Order.- The revision petitioner is the first accused in C.C.No. 210 of 1974 of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Palai. The Food Inspector of the Palai Municipality lodged a complaint against the first accused for an offence punishable under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short the Act). The case of the complainant is that on 7th March, 1974, the complainant, P.W.1 visited the shop of the first accused at 11-35 a.m. and purchased a sample of Vinegar, which, on analysis by the Public Analyst, was found to be adulterated, The 1st accused, who was the sole accused at that time pleaded not guilty and claimed that he purchased the article under a warranty, Exhibit D-2 issued by the second accused, examined as D.W.1 in the case. On the warranty being proved, the Court directed the 2nd accused to be brought on record under section 20-A of the Act. On receipt of summons, the second accused appeared before Court. The complainant was again examined and he was afforded an opportunity to depose to the facts relating to the second accused. Basing on the warranty, the trial Court ultimately acquitted the first accused. The Court held that on the facts of the case, the acts of the two accused could not be held to be parts of the same transaction, their joint trial was irregular and as there was no allegation in the complaint against the second accused, he was liable to be discharged. An order of discharge was, therefore, passed under section 245(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The complainant, Food Inspector, thereupon filed Criminal Revision Petition No. 60 of 1975 before the Court of Session, Kottayam. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, who disposed of the case observed that there could be no acquittal before framing a charge and that the trial Court ought to have framed a charge against both the accused and should have proceeded with the trial. Taking the above view, the order passed by the trial Court was set aside. The trial Court was directed to frame a charge against both the accused and to dispose of the case after trial The present revision petition is filed by the first accused challenging the order of the learned Sessions Judge. 2. Taking the above view, the order passed by the trial Court was set aside. The trial Court was directed to frame a charge against both the accused and to dispose of the case after trial The present revision petition is filed by the first accused challenging the order of the learned Sessions Judge. 2. The first point taken on behalf of the petitioner is that the learned Sessions Judge was wrong in setting aside the order of acquittal. According to the petitioner, the proper procedure was to file an appeal against the acquittal of the 1st accused and a revision petition against the discharge of the second accused. This contention, however, has no weight. Under section 399(1), Criminal Procedure Code, the Sessions Judge is competent to exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under sub-section (1) of section 401. It is no doubt true that section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not authorise the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The section, however, does not restrict the power of the High Court to consider the legality of an order of acquittal and in proper cases to order a retrial. Therefore, the order of the learned Sessions Judge setting aside the acquittal of the 1st accused and directing further trial cannot be said to be one passed without jurisdiction. 3. The main point arising in revision is the legality of the proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Palai. The stand taken by the revision petitioner is that the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Palai, acquitting him is not liable to be set aside. The respondent, Municipality) on the other hand, contends that the proper procedure that should have been followed by the Court was to conduct a de novo trial against both the accused after framing a charge. In fact, one of the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for interfering with the order of the trial Court is that the acquittal was without framing a charge. The learned Sessions Judge is of the view that after the second accused was brought on record a fresh trial should commence and whatever transpired prior to the introduction of the second accused on record should be ignored. The learned Sessions Judge is of the view that after the second accused was brought on record a fresh trial should commence and whatever transpired prior to the introduction of the second accused on record should be ignored. The learned Sessions Judge proceeded on the footing that a joint trial of accused 1 and 2 is obligatory and such joint trial is possible only if proceedings are started de novo and a fresh charge is framed. In other words, according to the learned Judge, the charge framed against the first accused and the evidence recorded including that of D.W. 1 have to be ignored for the purpose of the trial. 4. Reference has to be made in this conned ion to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice and Oil Mills1. The Full Bench considered the scope of section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the procedure to be followed in the matter of trial of an accused under that section. Section 20(A) reads: "Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or in section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under section 20.” In some of the cases that came before the Full Bench, the original accused had set up a plea of warranty. They adduced evidence producing warranty and sought protection under section 19(2) of the Act. The respective manufacturers, distributors or dealers, as the case may be, who sold the articles of food and issued the concerned warranty were also examined as defence witnesses. The persons who issued the warranties were brought on record as additional accused only later on. The Court acquitted the original accused and invoking the powers under section 20(A), proceeded with the trial of the persons who issued the warranties. The acquittal of the original accused was challenged in appeal. The persons who issued the warranties were brought on record as additional accused only later on. The Court acquitted the original accused and invoking the powers under section 20(A), proceeded