JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioners, who claimed to be residents and tax payers and some of whom are also office-bearers of Gram Panchayats and anchal Panchayats under Dhandalibarh anchal Panchayat (hereinafter referred to as the said Panchayat), have impeached in this Rule an action of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in having the name of the said Panchayat as referred to hereinbefore changed to debenrda Anchal Panchayat. 2. ADMITTEDLY, under section 25 (2)of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) and which is to the following effect : section 25 (2) : the State Government shall in the notification specify the names of the territorial limits of the anchal Panchayats; the State Government is the authority who can specify the name and territorial limits of the Anchal panchayats in question and after the necessary notification in terms of section 30 of the said Act, which is to the following effect : every Anchal Panchayat shall by the name notified under section 25 be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall, subject to the restrictions or qualifications, if any, imposed under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force, have power to accept a gift of, acquire, hold, administer and transfer property both movable and immovable and to enter into any contract or do all things necessary for the purposes of this act, and shall by the said name sue and be sued; anchal Panchayats become body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common seal and have the power to accept a gift or acquire, hold, administer and transfer properties both movable and immovable and to entertain any contract or to do all things necessary for the purposes of the Act and shall by name sue and be sued. The point involved in this case is that, once the same of such an anchal Panchayat is notified and thereafter the said Panchayat become a legal entity, whether such name as notified can be changed and the specific submissions of Mr. Bhunia, appearing in support of the rule is that, the change of the name of the said Anchal Panchayat to Debendra Anchal Panchayat was illegal, irregular and unauthorised. 3. Bhunia, appearing in support of the rule is that, the change of the name of the said Anchal Panchayat to Debendra Anchal Panchayat was illegal, irregular and unauthorised. 3. THERE is no dispute that the said name of the Anchal Panphayat was duly notified and thereafter there were proposals to change the name as given and to name the same Anchal panchayat as Debendra Anchal Panchayat. It has been stated by the petitioners that objections having been raised, there was an enquiry into the matter and they were informed that the proposal to change the name of the Panchayat was dropped. On such happening, it has been alleged by the petitioners that the rates and taxes were realised in the name of the said Panchayat and by a letter of January 20, 1972 it was informed further by the Sub-divisional Officer, contain, that there was no proposal of changing the name of the said Panchayat. It has of course been alleged by them that even inspite of such fact, rates and taxes were started to be realised in the name of Debendra Anchal panchayat and accordingly necessary objections were filed to the Block Development Officer, Contain (III. It appears that,in reply to such objections, the Block Development Officer concerned, by his Memo of April 3, 1972 informed that the Pradhan of the said Panchayat was directed to realise taxes in favour of the said panchayat. These apart, other instances have been cited by the petitioners for the purpose of establishing that steps were taken, acts were done and duties were performed in the name of the said Panchayat. 4. THE petitioners have alleged that although the functions of the said panchayat were being performed duly, suddenly by a Memo of february 8, 1974, the Block Development Officer, Contain (III) informed that by a notification of September 11, 1963, the name of the said Anchal panchayat has been changed to Debendra Anchal panchayat. The petitioners have alleged that without and notification in the Gazette, the original notification, whereby the name of the said panchayat was given or notified under the said Act, could not be corrected. This submission, of the petitioners, on the question of notification has of course no substance as it appears from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by Respondents Nos. 4 and 5. This submission, of the petitioners, on the question of notification has of course no substance as it appears from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by Respondents Nos. 4 and 5. against the application for injunction and which was filed by the petitioners herein and which has been accepted as an affidavit-in-opposition in the Rule, on submission made by the learned Advocate for the said Respondents, and more particularly from a reference to annexure 'f' therein, that a notification has in fact been made incorporating the corrections to the following effect: "part I-Orders and Notifications by the Governor of West Bengal, the High Court, government Treasury, etc. GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL department OF PANCHAYAT corrigendum no. 701 Panch - 14th January-In Notification No. 37671/panch/1p-78-63, dated the 4th September 1963, issued under section 25 of the West bengal Panchayat Act, 1957 (West bengal Act I of 1957) published at pages 3164-3164 (a) of Part I of the "calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary", dated the 11th September, 1963, the following correction is made : at page 3164, for the heading "dhandalibar Anchal Panchayat" read "debendra Anchal Panchayat. " Since such a notification has been made, Mr. Bhunia appearing in support of the Rule contended that the correction which was sought to be made viz., the change of the name of the said Anchal Panchayat to Debendra anchal Panchayat, was either unauthorised or in excess of powers. In any event, he submitted that the State government, which is the appropriate authority under section 25 (2) of the said Act, cannot change the name of the Anchai Panchayat as notified, merely by way of a corrigendum notification. 