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1977 DIGILAW 385 (ALL)

Chhedana v. Mast Ram Singh

1977-08-01

T.S.MISRA

body1977
JUDGMENT T. S. Misra, J. 1. Bhupendra Singh filed a suit against Srimati Chhedana for an injunction alleging that the defendant had sold her rights in plots of land to him by a sale deed dated 20th July, 1968. Before executing that sale deed the defendant made an application for grant of bhumidhari certificate before the authority concerned and deposited the requisite amount of rent on 20th July 1968 after obtaining the order of the authority to deposit that amount. Thereafter she executed a sale deed. However, after some time the defendant moved an application before the Tahsildar to withdraw the application for grant of certificate and also for the refund of the amount which she had deposited whereupon the Tahsildar made an order for the refund of the amount. He filed the suit claiming injunction to restrain the defendant from getting back the said amount and withdrawing her application for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad. 2. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the ground, inter alia, that she was an illiterate lady and the plaintiff fraudulently obtained thumb impression on certain papers. She alleged that she had never intended to sell the property in question to the plaintiff nor did she have the knowledge that she had applied for the grant of Bhumidhari Sanad. Before the learned Munsif no oral evidence was adduced by the defendant. The trial court decreed the suit. The defendant preferred an appeal. The appellate court below remitted an issue in the following terms to the trial court for its finding:- Whether the deposit of the requisite amount for obtaining bhumidhari rights and the application for the grant of sanad was obtained from the defendant without her knowledge and by fraud as alleged in para 12 of the written statement ? ' 3. The trial court returned its finding holding that the allegations of fraud as alleged in the written statement were not proved and the application for sanad and the deposit made for obtaining sanad were made with the knowledge of the defendant and by her consent. The issue was thus decided in the negative against the defendant. No objection was filed by the defendant against that finding. The appellate court below found that the plaintiff was entitled to seek the injunction prayed for by him. The issue was thus decided in the negative against the defendant. No objection was filed by the defendant against that finding. The appellate court below found that the plaintiff was entitled to seek the injunction prayed for by him. It observed that the court below was right in enforcing the performance of the contract by the issue of an injunction. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with the observation that in case the revenue authorities some how find it not possible to grant the Bhumidhari Sanad, the plaintiff respondent shall be entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 500/- in execution as well as the costs of both the Courts from the appellant. Second Appeal No. 61 of 1972 arises out of the aforesaid suit. 4. Mast Ram Singh filed suit No. 119 of 1969 in the Court of Munsif Qaiserganj against Srimati Chhedana for injunction restraining the defendant from getting back certain amount deposited by her for obtaining Bhumidhari Sanad and also restraining her to withdraw her application for the grant of the same. He had alleged that the defendant was a sirdar of the plots in question. She agreed to sell those plots to Mast Ram Singh and in that connection she had agreed to make an application for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad and deposited the requisite amount for the same with the competent authority. Consequently she made an application for obtaining the Bhumidhari Sanad and also deposited the requisite amount. Thereafter she executed a sale deed in favour of Mast Ram Singh for a consideration of Rs. 700/- and delivered possession of the plots in question to him. The defendant, however, being misled by certain persons moved an application before the Tahsildar to withdraw the application and for the refund of the amount which was deposited for obtaining Bhumidhari Sanad. An order was passed thereon by the Tahsildar for refunding the amount to her. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for specific performance of contract and for grant of injunction. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the ground, inter alia, that she was defrauded by the plaintiff in moving the application for grant of sanad and depositing the amount before the Tahsildar. The trial court on a consideration of the f acts and circumstances of the case decreed the suit. 5. The defendant preferred an appeal from that decree. The trial court on a consideration of the f acts and circumstances of the case decreed the suit. 5. The defendant preferred an appeal from that decree. The learned District Judge, Bahraich remitted an issue to the trial court in the following terms for recording its finding:- Whether the deposit of the requisite amount for obtaining bhumidhari rights and the application for the grant of sanad was obtained from the defendant without her knowledge and by fraud as alleged in paragraph 12 of the written statement ? 6. The trial court returned its finding holding against the defendant. Thereafter the appeal was heard by the learned District Judge who dismissed the same with the observation that in case the revenue authorities somehow find it not possible to grant the Bhumidhari Sanad, the plaintiff respondent shall be entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 700/- in execution as well as the costs of both the Courts from the appellant. Aggrieved, the defendant has now filed Second Appeal No. 60 of 1972. Since these appeals raise common questions of law and fact, they are being disposed of by one judgment. For the appellants it was urged that the courts below erred in granting the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff in both the suits inasmuch as the appellant could not be forced to obtain Bhumidhari sanad with respect to the disputed plots of land, I find no merits in this contention. The fact that the vendor appellant had taken upon herself the responsibility of depositing ten times rent of sirdari plots to convert them into Bhumidhari will not make the contract contingent. She had agreed to sell the plots in question to the respondents in both the appeals and in terms of the agreement she had also made an application for grant of bhumidhari rights and had in fact deposited the requisite amount for obtaining Bhumidhari Sanad. According to Section 137 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, once the application is found to have been duly made and the Assistant Collector is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the declaration mentioned in Section 134, he shall grant a certificate to that effect. The Assistant Collector has no option in the matter and he has to grant the certificate as required by Section 134 of the Act. The Assistant Collector has no option in the matter and he has to grant the certificate as required by Section 134 of the Act. The undertaking of the appellant that she will take steps under the Act to obtain bhumidhari rights in the sirdari land agreed to be sold was enforceable under the terms of the contract and the court has power and jurisdiction under Section 13 (b) of the Specific Relief Act to compel the defendant to take steps and obtain Bhumidhari rights in the sirdari land in question. I am fortified in my view by a decision of this court in Pahuncht Lal v. Man Singh, 1971 AWR 338. 7. It was next urged that the appellant is an illiterate lady and the respondents in both the appeals played fraud on her while obtaining her thumb impression on a blank paper and in making deposit of ten times of the land revenue in obtaining Bhumidhari Sanad. The appellate court below as pointed out earlier had remitted an issue to the trial court with regard to this aspect of the matter and the trial court had recorded its finding against the defendant. No objection was filed before the appellate court below against the said finding. The finding has thus become conclusive. It is, therefore, not open to the appellant to canvass the said plea in the second appeal inasmuch as it is a finding of fact which cannot be upset unless it is shown to be perverse or based on no evidence. 8. No other point was urged. In the result, Second Appeal No. 60 of 1972 and Second Appeal No. 61 of 1972 are hereby dismissed. Since none appears for the respondents in both the appeals, I make no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.