Sethuraman, J.-The unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S. No. 85 of 1968 in the District Court of Dharmapuri is the appellant. He filed a suit for partition and separate possession of his share in the plaint schedule properties. His wife was one Balkhis Bi. Her father was Abdul Azeez, who died in 1934, leaving behind him the said Balkis (his daughter by his first wife), the second wife, Mahaboob Bibi (the fourth defendant), his son, Mahaboob John (the first defendant), and three other daughters Pyari Begum the second defendant), Akila Begum (the 3rd defendant) and one Aqpari, who had died unmarried before the suit. The claim of the plaintiff was that he was entitled to 7|40th share in the properties of Abdul Azeez and that the sons and daughters of Abdul Azeez were in common enjoyment of the properties along with him. He claimed to have been realising a share of the income through the first defendant till about two years prior to the suit, and as the defendants were denying his right, setting up a claim of partition for themselves and perfection of title by adverse possession, he came forward with the present suit. 2. The defendant stated that the plaintiff’s wife, Balkhis Bi, died in the year 1945, that there was litigation among the heirs of Abdul Azeez in respect of the suit properties and that after the conclusion of the same, the first defendant was in enjoyment of the properties. According to the defendants, after the death of Balkhis, the plaintiff, who. married again within a period of 2 or 3 months, was not having any benefit out of the properties, and they denied that" he was collecting a share in the income from the properties. They stated that on 1st June, 1954, there was a partition arrangement as a result of which the properties left by Abdul Azeez were divided among defendants 1 to 4, and that the plaintiff, who was aware of the transaction, acquiesced in the said partition and did not set up any claim for a share in the properties. They pleaded ouster of the plaintiff for well over the statutory period. Defendants 3 and 4, who had been allotted some properties; in the said partition, had sold away their properties and the 5th defendant was in possession of them since 30th April, 1956. They pleaded ouster of the plaintiff for well over the statutory period. Defendants 3 and 4, who had been allotted some properties; in the said partition, had sold away their properties and the 5th defendant was in possession of them since 30th April, 1956. The 1st defendant himself stated that he-had sold some items allotted to his share-to different persons in 1953 and the plaintiff who had acquiesced in the said transaction did not appear to have made any protest. 3. Defendants 5 and 6, who were the alienees, stated that they were bona fide purchasers for adequate consideration and that they were in possession of the properties since their respective purchases. They pleaded that the plaintiff was estopped by conduct from questioning the transaction in their favour. 4. The seventh defendant, who was an alienee from the 1st defendant for certain items of properties, stated that he had been in possession of the properties in his own right and that as the plaintiff was fully aware of the transaction, he could not question the title of the defendant. 5. The 10th defendant, who was also an alienee under a sale deed dated 30th April, 1966, similarly contended that the plaintiff’s claim for partition could not be entertained. 6. Several issues were framed and the learned Subordinate Judge held that the plea of ouster set up by the defendants was well founded and that the plaintiff’s case of participation in the income was devoid of any substance and that the vendors of the alienees had acted within their rights in executing the sale deeds. The result was the dismissal of the suit, and it is this dismissal that is now challenged in the present appeal. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff’s wife and the other heirs of Abdul Azeez were co-owners of the properties left by him and that the Court below acted wrongly in holding that there was any ouster of the plaintiff’s rights for the statutory period so as to disentitle him from claiming partition of the properties left by Abdul Azeez. The short point to be considered is whether the plea of ouster put forward by the defendants was rightly entertained by the Court below. 8. There can be no dispute about the fact that the plaintiff’s wife was one of the heirs of Abul Azeez. The short point to be considered is whether the plea of ouster put forward by the defendants was rightly entertained by the Court below. 8. There can be no dispute about the fact that the plaintiff’s wife was one of the heirs of Abul Azeez. She died in the year 1945, and there is also no dispute that the plaintiff is the heir of the said Balkhis as her husband. We have first to consider the circumstances under which the plea of adverse possession of one co-heir against another can be taken as established. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this question in P. Lakshmi Reddi v. Lakshmi Reddi1. One Hanimi Reddi filed a suit for recovery of certain properties left by one Venkata Reddi, who, died as an infant in the year 1927. During the lifetime of Venkata ‘Reddi, the properties were being managed by and were in the possession of his father’s maternal uncles. The suit filed by Hanimi Reddi, was therefore, for recovery of possession of the said properties in the year 1927, on the death of Venkata Reddi. He got a decree in 1929 and, during the pendency of the suit, a receiver had been appointed in February, 1926. He obtained possession in January, 1930, and continued in possession till he died in 1936. The plaintiff in the proceedings which ultimately came before the Supreme Court, claimed that he and another person were reversioners of the same degree as Hanimi Reddi in respect of the properties left by Venkata Reddi. The suit was filed originally in October, 1941, and after the plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court, it was presented in the proper Court in December, 1942. The question that came up for consideration