Judgment :- 1. Sri Raghavan, the predecessor-in-interest of the revision petitioners, filed an application under S.80-B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, hereinafter called the Act, for purchase of kudikidappu against the 1st respondent, the landowner. The Land Tribunal dismissed the application, and the Appellate Authority has confirmed the decision of the Land Tribunal. This has given rise to this revision under S.103 of the Act. 2. It was averred in the application that the cost of construction of the dwelling house at the time of its construction was Rs. 400/-, and the rent it could have yielded at that time was Rs. 3/e The contention of the first respondent was that the construction was in the year 1950, the cost of construction at that time was Rs.4000/-, and it was entrusted to the applicant in the year 1954 on a rent of Rs. 20/- per month. It is the admitted case that it was in the year 1967 that the first respondent purchased the property in which the dwelling house is situate. 3. The decision of the Land Tribunal was based on Ext.C-1 report dated 15-10-1971 of the Special Revenue Inspector, according to whom the cost of construction of the dwelling house was Rs.1208.65. and the probable monthly rent Rs. 8/- In her report Ext. C-2, filed on 13-8-1975, the commissioner reported that the dwelling house was about 35 years old, the value of the house as assessed by her was Rs. 830.74, and the monthly rent it could have fetched was Rs. 7/e No objection is seen to have been filed by the first respondent to Ext. C-2 report. In his objection to Ext. C-2 report of the commissioner, the appellant (the predecessor-in-interest of the revision petitioners) had, inter alia, stated that the dwelling house was aged fifty years, and the valuation given by the commissioner, both in terms of the materials used and in terms of the rate adopted, was on the high side. It was also stated that no supervisory charge ought to have been added to the cost of labour and the materials to arrive at the cost of construction, and the dwelling house was not tiled at the time of construction; it was done subsequently, 4. It was also stated that no supervisory charge ought to have been added to the cost of labour and the materials to arrive at the cost of construction, and the dwelling house was not tiled at the time of construction; it was done subsequently, 4. In Para.3 of the affidavit dated 29-4-1975 sworn to by the appellant, and filed before the Appellate Authority, in support of the application for the issue of a commission, it is stated that the but included in the kudikidappu was taken on a rent of Rs. 3/- per month 45 years ago. As per an oral entrustment his mother came into possession, and after the death of his mother it was in the occupation of himself and family. It is also alleged that the cost of the house at the time of its construction was less than Rs. 400/-, and that with the permission of the then landlord, he bad saved the dwelling house from destruction, carrying out timely repairs of the house using reapers of coconut trees, old tiles, broken stones etc. Originally the dwelling house had only two small rooms, one kitchen and one small veranda. In his objections dated 8-1-1971 to the Revenue Inspector's report he bad stated that the house was entrusted to his mother on a rent of Rs. 3/- per month, and that for the sake of convenience certain repairs were effected by him. He also stated that he had at a cost of Rs. 350/- got the dwelling house electrified, The dwelling house was in the occupation of himself or his predecessor-in-interest continuously for the past 45 years. It was a small thatched structure at that time. He had since then replaced the thatched roof by tiled roof at his own cost, and that such cost should not be included in the cost of the dwelling house at the time of its construction. If the sum of Rs 350/- spent on electrification and the sum of Rs. 400/- spent on modifications and repairs are deducted from the value assessed by the revenue inspector, the cost of the bouse at the time of its construction could be found to be very negligible. 5. If the sum of Rs 350/- spent on electrification and the sum of Rs. 400/- spent on modifications and repairs are deducted from the value assessed by the revenue inspector, the cost of the bouse at the time of its construction could be found to be very negligible. 5. When the matter came up for argument, a question as to how the cost of the dwelling house at the time of its construction was to be assessed where, after the original construction, certain additions were made or repairs or modifications effected to it, was posed by the counsel for the contesting parties. The learned Advocate General, whose assistance was sought by the Court in view of the importance of the question, took me through the legislative history of the kudikidappu right, and also drew my attention to the observations by Mathew J. in Narayanan Nair's case (1970 KLT. 659) wherein at page 711 it has been stated as follows: "In this connection, it might be useful to trace the genesis of the protection given to kudikidappukars by the component parti of the Kerala State before the State was formed. By Proclamation 18 of 1122, the Government of Cochin sought to prevent the eviction of kudikidappukars. The Malabar Tenancy Amendment Act 1951 gave protection from eviction to holders of ulkkudi or kudikidappu in the Malabar area. Permanent right of occupancy in respect of their kudikidappu was conferred on kudikidappukars by the Travancore Prevention of Eviction Act 22 of 1124. The Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, Act