Short Note : 1. The appeal arose out of a suit instituted on 3-1-1951 in which a decree dismissing the plaintiff's suit for ejectment of the defendant-respondent had been passed. One Gulzarilal was the owner of the suit accommodation. The plaintiff Mansukhlal, since deceased and represented by his legal representives had purchased the suit house from Gulzarilal on 1-8-1949 by a registered sale-deed Ex. P-2. Held: The present suit was instituted on 3-1-1951 when the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan was in force This Act was repealed by the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955. The provisions of section 4 of the M. B. Sthan Niyantran Vidhian, clause 4 of the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Ordinance, 1955 and section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, were similar. By virtue of the provisions of section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 by which the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955 was re-pealed, all suits pending at the commencement of the 1961 Act were to be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, as if the 1961 Act had not been passed. Consequently the question of the defendant's liability of eviction will have to be considered in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of the M. B. Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, the M. P. Accommodation Control Ordinance, 1955 and the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, if the tenant fails to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of written notice of demand by the landlord or the tenant renounces his character and denies the title of the landlord or the landlord genuinely require the accommodation for his own residence or that of any person of his family and there is no other accommodation of his own, then a decree for eviction can be passed against the tenant. 2. On the question of plaintiff's genuine requirement the finding was against the plaintiff. 2. On the question of plaintiff's genuine requirement the finding was against the plaintiff. Regarding the default of rent, the finding was that as there was a bona fide dispute regarding the plaintiff's right as landlord, the defendant cannot be said to be in default, Though, these findings were challenged by the plaintiff in the appeal preferred by him, yet the learned Additional District Judge disposed of the appeal on one ground only and maintained the decree of dismissal of the present suit on the ground that the suit was time-barred. It was for these reasons that the learned counsel for the respondent while not seriously disputing that the defendant continued as a tenant of the plaintiff urged that this question of fact raised and decided in the trial Court was not decided by the learned Additional District Judge and the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court were not reconsidered and that this Court, in the event of disagreeing with the view of the learned Additional District Judge on the question of limitation, should remand the case to that Court for reconsideration of the evidence and proper finding to be recorded. This court does not feel inclined to allow this prayer made by the respondent. The present suit was instituted in January 1951 and because of the order passed for the stay of the trial of the suit much time was taken by the trial Court for its disposal. The result was that the suit instituted in 1951 was disposed of by the trial Court in May 1967 and after the decision of the appeal in Dec 1967, the present appeal in this Court remained pending till it was heard in this month. Apart from the reasons for the delay in finally disposing of the suit the fact is that a suit of 1951 has not yet been finally disposed of. If the appeal is remanded back to the Additional District Judge for rehearing then it would mean that all these 26 years were merely wasted and the parties will again be at the stage at which they were in 1967. If the appeal is remanded back to the Additional District Judge for rehearing then it would mean that all these 26 years were merely wasted and the parties will again be at the stage at which they were in 1967. This Court is, therefore, of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case interests of justice require that the appeal should be finally decided on merits so that the long pending litigation may come to an end so far as this Court is concerned. This Counsel, therefore, proposes to consider the evidence given by the parties on those grounds on which a decree for eviction has teen prayed by the plaintiff suit decreed. Appeal allowed.