by the Supreme Court was whether the present suit by the reversioners of Venkata Reddi was within time. There also it was contended on behalf of the defendants that they had perfected title by adverse possession for over the statutory period. Dealing with this aspect their Lordships observed at page 49 as follows:- "But it is well-settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the properties. Dealing with this aspect their Lordships observed at page 49 as follows:- "But it is well-settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law as possession of all the co-heirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part indentation of the other co-heir’s title. See Corea v. Appuhamy1. It is a settled rule of law that as between coheirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. This does not necessarily mean that there must be an express demand by one and denial by the other. There are cases which have held that adverse possession and ouster can be inferred when one co-heir takes and maintains notorious exclusive possession in assertion of hostile title and continues in such possession for a very considerable time and the excluded heir takes no steps to vindicate his title“. It was also pointed out that the burden of making out ouster was on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-heir by his adverse possession. 9. An earlier Bench decision of this Court in Godavari Lakshminarasamma v. Godavari Ramabrahmam2, stated the legal position in the following words in the passage at pages 1409 and 1410:- As laid down in the leading case of Corea v. Appuhamy1, the possession of the first defendant was in law the possession of his co-owner, the plaintiff. Possession is never considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. Mere non-participation in the profits of the property by one co-owner and exclusive possession by the other will not be sufficient to constitute adverse possession by the latter. Possession is never considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. Mere non-participation in the profits of the property by one co-owner and exclusive possession by the other will not be sufficient to constitute adverse possession by the latter. To constitute ouster by a co-owner, there must be an open and unequivocal, denial of the title of the other coparcener to the knowledge of the latter. Uninterrupted sole occupation of common property without more must be referred to the lawful title possessed by the joint holder to use the joint estate and cannot be regarded as an assertion of right to hold it as separate”. 10. There are two lines of decisions on the aspect as to how ouster is to be considered or inferred. There are cases in which it has been laid down that where the tenant-in-common or co-owner has not been in participation of the rents and profits for a considerable length of time, there is a presumption that there has been an ouster. The possession in such cases has to be for a much longer period than the period of 12 years prescribed under the statute of limitation. For instance, in Gangadhar v. Parashram3, the period of exclusion was 44 years. In Venkata Rao v. Venkoba Rao4, it was 55 years. In such cases, the presumption of ouster has been drawn. Venkatarama Aiyar, J., as he then was, in Maddala Krishnayya v. Maddala Udayalakshmamma5, sitting singly, pointed out that the presumption referred to above was analogous to one of a lost grant and was not to be applied when the transactions were recent and the primary parties were alive. In that particular case the non-participation was only for a period of 18 years and the presumption of ouster was not drawn. 11. In the present case, the defendant would plead ouster either from 1945, -when Balkhis died and when the plaintiff married again within a couple of months, or on 1st June, 1954, when there was a partition among themselves. If we take the date of partition, then the suit which was filed on 22nd October, 1966, would be just two years beyond the period of 12 years provided by the statute of limitation. Even if we take the date of the death of Balkhis as the starting point of exclusion, the period is only 23 years. If we take the date of partition, then the suit which was filed on 22nd October, 1966, would be just two years beyond the period of 12 years provided by the statute of limitation. Even if we take the date of the death of Balkhis as the starting point of exclusion, the period is only 23 years. This is not, therefore, a case where the presumption authorised by Culley v. Doe6, and the cases following it could be drawn. 12. In Mohamed Baqar v. Naimunissa Bibi7, the Supreme Court pointed out in dealing with a case of adverse possession among co-owners as follows: “Then, there is the question of limitation. The parties to the action are co-sharers, and as under the law, possession of one co-sharer is possession of all co-shares, it cannot be adverse to them, unless there is a denial of their right to their knowledge by the person in possession, and exclusion and ouster following thereon for the statutory period.” It can thus be seen that the plea of ouster cannot be founded on any fugitive conduct on the part of a person putting it forward. It has to be rested on an open and continuous exclusion of the co-owner, to his knowledge from enjoyment. The question as to whether the evidence in a particular case is sufficient to infer ouster will depend on the facts in each lease and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. 