Judgment B.C. Ray, J. This appeal by the defendants is against the judgment and decree dated April 24, 1975 passed in Title Appeal No. 165 of 1974 by the Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Midnapore affirming the judgment and decree made in Title Suit No. 12 of 1973 by the Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court Midnapore. 2. The respondent, Birendra Nath Ray as plaintiff instituted on April 1, 1973 Title Suit No. 12 of 1973 in the 3rd Court of Subordinate Judge, Midnapore praying for declaration of title to suit land measuring 3.90 acres in Mouja Uparkuai and Makulchak, for recovery of possession, for recovery of mesne profits and also for a declaration that the defendants are not bargadars in respect of the suit land and for permanent injunction stating inter alia that the suit land belonged to plaintiff and his brother Amarendra Nath Ray, since deceased, that the plaintiff obtained the suit land exclusively on the basis of an amicable partition between him and his brother embodied in a registered deed of partition dated March 18, 1964. The plaintiff had been in khas possession of the said land till 1376 B.S. In 1376 B.S. the defendants who belonged to an aggressive political party dispossessed the plaintiff forcibly from the suit land and had misappropriated the produce of 1376 B.S. to 1378 B.S. In 1379 B.S. the defendants made an application to the Bhagchas Officer, Keshpur claiming barga right in the suit land and praying for an order to deposit the owner's share of produce. The plaintiff denied that the defendants were bargadars of the suit land under him. 3. The defendants by their joint written statement alleged that they had been inducted as bargadars by the plaintiff's brother Amarendra Nath Ray while they were joint in 1364 B.S. It had also been alleged that from 1964 B.S. to 1370 B.S. the defendants cultivated the suit land as bargadars and delivered bhag produce to plaintiff's elder brother Amarendra who was the Karla of the joint family without taking any receipts from him. After partition the defendants cultivated the land and delivered bhag produce to the plaintiff from 1371 B.S. to 1376 B.S. on obtaining receipts. In 1377 B.S. the plaintiff realised the owner's share of produce through his Karmachari but he did not grant any receipt. After partition the defendants cultivated the land and delivered bhag produce to the plaintiff from 1371 B.S. to 1376 B.S. on obtaining receipts. In 1377 B.S. the plaintiff realised the owner's share of produce through his Karmachari but he did not grant any receipt. In 1378 B.S. the plaintiff on being asked by defendants refused to take delivery of bhag produce and asked them to give up possession of the suit land. The defendants deposited the owner's share of produce in 1373 and 1379 B.S. and so this suit was liable to be dismissed. 4. On April 23, 1974 the learned Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court, Midnapore decreed the suit in part holding that the suit land was in khas possession of the plaintiff till 1375 B.S. and after that the defendants forcibly trespassed into the suit land. The defendants it was held were not bargadars of the suit land. The plaintiff's title to the suit land was declared and his prayer for recovery of possession and mesne profits were allowed. The prayer for permanent injunction was not granted as the same was considered redundant. 5. Against the said judgment and decree the defendants filed on 1.6.74 an appeal being Title Appeal No. 165 of 1974. During the pendency of the above appeal the West Bengal Land Reforms Amendment Act 1974 came into force on June 21, 1974. By this amendment Act sub-s. 3 was introduced in S. 21 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. On the prayer of the appellants the question whether the defendants are Bargadars of the suit lands under the plaintiff or not was referred to the Bhagchas Officer, Keshpur for determination under S. 21 (3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The Bhagchas Officer on hearing both the parties and on a consideration and appraisement of evidence found that the defendants never possessed as bargadars under the plaintiff the suit lands which were in khas possession of the plaintiff till 1375 B.S. and in l376 B.S. the defendants forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff from the said lands. 6. On April 21, 1975, the learned Additional District Judge 1st Court, Midnapore on a consideration of the said order as well as of the evidences on record held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the suit lands from the defendants. 6. On April 21, 1975, the learned Additional District Judge 1st Court, Midnapore on a consideration of the said order as well as of the evidences on record held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the suit lands from the defendants. It was also held that the plaintiff would get a decree for mesne profits as claimed. The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the judgment and decree of the Court below was affirmed. 7. Feeling aggrieved the defendants have preferred this appeal against the said judgment and decree. 8. This appeal was head on April 21, 1977. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the provisions of S. 21(3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act could not apply retrospectively to proceedings which were pending at the time of coming into operation of the said sub-section and as such the order passed by the Bhagchas Officer on a reference made by the Court of Appeal below are without jurisdiction and erroneous. It was also urged that the hearing of the appeal should be stayed till the said point was finally decided by the larger Bench to which the same question was referred. Accordingly the hearing of the appeal was adjourned. It may be mentioned that the reference to the Bhagchas Officer for decision of the question whether defendants were bargadars or not was made under S. 21(3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act at the instance of the defendants. This controversy has been set at rest by the Full Bench in the decision reported in 1977 CHN 613 (FB) Raich Ali Khan v. Haji Sadek Ali Khan holding that S. 21(3) of, the West Bengal Land Reforms Act applied to pending proceedings. 