XIII of 1955, conferred on every kudikidappukaran the right of permanent occupancy in his kudikidappu and provided that it is only in specified cases that he can be evicted. The Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, Act IV of 1961, and the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964, Act I of 1964, conferred right of permanent occupancy on kudikidappukars as a part of agrarian reform," S. 37 of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act (Act IV of 1961 as amended by Act XIV of 1962) conferred fixity on kudikidappukars. The term "kudikidappukaran" was defined in sub-clause (20) of S.2 of that Act; and Explanation I thereto stated: "For the purpose of this clause "hut" means any dwelling house which has a value not exceeding four hundred rupees or the monthly rent of which does not exceed four rupees." (emphasis supplied). The term "kudikidappukaran" was defined in sub-clause (20) of S.2 of that Act; and Explanation I thereto stated: "For the purpose of this clause "hut" means any dwelling house which has a value not exceeding four hundred rupees or the monthly rent of which does not exceed four rupees." (emphasis supplied). The meaning given to the expression "hut" for the purpose of clause (25) of S.2 of the Act I of 1964 underwent considerable and significant change from what was given to it in S.2 (20) of Act IV of 1961. as is clear from Explanation I thereto which, before amendment by Act XXXV of 1969, read as follows: "For the purposes of this clause, 'hut' means any dwelling house which was constructed at a cost not exceeding four hundred rupees, or could have, at the time of construction, yielded a monthly rent not exceeding four rupees." (emphasis supplied). as is clear from Explanation I thereto which, before amendment by Act XXXV of 1969, read as follows: "For the purposes of this clause, 'hut' means any dwelling house which was constructed at a cost not exceeding four hundred rupees, or could have, at the time of construction, yielded a monthly rent not exceeding four rupees." (emphasis supplied). The provision was again amended by Act 35 of 1969, by stating in Explanation II to S.2 (25) as follows:-"(a) 'hut' means any dwelling house constructed by a person other than the person permitted to occupy it (i) at a cost, at the time of construction, not exceeding seven hundred and fifty rupees; or (ii) which could have at the time of construction yielded a monthly rent not exceeding five rupees, and includes any such dwelling house reconstructed by the kudikidappukaran in accordance with the provisions of S.79; and (b) 'homestead' means, unless the context otherwise requires, any dwelling house erected by the person permitted to have the use and occupation of any land for the purpose of such erection, and includes any such dwelling bouse reconstructed by the kudikidappukaran in accordance with the provisions of S.79 " By a further amendment introduced by Act XVII of 1972, Explanation IIA was added to the clause and it reads as follows: "Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, a person, who on the 16th day of August, 1968, was in occupation of any land and the dwelling house thereon (whether constructed by him or by any of bis predecessor-in-interest or belonging to any other person) and continued to be in such occupation till the 1st day of January, 1970, shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran: Provided that no such person shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran (a) in cases where the dwelling house has not been constructed by such person or by any of his predecessors-in-interest, if (i) such dwelling house was constructed at a cost, at the time of construction, exceeding seven hundred and fifty rupees; or (ii) such dwelling house could have, at the time of construction, yielded a monthly rent exceeding five rupees; or (b) 6. The replacement of the expressions "has a value" and "does not exceed "occurring in S 2(20) of Act IV of 1961 by "was constructed" and "could have yielded" occurring in S.2(25) of Act 1 of 1964 indicates a clear and deliberate departure in the matter of legislative intent, the provisions of the latter Act emphasising the state of affairs as it obtained at the time of the origin of the 'hut'. Otherwise the expression "has" would have been retained, or words like 'is' or 'has been' would have been used. So also, instead of "could have yielded", 'does yielo" could have been used. 7. S 40(1) of Act IV of 1961 had provided that the right of kudikidappukaran was heritable, but not alienable Sub-section (2) of that section had provided that the kudikidappukaran shall have the right to maintain, repair and rebuild the homestead erected by him, without exceeding the dimensions of the original dwelling house, at his own cost. S 79 of Act I of 1964 before it was being amended by Act XXXV of 1969, provided that the kudikidappukaran shall have the right to maintain, repair and reconstruct with the same or different materials, but without increasing the plinth area, the but belonging to the person who permitted occupation by the kudikidappukaran, or the homestead, at his own cost. The provision was liberalised further in favour of the kudikidappukaran when S 79 of Act I of 1964 was amended by Act XXXV of 1969, and in the amended form the provision reads as follows: "The kudikidappukaran shall have the right to maintain, repair and reconstruct with the same or different materials, but without increasing the plinth area at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, by more than fifty per cent, the but belonging to the person who permitted occupation by the kudikidappukaran, or the homestead, at his own cost. Explanation: In this section and in S.79A, 'homestead' includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation HA to clause (25) of S.2." It may incidentally be noted here that the legislative history behind the kudikidappu provisions makes it abundantly clear that the legislature was anxious to confer greater security and better and enlarged rights on kudikidappukars. S.79A preserves in favour of the kudikidappukaran rights accrued to him by use, custom or agreement which he was enjoying immediately before the commencement of the Act. 8. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions contained in clause (25) of S.2 have to be understood and interpreted in the background of the social philosophy the legislature had in mind; and therefore the endeavour of the Court should be, as far as possible to give effect to the true spirit of the provisions if and when there arises a doubt as to the true scope of the expressions used. In support of this argument he cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahadeolal v. Administrator General of W.B. (AIR. 1960 SC. 936), wherein Das Gupta, J. has laid down that one of the principles to be applied for interpretation of statutes is that if in any legislation the general object of which is to benefit a particular class of persons, any provision is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the benefit and another which would take it away, the meaning which preserves it should be adopted. He also relied on the following observation by Krishna Iyer J. in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai (AIR. 1976 SC. 1455): "Statutory interpretation, in the creative Indian context, may look for light to the lodestar of Part IV of the Constitution e.g., Art.39 (a) and (c) and Art.43. Where two judicial choices are available, the construction in conformity with the social philosophy of Part IV has preference." Yet another decision cited by the learned Advocate General is the one reported in Mohd Shafi v. VII Addl. Dist. & Sessions Judge, Allahabad & others (AIR. 1977 SC 836) wherein in Para.6 at page 840 Bhagawati J. has observed as follows: "Here, unfortunately the language of Explanation (iv) is such that we have to grope our way in a chaos of verbal darkness and try to arrive at the correct legislative meaning with great diffidence and hesitation. Dist. & Sessions Judge, Allahabad & others (AIR. 1977 SC 836) wherein in Para.6 at page 840 Bhagawati J. has observed as follows: "Here, unfortunately the language of Explanation (iv) is such that we have to grope our way in a chaos of verbal darkness and try to arrive at the correct legislative meaning with great diffidence and hesitation. But there is one principle of interpretation which offers some guidance in the interpretation of the rather obscure language of this Explanation and it is that since the Explanation raises a conclusive presumption in favour of the landlord in a legislation which is intended to protect the tenant against unreasonable eviction, it must be construed strictly against the landlord so as to cut as little as possible into the protection afforded to the tenant If the language of the Explanation is susceptible of two interpretations, we should prefer that which enlarges the protection of the tenant rather than that which restricts it." My attention was also drawn to the following observations contained in Para.12 and 13 of the decision reported in the State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh (AIR. 1975 SC 1952): 1112. A processual facility cannot be converted into an opportunity to pervert and to thwart the substantive object of the law. After all, Courts, faced with special case situations have 'creatively' to interpret legislation. The Courts are 'finishers. refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degress of further processing 13. We feel that when economic legislation in the implementation of Part IV of the Constitution strikes a new ground and takes liberties with old jurisprudence, there looms an interpretation problem of some dimensions which Indian jurists will have to tackle..." The following passage from the judgment given by Bhagawati J. in Mohd. Shafi v. VII Addl. Dist. & Sessions Judge, Allahabad and others (AIR. 1977 SC. 836) will be of some assistance to the facts of the present case: "The word 'building' is used thrice in Explanation (iv) and it is clear from the context in which it occurs that it is not intended to be used in its popular sense so as to mean the entire superstructure raised on the ground. 1977 SC. 836) will be of some assistance to the facts of the present case: "The word 'building' is used thrice in Explanation (iv) and it is clear from the context in which it occurs that it is not intended to be used in its popular sense so as to mean the entire superstructure raised on the ground. The first time that the word 'building' is used is in the expression 'the building under tenancy' and it is obvious that it is 'the building under tenancy' which is intended to be referred when the word 'building' is used towards the end of the Explanation. It is in respect of 'the building under tenancy' that a conclusive presumption is raised, that it is bonafide required by the landlord. Now, 'the building under tenancy' cannot be the entire superstructure because what is contemplated by the Explanation is that 'the building under tenancy must be 'a part of the building' and, therefore, it cannot be the whole superstructure. Here, the word 'building' obviously means accommodation which is the subject-matter of tenancy. The question thus is: what is the sense in which the word 'building' is used when it occurs for the second time in the Explanation. The context clearly indicates that the word 'building' is there used to denote a unit of which the accommodation under tenancy constitutes a part and the remaining part is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes. The object of the Legislature clearly was that where there is a single unit of accommodation, of which a part has been let out to a tenant, the landlord who is in occupation of the remaining part should be entitled to recover possession of the part let out to the tenant. It could never have been intended by the Legislature that where a superstructure consists of two independent and separate units of accommodation, one of which is let out to a tenant and the other is in the occupation of the landlord, the landlord should, without any proof of bona fide requirement, be entitled to recover possession of the tenement let out to the tenant." 9. Now, applying the guideline given by the Supreme Court in the matter of interpretation of statutes intended for the benefit of the weaker section of the society, we have to decide in the present case as to what the legislature had in mind when the expression "cost at the time of construction" is used in clause (a) of Explanation II to S.2 (25) of the Act. It may be noted that the expression used is "hut means any dwelling house constructed'. This may be compared to the expression in Explanation I to S 2 (20) of Act IV of 16, where "hut" means any dwelling house which "has" a value not exceeding four hundred rupees or the monthly rent of which "does not exceed" tour rupees. The departure in Act I of 1964, from the expressions used in the earlier Act is not without significance or purpose. The legislature consciously wanted to have the right of the kudikidappukaran determined with reference to the value of the dwelling bouse as it existed at the time of its construction, not as it existed at the time of the coming into force of the Act or at any other point of time. If the legislature had a contrary intention that would have been made clear while stating the meaning of the expression "hut" in S.2 (25) of the Act. Like the expression "was constructed" used in Explanation I to S.2 (25) of Act I of 1964 before its amendment, the expression "constructed" (not 'has been constructed') has been used in Explanation II to S.2 (25) after amendment by Act XXXV of 1969. 10. The question of value of the dwelling house, in the context in which we are now considering the point, will arise only in the case of 'hut', the meaning of which is to be found in clause (a) of Explanation II to S.2 (25) of the Act, as I find no inhibition in clause (b) of Explanation II to S.2 (25) as to the value of the "homestead" a kudikidappukaran may construct on the land belonging to another person who permits him to erect the dwelling house, though, unintentionally perhaps, a restriction on the extension of plinth area it could occupy is seen to have been placed by S.79 of the Act. 11. 11. If a reasonable interpretation, bearing the legislative intent in mind, is given, the expression "cost at the time of construction", has to be construed to be the cost at the time of the original construction of the structure, without including therein the cost subsequently incurred by the landowner; otherwise, the landlord can in given cases succeed in getting the valuable right of the kudikidappukaran defeated by making him fall into the trap of inducement of modification of or addition to the but without his knowing that he was in that process to lose his very right to exist in the kudikidappu. It is to avoid this sort of uncertainties and the resultant evil consequences presumably, the legislature wanted to have the right of the kudikidappukaran fixed with reference to the position as on the date of construction without allowing it to be overtaken by fluctuations that might arise out of modification, additions etc. 12. The counsel for the first respondent submitted that it would be both illogical and unreasonable to construe the expression "at the time of construction" as meaning 'at the time of construction of the building originally', inasmuch as what is sought to be purchased by the kudikidappukaran by virtue of the provisions contained in S.80A of the Act is the structure as it existed on the date of the application or on the date of the order for purchase, and therefore there is no justification for treating the kudikidappu as one existed originally without noting the further additions or improvements made, which also are sought to be purchased by the kudikidappukaran. In my view, the difficulty could be got over by making a practical approach to the question. The right of the kudikidappukaran to purchase the kudikidappu and claim fixity under S.80A and S.75 would be determined with reference to cost of construction of the but at the time when the construction was made originally; however, in cases where the landlord had invested money thereafter, by modification, additions, etc., the cost thereof has to be assessed and added to the cost of the but while determining the compensation payable to the landlord treating that also as an item of improvement for which he is entitled to receive compensation. There is yet another possibility as pleaded in the present case, as is likely in many other cases, where modifications or additions to the dwelling houses might be made by or at the expense of the kudikidappukars. In such cases the landlord having made no contribution for such