with the trial of the persons who issued the warranties. The acquittal of the original accused was challenged in appeal. The proper procedure, according to the contention put forward before the Full Bench was to have a joint trial of the vendors and the persons who issued the warranties. The Full Bench, after considering the different Contentions put forward, came to the following conclusions: “(i) Section 20-A of the Act envisages a joint trial of the vendor and the manufacturer or distributor or dealer of any article of food, as the case may be; (ii) The powers given under section 20-A can be invoked only during the trial of any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, for any offence under the Act; (iii) Under this section it is imperative on the part of the Court to implead a manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, whenever the Court is satisfied on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence with which the vendor, the original accused, is charged. (iv) The satisfaction referred to in this section is to be reached by the Court on the basis of the materials already on record and no hard and fast rule or any guide-line can be laid down regarding the data or quantum of materials necessary or sufficient to reach this satisfaction; (v) Even if a manufacturer, distributor or dealer is not present in Court the magistrate is empowered to implead such a manufacturer, distributor or dealer without a complaint or written consent or sanction as contemplated under section 20 of the Act; (vi) Impleading under this section can be done at any stage after the commencement of the trial and before the conclusion of the trial of the vendor, the original accused, by convicting or acquitting him and not thereafter; and (vii). After impleadment of the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, as the case may be, the entire proceeding against the original as well as the newly added accused shall commence afresh in accordance with law.” Apparently basing on the above interpretation of the law the learn:d Judge held that trial should start afresh after framing a charge against both the accused. The revision petitioner before this Court would contend that the decision of the Full Bench in the above case is no longer law and stands overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in in Bhagwan Das v. Delhi Administration1 5. In the case before the Supreme Court the vendor Laxmi Narain was jointly tried with the Bhagwan Das Jagadish Chander, Ghee Merchants and Commission Agents at Delhi, the warrantor for offences under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Laxmi Narain set up defence under section 19(2) of the Act and urged that to enable him to prove the warranty, Jagadish Chander, a partner of the warrantor firm should be examined and the said person could be compelled to appear as a witness only on being discharged or acquitted. The trial Court accepted the contention and acquitted the warrantor firm. On proof of the warranty Laxmi Narain was also acquitted. After the acquittal of both the accused the Magistrate impleaded the manufacturer under section 20-A of the Act. The Municipal Corporation appealed against the acquittal of Laxmi Narain and Jagadish Chander. The High Court confirmed the acquittal of Laxmi Narain and set aside that of Messrs. Bhagvan Das Jagadish Chander. Against this Bhagvan Das filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. One of the questions mooted before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution of the appellant was invalid because the appellant was sent up for trial jointly with Laxmi Narain, the vendor. The Supreme Court did not accept the reasoning that in every case under the Act those who sold the article to the vendor could be brought in only after warranty set up under section 19(2) has been pleaded and substantiated. The Supreme Court did not accept the reasoning that in every case under the Act those who sold the article to the vendor could be brought in only after warranty set up under section 19(2) has been pleaded and substantiated. The Supreme Court held that the special provisions in sections 20-A, 19(2) and 20 do not take away or derogate from the effect of the general law relating to separate trial or joint trial of the accused in accordance with the provisions of sections 233 to 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that if the allegations justify, the vendor and the distributor or the manufacturer as the case may be, can be joined as co-accused even initially in a joint trial. While discussing about the applicability of section 239, the Court observed: "We think that the activities of the manufacturer, the distributor, and the retail seller are sufficiently connected, in such a case of sale of an article of food found to be adulterated, by a unity of purpose and design, and, therefore, of a transaction, so as to make their joint trial possible in a suitable case. But, at the same time, we think that, where a joinder of several accused persons concerned with dealing in different ways with the same adulterated article of food at different stages is likely to jeopardise a fair trial, a separate’ trial ought to be ordered. It is not proper to acquit or discharge an accused person on this ground alone. The ordering of a separate trial in a case where prejudice to an accused from a joint trial is apprehended, is enough. Indeed, we can go even further and say that, ordinarily, they ought to be separately tried. But a joint trial of such accused persons is not ab initio illegal. It can take place in suitable cases." The Court then quoted with approval the observation in V.N. Kamdar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi1 that the normal rule under the Criminal Procedure Code is to try each accused separately when the offence committed by him is distinct and separate and that the provisions of sections 233 to 239 would indicate that joint trial is an exception. The Court also observed that addition of an accused under section 20-A of the Act constitutes an exception to the requirement of sanction under section 20(1) and such addition can be made only during the course of the trial. The Court after referring to the decision in Kadiri Kunhammad v. State of Madras2 observed: "We do not interpret Kadiri Kunham mad’s case2 to mean that a joint trial of accused persons