Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the second accused in a case charged by the Food Inspector, Pinarayi Panchayat in Cannanore District. Pw. 2, the Food Inspector visited the grocery shop building No. W. V. 64A of the Pinarayi Panchayat at about 12-15 P M. on 7-8-1972. The petitioner, according to the complainant, was conducting sales in the shop. Pw. 2 purchased 750 grams of toor dhall for purposes of sampling after following the formalities prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules thereunder. The sample was divided into three equal parts and one portion of the same was sent to the Public Analyst, Trivandrum for analysis. The Public Analyst sent a report which is marked as Ext. P5 in the case stating that the sample consisted wholly of lac dhall otherwise known as Kesari dhall as seen from the microscopic examination. The sample also gave a positive test for B. O. A. A which is a characteristic amino acid present in kesari dhall. The sale of kesari dhall under any description is prohibited on account of the fact that its consumption is injurious to public health. Relying on the report, a complaint was filed by Pw. 4, the then Food Inspector against one Kumaran, stated to be the licensee of the shop as the first accused and the petitioner as the second accused. The trial court acquitted the first accused on the ground that there was no proof to show that he had any active part in the transaction and that the conduct of the grocery shop was entrusted to the second accused-revision petitioner. The court held that the petitioner was guilty of an offence punishable under S.16 (1) (a) (i) read with S.7 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment till the rising of the court and a fine of Rs. 2000/-. In default of payment of fine, he is to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. There was an appeal before the Sessions Judge, Tellicherry. The Sessions judge confirmed the conviction and sentence. The revision petition is filed against the above conviction and sentence. 2. The defence put forward by the revision petitioner both in the trial court and in the appellate court was one of denial of his status as the salesman of the shop. There was an appeal before the Sessions Judge, Tellicherry. The Sessions judge confirmed the conviction and sentence. The revision petition is filed against the above conviction and sentence. 2. The defence put forward by the revision petitioner both in the trial court and in the appellate court was one of denial of his status as the salesman of the shop. The petitioner also contended that there was no proper evidence to prove the sampling by Pw 2. The contention of the petitioner is that he had nothing to do with the shop mentioned and that he was never a salesman there. According to him, during the relevant period, he was a beedi roller in the Dinesh Beedi Company. He examined Dw. I, who is stated to be a maistry of the Dinesh Beedi Company and also produced Ext. Dl in order to show that he was working as a beedi roller for the company on the relevant date. According to Dw.1, it was not open to an employee of the company to undertake any other extra work. Both the trial court and the appellate court did not act upon the evidence of Dw.1 or on Ext. D1. The court held the evidence to be unreliable. There is no reason for interference with the finding. 3. It is noted that there has been a deliberate attempt by the petitioner to change his signature from what it was during the date of sale. In the mahazar prepared by Pw. 2, he has signed after writing down his name in English. In the vakkalath filed by him before the trial court also, the signature is put after writing down his name in English. There is close resemblance between the name written in the mahazar and that written by him in the vakkalth, which clearly indicates that the person who was present at the time when Pw.2 is alleged to have taken the sample and the person who signed in the vakkalath are one and the same. But curiously enough, in the later papers especially in the statement under S.342 Cr. P. C., he has written his name in Malayalam followed by a signature. The signature is nowhere consistent and, therefore, the identity has to be drawn from the name preceding the signature. 4. But curiously enough, in the later papers especially in the statement under S.342 Cr. P. C., he has written his name in Malayalam followed by a signature. The signature is nowhere consistent and, therefore, the identity has to be drawn from the name preceding the signature. 4. One of the circumstances which has been relied upon by the petitioner to show that he was not the person who was present on the alleged date of sale is the fact that the copy of the certificate which was sent in his address as salesman of the shop was returned stating that the person was not known. But this is not a conclusive circumstance. The alleged sale took place, as already stated, on 7-8-1972, while the copy of the certificate is seen to have been sent only in March, 1973. It is possible that the petitioner left the shop subsequent to the sampling. 5. It is pointed out that apart from the testimony of PW. 2, there is no other evidence to prove the identity of the person in as much as PW. 3, the independent witness turned hostile. But PW. 3 has admitted his signature in the mahazar. The conclusion that he was deliberately helping the petitioner by denying his presence at the time of the sampling is, therefore, justified. There is also no rule that a conviction cannot be entered on the sole testimony of PW. 2. As has been held by the Supreme Court in Prem Ballab v. State (1977 Crl. Q.12), "It is only out of a sense of caution that the courts insist that the testimony of a Food Inspector should be corroborated by some independent witness." 6. The next contention put forward is that the questioning by the trial court under S.342 Cr. P. C., was not properly made and the revision petitioner was not given an opportunity to deny that he was not a salesman of the shop. It is pointed out that the questions were so framed as to appear that the shop belonged to him while the prosecution case itself was that the licensee of the shop was the first accused in the case. It is, however, clear that the petitioner understood the case of the prosecution and had chalked out a defence of his own. It is pointed out that the questions were so framed as to appear that the shop belonged to him while the prosecution case itself was that the licensee of the shop was the first accused in the case. It is, however, clear that the petitioner understood the case of the prosecution and had chalked out a defence of his own. There is no indication to show that the revision petitioner was misled by the questions put or that any prejudice has been caused to him. The conviction of the petitioner does not deserve interference on this ground also. 7. It is, however, seen that the trial court as also the learned Sessions Judge did not give importance to the fact that the petitioner has mentioned bis age as 20 years in his statement under S.342 Cr. P.C. Under S.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, a person under the age of 21 years shall not be sentenced to imprisonment unless the Court is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under S.3 or S.4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Whenever a court passes a sentence of imprisonment, the reason for so doing should also be recorded. The trial court has adverted to the fact that the petitioner was only 20 years old. His young age is taken as a ground for not awarding the minimum substantive term of imprisonment mentioned in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In other words, the age of the petitioner was only taken into account for the purpose of reducing the substantive term of imprisonment. The Court has, at the same time, directed that in default of the petitioner's omitting to pay the fine of Rs. 2000/-, he should suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. Evidently, the Court has overlooked the provisions of S.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, which, in the words of the Supreme Court, embodies in it a mandatory injunction against the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment in the case of offenders under the age of twenty-one years, unless the conditions mentioned in the section exist. The reasons for imposing a term of imprisonment should be recorded in the judgment. 8. The reasons for imposing a term of imprisonment should be recorded in the judgment. 8. Though the Supreme Court has time and again stated that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should not be given to offenders under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and other economic offences (the latest decision reported is Prem Ballab v. State (1977 Crl. L. J. 12) already referred to), a distinction is made in the case of youthful offenders coming under the purview of S.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Reference may be made in this connection to the following observation of the Supreme Court in Isher Das v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1972 SC. 1295): "As regards persons under 21 years of age, however, the policy of the law appears to be that such a person in spite of his conviction under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, should not be deprived of the advantage of Probation of Offenders Act which is a beneficent measure and reflects and incorporates the modern approach and latest trend in penology." The Court has also observed: "In this respect we are of the opinion that a sentence of fine also carries with it the consequence of imprisonment in case the accused fails to pay the fine. As the object of Probation of Offenders Act is to avoid imprisonment of the person covered by the provisions of that Act, the said object cannot be set at naught by imposing a sentence of fine which would necessarily entail imprisonment in case there is a default in payment of fine." In the light of the above observation, the trial court committed an error in not adverting to the provisions of S.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act and in sentencing the offender to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and fine of Rs. 2000/-without assigning reasons. 9. The trial court also committed an error in directing that the imprisonment till the rising of the Court should be rigorous. Under proviso to S.418 Cr. P C., where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court, it is not necessary that the Court should prepare a warrant to the jail and the accused may be confined in such place as the Court may direct. The reasonable inference is that imprisonment till the rising of the Court is simple imprisonment. P C., where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court, it is not necessary that the Court should prepare a warrant to the jail and the accused may be confined in such place as the Court may direct. The reasonable inference is that imprisonment till the rising of the Court is simple imprisonment. For the foraging reasons, I set aside the sentence passed by the trial court. The case is remanded to the trial court for considering whether S.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act should not be applied and for disposal according to law. The revision petition is allowed as stated above. Allowed.