore 1). In the Allahabad case it has been laid down as follows: "Where a plaintiff claimed possession against a defendant alleging him to be his tenant and failed to prove the tenancy set up by him. Article 142 will not apply, and the only Article that can apply is Article 144. AIR 1946 All. 389 , Overruled ; AIR 1919 All. 403 (2) Approved." 11. Article 142 will not apply, and the only Article that can apply is Article 144. AIR 1946 All. 389 , Overruled ; AIR 1919 All. 403 (2) Approved." 11. In the Mysore case the Full Bench laid down as follows : "The plaintiff, who seeks to eject persons from immovable property claimed by him on the ground that although they entered into such property as tenants, were in wrongful possession thereof, but fails to prove his allegations, has to establish his possession within 12 years from the date of the suit; otherwise the suit should be dismissed. Every suit for possession based on title attracts to itself the mischief of Article 142. If a person having title to the property sues for possession of the suit property on the allegation that the defendant was his tenant but fails to establish the tenancy pleaded, then it follows that he must have either been dispossessed or he had discontinued his possession prior to suit. Where a plaintiff pleads permissive possession and the defendant admits his possession but denies that he is in permissive possession (in either case the defendant's possession being admitted), if the plaintiff fails to establish his case, then it follows that the defendant's possession was without the consent of the plaintiff. From the time the defendant holds the property without the consent of the plaintiff, the plaintiff must be deemed to have been dispossessed. In such a case, law requires the plaintiff to establish that he was in possession of the suit property within 12 years from the date of the suit. Otherwise, his rights get barred under Article 142. At one time, there was a view that the question whether Article 142 or Article 144 applied to the facts of a given case depended on the allegations made in the plaint. This view has now been definitely negatived by a chain of decisions of different High Courts. It is now well settled that the plaintiff cannot be allowed by skillful drafting of the plaint to evade the inconvenient article; the decision as to the applicability of the particular article must necessarily depend on the proved or admitted facts. When the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant was in permissive possession of the suit property is not established, the allegation in question amounts to an admission of discontinuance of plaintiff's possession and, therefore his case falls under Article 142." 12. When the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant was in permissive possession of the suit property is not established, the allegation in question amounts to an admission of discontinuance of plaintiff's possession and, therefore his case falls under Article 142." 12. It will thus be seen that whereas the Mysore High Court relied on AIR 1946 All. 389 and doubted AIR 1919 All. 403, our Full Bench has done just the reverse. It has overruled AIR 1946 All. 389 and has approved AIR 1919 All. 403. It is curious that the earlier Full Bench decision reported in Bindhyachal v. Ram Gharib ( AIR 1934 All. 993 ) has been pressed in service in both the aforesaid Full Bench decisions and both have sought to get support from the same. The said earlier Full Bench of this Court held as follows ; "Article 142 is not restricted to suits based on possessory title only. Where a plaintiff who was co-sharer with some of the defendants who transferred a part of the property to third parties, admits in the plaint that he was dispossessed by the transferees sometime prior to the institution of the suit, Article 142, Lim. Act and not Article 144 applies." It will be seen from the facts of the said case that the plaintiff had failed to prove his dispossession sometime prior to the institution of the suit as alleged by him. In the facts of the instant case both the courts below have recorded the concurrent findings that: (1) the plaintiff or predecessor-in-interest was not in possession within a period of 12 years prior to the institution of the suit. (2) the possession of the defendants for a period of more than 12 years prior to the institution of the suit was adverse and hostile and they prescribed title to the two houses in suit by such adverse possession. In my view, in view of the said two findings the suit was correctly held to be barred both under Article 142 and Article 144. It is true that both the said Articles cannot apply to a case at one and the same time. In my view, in view of the said two findings the suit was correctly held to be barred both under Article 142 and Article 144. It is true that both the said Articles cannot apply to a case at one and the same time. It has been repeatedly emphasised that Article 144 is the residuary article and will be applicable only when no other article of the Limitation Act having a bearing on the plaintiff's claim for possession is applicable vide AIR 1954 All 993 (supra) and AIR 1970 All. 289 (supra). However, this does not mean that a suit cannot be held to be barred under both the articles without deciding which of the two articles will govern the period of limitation in a specific case. This is so because in view of the findings of a court, irrespective of whether Article 142 or Article 144 is applied, the suit is held to be barred by time. Such a situation will arise where the court returns a finding that not only the plaintiff has been out of possession for a period of 12 years prior to the institution of the suit but that the defendant has also perfected his title by his adverse possession for the statutory period of 12 years and more prior to the institution of the suit. This is explicitly the position in the instant case. 13. So far as the first finding is concerned, that is a pure finding of fact and is based on an appraisal of the material and evidence on record. The courts below have noticed that the rent notes, which were filed on behalf of the plaintiff, pertained to a period