is obligatory in every case where a catenation of facts, said to constitute separate but related or cognate offences, can be viewed as one transaction. The question whether there should be a joint or separate trial in a case should be determined on the facts of that case and the requirements of justice there. As pointed out by this Court in V.N. Kamdar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi1 the special provisions of section 20-A are only enabling and do not give rise to a mandatory duty. They do not bar either a separate or a joint trial of an accused person if other conditions are satisfied. Similarly, section 239(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, which is reproduced as section 223 (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, is only an enabling section. No doubt it has to be shown that the requirements of section 239(d) have been fulfilled whenever this provision is sought, to be utilised. The result is that we think that, in a suitable case, a vendor, a distributor, and a manufacturer could be tried together provided the allegations made before the Court show that there are connecting links between their activities so as to constitute the same transaction. The connecting links, in a case such as the one before us, could be provided by: firstly, the fact that a sale at an anterior stage could be viewed as the cause of the subsequent sale; secondly, the allegation that each of the accused parted with the article of food when it was in an adulterated state; and, thirdly, by the common object of the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor that the article should reach the consumer to be used as food. The third and last mentioned link seems decisive and must tilt the balance in favour of legality of a joint trial of the parties concerned. But, we are also conscious of the fact that Courts cannot ignore broader requirements of justice.“ 6. The third and last mentioned link seems decisive and must tilt the balance in favour of legality of a joint trial of the parties concerned. But, we are also conscious of the fact that Courts cannot ignore broader requirements of justice.“ 6. It follows that the exposition of law in conclusions (i) and (iii) in Food inspector v. Seetharam Rice and Oil Mills1 that section 20-A of the Act envisages a joint trial of the persons referred to therein and that it casts a mandatory duty on the Court to implead the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer, as the case may be, stands over-ruled to the extent it is contrary to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the passages quoted above. In other words, section 20-A of the Act and section 239(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (section 223 (d) of the new Code) are only enabling provisions. Whether in a case where the complainant seeks to prosecute both the vendor and the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer as the case may be, who issued the warranty, there can be a joint trial, will depend upon the allegations in the complaint and is subject to the provisions relating to joint trial in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. It is only appropriate at this stage to refer to the case V.N. Kamdar v. Delhi Municipality2. The Food Inspector concerned filed a complaint against one Ram Prakash Oberoi for sale of adulterated curry powder. During trial when questioned under section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure, Ram Prakash Oberoi put forward the defence of warranty under section 19(2) of the Act which was accepted by the Court. The Court observed in the concluding portion of the judgment that it was open to the Municipal Corporation to proceed against the warrantor concerned, the appellants before the Supreme Court for issue of false warranty. A complaint was in due course filed against the appellants alleging that they gave a false warranty in respect of the curry powder manufactured by them. The appellants moved for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they ought to have been impleaded in the proceedings against Ram Prakash and that not having been done, the complaint war barred. The prayer was not allowed. The matter ultimately came before the Supreme Court. The appellants moved for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they ought to have been impleaded in the proceedings against Ram Prakash and that not having been done, the complaint war barred. The prayer was not allowed. The matter ultimately came before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that the Act does not contain any provision which obliged the Food Inspector to have joined the appellants as parties to the complaint filed against Ram Prakash Oberoi. After referring to section 20-A, the Supreme Court observed: “The section is an enabling one. There is nothing mandatory about it. It is left to the discretion of the Magistrate whether, in a particular case, having regard to the evidence adduced, it is necessary, in the interest of justice, to implead the manufacturer, the distributor or the dealer as the case may be. Even in a case where the Magistrate could properly have impleaded the manufacturer, distributor or dealer in a proceeding against a person alleged to have committed an offence under the Act but failed to do so, that would not in any way confer an immunity upon the manufacturer, distributor or dealer from a prosecution for an offence committed by him.“ 8. The Supreme Court proceeded to say that the normal rule under the Code of Criminal Procedure is to try each accused separately, joint trial is only an exception and the real purpose of section 20-A is to avoid as far as possible conflicting findings. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, thus approving the initiation of separate proceedings. 