Short Note : 1. It was not disputed that the plaintiff purchased yarn during the period from 11-12-1973 to 24-12-1973 from the defendant and paid the price as disclosed by sale invoices produced on record. It was also not disputed that the levy of octroi duty imposed on the import of yarn within the municipal limits was later on set aside by a decision of the High Court However, the octroi duty was levied on the seller defendant and was paid by him. The claim of the plaintiff was based on the allegation that since the subject-matter of levy of octroi duty was under challenge at the time of sale and purchase of yarn, the price paid by him included the amount of octroi duty also and because the said levy had been later on quashed with retrospective effect, the defendant was bound to refund the same to the plaintiff as was already agreed in between the parties. Held : From the perusal of the material on record, it is apparent that the goods in question were sold time to time for the price as disclosed in the side invoices. There was no term in the sale invoice to indicate recovery of any amount towards octroi. It might be true that while quoting the price the seller might have taken into account the amount of octroi also paid by him, but this does not mean that the seller defendant recovered octroi duty from the plaintiff. Thus the plaintiff-purchaser could succeed if it was established that there was an agreement between the parties to refund an amount equal to the amount of octroi in case the levy of octroi was ultimately quashed. In this respect there is no evidence at all to show that the plaintiff and the defendant ever entered into any such agreement in respect of refund of any amount' equal to the amount of octroi. The witnesses examined by the plaintiff himself did not state about, any such agreement with the defendant. They, simply referred to an oral discussion in the meeting of the Chamber of Commerce attended by various traders for adopting the said course. Mere discussion of general nature while, attending the meeting called by the Chamber of Commerce will not amount to an enforceable agreement to claim refund. They, simply referred to an oral discussion in the meeting of the Chamber of Commerce attended by various traders for adopting the said course. Mere discussion of general nature while, attending the meeting called by the Chamber of Commerce will not amount to an enforceable agreement to claim refund. Under these circumstances the trial Court observed that even if there was no such agreement for refund, the defendant was liable to pay the amount in question, by virtue of the provisions of section 72 of the, Contract Act. In the opinion of this Court, there is no scope for applying the provisions of section 72 of, the Contract Act to the present case. The plaintiff did not make payment of any money either by mistake or under coersion. Whatever was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant was towards the price of the goods sold as settled, between the parties. Nothing was specifically recovered as an amount of octroi. No such agreement having been proved, the trial Court was wrong in decreeing-the claim by applying the provisions of section 72 of the Contract Act to the present case which was neither of coersion nor mistake. Revision allowed.