which ended in 1941 and thereafter the rent notes which were brought on record on behalf of the defendants, showed the latter's possession. It is true that the said rent notes, namely, Exs. A 46 to A 52, have been doubted in their genuineness. However, apart from the rent notes the courts below have found that in the years 1949-50 onwards the defendants were in possession. Exs. A 9 to A 43 are municipal tax receipts which show that during the period of 1945 to 1961 such tax in regard to both the houses was paid by the defendants from whose custody the said receipts have come out and have been filed in the court. Exs. A 9 to A 43 are municipal tax receipts which show that during the period of 1945 to 1961 such tax in regard to both the houses was paid by the defendants from whose custody the said receipts have come out and have been filed in the court. The courts below have examined certain other pieces of documentary evidence along with the oral evidence or both the parties and have given their finding to the effect that the plaintiff or her predecessor-in-interest was not in possession of the two houses in suit for a period of 12 years before the institution of the suit. 14. So far as the second finding is concerned that would undoubtedly be a mixed finding of fact and law. The courts below have emphasised that the plaintiffs case that the defendants were realising the rent from the tenants of the houses in dispute and were paying municipal tax in respect thereof on behalf the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff not substantiated by the evidence on record. In other words, the alleged permissive nature of the defendant's dealing with the houses in dispute as set up by the plaintiff has not been accepted. On the other hand, the courts below have rightly placed great reliance on the exchange of notices between the parties in 1949-50 vide Ex. A 53, A 54. A 55 and A 62 which clearly show that the defendants were denying the plaintiff's title and were setting up their hostile title in respect of the two houses. An attempt was made on behalf of the plaintiff in the courts below to seek to explain away the effect of the said notices by alleging that the notices were given by the counsel concerned against the instruction of Smt. Champi and in order to injure her interest. But this explanation has not been accepted. I think the said notices clearly bring out that the defendants openly and to the knowledge of the plaintiff asserted adverse title to the two houses in question. I am not impressed by the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that the defendants-respondents' possession should be presumed to be permissive on account of the closeness of their relationship with the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff. It is obvious that as far back as 1949 the defendants were denying the title of the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest and asserting their own title. It is obvious that as far back as 1949 the defendants were denying the title of the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest and asserting their own title. At least since that date the defendants' possession could not be held to be permissive or on behalf of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff. Shri K.N. Tripathi's contention that the defendants' claim of adverse possession disproved in view of the fact Smt. Champi's name stood recorded in the municipal record in respect of the suit houses during the quinquennial assessment 1945 to 1950 vide Exs. 4 and 5, is also not tenable. Similarly his reliance on Exs. A 43 and A 37, which show that on 10th March, 1950 and 28th November 1950 tax was paid by the defendants in the name of Smt. Champi will also be of no help to his client. The tax was admittedly not paid by Smt. Champi. As a matter of law, it cannot be held that there can be no adverse possession as long as the name of the true owner stands recorded in the municipal register. I think it is conceivable that a defendant may fail to get his name recorded in the municipal records and yet may claim adverse and hostile title to a property. The recording in the municipal board is for the fiscal purposes. The board seeks to collect house tax and water tax and such entry is never an evidence of title. It is sometimes treated as evidence of possession but even that is rebuttable. In other words, even on the question of possession it may be shown that despite the entry in the municipal records the possession of the properly is held by non-recorded persons. In the instant case it has been the finding of both the courts below that the possession did not belong to Smt. Champi but was that of the defendants who throughout paid municipal taxes and retained tax receipts during the period 1945 to 1961. Therefore, the aforementioned municipal documents do not prove either the title or the possession of Smt. Champi, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff. 15. The only question which remains is whether a person who is setting up adverse title can be said to be really claiming the title adverse and in a hostile manner when he pays tax in the name of the true owner of the property. 15. The only question which remains is whether a person who is setting up adverse title can be said to be really claiming the title adverse and in a hostile manner when he pays tax in the name of the true owner of the property. This aspect of the matter is not free from difficulty but, still, I think, as I stated above, that in law it is possible to claim adverse possession without bothering about the mutation in the municipal record. Even in the two receipts, namely, Exs. A 43 and A 37, even though the name of Smt. Champi was shown, still, it was recorded that the tax was paid by the defendant. A number of other receipts are there on record being Exs. A 9 to A 43 and all of them (except Ex. A 37 and A 43) are in the names of the defendants. They relate to a period from 1945 to 1961. In my opinion, in this state of the evidence, the courts below were justified in holding that the possession of the defendants was hostile and adverse. 16. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.