modifications, or additions, the kudikidappukaran need not be made liable to pay any amount by way of additions or modifications made. After all, generous instances of landlords making additions or modifications to dwelling bouses in the occupation of kudikidappukars would be far and few; stray cases of such occurrence should not be allowed to influence the decision as to what could have been the legislative intent of the provisions contained in a beneficiary legislation like this. 13. Counsel for the first respondent has a further argument. According to him, under Explanation IIA the presumption of kudikidappukaran would not arise if either the cost of construction at the time of construction of the dwelling house exceeded Rs. 750/- or the rent that the dwelling house could have yielded at the time of its construction exceeded Rs. 5/e In this case in Exts. C-1 and C-2, reports filed respectively by the Special Revenue Inspector and the Commisioner, the rent at the time of construction has been found to be Rs. 8/- and 7/- respectively. The word "or" used disjunctively, probably due to a drafting oversight, has given room for this argument. As the provision now stands, it would appear that if one of the conditions, namely, either the cost of construction at the time of construction of the dwelling house exceeding Rs. 750/- or the rent that it could have yielded at that time exceeding Rs. 5/-, is satisfied it would be open to the landlord to plead that the occupier shall not or need not be treated as a kudikidappukaran as contemplated in Explanation II-A Considering the scheme of the Act, the legislature does not appear to have intended this consequence. Anyway, as the counsel for the revision petitioners submitted, the revision petitioners have no need to rely on the presumption, as undisputely the revision petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in occupation of the dwelling house from a period long before 16-8-1968, and the aid of the presumption under Explanation II-A is not sought or relied on. 14. Anyway, as the counsel for the revision petitioners submitted, the revision petitioners have no need to rely on the presumption, as undisputely the revision petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in occupation of the dwelling house from a period long before 16-8-1968, and the aid of the presumption under Explanation II-A is not sought or relied on. 14. Now, coming to the facts of the case, the counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that the value determined by the commissioner in Ext. C-2 report includes the expenses incurred by the applicant for replacing the thatched roof by a tiled one at his expanse. In his objection to Ext. C-1 report of the Special Revenue Inspector he has categorically stated that the structure originally was a thatched one and the repairs and the tiling work were done by him at bis cost. In his objections to Ext. C-2 report of the commissioner he has stated that the tiling was done after construction of the but, which would only mean that his contention is that it was done at his expense, or, at any rate, that it was not to be taken into account when the cost of construction of the dwelling house at the time of its construction was to be assessed. The first respondent who purchased the property in the year 1967 could not have had any direct knowledge about the position as to who got the thatched root replaced by the tiled roof, and who spent the money for that purpose. Though at the first flash it would appear to be a question of fact, it is not really as simple as that, because, if a proper assessment of the cost of construction at the time of construction is not made, it may result in great miscarriage of justice. If relevant factors are omitted to be taken note of, or irrelevant factors are allowed to influence the decision, that may go to the very root of the matter and may ultimately affect the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal to grant the relief, as it is only where the cost at the time of construction of the dwelling house does not exceed Rs. 750/- or the rent that could have yielded at that time does not exceed Rs. 5/- per month, that the Tribunal will have the jurisdiction to grant the relief to the applicant. 15. 750/- or the rent that could have yielded at that time does not exceed Rs. 5/- per month, that the Tribunal will have the jurisdiction to grant the relief to the applicant. 15. In the light of the observations made above, the matter requires to be further investigated by the Land Tribunal. The Land Tribunal would consider the question as to whether the tiling and the electrification of the dwelling house were made by the applicant (predecessor-in-interest of the revision petitioners), and if so, when such expenses as incurred by him are deducted from the total cost now assessed, what would be the cost of construction of the dwelling house at the time of its construction, and the monthly rent it (dwelling house) could have yielded at that time In so far as supervision charge is concerned, it is normally an item of expense, and in the absence of any better evidence, and it being a question of fact, I do not think that there is any scope for interference with the decision of the Land Tribunal on that question by this Court in revision. The order of the Land Tribunal and the judgment of the Appellate Authority are set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Land Tribunal for fresh disposal according to law and in the light of the observations contained in this order. The revision is allowed as above. There will be do order as to costs.