Judgment :- Subramonian Poti, J. -One Sri Muraleekrishna Das, Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, now under suspension, has filed this petition against the Inspector General of Police of the State of Kerala praying that this court may take proceedings for perjury against him under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The charge of perjury is levelled against the Inspector General of Police in connection with some statements made by him in the counter-affidavits filed in O. P. No. 1141 of 1977, a petition for Habeas Corpus filed by one Sri -Eachara Warrier complaining that his son Rajan arrested from the Regional Engineering College, Calicut on 1st March 1976 was detained by police and this court may direct production of Rajan in court. Though the respondents to the petition denied that Rajan had been arrested or had been taken into the custody of the police, this court found that he had been taken by the officers of the police to an investigation camp set up at Kakkayam. As Inspector General of Police of the State the second respondent had been it pleaded and writ was issued against him too Later respondents 1, 2 and 4 in that case filed affidavits admitting that Rajan had been taken into custody by the police and while he was detained in the camp he died as a result of torture inflicted on him. The State caused further investigation to be made as a consequence of which a case has been charged against certain police officers of the State for the offence of murder. Respondents 3 and 5 in O. P. 1141 of 1977 are among the accused in the case. The petitioner herein who was not a party to the Original Petition is also said to be an accused in that murder charge. On a motion made by Sri Eachara Warrier this court had occasion to examine whether the respondents in the Habeas Corpus Petition including the Inspector General had committed the offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code by giving false evidence to this court in their affidavits concerning the fact of taking Rajan into custody. While respondents 1 and 2, the Home Secretary and Inspector General of Police were exonerated, respondents 3 to 5 have been found to be liable to be proceeded against for perjury under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While respondents 1 and 2, the Home Secretary and Inspector General of Police were exonerated, respondents 3 to 5 have been found to be liable to be proceeded against for perjury under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though the Inspector General of Police has thus been exonerated by this court by the order passed earlier on 13th June 1977, according to the petitioner that ought not to have been done since there was a case for taking up proceedings against him for perjury. Though no additional data or material which would justify a fresh look into the question of action against the Inspector General of Police has been furnished in the petition certain averments are made as to the existence of such material and it is said that if the court causes further investigation to be made in the matter it is possible for the court to come across such material as would indicate that in making statements to this Court the respondent has not been speaking the truth. 2. At the outset a preliminary objection has been raised as to the maintainability of this petition. The matter having been considered by this Court once and a decision having been rendered on the merits whether fresh proceedings could be taken up is a question of some importance. The further question, concerns the locus standi of the petitioner. He is not a party to the earlier proceedings and if he comes to this Court merely as a busy body possibly the Court may not take serious notice of his action. Though not so stated in the petition, at the hearing Sri P. V. Ayyappan, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted to Court that despite the fact that insistence on prosecution for perjury against the respondent may to some extent be suicidal to his client, his attitude was that the Captain must sink with the crew. 3. We were concerned in the earlier proceedings only with examining the question whether respondent had committed perjury in stating to this Court that Rajan had not been taken into police custody. 3. We were concerned in the earlier proceedings only with examining the question whether respondent had committed perjury in stating to this Court that Rajan had not been taken into police custody. Since this Court in the evidence available found that he was so taken and it was disclosed by respondents 1, 2 and 4 that Rajan had been taken into police custody, the only question to be considered was whether respondents were aware of that fact when they said to the contrary in their counter-affidavits. In fact respondents need not even be aware. If they were not certain that Rajan was not taken into police custody they should have only said so. If they were in doubt as to whether Rajan had been taken into custody they should have said so and they could not have said that Rajan was not taken into custody. If they were not sure or certain about it they could not have believed that their statement that Rajan was not taken into custody was true and they should not have asserted a fact which they did not believe to be true. It is an offence not only to state something which is false but also to state something which is not believed to be true. On the materials before us we did not feel that there was sufficient reason to find that the Inspector General of Police was speaking to a fact which b: knew was false. For reaching this conclusion we relied on the fact that his source of information was the report-no doubt unsatisfactory-of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crimes, who was in charge of the investigation who was dealing directly with the Government and not through him and that there was no case that Eachara Warrier ever met the