JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a reference made by Sri B.N. Singh, Addl. Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, recommending that the revision against the order dated April 30, 1973 passed by the Addl. S.D.O. Tanda, district Faizabad in case No. 24 of 1973 under Section 229-B, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act may be allowed and the impugned order set aside. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Ram Adhar, major and Ishwar Dutt and Deo Datta minors through their next friend Ram Adhar, had filed a suit for declaration of their Bhumidhari rights in certain plots on August 22, 1963. The suit was dismissed in default on April 16, 1964. An application for restoration was moved on June 15, 1972. The Additional Sub-Division Officer has by his order dated April 30, 1973 allowed the restoration application on payment of Rs. 30/- as costs. This order has been challenged in the present revision. 4. The grounds taken in the revision are, firstly, that the application for restoration having been made after eight years of the dismissal of the suit and long after the attaining of the majority by the minors, the trial court illegally exercised jurisdiction in allowing the application; secondly, that the fact that Ram Adhar, plaintiff No. 1 and next friend of the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 died about sixteen months after the dismissal of the suit has been established beyond doubt by affidavit; thirdly, that the copy of the death certificate was filed before the start of argument but the trial court has wrongly written that it had been filed after the judgment had been written: fourthly, that the trial court should have allowed an opportunity to the revisionist to prove his allegations by adducing oral and documentary evidence, and finally, that the judgment passed by the trial court is no judgment in the eye of law and is against the oral and documentary evidence on record. 5. The record shows that the restoration application is highly belated. That the plaintiff-opposite parties had full knowledge of the date of hearing April 16, 1964 is beyond all doubts. In fact, Ishwar Dutt Tripathi, plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 had signed the order sheet on February 15, 1964 noting down April 16, 1964 as the next date of hearing. 5. The record shows that the restoration application is highly belated. That the plaintiff-opposite parties had full knowledge of the date of hearing April 16, 1964 is beyond all doubts. In fact, Ishwar Dutt Tripathi, plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 had signed the order sheet on February 15, 1964 noting down April 16, 1964 as the next date of hearing. The only ground shown in the restoration application is that Ram Adhar was doing the Pairvy of the case himself and, therefore, the remaining plaintiffs, Ishwar Dutt and Deo Datta had no knowledge of the case. This is proved to be a false statement in view of the order-sheet dated February 15, 1964 bearing the signature of Ishwar Dutt on the margin. Further, even Ram Adhar was alive on April 16, 1964. The affidavit of Deo Dutt merely says that Ram Adhar fell ill in 1964 and died in the same year, but the date of his death is not given in his affidavit. On the other hand, the affidavit of the revisionist Deota clearly says that Ram Adhar was not ill on April 16, 1964 and he died seventeen months after. The trial court has neither disbelieved this affidavit nor recorded any finding on the date of death of Ram Adhar and has not even given the revisionist any opportunity to file oral and documentary evidence regarding the date of death. The trial court has not recorded any finding at all whether there were sufficient grounds for non-appearance of the plaintiffs on the date of hearing nor it has recorded that there are any sufficient ground for the condonation of delay. 6. The learned counsel for the revisionist has invited my attention to Raghunath Das v. Sri Kishan, A.I.R. 1950 Alld. 248, in which it has been held that where restoration of execution application has been struck off for default of prosecution and subsequently restoration has been ordered on the ground that the decree holder was an old man and that he had made it his aim in life to execute the decree, no sufficient cause for restoration has been established and the court had failed to apply its judicial mind. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has failed to cite any authority to challenge this view. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has failed to cite any authority to challenge this view. To my mind, it is fully established that in the present case the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer has not only failed to apply his mind judicially but has also committed gross illegality and material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction in allowing the belated restoration application even when no sufficient cause either for non-appearance or for condonation of delay has been shown. 8. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has tried to argue that the present revision alongwith the original suit should be abated under Section 5(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on the ground that the village Sekhasipur has come under consolidation operation vide notification No. 3395/G-156-69, dated May 20, 1972. This argument is countered by the learned counsel for the revisionist. He has referred to Gorakh Rai v. Rajpati, 1968 R.D. 423 in which a learned Member Sri M.L. Dave has observed as follows:- "Section 5(2)(a) of the U.P.C.H. Act provides that every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area shall stand abated, meaning thereby that all suits pertaining to declaration of right of parties and all proceedings wherein the right and title of parties are adjudged shall on an order being passed in that behalf be allowed to abate. A restoration application filed for setting aside an ex-parte decree is not an application for deciding the rights and title of the parties, and as such proceedings arising out of a restoration application and pending before any court or authority whether of first instance, appeal, reference or revision cannot be held to be proceedings of the nature contemplated in the section. The Legislature must have intended to abate only those proceedings wherein title of the parties are being adjudicated. Merely because an application for restoration under Order IX, Rule 13 is pending the entire suit cannot be allowed to abate." 9. A contrary view has been held in Paras Nath v. Gaon Sabha, 1975 R.D. 52 by another learned Member who has observed as follows:- "The suits were restored on June 10, 1971. Notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P.C.H. Act was published when the revisions were pending before the Additional Commissioner. A contrary view has been held in Paras Nath v. Gaon Sabha, 1975 R.D. 52 by another learned Member who has observed as follows:- "The suits were restored on June 10, 1971. Notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P.C.H. Act was published when the revisions were pending before the Additional Commissioner. The suits having been pending when the notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P.C.H. Act was published, the suit and the revision are liable to be abated under Section 5(2) of the U.P.C.H. Act. The position would have been different if the restoration applications had been rejected." 10. The contradiction in the two decisions cited above is more apparent that real. The crucial point for consideration is whether any suit, appeal or revision was pending on the date of the issue of notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. If no such suit, appeal or revision was pending on this crucial date, Section 5(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act does not come into play at all. 11. In the present case, the notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was issued on May 20, 1972. On that date no suit, appeal or revision or any proceedings were pending in a revenue Court. The application for restoration of the suit was made subsequently on June 15, 1972. Thus the learned Additional Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to have entertained this application and to allow it on April 30, 1972. Had the restoration application been moved before the date of the issue of the notification under Section 4(2) and had the suit been restored before such date, the observation made by my learned colleague would have held good in this case. In the present case no suit, appeal or revision was pending on the date of the issue of the notification under Section 4(2) and that could not now be revived. 12. I, therefore, hold that the learned Additional Sub-Divisional Officer has not only acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction, he has also acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the restoration application. This is a fit case for the exercise of the powers of the Board under Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. I hereby allow the revision and set aside the impugned order.