JUDGMENT T. U. Mehta, J.—One common question which arises to be Considered in all these second appeals is, whether in the suits which have been instituted either under the provisions of Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, of under the provisions of Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (Act No. 6 of 1918), second appeals can be preferred to the High Court as provided by section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Amendment Act No, 104 of 1976, or as provided by the relevant provisions of Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948 and or Punjab Courts Act, 1918. In some of these matters two questions have been referred to a larger Bench and these two questions are as under:— 1. Whether this second appeal is govered by the amended section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and 2. What is the precise content of the expression "substantial question of law" within the meaning of the amended section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Since these two questions affected many other second appeals which have been filed in this Court, all these appeals in which these questions were involved were listed on board so that the parties concerned would have an opportunity to advance their contentions regarding these two questions. 3. Before dealing with these two questions, it would be necessary to State the historical background regarding the right of second appeal in the areas covered by the State of Himachal Pradesh. It should be stated here that the State of Punjab was re-organised in the year 1966, and as a result of this re-organisation, some area of the erstwhile State of Punjab came to be integrated with the Himachal Pradesh territory. After this integration the Stats of Himachal Pradesh was comprised by the area originally covered by Himachal Pradesh territory, and the integrated area which came from the erstwhile State of Punjab. After this integration the Stats of Himachal Pradesh was comprised by the area originally covered by Himachal Pradesh territory, and the integrated area which came from the erstwhile State of Punjab. So far as the area covered by the erstwhile State of Punjab is concerned, the right to file second appeal was governed by the Act called Punjab Courts Act, 1918, while so far as the area covered by the erstwhile Himachal Pradesh territory is concern ed, right to file second appeal was governed by the order called the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948 passed on 10-8-1948 by the Central Government which had full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power for and in relation to the governance of Himachal Pradesh. Thereafter, the enactment called the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976 (Act No. 23 of 1976), came into operation on 26-5-1976, when it received the assent of the Governor. 4. So far as the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 is concerned, section 41 thereof provided for the grounds which could be urged in second appeals which lay to the High Court. Its terms were as under— "41. (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court on any of the following grounds, namely : — (a) the decision being contrary to law or to some custom or usage having the force of law ; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or custom or usage having the force of law ; (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or by any other law for the time being in force which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. Explanation—A question relating to the existence or validity of a custom or usage shall be deemed to be a question of law within the meaning of this section. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex-parte. Section 42 of that Act said that no second appeal would lie except on the grounds mentioned in the above quoted section 41. Thus according to this section second appeal was to lie to the High Court principally on a question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex-parte. Section 42 of that Act said that no second appeal would lie except on the grounds mentioned in the above quoted section 41. Thus according to this section second appeal was to lie to the High Court principally on a question of law. This section was to a great extent similar to section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the only difference being that under section 41 of the Punjab Act, second appeal could lay even with regard to a question relating to custom or usage. 5. So far as the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948 is concerned, paragraph M thereof provided for second appeals, and the grounds on which they could be filed. The relevant portion of this paragraph was as under:— 32. (1) A second appeal shall lie to the court of the Judicial Commissioner in any of the following cases from an appellate decree of a District Court on any ground which would be a good ground of appeal if the decree had been passed in an original suit, namely :" (emphasis supplied). Thus according to this order, a second appeal could lie on questions of law as well as facts 6. As already noted above, on 26-5-1976 the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976 was applied. By section 30 of this Act Punjab Courts Act, 1918, as well as the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, are repealed. This section is in the following terms: "30. As already noted above, on 26-5-1976 the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976 was applied. By section 30 of this Act Punjab Courts Act, 1918, as well as the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, are repealed. This section is in the following terms: "30. Repeal and savings.—(1) The Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), as in force in the areas added to Himachal Pradesh under section 5 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1918 as in force in the areas comprised in Himachal Pradesh immediately before 1st November, 1966 are hereby repealed :— (a) Provided that anything done or any action taken, courts constituted, notifications issued, rules made, powers conferred, delegations and appointments made under the said Act or the said order shall be deemed to have been done, taken, constituted, issued and conferred under the provisions of this Act: (b) Provided further that in every enactment now in force and in every appointment order, rule, bye-law, notification or form made or issued thereunder, all references to the said Act or the said order shall be construed as referring to this Act. (2) For the removel of doubts, it is hereby declared that all suits, appeals, revisions, applications, reviews, executions and other proceedings whatsoever pending in any of the Courts established under the Act, or the Order repealed under sub-section (1), shall be continued and concluded in the same Court as if the said Court had been duly established under this Act." It should be noted here that this Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976 does not make any specific provision as regards second appeals, as well as, as regards the grounds on which second appeals could be filed in High Court, even though it does repeal the provisions of previous enactments as stated in section .0. Chapter II of this Act is with regard to "appellate and revisional jurisdiction in civil cases", but says nothing about second appeals. This Chapter consists of only three sections, namely sections 20, 21 and 22. Section 20 speaks- of appeals to the High Court "from a decree or order of a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising original jurisdiction". Thus this section contemplates first appeal to the High Court against the decrees and# orders passed by a District or Additional District Judge in exercise of his original jurisdiction. Section 20 speaks- of appeals to