Inspector General of Police. In other words there was no indication in the case that there was any occasion for the Inspector Genera! of Police to be appraised of the complaint otherwise than through the correspondence and papers that passed through him. We also indicated that suspicion cannot be a substitute for some material on which slone this Court could direct prosecution. While we saw reason to comment on the conduct of the Inspector General and his efficiency we found that there was no case to bold on the available material that the second respondent was guilty of giving false evidence. We also indicated that suspicion cannot be a substitute for some material on which slone this Court could direct prosecution. While we saw reason to comment on the conduct of the Inspector General and his efficiency we found that there was no case to bold on the available material that the second respondent was guilty of giving false evidence. 4. A court directing a prosecution for perjury does so not to vindicate the grievance of any party but to safeguard the prestige and the dignity of the Court and to maintain the confidence of the people in the efficacy of the judicial process. Solemnity is attached to an oath taken by a witness whether it be in the witness box or in an affidavit. When a party speaks to a thing which is not true or which he has reason to believe to be not true under oath he is flouting the administration of justice and the Court is interested in seeing that this does not go unnoticed. The offender must then be brought to book. Therefore the court initiates a prosecution wherein the accused can have a fair trial. Since this is primarily a matter for the Court and not for a party even when a party moves a petition for taking action for perjury against another the court primarily sees whether interests of justice would be subserved by spending the time of the court in taking prosecution proceedings against a person who is alleged to have perjured. Consequently it is not any and every statement made by a witness that the Court would wish to examine. If the Court is to notice every falsehood that is sworn to by parties in Courts there would be very little time for Courts for any serious work other than directing prosecution for perjury. Again the edge of such weapon would become blunted by indiscriminate use. The gravity of the false statement, the circumstances under which such statement is made, the object of making such statement and its tendency to impede and impair the normal flow of the course of justice are matters for consideration when the Court decides on the propriety of instituting a complaint for perjury. The gravity of the false statement, the circumstances under which such statement is made, the object of making such statement and its tendency to impede and impair the normal flow of the course of justice are matters for consideration when the Court decides on the propriety of instituting a complaint for perjury. The party even when he is an applicant under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is more or less an informant bringing to the Court's notice a situation which may call for action, a situation which possibly the court may otherwise miss to notice. 5. There is no rule that only a party to a proceeding would be competent to move the Court under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In appropriate cases even of the instance of a stranger the Court may look into a plea that a witness or a party has been guilty of giving false evidence and the Court may if satisfied that the accused must stand trial order prosecution in such a case. S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure begins with the words "when, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made " It appears to us to be plain that even a person who is not a party to a proceeding can move an application contemplated under this section. We do not think that this question calls for any decision. We may notice that the view that we are expressing here accords with that taken in the decisions in Harekrishna v. Emperor AIR 1929 Patna 242, Puranchandra v. Sheikh Dhalu AIR. 1930 Calcutta 721, Bagwandas v. D.D. PatelandCo., AIR. 1940 Bombay 131 and Shanmugesan v. Chengalvaraya AIR. 1955 Madras 611. The decision holding that a person is not liabl? to be proceeded against under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the institution of a complaint for perjury has been compared to a dismissal of a complaint under S.203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has quite often been argued that the question of maintainability of the second application for proceedings under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be answered on* the anology of a fresh complaint being permissible. On this anology the Nagpur High Court in Mansoorali v. Taiyabali AIR. It has quite often been argued that the question of maintainability of the second application for proceedings under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be answered on* the anology of a fresh complaint being permissible. On this anology the Nagpur High Court in Mansoorali v. Taiyabali AIR. 1935 Nag. 156, the High Court of Madras in Kalastri Mudali v. Emperor AIR. ly5L Madras 130, and the Patna High Cowrt in Kunjo Chaudhry v. Emperor AIR. 1938 Patna 99 have held that a second application for taking action would be permissible. The rule of autre fois acquit does not apply to such a case as has been held by the High Court of Sind in Rajabali v. Emperor AIR. 1930 Sind. 315. That a second application would lie has also been held in Harekrishna v. Emperor AIR. 1929 Patna 242 and Jawala Parshad v. Ram Parshad AIR. 1940 Lahore 526. There is the further question whether the plea of issue estoppel may arise when the same question has once been considered by a court judicially and disposed of. Though in such a case the bar may be not one of application of the principle of autre fois acquit, it could well be said that the issue has once been decided and the consideration of the same issue would be barred on general principles. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Lalta v. State of U. P. AIR. 1970 S. C. 1381. The question there was one of bar raised on the basis of determination of an issue in an earlier criminal proceeding in relation to a subsequent proceeding. S.403(1) of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which embodied in statutory form the accepted English rule of autre fois acquit did not evidently apply. The prosecution was permissible by reason of S.403(2) of the said Code under which a person acquitted or convicted of an offence may afterwards be tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial. Dealing with this the Supreme Court said: "The question presented for determination in this appeal is, however, different. Dealing with this the Supreme Court said: "The question presented for determination in this appeal is, however, different. The question is whether an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different offence but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of S.403(2), Criminal Procedure Code. The distinction between the principle of autre fois acquit-and the rule as to issue-estoppel, in other words, the objection to the reception of evidence to prove an identical fact which has been the subject-matter of an earlier finding between the same parties is clearly brought out. in the following's passage from the judgment of Wright, J in The Queen v. Oll is, (1900)2 QB 758 at pp. 768-769." "The real question is whether this relevant evidence of the false pretence on July 5, or 6 ought to have been excluded on the ground that it was part of the evidence given for the prosecution at the former trial, at which the prisoner was charged with having obtained money from Ramsey on that false pretence, and was acquitted of that charge." "It is therefore clear that S.403, Criminal Procedure Code does not preclude the applicability of this rule of issue-estoppel. It was contended by Mr. Rana on behalf of the respondent that the decision of this Court in Pritam Singhs' case. AIR. 1956 SC. 415 was based on the observations of the Judicial Committee in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya, 1950 AC 458 and the decision in Pritam Singh's case, AIR. 1956 SC. 415 required reconsideration because the principle could have no application to India where the principle of autre fois acquit is covered by a statutory provision viz., S.403, Criminal Procedure Code which must be taken to be exhaustive in character. We are unable to accept this contention as right. We have already pointed out that S.403, Criminal Procedure Code does not preclude the applicability of the rule of issue-estoppel. We are unable to accept this contention as right. We have already pointed out that S.403, Criminal Procedure Code does not preclude the applicability of the rule of issue-estoppel. In any event the rule is one which is in accordance with sound principle and supported by high authority and there are already two decisions of this court, viz. Pritam Singh's case, AIR. 1956 SC. 415 and a latter case -Manipur Administration v. Thokchom, Bira Singh (1964) 7 SCR. 123 =:(air. 1965 SC. 87) -which have accepted the rule as a proper one to be adopted. We therefore do not see any reason for casting any doubt on the soundness of the rule or for taking a different view from that adopted in the two earlier decisions of this Court referred to." 6. In this case it is not only the averment in the affidavit of the respondent filed on 3rd April 1977 that is the subject-matter of the charge of perjury but also the averments made in the affidavit filed on 8th June 1977. The earlier affidavit of 3rd April 1977 was the only one with which this Court was concerned on the previous occasion when the question of perjury was considered. That was an affidavit in which the statement that Rajan had not been taken into custody by the Police was made. Naturally the court was interested in examining whether in making that statement respondent had perjured. In the subsequent affidavit of 8th June 1977 the fact that Rajan was taken into custody was admitted. Some other statements in the affidavit are referred to in the present petition as false and, intentionally so made. These statements are: 1. It is not true that the investigation camp at Kakkayam was set up with my knowledge.." "2. He deals directly with Government in regard to crimes investigated by him. Naxalite cases including the detention of naxalities under MISA were handled exclusively by the Deputy Inspector General Police, Crimes. He was directly corresponding with the Government in respect of MISA detention of naxalities and copies of such correspondence were never marked to me." "3. Naxalite cases including the detention of the naxalities under MISA were handled exclusively by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crimes." 4. I have had no knowledge of the happenings in the Kakkayam camp at the relevant time." "5. Naxalite cases including the detention of the naxalities under MISA were handled exclusively by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crimes." 