5. THE Respondents Nos. 1 to 3, for whom Mr. P. K. Roy has appeared, have not filed any return to the Rule. But Mr. Roy made his submissions on the facts as appearing from the petition and the opposition as referred to hereinbefore, and sought to interpret the provisions of the said Act and the notification as quoted hereinbefore, to mean that steps were taken duly and properly by the State Government and that too in appropriate exercise of jurisdiction. As stated hereinbefore, the Respondents Nos. 4 and 5, for whom Mr, Panda appeared, placed reliance on the submissions as made in the opposition as referred to hereinbefore. As stated hereinbefore, the Respondents Nos. 4 and 5, for whom Mr, Panda appeared, placed reliance on the submissions as made in the opposition as referred to hereinbefore. In the said opposition, those answering respondents have categorically denied the material allegations, apart from contending that some of the petitioners were neither rate-prayers nor residents of the said panchayat or have any interest in the same. It is true that on the basis of such submissions and as contained in the affidavit-in-opposition, as referred to hereinbefore, it appears that perhaps some of the petitioners have no locus standi to maintain the petition. But such defence of the said respondents would not be applicable or available in respect of all the petitioners, I have made a reference to these facts, because on the statements as contained in the said affidavits, Mr. Roy submitted that since the petitioners have no legal right or none of their rights have been infringed, the application at their instance, should be deemed to be not maintainable. I am of the view that if one of the petitioners amongst many have any right, be it as a rate payer or a member of the said Panchayat, the petition should not be thrown out in liming or without disposing of or determining the paints as raised. I make it clear further that since some of the facts as alleged in the petition have been disputed by the answering respondent Nos. 3 and 4. I shall not enter into them or make any determination on the basis thereof, as disputed questions of fact cannot be determined or entertained in an application under Article 226 or they should not be entertained or allowed in this jurisdiction. Such disputed questions of fact, would also be not relevant in the instant case or the determination which is required to be made viz., whether under section 25 (2) of the said Act, the state Government had any right, authority or competence to give another name to an Anchal Panchayat, after initially giving the said Anchal Panchayat a name by necessary notification. 6. MR. Roy, apart from the preliminary points as recorded hereinbefore, submitted further that the change of the name of the said Panchayat to debendra Anchal Panchayat has not and in fact would not change its corporate character. 6. MR. Roy, apart from the preliminary points as recorded hereinbefore, submitted further that the change of the name of the said Panchayat to debendra Anchal Panchayat has not and in fact would not change its corporate character. It was contended by him that when such change as in the instant case is incorporated by the corrigendum the same would not change the corporate character of the said Panchayat and as such1 the action as taken should hot be interfered with. In support of his submissions, he referred to the case of Ramchandra Reddy and And Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, A. I. R. 1965 A. P. 40, wherein the principle as enunciated in the United States and to the following effect : "a corporation is not dissolved, nor its identity affected by enlargement or diminution of its corporate limits, by a change in its character or corporate form, by an increase or decrease in the number of its corporation or inhabitants, by a change of its name by failure of the legislature to assign a city to its proper class, by transition from a hamlet, village or town to a city, or vice versa or by pass from one class or grade to another class or grade, has been followed. The above determination was made in the cases of Broughton Vs. Penssacolls, (1874-76) 23 L. Ed. 806, Girard Vs. Philadelphia (1868-70), 19 L. Ed. . 33. Mr. Roy has of course agreed that a corporation can be dissolved only by law and in the manner as prescribed by a statute viz., by the said Act in the instant case. He repeated that when the corporate character 5n the instant case of the said Panchayat has not admittedly been changed, so there was no infirmity in the action as taken. That apart, on the power of the State government to have the name of a notified Anchal Panchayat changed, on construction of the sections as referred to hereinbefore, Mr. Roy submitted that when the State Government had the right or power to name an Anchal panchayat by notification, so they will also have the power to correct any error. That apart, on the power of the State government to have the name of a notified Anchal Panchayat changed, on construction of the sections as referred to hereinbefore, Mr. Roy submitted that when the State Government had the right or power to name an Anchal panchayat by notification, so they will also have the power to correct any error. In support of such submissions he first relied on section 21 of the central General Clauses Act, 1897, which is to the following effect : section 21 : power to make, to include to add to, amend, vary or rescind orders, rules or bye-laws whether by any Central Act or regulations, a power (issue notification), orders, rules, or bye laws is conferred with power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any (notification), orders, rules or bye laws so (issue. The said section 21 is corresponding to section 22 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, which is to the following effect : section 22 : where by any bengal Act (or West Bengal Act)a power to (issue) orders, rules, bye laws or notification is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner subject to the like sanction and condition (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any orders, rules, bye laws or notifications so (issue. And also submitted that those corrections by the notification as was done, was permissible and was done in accordance with law. In support of his submissions, Mr. Roy also relied on the determinations in the case of Ranchhod Jena Vs. Patankar and Anr., A. I. R. 1866 Gujarat 248, which, was incidentally a case under section 21 of Bombay general Clauses Act and wherein it has been observed that under the said section the State Government has power to rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye laws and the said power is without any limitation or condition. On the question of interpretation of the provisions of the General Clauses act as referred to hereinbefore, further reference was made by Mr. Roy to the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Bishnu Prasad Sharma and Ors., a. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1593. On the question of interpretation of the provisions of the General Clauses act as referred to hereinbefore, further reference was made by Mr. Roy to the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Bishnu Prasad Sharma and Ors., a. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1593. In that case there was a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and a successive notifications under section 6 of that Act in respect of different pieces of lands included in a locality specified in the notification under section 4 and the point arose, whether under the provisions of the statute, such action was permissible and it has been observed that the Government can always cancel the notification under sections 4 and 6 by virtue of its powers under section, 21 of the General Clauses Act and such power can be exercised before the Government directs the Collector to take action under section 7. The fact that the Government under the provisions of General Clauses Act, has power to cancel its earlier notifications or action, has also self supported from another determination in the case of p. Raman Nair Vs. State, A. I. R. 1957 p. C. 220 as cited by Mr. Roy. In that case it has been observed that the order by the Government, by which sanction is accorded to Panchayat to open and conduct a public market at a certain place comes within the ambit of section 20 of Travancore and Cochin Interpretation and General Clauses Act and implies a power in the Government to cancel the order by subsequent order. Apart from the cases as referred to hereinbefore, on the interpretation and application of General Clauses Acts, mr. Roy further relied on the determinations in the case of Gopi Chand vs. Delhi Administration, A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 609. In that case section 19 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, which is pan material with section 21 of the General Clauses Act, was in issue and it has been observed that the power to cancel the notification can be easily conceded to the competent authority and so also the power to modify or vary it be likewise, conceded; but the said power must inevitably be exercised within the limits prescribed by the provisions conferring the said power. Admitted facts in the instant case are that, that after the naming of the said Panchayat by a notification, the subsequent corrigendum notifications as quoted hereinbefore, was issued in the extraordinary issues of the Calcutta Gazette of February 1, 1974. Mr. Roy submitted and that too on the pleadings as available, that at all material times there were objections to the re-naming of the said Anchal Panchayat and representations for the change of its name to Debendra Anchal panchayat was pending. Such representations, he submitted, were made after the issue of the original notification, by which the name of the said panchayat was notified. He submitted that since those representations were pending on the date of the initial notification in question or thereafter, by the present corrigendum, on acceptance of the connected representations, the notification itself has been corrected and thereby the name of the said Panchayat has been changed to Debendra Anchal panchayat and such power in view of the submissions as made hereinbefore, and the provisions of the respective general Clauses Act, was with the government and the same was duly exercised. Mr. Bhunia of course submitted that the authorities concerned in the instant case had not acted in a bonafide manner, rather they have misused their power or acted in abuse of the same. For the purpose of establishing such argument, he submitted that section 25 (2) of the said gives power to the Government concerned for naming an Anchal Panchayat. but such power would not mean to change the name and in fact by such change in the instant case, the character of the said anchal Panchayat has been changed and thus the power was exercised or abused as such or necessary power was not there with the State Government. 7. CONSIDERING the provisions of sedition 21 of the General clauses Act corresponding to the provisions- in section 22 of the bengal General Clauses Act, in agreement with the arguments of Mr. Roy I hold that under those provisions the government, which has notified the name of an Anchal Panchayat will have power and authority to issue necessary corrections as was done in the instant case and such power is of course to be exercised or allowed to be exercised, when by such change, the nature and character of the Anchal Panchayat in question, is not changed. By the change of the name of the said Panchayat to Debendra Anchal Panchayat, in the facts of the present case, I also hold that the character of the Panchayat in question, which is the only material fact to be considered, has not been changed and as such the State Government's action in issuing the corrigendum notification and thus to change the name of the Anchal Panchayat to debendra Anchal Panchayat, cannot be said to be unauthorised, irregular or void. 8. ON the arguments as advanced by Mr. Roy, on the question of locus standi or the petitioners to maintain the petition, as none of their legal rights were interfered with, Mr. Roy first placed reliance on the case of mani Subrat Jain Vs. Stats of Hariyana, A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 276, wherein it has been observed that it is elementary though it is to be re-stated that no one can ask for a Mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance, can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by the summons who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. In reply to such arguments of Mr. Roy, mr. Bhunia submitted that if a petitioner amongst many, has any subsisting right, either as rate payer or as a member of the said Panchayat, the petition would be maintainable, at least by 6r at his instance. In support of his submissions, Mr. Bhunia referred to the determination of the Supreme court in the case of Maharaj Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., a. I. R. 1976 S. C. 2602. After considering the arguments and the decision cited at the Bar, I am of the view that it is not possible for this Court to come to a conclusion that all the petitioners were neither interested as rate payers or as members of the said Anchal panchayat. It may be in view of the arguments as advanced, some of the petitioners, because of their infirmities as indicated hereinbefore, would not be in a position to maintain the petition. It may be in view of the arguments as advanced, some of the petitioners, because of their infirmities as indicated hereinbefore, would not be in a position to maintain the petition. But since such objection would not be applicable or available to all the petitioners, the petition would be maintainable and that too if at least one of them has any subsisting interest. Thus I hold that the petition is maintainable. In view of the above, although i find the petition to be maintainable. I am discharging the Rule on the other arguments as made by the respondents. The Rule is thus discharged. There will be no order for costs. Rule discharged.