the High Court "from a decree or order of a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising original jurisdiction". Thus this section contemplates first appeal to the High Court against the decrees and# orders passed by a District or Additional District Judge in exercise of his original jurisdiction. Section 21 provides for appeals from Subordinate Judges, while section 22 provides for power of transfer of an appeal from one Subordinate Judge to another Subordinate Judge. Though this Chapter II speaks of revisional jurisdiction, it nowhere provides for the same. There is no other provision in the whole of the Act showing on what grounds second appeal to the High Court be preferred. The result, therefore, is that the suits which are filed after the application of this Act would be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and second appeal could be filed only as provided in section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Now all the second appeals in which the above referred two questions arise to be considered arise out of the suits which were instituted either when the Punjab Act of 1918 was in force or when the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948 was in force. The contention of the appellants, there fore, is that so far as these second appeals are concerned, they would not be governed by the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. 8. By the Amendment Act of 1976, the provisions of section 100 of the Code, as it stood before the amendment, have undergone substantial changes. One of the changes introduced by the Amendment Act is that now second appeals could be preferred, inter alia, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves "a substantial question of law", whereas previously before the Amendment Act, it could have been preferred if the decision of the lower Court was "contrary to law". One of the changes introduced by the Amendment Act is that now second appeals could be preferred, inter alia, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves "a substantial question of law", whereas previously before the Amendment Act, it could have been preferred if the decision of the lower Court was "contrary to law". Section 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that no second appeal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in section 100 and, therefore, if the provisions of section 100 as amended by the Amendment Act of 1976 are applicable, all these second appeals would be admitted only if it is found that they involve a substantial question of law, and not if it is merely found that the decision of the lower Court is contrary to law. It is in view of this position that the two questions which are referred to this larger Bench assume good deal of importance. 9. So far as the first question is concerned, the contention of the learned Advocates of the appellants was that right to prefer an appeal is a substantive right and does not relate to a mere matter of procedure, and if this is so, such a right can be curtailed by a subsequent enactment only by an express provision or by necessary implication. It was pointed out that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1976 have no retrospective effect and if that is so, the appellants right to prefer second appeal on the grounds contemplated by the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, or the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948 could not be curtailed. 10. It should be noted that even the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act of 1976 by which the old section 100 is substituted by a new one, makes no prohibition against the institution of a second appeal. It, however, does, restrict the grounds on which second appeal can be preferred to the High Court inasmuch as it provides that this second appeal can be preferred, inter alia, if a matter involves a substantial question of law. It, however, does, restrict the grounds on which second appeal can be preferred to the High Court inasmuch as it provides that this second appeal can be preferred, inter alia, if a matter involves a substantial question of law. Therefore, while under the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, second appeal could be preferred on question of law as well as facts, and under the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, second appeal could be preferred on a simple question of law as well as on the question of custom or usage, now under the newly added provision of Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure second appeals could be preferred only if a substantial question of law is involved. Therefore, the real question which arises to be considered is whether the restriction of the grounds on which second appeal could be preferred can be said to be infringing a vested right of a litigant, who has filed the original suit in the Court of the first instance under the provisions of the repealed enactments. In other words, the question is whether a ground on which second appeal could be filed can be treated as an inseparable part of the right to prefer appeal itself. 11. We find that the matter is settled by two decisions of the Supreme Court We shall, therefore, straight awaytake up these two decisions for our consideration. The first decision is the one given in the case of Garikapati v.Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540. The question involved in this decision was not whether the grounds on which an appeal could be filed should be considered as an inseparable part of the right to file an appeal, but there are certain observations made by the Supreme Court in this decision which would have good deal of bearing on this question. The facts of that case show that before the establishment of the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Constitution of India, there was a right to prefer an appeal to the Federal Court when the valuation was above Rs. 10,000/-. On account of the subsequent changes in law the Federal Court was abolished and the Supreme Court was established. Valuation necessary for appeal to the Supreme Court was raised to Rs. 20,000/-. 10,000/-. On account of the subsequent changes in law the Federal Court was abolished and the Supreme Court was established. Valuation necessary for appeal to the Supreme Court was raised to Rs. 20,000/-. Therefore, the question which arose before the Supreme Court was whether in the suit which was filed before the Constitution came into force and the valuation of which was above Rs. 10,000/- but below Rs, 20,000/-, an appeal could lie to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that right to prefer an appeal is a vested right and is governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit. After considering the case law on the subject exhaustively, the Supreme Court has formulated the following five principles in such cases :— "(1) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as *one legal proceeding. (2) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (3) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (4) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the Us commences, and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced, such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding, and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (5) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment, and not otherwise.” 12. Principles nos. (5) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment, and not otherwise.” 