4. I have had no knowledge of the happenings in the Kakkayam camp at the relevant time." "5. Wireless messages were not sent to me from Kakkayam camp during the investigation of Crime 19/ 76 of Kayanna Police Station. It was not the practice that I specially noted for prompt action cases involving extremist activities." "6, The Special Branch CID. is never concerned with the investigation of Crimes. There was no special set up by which during the Emergency the Special Branch passed on information of investigation of Crimes to me." With regard to the statements in the affidavit of 8th June 1977 there can be no question of any issue-estoppel. If at all there could be any such bar it could be only with regard to the statement in the affidavit of 3rd April, 1977, a statement in which the respondent denied that Rajan had been taken into police custody. For the purpose of this case it may not even be necessary to find whether in regard to that the rule of issue-estoppel would operate to bar the consideration of the question by this Court afresh. That is because on the former occasion on a very elaborate appreciation of the facts and circumstances we held that no material justifying prosecution for perjury against Sri. Rajan, Inspector General of Police was available. That he was intentionally misleading this Court by making a statement that he had reason to believe was not true had not been brought out then by reference to any material available in the case. The position remains the same even now. In spite of repeatedly questioning the learned counsel for the petitioner. Sri. P. V. Ayyappan, whether he can pinpoint any material which would establish the fact of knowledge with the respondent of the detention of Rajan by the Police prior to the filing of the affidavit of 3rd April, 1977, learned counsel has not been able to bring to our notice any specific material. Sri. P. V. Ayyappan, whether he can pinpoint any material which would establish the fact of knowledge with the respondent of the detention of Rajan by the Police prior to the filing of the affidavit of 3rd April, 1977, learned counsel has not been able to bring to our notice any specific material. No doubt there is a fervent plea before us to permit examination of witness with a view to find out the truth and to call for records with a view So examine whether some record or other would substantiate the petitioner's case that the Inspector General was aware of the detention of Rajan at the time he filed the affidavit on 3rd April 1977. We think we will be overstepping our limits if in the circumstances of the case we go fishing for material to find out whether the Inspector General had perjured. 7. We must remark here that the primary concern in directing the initiation of prosecution for perjury being that of the court any person who comes to this Court with an application that such steps be taken would be taken seriously only if the court is convinced that becomes to this Court out of anxiety and desire to further the cause of justice and not out of any personal vendetta or revenge. The petitioner in this case is not even prepared to say that Rajan had been taken into police custody. In spite of a fairly lengthy affidavit filed by him he foams not categorically stated that Rajan had been taken into police custody and of course at the hearing also counsel for the petitioner does not admit this. This is only natural since, as explained by counsel, the petition r is facing a murder trial in which possibly he may even dispute the case that Rajan was taken by the police from his College Hostel. But we are referring to this circumstance to show that when petitioner seeks that'.he Inspector General be prosecuted for making the statement that Rajan has not been arrested it is certainly not because of the normal indignation or the righteous feeling of a citizen that the Inspector General of Police has perjured and that calls for serious notice in the cause of proper administration of justice. Probably it is because of his feeling that he has been implicated in a murder case at the instance of the respondent and according to him unjustifiably that the present motion has been made This is reflected in the attitude expressed in the Words Captain should sink with the crew. 8. We do not find any case for taking action against the respondent for the various averments made in the counter-affidavit of 8th June 1977. On the materials before us we would not be able to say that the Inspector General of Police has perjured in regard to those statements. Here again counsel seeks orders from this Court for calling for certain records lunch as wireless messages said to have been sent from Kakkayam camp. Here again counsel does not indicate any specific wireless messages as being sufficient to bring home to the Inspector General the new so farreit of Rajan. If he bad mentioned in the petition or even at the bearing that any specific message was sent by any specific person from the Kakkayam camp conveying the news of detention of Rajan in the camp there would have been some purpose in making further investigation. But the request is that we may call for all those and examine them. It is said for the Inspector General by learned counsel Sri Govind Swaminathan that wireless messages received by the operator are not entered as such either in the in-message book or in the log book kept by him and further the relevant records are normally destroyed after six months Ws do not propose to go further into the question, for, we are not called upon to examine any specific disclosure that may come out of any specific document. More than that, as we said earlier, it is not any and every statement which is alleged to be false that calls for notice by this Court. We were interested and genuinely interested in seeing whether responsible quarters had withheld the information of the arrest of Rajan when they had a duty to answer the rule issued to them in Habeas Corpus proceedings. We do not think that much importance can be attached to the various statements in the counter affidavit of 8th June 1977 which relates to other matters. Even so we would have gone into the truth or otherwise of these if that was aparent. We do not think that much importance can be attached to the various statements in the counter affidavit of 8th June 1977 which relates to other matters. Even so we would have gone into the truth or otherwise of these if that was aparent. But we are, as we said earlier, not prepared to embark upon a fishing expedition for that purpose. In the circumstances we dismiss the petition. But we direct the parties to suffer costs in the petition, in the circumstances of the case.