JUDGMENT H.N. Agrawal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree of Sri Saiyid Husain, Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad dated January 9, 1973 allowing the appeal against the judgment and decree of the Judicial Officer Pratapgarh dated May 11, 1964 in Revenue Suit No. 130 of 1958 under Section 220-B, U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The appellants, Badri and Kara Din had filed a suit seeking declaration of their Sirdari rights in three plots Nos. 168, 169 and 224 in village Shairepur on the ground of their patently adverse possession for more than fourteen years. They also alleged that if they could not claim their rights of adverse possession, they should be treated as Adhivasi/Sirdar on the basis of being recorded occupants in 1356 Fasli and in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli. The suit was contested by Srimati Ram Rati and Shital din on the ground that Srimati Ram Rati was the Sirdar of the land in suit and after obtaining a Bhumidhari Sanad she executed a sale deed in favour of Shital Din who thereby became the Bhumidhar of the land. The trial court decreed the suit. The lower appellate court has, however, set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that on the own admission of Srimati Ram Rati, she had filed a suit under Section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act in which she had specifically alleged that she had been dispossessed and her suit was dismissed and thus the present case is barred by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It would appear that Srimati Ram Rati had filed a suit under Section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act on September 22, 1958. An application for amendments. This amendment was allowed. The suit was dismissed in default. The question is whether the decision of the suit dismissed is default would operated as res judicata. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to Srimati Jamuna v. Dy. An application for amendments. This amendment was allowed. The suit was dismissed in default. The question is whether the decision of the suit dismissed is default would operated as res judicata. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to Srimati Jamuna v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1965 AIR 806, in which it has been held that it is well established that a decree in a suit for dismissal in default where the controversy involved in the suit is not decided on merits and no findings are recorded would not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit raising the same controversy or issues. 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that it is fully established from the evidence on the record that the appellants are in possession over the land in suit at least from 1944 and matured Sirdari rights before the date of vesting and the view taken by the learned Additional Commissioner is perverse. This contention cannot be accepted. It is true that in the suit filed by Srimati ram Rati in 1944, forcible dispossession was alleged. There is, however, no evidence whatsoever on the record that the defendant-appellants were able to remain in possession of the land in suit thereafter. In the subsequent years Srimati Ram Rati is recorded in cultivatory possession of the land and it is only in 1364 Fasli that the appellants are recorded as Kabiz in the remarks column. Srimati Ram Rati has also filed the land revenue receipts for Kharif 1356F and Kharif 1359 Fasli in her name. The accepted principle of law in that the continuity of adverse possession cannot be presumed on the other hand, the person claiming continuous adverse possession has specifically to show his possession from year to year. 6. The appellants have specifically claimed in the written statement that they were recorded occupants of the land in suit in 1356 Fasli and in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli and thus acquired Adhivasi rights. They have, however, failed to file any extracts from the revenue records of 1356F of 1359F to prove their allegation. 6. The appellants have specifically claimed in the written statement that they were recorded occupants of the land in suit in 1356 Fasli and in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli and thus acquired Adhivasi rights. They have, however, failed to file any extracts from the revenue records of 1356F of 1359F to prove their allegation. The appellants are indeed recorded as Kabiz in the remarks column of the Khasra from 1361 to 1365 Faslis but the learned Additional Commissioner has held that these entries do not bear diary number and date and there is no reference to Form P.A. 10 and, therefore, no reliance can be placed on these entries. On the other hand, the entries of the preabolition time are all in favour of Sri mati Ram Rati. Srimati Ram Rati obtained a Bhumidhari Sanad for the land in suit and executed a sale deed in favour of Shital Din on October 5, 1957. Even if it be presumed that the defendant-appellants were in adverse possession of the land from 1361 to 1365 Fasli, this period was not adequate for them to prescribe their rights by adverse possession against Srimati Ram Rati. After October 5, 1957 Shital Din had acquired the Bhumidhari rights. There is no material at all to show that the appellants had matured their rights in the land in suit before the date of vesting. There is no perversity in the findings recorded by the learned Additional Commissioner. 7. Another contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that there was no allegation on behalf of Sri mati Ram Rati that the appellants were ejected after 1944 or 1945, and the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in alleging the appeal. This contention originates from a complete misconception of law. The learned counsel for the appellants has presumed that a trespasser has the right to acquire adverse possession over the land by the use of force but the rightful tenure-holder can only proceed to eject the trespasser through the court of law. This is a wrong notion. Every person has the legitimate right of protection of his property and for this purpose he is as much entitled to throw out the trespasser by the use of force. This is a wrong notion. Every person has the legitimate right of protection of his property and for this purpose he is as much entitled to throw out the trespasser by the use of force. It would lead to lawlessness if the principle is laid dow that a person can usurp the property of another by the use of force but nobody can protect his property from a usurper by the use of force. Apart from this, a person in unlawful trespass of land may sometimes be asked to vacate the land through the mediation of the respectable people of the village and it is not necessary that the Court should be moved for ejectment proceedings. In the present case, merely because the appellants made forcible possession of the land in 1944 or 1945 it would not be presumed that they have continued in possession happily over after. Unlawful trespass in not like the bonds of marriage which will not be dissolved unless there is death, divorce or dissolution. 8. Another contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the appeal filed before the lower appellate court was liable to be dismissed on the ground that two suits were filed and out of two suits only one appeal was preferred before the learned Additional Commissioner. This contention has no force at all. I do not find that two suits were filed. On the other hand, the plaintiff-appellants had filed a single suit under Section 239-B, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act against Srimati Ram Rati and Shitladin. This suit was numbered as 120 of 1958. It would appear that there was a prolonged litigation in the case which had gone right upto the Board of Revenue. Thereafter the Board of Revenue had directed the Commissioner to rehear the appeal on merits. It is in pursuance of this Board's order dated August 5, 1970 that the learned Additional Commissioner reheard the appeal and passed the appellate order dated April 9, 1973. What transpired before the Board of Revenue to pass the order dated August 5, 1970 cannot be reopened for discussion at this stage. We are only concerned with the appellate order passed by the Additional Commissioner on April 9, 1973 and the second appeal against this order filed by Badri Prasad and Kare Din. What transpired before the Board of Revenue to pass the order dated August 5, 1970 cannot be reopened for discussion at this stage. We are only concerned with the appellate order passed by the Additional Commissioner on April 9, 1973 and the second appeal against this order filed by Badri Prasad and Kare Din. This much is certain that there were only one suit and not two suits as alleged by the appellants and there is only one second appeal before this Court for consideration. Badri and Kare Din are represented by Sri S.R. Misra, Advocate of the appellants, while the appeal has been contested by Shital Din, respondent No. 2 who is represented by his counsel Sri V.M. Sahai, Advocate. I find no procedural irregularity either in the first appeal decided by the Additional Commissioner or in the filing of the second appeal. 9. Yet another contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner is no judgment in the eye of law. This contention does not cut any ice. The judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner is perfectly sound in law and has properly discussed the evidence on record and the points of law involved and has recorded logical findings. I find no error in law nor any reason to differ with the findings of the learned Additional Commissioner. 10. The second appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed.