JUDGMENT T. Chandrasekhara Menon, J. 1. A driver in the service of the P and T. Motor Mail Service has approachedthis court in a writ petition, wherein he has sought for orders for quashing theorders resulting in punishments to him - punishments being one of censureand also a direction to recover Rs. 250 being the loss incurred by thedepartment on account of the alleged misconduct of the petitioner in thematter of driving the vehicle. He also sought for an order directing the firstrespondent - Manager, P. and T. Motor Service, Ernakulam, to give thepetitioner his due promotion over respondents 2 to 4 on the basis of bisseniority and to give him all attendant benefits. 2. It was strongly contended on behalf of the petitioner that the twopunishments as such - one of censure and another of recovery of Rs. 250/- forthe alleged damages caused by the petitioner could not be imposed by theauthorities concerned; and also that in the matter of recovery of damages thathad been ordered without any finding that the petitioner was negligent in hisjob of driving the vehicle, and that no specific amount was shown in the showcause notice regarding the quantum of damages and that the punishmentcannot stand. 3. After going through the relevant records, I am of the view that thepetitioner's contentions regarding the same are untenable. As pointed out inChellappan Nair v. State 1970 KLR 162 by Justice Mathew, the authority iscompetent to impose two penalties on the delinquent. In that case the questioncame up under R.11 and 13 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification,Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960. It was contended on behalf of the delinquentofficer there that no two penalties can be imposed cumulatively. The materialpart of R.13 provides: "Government may impose any of the penalties specified in items (i) and (iii) to (viii) of R.11(1) on members of the State services" R.11 provides that, "The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a government servant ......"'. It was contended there that the Government was competent to impose onlyone of the penalties enumerated in R.11, and therefore, the imposition of thetwo penalties upon the delinquent was not authorised. Mathew, J. pointed outthat this contention cannot be accepted. It was contended there that the Government was competent to impose onlyone of the penalties enumerated in R.11, and therefore, the imposition of thetwo penalties upon the delinquent was not authorised. Mathew, J. pointed outthat this contention cannot be accepted. Following the ruling in AIR 1961 SC938, where the word, 'everyone of the Directors was construed as meaning allthe Directors' Justice Mathew said, "looking at the context the sameconstruction should be adopted in this service rules also". 4. This decision of Justice Mathew is directly applicable here also. Therefore,in the matter of the imposition of the penalties I cannot accept the petitioner'scontentions. 5. Now the question arises as to whether on account of the imposition of thepenalties the petitioner could be denied promotion, the rule for promotionbeing on the basis of seniority cum fitness. It has been pointed out by theSupreme Court in State of Mysore v. Seshadri AIR 1974 SC 460 that senioritycum fitness will not mean selection made on merit and ability. There is noquestion of any comparative assessment as such coming in. In such cases nodoubt the suitability or fitness of the person concerned for promotion to thepost, his qualification, health etc., might be relevant and will have to beconsidered. 6. But the appointment being not on merit or ability, I do not think thepunishment of censure imposed on him or punishment of recovery of money,that has also been imposed on him, might be taken into consideration in thematter of determination of his fitness for the post. If such consideration hadbeen taken in the matter, the promotion of respondents 2 to 4 was certainlywrong and the mistake will have to be rectified after hearing the partiesconcerned. 7. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the Department, viz., W. A.199/73 will not indicate anything different from what I have stated above.There the appellant in the case while she was holding the post of a lowerselection grade Monitor was reverted by the impugned order therein andafterwards her juniors were promoted in a regular manner as L S G. Monitors. The case as put forward before court was that the selection must be inaccordance with R.272A of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual and not on thebasis of merit and ability. The case as put forward before court was that the selection must be inaccordance with R.272A of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual and not on thebasis of merit and ability. It was contended on behalf of the Officer therein thatseniority cum fitness is what R.272A provides and that it is different from aselection based on merit and ability, and the court's attention was drawn to thedecision in Union of India v. M. L. Kapoor AIR 1974 SC 87 . In support of thiscontention it was urged that instead of considering the fitness, what has beendone was to refer the matter to the departmental promotion committee and thedepartmental promotion committee compared the claims of the appellanttherein with that of respondents 4 to 6 and the committee selected on thebasis of merit and ability. This, it was submitted therein, was not choosing onthe basis of seniority cum fitness. But in the counter affidavit (in that case), itwas asserted that what was considered was fitness and that there was nocomparison of merit and ability. Accepting the averments in the counteraffidavit, the court said "even if R.272A was the rule that should have beenapplied" the court was not satisfied that this had not been done. 8. What is stated in that decision (W. A. 199/73) would make it clear that nocomparative assessment on the basis of merit and ability, where certainly thepunishment imposed could be taken into consideration could be had forappointments purely based on seniority cum fitness. No doubt a differentmeaning to the words seniority cum fitness had been given in Rev. MotherProvincial v. State 1969 KLT 749 (F.B) wherein a Full Bench of this courtwhich was considering the validity of the provisions of the Kerala UniversityAct, Chief Justice Raman Nayar speaking for the Bench gave a meaning tothe expression seniority cum fitness something that is different from themeaning usually attributed to it in the ordinary service rules. 9. It might be noted that subsequently to bring the provision in conformity withthe ordinary service rules, an amendment was sought to be incorporated andthe amendment was struck down by this court in Chandrasekhara Pillai v.Accountant General 1972 KLT 111 . 10. 9. It might be noted that subsequently to bring the provision in conformity withthe ordinary service rules, an amendment was sought to be incorporated andthe amendment was struck down by this court in Chandrasekhara Pillai v.Accountant General 1972 KLT 111 . 10. It is also of interest to note that regarding this provision of the KeralaUniversity Act another Full Bench of this Court in Mercy Mathew v. Universityof Kerala 1976 KLT SN 41 held: "It is clear that this court was doubtful of the wisdom of the provision insub-s.(7) of S.53 of the Act. But it was prepared to uphold the section asnecessary to prevent favouritism and secure fair prospects of advancement ofthe teaching staff. But this approval was qualified by the statement 'we wouldlike to make it clear that the seniority cum fitness means that due and equalregard should be paid both to seniority and to fitness and since fitness is amatter of degree, it would appear that a senior person can be overlooked infavour of a junior who is demonstrably more fit for the appointment than he is'.There was a further qualification to the approval that notwithstanding thewording of the sub-section that direct recruitment could be had only if there isno person available for promotion possessing the necessary qualification, itwould be open to the management to resort to appointment otherwise than bypromotion if there is no person fit for promotion. There can be little doubt that to the words seniority cum fitness a particularmeaning had been given by this court in Rev Mother Provincial and others v.State of Kerala (1969 KLT 749) This view was reiterated in Rt: Rev. Dr. M M.John v. .Government of Kerala ( 1971 KLT 875 ). The use of the sameexpression, which has been judicially interpreted, in the present Act indicatesthat the legislature has accepted that interpretation. If the intention was thatthe appointment should be on considerations different from what has beenpointed out in 1969 KLT 749, different language would certainly have beenadopted. That the legislature has accepted the interpretation is also evidentfrom the fact that the two other suggestions made by this court in its judgmentin 1969 KLT 74 have also been adopted by the legislature. This courtexpressed the view in 1969 KLT 749 that in the matter of appointment of aPrincipal, it is not desirable to have the selection confined to the teachers inthe college or colleges. This courtexpressed the view in 1969 KLT 749 that in the matter of appointment of aPrincipal, it is not desirable to have the selection confined to the teachers inthe college or colleges. These restrictions which were contained in sub-s.(1)and (3) of S.53 (which were declared void) of the earlier Act have now beenremoved. Sub-s.(2) of S.57 of the present Act significantly provides 'directrecruitment' as a method of appointment to the post of Principal. Secondly inregard to the appointments other than in the lowest grade of teacher of thecollege or of all the colleges as the case may be now provided by sub-s.(4) ofS.57 what was pointed out by this court in the above decision in regard tosub-s.(7) of S.53 that this court did not understand the provision therein topreclude appointment by direct recruitment when the person available in thecollege or colleges are not fit for promotion, has now been specifically enactedin sub-s.(4) of S.57 of the present Act. The meaning thus given to the sub-section would enable the management tosome extent at least to choose. If a junior is better equipped than the seniorthe junior can be preferred and automatic promotion of the senior most if he isnot found to be unfit in the sense unsuitable, is not what is meant by thelegislature according to the interpretation placed on the provision. There is anelement of comparison in determining fitness". 11. In view of what I have slated above, the petitioner is entitled to have hispromotion to the post of selection grade driver considered on the basis of whatI have indicated above. The O. P. is disposed of as above. No costs.