9. At the resumed hearing of the appeal Mr. Bidyut Kumar Banerjee learned Advocate for the appellants has contended that the order passed by the Bhagchas. Officer on a reference under S. 21 (3) of the said Act is one under S. 18(2) of the said Act and so the same is appealable. An appeal has been filed against the order made by Bhagchas Officer on reference with an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 and so prayed for stay of hearing of the appeal till the decision filed on B.C. Case No. 60(n) of 1975-76 by an application filed on August 12, 1917. An appeal has been filed against the order made by Bhagchas Officer on reference with an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 and so prayed for stay of hearing of the appeal till the decision filed on B.C. Case No. 60(n) of 1975-76 by an application filed on August 12, 1917. In support of his submission Mr. Banerjee has referred to the decision in 1975 (2) CLJ 447, Chapala Bala Adhikary v. Manoranjan Das & Ors. 10. Mr. Asoke Kumar Sen Gupta, learned Advocate for the respondent, has joined issue and submitted that the observation made in the said decision that an order passed on a reference under S. 21 (3) of the said Act was appealable was a mere obiter dictum. There is no express provision in the said Act that a determination made on a reference under S. 21(3) of the said Act will be subject to appeal under the said Act and to hold so will be reading something into the provisions of the Act which is not there and this amounts to legislating and not interpreting the provisions of the Act. The decision, in AIR 1962 SC 1543 , Madenlal Fakirchand Dudheciya v. Sree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. & Ors. has been cited. It has been submitted that the learned Subordinate Judge as well as the Bhagchas Officer duly considered the evidences adduced by the parties and conclusively found that the defendants appellants were never bargadars of the suit land. The lower appellate court also held so after due consideration of evidences on record and as such there is no plausible grounds for staying the hearing of the appeal till the decision of the alleged Bhagchas appeal filed long after the period of limitation. 11. In view of the provisions of S. 21(3) read with S. 21(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, the order passed on a reference by the Lower Appellate Court finding that the defendants are not bargadars in respect of the suit land under the plaintiff cannot be agitated in Civil Court. 12. The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the hearing of the appeal should be adjourned pending decision of the B.C. Appeal No. 60(n) of 1975-76. 12. The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the hearing of the appeal should be adjourned pending decision of the B.C. Appeal No. 60(n) of 1975-76. It appears that the order of the Bhagchas Officer, Kespur on reference by the Lower Appellate Court was passed a early as on March 10, 1975 and the said appeal was filed on February 13, 1976 under S. 19 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar North Midnapore long after the period of limitation. It has been submitted that the order passed on a reference under S. 21 (3) of the said Act by the authority appointed under S. 18(1) of the said Act is appealable as the same is one made under S. 18(2) of the Act relying on the observations made in the decision in 1975(2) CLJ 447, Chapala Bala Adhikary v. Manoranjan Das. The principal question agitated in that case was if the Munsif acted within his jurisdiction in referring the issue whether the defendant was a bargadar or not to the officer appointed under S. 18(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act under S. 21(3) of the said Act. In deciding that question Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. has observed that the officer or authority in determining the said point exercises his power under S. 18(2) and as such the said decision is appealable. The question whether an order made on a reference under S. 21(3) of the said Act was appelable as the same was deemed to be made under S. 18(2) of the Act did not arise for decision in that case. As such the observations made in that case on this point are mere obiter dictum. It is also clear that there is no express provision for appeal against an order made under S. 21 (3) of the said Act. That apart no ground was taken in this appeal that such an order was appealable and a specific ground was on the other hand taken that no appeal being provided for in this Act against an order under S. 21(3) of the said Act, the said provisions of S.21(3) were illusory. We are not inclined to decide this question in this case and leaving this question open to be decided in a proper case. 13. We are not inclined to decide this question in this case and leaving this question open to be decided in a proper case. 13. For the reasons aforesaid the submissions made on behalf of the appellants having failed we dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment and decree of the Court of appeal below. The application for adjournment of hearing of the appeal filed on August 12, 1977, is rejected. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.