9. In the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court the following alternatives are open to a. complainant under the Act: “(i) Subject to the law relating to joint trial in the Code of Criminal Procedure, depending upon the allegations in. the complaint, proceedings can be initiated jointly against the vendor, and the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer as the case may be and they can be tried jointly as in Bhagwan Das’s case1. (ii) Separate complaint can be filed against the vendor and the concerned warrantor viz., manufacturer, distributor or the dealer, as the case may be, after complying with the formalities in section 20 of the Act as in V.N. Kamdar’s case2. (ii) Separate complaint can be filed against the vendor and the concerned warrantor viz., manufacturer, distributor or the dealer, as the case may be, after complying with the formalities in section 20 of the Act as in V.N. Kamdar’s case2. (iii) Pending trial of the vendor if there is evidence to the satisfaction of the Court to show that the manufacturer, the distributor or the dealer is concerned with the offence, he can be proceeded against as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under section 20, as provided in section 20-A." The present case falls under the third category. 10. The further question is whether, having impleaded the warrantor, the trial should proceed afresh against both the vendor and the warrantor. It is to be noted in this connection that the cases disposed of in Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice and Oil Mills3, were tried when the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was in force. There is marked difference between section 219 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure (II of 1974) and section, 351 of the Code of 1898. Section 319 of the new Code reads: "319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence: (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), then- (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard; (b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced." The section as was the case with section 351 of the old Code is an enabling provision. Section 351 of the old Code enabled the Court to bring in only persons attending Court whereas subsections (1) and (2) of section 319 of the new Code empower the Court to summon or arrest and to proceed against any person not being an accused, who, it appears from the evidence, has committed an offence for which joint trial is permissible. While subsection (4) makes it obligatory that the proceedings in respect of the person so brought in should be commenced a fresh, it does not say that in respect of the accused originally on record, the Court should not act upon the evidence already taken. Section 319(4) also does not say that after the new accused is brought in he should be tried jointly with the original accused. It is therefore open to the Court to decide whether there should be joint trial taking into account the circumstances of the easel and taking care that no prejudice is caused to the accused. The power to order separate trial can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings. There is nothing in either section 319, Criminal Procedure Code or in section 20-A of the Act which restricts the power. What the decisions of the Supreme Court cited above lay down is only that it is not illegal to try a vendor with the persons mentioned in section 20-A and not that a joint trial is obligatory. There is nothing in either section 319, Criminal Procedure Code or in section 20-A of the Act which restricts the power. What the decisions of the Supreme Court cited above lay down is only that it is not illegal to try a vendor with the persons mentioned in section 20-A and not that a joint trial is obligatory. If as is stated by the Supreme Court separate trial is the rule and joint trial is the exception, it is not incumbent on the part of the Court to start the case de novo against the vendor even in cases under section 20-.A, though it is open to the Court to do so. This means, the procedure in conclusion No. (vii) of the Full Bench in Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice and Oil Mills1 requires modification in the light of the rulings of the Supreme Court and need not always be followed in a trial under section 20-A of the Act at any rate under the new Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words to avoid prejudice to the accused separate trial can be ordered even after the new accused are brought in under the above provisions. Since the cases are to be disposed of by the same Court conflict of findings may not usually occur. In appropriate cases the Court can adopt the procedure usually followed in cases and counter cases and pronounce judgment simultaneously. 11. In the instant case, the complaint originally filed on 20th May, 1974 did not make mention of the second accused. A charge was framed against the first accused, following the formalities of a warrant case. After the prosecution evidence was over, the accused was questioned and he has also let in evidence by way of evidence. In. the light of the warranty and the evidence of D.W. 1, the first accused was entitled to acquittal even before the Court acted under section 20-A and inducted the 2nd accused into the case. In view of the provisions contained in section 319 (4) the formalities of a warrant case have to be gone through before a charge is framed against the 2nd accused and in case there is to be a joint trial, the trial against the first accused also has to be started de novo. In view of the provisions contained in section 319 (4) the formalities of a warrant case have to be gone through before a charge is framed against the 2nd accused and in case there is to be a joint trial, the trial against the first accused also has to be started de novo. Since the defence under section 19(2) of the Act is available to first accused and he has succeeded in his defence by examining the second accused, to start proceedings de nono to enable joint trial with the 2nd accused is to say the least unnecessary harassment of the 1st accused. When neither the Act nor section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes a joint trial obligatory, there is justification to order such a trial as against the first accused at this late stage. The trial Court is, therefore, justified in acquitting the first accused. The learned Sessions, Judge committed a mistake in interfering with the order of acquittal on the ground that there was no charge against him. 12. The revision petition is, therefore, allowed. The order of acquittal passed by the trial Court as against the first accused’ will stand restored. The 2nd accused has not challenged the setting aside of the order of discharge and no interference is called for in his case. The case will be taken to file as against the 2nd accused and will be proceeded with in accordance with law.