Short Note : 1. The suit in which this revision arises was filed, on 30th June 1976. The rent was claimed in the suit from 16th January 1975. Although the rate of rent is not mentioned in the plaint, it appears that the rent was claimed by the plaintiff-landlord at the rate of Rs. 35 per month. The tenant disputed the rate of rent. On 12th January 1977, the Court fixed Rs. 20 per month as the reasonable provisional rent and granted time upto 14th February 1977 to the tenant to clear off the arrears. The tenant applied on 14th February 1977 for extension of time to clear of the arrears. It was stated in the application that the tenant is a poor man being a cobbler, and that his wife was in the hospital and, therefore, he was unable to arrange for the funds for depositing the arrears. This application was dismissed by the trial Court on 25th February 1977 holding that it was not made in good faith. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed. Held : It is difficult to understand as to on what basis the Court could hold that the application was not made in good faith. The Court did not hold that the applicant was not a poor man and that his wife was not ill. In my opinion, on the face of the application good grounds were shown for extension of time. The application, therefore could not be dismissed by simply observing that it was not made in good faith. In dismissing the application in this manner, the Court acted with material irregularity in disposing of the application. 2. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-applicant argues that the Court had no power to extend the time. The submission is that under section 13 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961, the Court can extend the time only once and that having been done on 21st January 1977, the power to extend the time had exhausted and no further extension of time could be made on the application filed on 14th February 1977. Reliance for time could be made on the application No. 15 in Firm Ganeshram Harvilas v. Ramchandra, 1970 JLJ 982. Reliance for time could be made on the application No. 15 in Firm Ganeshram Harvilas v. Ramchandra, 1970 JLJ 982. The proposition referred to in the ruling of Ganesh ram Harvilas does not support the contention of the learned counsel that the time under the first part of section 13 (1) can be extended only once. In my opinion, there is no such limitation contained in section 13 (1) and, therefore, no such limitation can be imposed. If good ground is shown for extension of time earlier granted by the Court for making the deposit under the first part of section 13 (1), the Court can further extend the time. 3. It was then submitted that as the dispute was raised after the expiry of one month from the service of summons, the Court could not, by extension of time condone the default made by the tenant. This point is covered by the judgment in Ramjiwan v. Mahesh Kumar (Civil Revision No. 608 of 1977, decided on 22-8-1977). In that case, I have pointed out that the legal position is well settled that an application under section 13 (2) can be made even after the expiry of one month from the date of service of summons and, if time is extended for making the deposit of all arrears and if the deposit is made within the extended period, there would be no default under section 13 (1). The difficulty would arise only when the application for extension of time for making the deposit, after the provisional rent is fixed, is rejected by the Court. In the instant case, the Court, granted the applicant time for making the deposit upto 14th February 1977. Had the applicant made deposit of all arrears within that period, there could have been no difficulty in holding that there was no default under section 13(1). Similarly, if the tenant's application which was made on 14th February 1977 for extension of further time is allowed and the deposit of arrears is made within the time allowed, there would be no question of any default under sec. 13 (1). The second part of section 13 (1) requiring the tenant to make monthly deposits would operate after all the arrears are deposited within the extended period. That is the significance of the word "thereafter" as pointed out in Ramjiwan v. Mahesh Kumar (supra). 4. 13 (1). The second part of section 13 (1) requiring the tenant to make monthly deposits would operate after all the arrears are deposited within the extended period. That is the significance of the word "thereafter" as pointed out in Ramjiwan v. Mahesh Kumar (supra). 4. It was lastly contended that the trial Court by order dated 26th June, 1977 struck off the defence of the tenant and as no revision has been filed against that order, no relief can be granted to the tenant in this revision. This contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-applicant is also without any substance. The order striking off the defence is a consequential order which was made after the tenant's application for extension of time for depositing arrears was rejected. If the order dated 25th February 1977 rejecting the application of the tenant for grant of further time to make the deposit, the necessary consequence would be that the order striking off the defence will also disappear. Revision allowed.