JUDGMENT Pradyot Kumar Banerjee, J. 1. This appeal at the instance of the plaintiff-appellant against the defendant arises out of a suit for eviction from the disputed premises. The defendant, Dr. J.C. Gupta was a monthly tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the 1st floor flat at 100A, S.N. Banerjee Road, Calcutta, at a rental of Rs. 7431 per month payable according to English Calander month. It is alleged that the defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent since October, 1969 as such he is not entitled to the benefit of protection against eviction under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. It is further stated that the premises was let out to the defendant for the residential purposes and the defendant Dr. J.C. Gupta lived there with his family for several years. Thereafter the said defendant removed his family from the said premises to his newly constructed house at 3 Lower Range, Calcutta, where he is permanently living with his family. The defendant Dr. J.C. Gupta, it is alleged, however used the said premises for business purposes by starting a wooden furniture business under the name and style of Kamala Furnishing Company in the benami of his son Sri G.B. Gupta as partner. But, in fact, it is alleged, the defendant is the sole proprietor of the said business. So the said premises although let out for residential purposes have been now used by the defendant for business purpose without the consent in writing of the plaintiff. The plaintiff gave a notice determining the tenancy and filed the suit. During the pendency of the suit Dr. J.C. Gupta died and in his place the heir and legal representative of Dr. J.C. Gupta was substituted. 2. Written statement was filed on behalf of the defendant stating, inter alia, that the house was taken for Chamber-cum-residential purposes. It is alleged that the premises was being still used for the residential purposes and the plea to the contrary is wrong. It is further stated that the de fwd ant shifted a portion of his family from the rented house to premises No. 1723 Lower Circular Road, Calcutta. The defendant further shifted a portion of his family from the aforesaid premises No. 172/3, Lower Circular Road, Calcutta, in or about the year 1960 and since then a portion of his family is residing there. The defendant further shifted a portion of his family from the aforesaid premises No. 172/3, Lower Circular Road, Calcutta, in or about the year 1960 and since then a portion of his family is residing there. The premises in suit was still being used by the defendant for the purpose of his residence as well as for his Chamber in connection with his vocation as a medical practitioner. As the defendant's son Sri Joy Bejoy Gupta after finishing his education career entered into the business and the defendant became invalid being suffering from various ailments and having become invalid, the premises in suit is used by the defendant's son for residence-cum-office for the purpose of furniture business having the workshop in Park Circus. The plea about the default was however denied. The Court below held that the suit premises was not used for the purpose other than for which it was let out and there was no default and in regard to the default, it was held that the defendant was in default in payment of one month's rent, that is, July 1971 deposited out of time on 23.8.1971, that is, beyond time and the suit was dismissed. Being aggrieved the plaintiff preferred the present appeal. 3. Mr. Sukumar Mukherjee on behalf of the appellant contended that the application under section 151 is not maintainable for condonation of delay of deposit of rent for the month of July 1972 and secondly the dominant purpose of the tenancy was for the residential but it was used by the defendant for business purpose. 4. Mr. A.K. Matilal on behalf of the defendant contended that the application under section 151 for condonation of delay in depositing the amount is maintainable and the dominant purpose of the tenancy was residential but the defendant being a doctor and as such used the same as his Chamber for the purpose of his profession. 5. The Court below having held against the appellant, the appellant preferred the present appeal. It appears that during the pendency of the suit the respondent defaulted in depositing the rent for the month of July 1971. The rent for July 1971 was deposited on 23.8.1971, that is, beyond time. 5. The Court below having held against the appellant, the appellant preferred the present appeal. It appears that during the pendency of the suit the respondent defaulted in depositing the rent for the month of July 1971. The rent for July 1971 was deposited on 23.8.1971, that is, beyond time. The defendant-respondent filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the condonation of delay in making the deposit for the month of July 1971 on the ground that in the middle of the month of August 1971 the original defendant was seriously ill between 12.8.1971 and 19.8.1971 and the petitioner's son was so busy for giving medical help to him that he could not leave the bed of the said defendant. It appears however that the said application under section 151 was made after the argument was concluded in the suit and having made the application after the argument has been advanced and concluded the Court below cannot condone the delay in making the deposit under section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. We are further convinced that the application for condonation of delay only shows that there are latches on the part of the defendant and as no sufficient ground has been made out for making the application long after the delay occurred and in fact the application was filed at the time of the argument. In our opinion, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the application under section 151 should not have been allowed. As the defendant violated the provision of section 17(1) of the Act the plaintiff is entitled, on this score alone, to a decree for eviction. 6. Mr. Matilal relied upon the cases reported in Sitala Debi vs. Man Bahadur, (1972) 76 CWN 435 and Haripada Kanungo vs. N.N. Shah, (1974) 80 CWN 481, in support of his contention. In the case reported in 76 CWN 435 it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the court has always the inherent power in appropriate circumstances in proceedings under section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. In the case reported in 76 CWN 435 it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the court has always the inherent power in appropriate circumstances in proceedings under section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. It will be for the defaulting party on the facts of his case to establish that there has been no negligence or inaction on his part in complying with the requirements of the provisions of the statute. There cannot be any dispute about the proposition of law. On the facts of this case it appears to us that the default was made as far back as in 1971 and the application for condonation of delay was made at the time of the argument and the argument was concluded. In our opinion, therefore, in not making the deposit in time for the month of July 1971 the penal consequences of section 17(3) of the Act must be fastened of the defendant and the defence against the delivery of possession must be struck out and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree on that score alone:. In so far as the other question is concerned, we, however, agree with Mr. Matilal that the defendant was using the premises exclusively for the residential purpose. It is wrong to say that the defendant who was a doctor used it for business purposes. A professional man may carryon his profession from the residential house itself and if he is a doctor he must have a chamber. A residential house is a dwelling house in contradiction for a commercial or business purpose but it is found that the professional man, a doctor, in fact resides inside the part of the premises and has a chamber in some of the rooms, it cannot be said that the said professional man used the premises for purposes other than residential. In our opinion, therefore, the defendant doctor used a part of the residential premises as his chamber which does not at all convert the residential purpose into a non-residential purpose. We are, therefore, unable to agree that the lease hold was being used for residential and non-residential purpose. In our opinion, therefore, the defendant doctor used a part of the residential premises as his chamber which does not at all convert the residential purpose into a non-residential purpose. We are, therefore, unable to agree that the lease hold was being used for residential and non-residential purpose. But the dispute arose after the defendant doctor moved out of the residential accommodation and shifted to his own house and his son began to carryon his business in furniture and used the premises for business purpose. It is an admitted fact that the defendant's son has started a wooden furniture business under the name and style of Kamala Furnishing Company in 1969. The landlord stated that the furniture is being manufactured in the business premises. The defendant contended that this is only an office. In our opinion when it is admitted that the part of the premises is being used for business purpose we have to hold that the premises is being used for business purpose. It is the admitted case of the parties that the premises was let out for residential purposes. It is also admitted that some portion of the premises was used by the defendant for the business purposes, namely, the business of furniture that is clearly outside the scope of the residence. The landlord let out the premises to the doctor who had is chamber all through in the said premises. When he shifted to his own house the chamber was still there but when the doctor transformed the said chamber into a business office he was clearly using the same for non-residential purpose and therefore he is liable to be evicted under section 13(1)(h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 7. In the circumstances, therefore, the appeal must succeed and the order of the learned Judge is set aside. The plaintiff will get a decree for eviction. As the defendant carries on business on the said premises, he is given six months' time to vacate the premises on condition that the petitioner must go on depositing the amount at the rate of rent last paid. In default of payment of any installment the decree will be immediately executable. There will be no order as to casts.