12. Principles nos. 3 and 4 quoted above show that right of appeal which is vested in a party and which could not be divested unless by an express provision or necessary intendment, is the one which is "to be governed by law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit" and not by the law which prevails at the date of the filing of the appeal. If these principles are applied to the facts of these cases, the simple question which arises is what were the provisions of law which governed these suits at the date of their institution. The obvious reply to this question is that provisions of Jaw which governed these matters at the date of their institution were those contained either in the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 or in the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948. If this be so, these second appeals cannot be governed by the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure because these provisions have no retrospective application either by express provision or by any necessary intendment. 13. Another decision of the Supreme Court which squarely applies to the facts of these cases is the one given in Kasibai v. Mahadu, AIR 1965 SC 703. Facts of that case were quite similar to the facts of the cases under our consideration and, therefore, they should be shortly stated. The suit in that case was filed under the provisions of the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code. Section 602 of Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code allowed second appeals to be filed on question of fact as well as law. Thereafter the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was applied to the territory concerned on 1-4 1951 and the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code was repealed. When the second appeal was filed, it was section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which was in force. Therefore, under the said section, a second appeal could lie merely on a question of law and not on a question of fact as well as law as provided by the old section 602 of the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, under the said section, a second appeal could lie merely on a question of law and not on a question of fact as well as law as provided by the old section 602 of the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code. Shah, J. (as then he was) speaking for the Court relied upon the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369, and the above referred decision in Garikapati v, Svbhiah Choudhury, (supra), and held that there was nothing to show that section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applied retrospectively to the territory of the State of Hyderabad, and therefore, even though the power of the High Court in dealing with second appeals was restricted under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that restriction would apply only to the cases instituted in the Court of first instance on or after 1-4-1951, and so for as the suits which were instituted before 1-4-1951 were concerned the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal would be governed by old section 602 of the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code. 14. Both the above referred decisions of the Supreme Court proceed on the footing that right to raise a particular ground in appeal is an inseparable component of the main and substantive right to prefer the appeal itself. The Supreme Court has, therefore, proceeded in these cases on the basis that if appeal could be preferred under the repealed Act on serveral grounds, then any limitation put on the number of grounds on which it could be preferred under the new Act, would amount to the curtailment or limitation on the right of appeal itself. Therefore, in view of these decisions it must follow that the suits which were filed before the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, came into force, either under the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, or under the provisions of Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, would be governed by the respective provisions of those Acts, and second appeals arising from these suits would not be governed by section 100 as amended by the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act of 1976. 15. The above view is taken by other High Courts also. 15. The above view is taken by other High Courts also. Our attention was specially drawn to the decisions given by the Madhya Bharat High Court in Narayan Dass v. Jagan Nath, AIR 1950 MB 85, Hyderabad High Court in Govinda v. Gangubai, AIR 1952 Hyderabad 22 and Punjab High Court in Gurbinder Singh v. Lal Singh, AIR 1959 Punj 123. However, in view of the above referred decisions given by the Supreme Court, we do not find it necessary to refer to these decisions in further details. 16. It should be noted that section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976 provides for repeals and savings. Clause (m) of sub section (2) thereof provides as under:— "(m) the provisions of section 100 of the principal Act, as substituted by section 37 of this Act shall not apply to or affect any appeal from an appellate decree or order which had been admitted, before the commencement of the said section 37, after hearing under rule 11 of Order XLI ; and every such admitted appeal shall be dealt with as if the said section 37 had not come into force." From this clause it is apparent that the amended section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to those second appeals which have been admitted by the High Court before the amended section 100 came into force. 1 his would imply that the amended section 100 would be applicable to those second appeals which have come for admission after the^ amended section 100 came into force. But this aspect of the matter would not affect those second appeals which arise out of the suits which were instituted under the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, and the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1918, for the simple reason that the rights of the parties to prefer second appeal in these cases would not he governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure either amended or unamended. Provisions contained in clause (m) of section 97 (2) of the Amendment Act, 1976 apply only to those suits which were filed under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, M8. 17. Provisions contained in clause (m) of section 97 (2) of the Amendment Act, 1976 apply only to those suits which were filed under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, M8. 17. Shri Ramesh Chand who appeared on behalf of the respondents in these appeals contended that even before the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 came info force, second appeals could be preferred to the Chief Court of Punjab under the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, after the repeal of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, the right of the parties to prefer second appeal would be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. This contention of Shri Ramesh Chand is irrelevant for two reasons, namely (1) provisions relating to the powers of the Chief Court of Punjab cannot be applied to the powers of the High Court with regard to second appeals, and (2) as held by the Supreme Court in the above referred two decisions, the right of a party to prefer an appeal would be governed by the statute under which the suit was originally filed. Since all these suits are filed either under the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, or under the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, this right would be governed by the relevant provisions of these Acts only. 18. Thus our answer to the first question is that these appeals would not be governed by section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976. 19. In view of the above answer to question No. 1, it is not necessary to go into the question No. 2. 20. These references are, therefore, accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs of this hearing. The matter shall accordingly go to the learned single Judge for further disposal. -