13. In Mohiadeen Abdul Khadir v. Md. Mohideen Umma1, the distinction between the adverse possession as against a co-owner and the adverse possession by a stranger has been indicated. In the case of adverse possession on the part of a stranger, it is sufficient that the possession is overt and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time is running ought, if he exercised due vigilance, to be aware of what was happening. But, in the case of a co-owner, to constitute adverse possession, there must be something more than the mere exclusion of possession and perception of profits, and there must be denial of the rights of the co-owner over the property and that denial must be made to his knowledge. But, in the case of a co-owner, to constitute adverse possession, there must be something more than the mere exclusion of possession and perception of profits, and there must be denial of the rights of the co-owner over the property and that denial must be made to his knowledge. Certain factors have been considered to be relevant in examining this aspect: viz., (1) dealings by the party in possession treating the properties as exclusively belonging to him, and (2) the means of the excluded co-sharer of knowing that his title has been denied by the co-owner in possession. It is in this context that we have to examine the question as to whether there has been exclusion of the plaintiff from participation of the properties to his knowledge. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents faintly put forward the contention that the adverse possession started even in the year 1943, at the time when Balkhis died. There is absolutely no shred of evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, to support this plea. As already pointed out, mere non-participation of the plaintiff on the death of his wife will not sustain the plea of adverse possession, as he is one of the co-owners of the properties and the possession of one is the possession of all. The learned counsel for the respondents had thus to rely on the partition of 1st June, 1954 as the commencement of ouster. That partition was entered into between defendants 1 to 4. The partition deed has been attested by 4 persons, viz., Basheer Ahmed, son of Abdul Jaffar Sahib, (2) Mohamed Ibrahim, son of Mohamed Aliasakila, (3) Mohamed Ibrahim, son of Mohamed Kasim Sahib and (4) P. E. Rathinamanickam, son of Ekambara Achari. The document has been written by one Arulsami, the karnam of a neighbouring village. The properties are situated in a village called Palakodu and the four witnesses to the deed are all persons who belong to the said village. The plaintiff himself belongs to the same village. He was, even prior to the marriage of Balkhis, to him related to the family of the defendants. It is not in dispute that some of these attestors are all persons who were related to him. Those of the attestors as are persons who were alive, had also been examined in the trial. The document has been registered under the Indian Registration Act. It is not in dispute that some of these attestors are all persons who were related to him. Those of the attestors as are persons who were alive, had also been examined in the trial. The document has been registered under the Indian Registration Act. Thus, this is not a case of a fugitive conduct on the part of the defendants in making some arrangements among themselves without making it known to the outside world. The transaction could not have been entered into in a more open manner. Though the plaintiff as P.W. 1 has stated that he was not aware of the transaction and has also taken up the same stand in the plaint, still it is too much to accept his testimony on this aspect. It was, therefore, rightly disbelieved by the Court below. The subsequent conduct on the part of the defendants 1 to 4, who effected the partition among themselves, is also consistent with their being absolute owners, of the said properties. Defendants 3 and 4 had alienated the entire properties obtained in the partition. The first defendant also has parted with some of the items that he obtained in the partition. Though some of the alienations are within the period of 12 years counted from the date of the plaint, still they show that the allottees of the properties asserted their absolute ownership of the properties. The plaintiff stood by all these years and came forward with this suit only in October, 1968. We consider that the Court below rightly drew the inference on the facts that the plaintiff had knowledge of all these transactions. Being residents of the same village, their houses being situate not far ‘from each other’s, the plea of ignorance of the transactions can only be taken as born out of convenience. 15. The conduct of ouster in such cases has necessarily to be unilateral, as there can be no possibility of any agreement to get ousted. Therefore, the ‘fact that the defendants partitioned the properties among themselves without reference to the plaintiff cannot by itself justify the plea that the unilateral conduct on the part of the defendants will not amount to ouster. Therefore, the ‘fact that the defendants partitioned the properties among themselves without reference to the plaintiff cannot by itself justify the plea that the unilateral conduct on the part of the defendants will not amount to ouster. We are, therefore, satisfied on the facts that the Court below rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was ousted to his knowledge from the possession and enjoyment of the properties by the other co-owners viz., the defendants right from June, 1954. Knowledge, unless admitted, can only be proved by circumstantial evidence and it is so proved in this case. 16. With reference to this aspect it may be appropriate to examine a Full Bench decision of this Court in Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim Rowther1. In that case, the appellant had taken a usufructuary mortgage of some properties from defendants 1 and 3 who were members; of a Mohamedan family and who were co-sharers in the mortgaged property. One of the questions that arose was whether the usufructuary mortgage created1by defendants 1 and 3 in that case in favour of the 8th defendant was binding on the plaintiffs. The mortgage had been created in 1920. The plaintiff’s case was that the mortgagors who were only co-sharers, had no right to charge their interest in the said properties. The suit was filed in 1937 after about 17 years, from the date of the usufructuary mortgage. The plaintiffs claimed that they had no knowledge of the mortgage and that limitation could not run until they had acquired knowledge. It was common ground in that case that they acquired knowledge only within the period of 12 years of the suit. The question was whether in spite of their knowledge being only within the period’ of 12 years, the suit was within time. In dealing with this question it was pointed out as follows- “Where one of several co-sharers lets into possession a stranger who proceeds to cultivate the land for his own benefit the other co-sharers must, unless they deliberately close their eyes, know of what is going on, but if they are so regardless of their own interests they must take the consequences. Where a person who is in possession under a usufructuary mortgage granted by one of several coparceners remains in possession of the land and cultivates it for years, a position which we have here, there can be no doubt that the requirements of continuity, publicity and extent for adverse possession are fully complied with.” In the present case also strangers had been let into possession of the properties as a result of the sale deeds in their favour executed by defendants 3 and 4. If the plaintiff deliberately closed his eyes to what was going on, he has necessarily to take the consequences. The sale deeds by themselves are not taken as the basis of the commencement of adverse possession. It was the partition deed of 1st June, 1954 and the open exclusion of the plaintiff as a result thereof that was relied on for this purpose. We do not, therefore, have to consider a case where there are only alienations of part of the properties by co-sharers, and whether in such cases of partial alienation the conduct could be taken as amounting to ouster of the sleeping co-owners from enjoyment of the entire properties. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant repeatedly asked whether it is consistent with reason or probabilities that a person who had such a stake in the properties left by Abdul Azeez would have merely stood by if he has knowledge of the transaction of partition and subsequent alienations by the defendants. One explanation that was attempted on behalf of the respondents was that the plaintiff had, not accounted for the mahar and jewellery worn by Balkhis at the time of her death, and that was the reason why the plaintiff who had married so soon after the death of the first wife did not have the face to assert his claims as the heir of Balkhis. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to consider the correctness or otherwise of this explanation. If on the given facts we are satisfied that the plaintiff had knowledge of the transactions and had not chosen to question the partition or alienations during the relevant period, then it is not for us to probe into any question of probabilities as to whether the plaintiff would have kept quiet all these years if he had knowledge. The partition deed had been entered into openly. The partition deed had been entered into openly. It had been attested by the persons in the village. The partition was not effected in a secretive manner with the help of some strangers. There is nothing to show that the attesting witnesses who have given evidence in this case had, any particular interest in the defendants as contrasted with the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not come forward with any version that the defendants were so inimically disposed against him that they had conspired, as it were to keep him out of the inheritance. On the facts, we are satisfied that the plaintiff cannot successfully disclaim knowledge of the transactions. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant relied strongly on the decision of this Court in Valliammai Achi v. Velu Servai 1 . That was also a case of co sharers, one of them pleading adverse possession as against the others. A Bench of this Court affirmed the proposition that mere inaction on the part of one co-tenant could not amount to adverse possession by another co-tenant or co-sharer in actual possession. It was pointed out that there should be positive assertion of hostile title to the knowledge of the co-owner sought to be excluded in order to constitute ouster and that to constitute adverse possession, it was the animus of the person in possession that was material. We do not see how the principle laid down in this decision supports the case of the appellant herein. The animus of the person in possession in the present case, viz., the defendants was, at any rate, from 1st June, 1954 to make a positive assertion of hostile title. We do not, therefore, find anything to support the case of the appellant in this decision. 19. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there were exhibits in this case showing mutation of the names of the defendants in respect of the suit properties thereby showing that the plaintiff was excluded. However, there is no evidence in this case about the person in whose name the properties originally stood registered in the revenue records so as to find out whether there was any actual mutation subsequent to the partition of 1954. However, there is no evidence in this case about the person in whose name the properties originally stood registered in the revenue records so as to find out whether there was any actual mutation subsequent to the partition of 1954. Even assuming that there has been mutation as contended, we do not consider that the mutation by itself would have been of any avail in a case like this because the decision of the revenue authorities in a matter relating to grant of patta, particularly in respect of ryotwari lands, cannot be equated to a decision on title to immoveable properties. The obvious purpose of the proceedings before the revenue authorities is only to enable recovery of revenue in a convenient manner from the persons either in occupation or ownership of the lands. The absence of a patta in the name of the plaintiff cannot, therefore, derogate from his title if he had it, as a patta is not a document of title. This aspect has also been dealt with in, Valliammai Achi v. Velu Servai1. However, notwithstanding the rejection of this plea, for the reasons already given, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff has been ousted for well over the statutory period to his knowledge so that the suit is time barred. 20. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.