JUDGMENT : Amitav Banerji, J. This writ petition is directed against an order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Mirzapur dated the 14th August, 1972. The Deputy Director dismissed six revisions tiled by Shanker and affirmed the orders passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The dispute was in respect of two matters. One was in respect of the holding of Smt. Ingurdani which she got from her first husband Ram Charan and the other was in respect of the claim made by Sukhdeo from the holding of Shanker. The main contention in this case was in regard to the first matter. 2. Sukhdeo has been held to be the son of Shanker from his second wife Smt. Ingurdani. The finding of fact arrived at by the Deputy Director on this point is final and conclusive. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner could not point out any manifest error of law in this finding. Consequently, the Deputy Director was right in holding that Sukhdeo had an interest in the share of Shanker. I do not find any error of law apparent on the face of the record to set aside the decision of the Deputy Director in regard to the claim of Sukhdeo as the son of Shanker. To that extent the order passed by the Deputy Director has to be affirmed. 3. The main question in dispute between the parties is whether the share inherited by Smt. Ingurdani as the widow of Ram Charan remained with her or vested in Shanker by virtue of the two deeds said to have been executed by Smt. Ingurdani and Shanker, subsequently. 4. Ram Charan died as a separate Hindu leaving his wife Smt. Ingurdani as his only heir. Ram Charan had also executed a Will in favour of Smt. Ingurdani in 1946. On his death in 1950 she became the absolute owner of his properties. Shanker married Smt. Ingurdani after Ram Charan's death and a son Sukhdeo was born to them. These are findings of fact not open to challenge in the writ petition. 5. It is stated that on the 29th January, 1951, Smt. Ingurdani executed a gift deed of her entire property to Shanker. The same day Shanker also made a gift in her favour of the very same property with conditions. These are findings of fact not open to challenge in the writ petition. 5. It is stated that on the 29th January, 1951, Smt. Ingurdani executed a gift deed of her entire property to Shanker. The same day Shanker also made a gift in her favour of the very same property with conditions. These were: only a life interest was granted and secondly, the property would revert to Shanker if she did not lead the life of a chaste widow. Both deeds were registered. 6. Shanker claimed that these gift deeds were executed by way of family arrangements. His case further was that as Smt. Ingurdani became immoral she lost her rights in the property. The immoral act was that she had led an adulterous life and remarried and consequently ceased to be a widow. 7. Smt. Ingurdani denied the case set up by Shanker and stated that she remarried Shanker and had a son Sukhdeo from the union. She alleged that the gift deed was got executed by Shanker by exercising undue influence on her and that she was not divested of her rights. 8. The Consolidation Officer accepted the pleas of Shanker and ordered the expunction of the name of Smt. Ingurdani. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowed her appeal and ordered her name to be maintained as in the basic year Khatauni. Her share was held to be 1/4th and that of Shanker to be l/6th and of Shukhdeo to be 1/12th. This order was maintained by the Deputy Director. The Deputy Director held that the condition imposed by Shanker in his gift deed dated the 29th January, 1951 was void and hit by Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act. He further held that Shanker had dominated the Will of Smt. Ingurdani in getting her property. It was further held that the gift deed was not acted upon and that she obtained new rights on the date of vesting under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Also she became full owner u/s 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The Deputy Director further held that she was not holding the land in lieu of maintenance allowance and the plea of a family arrangement was also rejected. The Deputy Director further held that the immorality of character referred to the marriage of Smt. Ingurdani with Shanker himself. 9. Also she became full owner u/s 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The Deputy Director further held that she was not holding the land in lieu of maintenance allowance and the plea of a family arrangement was also rejected. The Deputy Director further held that the immorality of character referred to the marriage of Smt. Ingurdani with Shanker himself. 9. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that the consolidation courts had no jurisdiction to adjudicate about the validity of the gift deed. This could only be done by a competent civil court. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gorakh Nath Dube Vs. Hari Narain Singh and Others, AIR 1973 SC 2451 and on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramnath v. Smt. Munna 1976 AWC 412 . The Supreme Court in the case of Gorakhnath (supra) laid down the law in the following words: ...Where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it. If the deed was void, then certainly it could be ignored and there was no bar on the consolidation courts to proceed to adjudicate the right treating the document to be void. Similarly, where an alienation was made in excess of power to transfer it would be to that extent Invalid. In such a case the Consolidation Courts would have jurisdiction to go into the question whether a particular document was void or not. If the document was voidable then the consolidation courts have no jurisdiction to go into that question. In such a case only a competent civil court can cancel the deed. 10. In the present case, the Deputy Director has held the two deeds executed on 29th January, 1959 were not given effect to and acted upon. The name of Smt. Ingurdani continued to be recorded till the basic year. This shows that there was no change in title. 10. In the present case, the Deputy Director has held the two deeds executed on 29th January, 1959 were not given effect to and acted upon. The name of Smt. Ingurdani continued to be recorded till the basic year. This shows that there was no change in title. For had Smt. Ingurdani been divested of all her rights, her name ought to have been deleted from the revenue records at the instance of Shanker but this did not happen. Thus, the fact that no mutation took place and that the name of Smt. Ingurdani continued to be recorded in the revenue records was material. The question whether the deed was acted upon or not, is a question of fact. The findings of the Deputy Director on this point has got to be accepted. The Deputy Director had given reasons for holding that the deeds were not executed by way of family arrangement. This is again a finding on a question of fact arrived at by the Deputy Director and this has also to be accepted. No manifest error of law could be pointed out in these findings. 11. It is true that the question of undue influence in the execution of a deed would raise a question of the voidable contract. The provisions of Section 19 of the Contract Act would be applicable. A suit has to be brought in a competent court to cancel such a document and the consolidation courts would have no jurisdiction to decide the question. The consolidation courts, therefore, have to accept the deed as valid, until it is avoided. 12. Even if the gift deed is held to be valid, the question still remains as to whether the condition incorporated in the gift deed executed by Shanker is void. 13. The finding by the Deputy Director that the condition imposed by Shanker in the second gift deed was contrary to law and void. If a limitation is placed on the right to transfer it is hit by the provisions of Section 10 of the Transfer or Property Act. The Deputy Director has rightly held that the condition imposed by Shanker was void. Consequently, the gift deed has to be read without the condition imposing limitation on the powers of transfer. 14. The second condition was that the property would revert to Shanker if she did not lead the life of a chaste widow. The Deputy Director has rightly held that the condition imposed by Shanker was void. Consequently, the gift deed has to be read without the condition imposing limitation on the powers of transfer. 14. The second condition was that the property would revert to Shanker if she did not lead the life of a chaste widow. The question is whether this condition is void or not. The question of unchastity has been considered in paragraph 96 of Mulla's Hindu Law in the following words: Unchastity- A widow who is unchaste at the time of her husband's death, is not entitled to inherit him, but once the husband's estate has vested in her-which could only be if she was chaste at the time of her husband's death-it cannot be divested by her subsequent unchastity. It has further been stated there that where a widow of a joint owner is given a widow's estate on her husband's death under a family arrangement, such an estate it not divested by her subsequent unchastity in the absence of any provision to that effect. In the present case, Smt. Ingurdani received the estate from her husband under a will. She was an absolute owner under the will. Her name was entered in the revenue records. She could not, therefore, be divested of that estate for her subsequent unchastity. In the present case, the only act of unchastity given is her second marriage. A marriage does not connect unchastity. If the custom or law permits a second marriage that by itself would not amount to unchastity. It may be that she has ceased to be a widow of a particular person but it does not mean that she has become unchaste. Consequently, if she did not become unchaste the question of the property reverting to Shanker did not arise. Shanker thus did not become entitled to the property on the basis of the second condition in the gift deed. Even otherwise the condition could be considered provided it was arrived at in a family settlement. The finding of the Deputy Director is that there was no arrangement. Consequently, the second condition was void ab initio. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this condition was also void. 15. The result of the above conclusion is that the second gift deed has to be accepted as a valid gift deed minus the two conditions. The finding of the Deputy Director is that there was no arrangement. Consequently, the second condition was void ab initio. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this condition was also void. 15. The result of the above conclusion is that the second gift deed has to be accepted as a valid gift deed minus the two conditions. It means that Smt. Ingurdani was not divested of her rights in the property in dispute. Even assuming that it was a gift with limited life interest even then Smt. Ingurdani would retain her rights for her life time. Consequently, Shanker could not claim any rights in the property on the basis of the second gift deed. 16. Learned Counsel then contended that the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act has no application to the agricultural plots governed under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. This is correct. In my opinion, the provisions of Section 14(1) were not attracted to the facts of the case but this would make no difference to the ultimate conclusion in this case. 17. There was some dispute as to whether Sukhdeo was the son of Smt. Ingurdani by Shanker. He married hoc in July 1951 and the child was born in May, 1952. In any event this question need not be gone info for there is now a clear finding that Sukhdeo was the son of Shanker. There is no other allegation of her being unchaste with any one else other than Shanker. Sukhdeo had filed a suit for partition alleging that he was the son of Shanker. This case was fought upto the High Court and a judgment was passed affirming the findings in favour of Sukhdeo. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that since no final decree was prepared the decree did not operate as res judicata. In support of this contention he relied on a decision of the Lucknow Bench of the High Court in Ram Garib v. Bhagauti Din Singh 1976 AWC 591 . It is, however, clear that from the evidence on record the Deputy Director came to the conclusion that Shukhdeo was the son of Shanker. In view of this finding the plea now taken that the order of the High Court in second appeal did not operate as res judicata is only of academic interest. 18. It is, however, clear that from the evidence on record the Deputy Director came to the conclusion that Shukhdeo was the son of Shanker. In view of this finding the plea now taken that the order of the High Court in second appeal did not operate as res judicata is only of academic interest. 18. Smt, Ingurdani had been given an absolute interest under the will. This was in 1946. Her holding was Sir and Khudkasht. She would become a bhumidhar of the land in dispute. Even if it be assumed that the gift deeds were executed on 29-1-1951 i.e. before the coming in force of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act she would then become a bhumidhar u/s 18 of the Act. In any event, she had a life interest in 1951 and as the land was sir and khudkasht, she would become a bhumidhar. The contention by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that she would become an asami and not a bhumidhar is not acceptable. The entire premises of the Petitioner's contention rests on the question whether she took the gift with a condition and whether she was divested of all her rights in the holding because of her subsequent unchastity. The finding is that the conditions imposed in the second gift deed were void, and there was no family arrangement. Consequently, she was not divested of her rights which she had inherited from her first husband Ram Charan. She retained her rights in them. Since the conditions were void her rights remained intact and she became a bhumidhar. 19. What is more significant is that the act of unchastity is committed by marrying Shanker. Shanker himself claims to derive benefit from her alleged unchastity with him. It appears that he first induced her to execute a gift deed in his favour and then re-conveys the property with certain conditions back to her. One of the conditions stipulates that if she became unchaste then she would lose her rights in the property and then he seduces her to acquire the property absoluetely. Nothing cold be more dishonest. This alone would be a good ground to decline to exercise the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary. Nothing cold be more dishonest. This alone would be a good ground to decline to exercise the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary. If subsequential justice has been done then it is not necessary for this Court to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash its impugned orders. For the reasons given above I am not inclined to exercise the powers of Article 226 of the Constitution in the facts and circumstances of this case. 20. For the reasons given above I decline to exercise the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to set aside the impugned orders. The Writ Petition fails and is dismissed with costs.