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1977 DIGILAW 383 (RAJ)

Chiranji Lal and two others v. The State of Rajasthan

1977-11-17

V.P.TYAGI

body1977
JUDGMENT 1. - The three petitioners, namely, Chiranji Lal, Shiv Bhagwan and Manohar Lal were challaned in the court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur under section 411 I.P.C. The learned Magistrate after having gone into the material placed by the Investigating Officer, found nothing against these petitioners and passed an order of discharge. The State came in appeal against this order of discharge to the court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Sikar who after hearing both the parties quashed the discharge order passed by the Magistrate on 12th August, 1976 and directed the trial of the present petitioners under section 411 I.P.C. It is against this order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge that the present revision has been filled by these petitioners. 2. The allegations of the prosecution are that one Sarvan who was challaned under sections 457 and 380 I.P.C. handed over the properties to Sadiq and Mumtaz who change their shapes and prepared ingots of the same. It is said that these : Sadiq and Mumtaz were instrumental in selling the ingots of silver to Chiranjilal, Shiv Bhagwan and Manohar. When it was found by the investigating agency that Sarvan had sold the stolen property through Sadiq and Mumtaz to these three persons, they were caught and ingots of silver were recovered from their possession. They were, therefore, challaned under section 411 I.P.C. The learned Magistrate did not find any material to proceed with the trial and, therefore, passed the discharge order. 3. The only ground on the basis of which the order of discharge has been set aside by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge is that these three petitioners purchased the ingots of silver on a throw away price and, therefore, presumption was raised against these persons to have purchased this property knowing it to be stolen property. 4. During investigation Sadiq and Mumtaz were examined under section 161 Cr.P.C. and in their statement they have categorically stated that at the time when the silver ingots were sold through them to the three petitioners, they themselves did not know that they were stolen articles. 4. During investigation Sadiq and Mumtaz were examined under section 161 Cr.P.C. and in their statement they have categorically stated that at the time when the silver ingots were sold through them to the three petitioners, they themselves did not know that they were stolen articles. In these circumstances, it is urged by the learned, counsel for petitioner that unless it is established by the prosecution that the purchaser at the time of the purchase knew it that he was purchasing a stolen property, he cannot be found to be guilty of an offence under section 411 I.P.C. No such presumption as has been raised in the present case by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge under section 114 of the Evidence Act, can be raised against the petitioners.The Supreme Court in Mahabir Sao v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 642 has clearly laid down that the essential requirement of the offence of receiving stolen property is that the property seized from the possession of the accused must be proved by the prosecution to be stolen. In the present case there is not an iota of evidence on the record to show that the ingots which were recovered from the possession of the petitioners after more than 11/2 years from the date of the sale, was really same ingot which they had purchased through two witnesses Sadiq and Mumtaz and that they were purchased knowing them to be stolen property by the petitioners. In the absence of any such material, it is difficult to proceed with the prosecution of these three petitioners. On the very face of it the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sikar is erroneous. The property cannot be presumed to be stolen property simply because it was purchased by the purchaser at a throw away price. There can be other circumstances which can compel to sell the property at a lower rate and, therefore, this factor by itself cannot be deemed to be sufficient factor to raise presumption under section 114 of Evidence Act, that the property sold to the petitioners Mumtaz and Sadiq was really stolen. In these circumstances, I find every force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order of discharge was correct. 5. The petition is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order of the court of the learned Addl. In these circumstances, I find every force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order of discharge was correct. 5. The petition is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order of the court of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sikar dated 12-8-76 is set aside and the order passed by learned Magistrate discharging the accused petitioners is upheld. *******