JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal from a judgment and decree of affordance. The suit was instituted on August 2, 1967 by Phanindra Krishna Mitra for recovery of possession of a portion of premises No. 19b, Dr. Rajendra road, Bhowanipur, Calcutta consisting of two bed rooms in the first floor and two bed rooms in the ground floor with kitchen and store on the second floor thereof which the defendant held as a monthly tenant according to English calender month. The plaintiffs case was that he was living in another portion of the premises with two bed rooms and a kitchen which was hopelessly inadequate and insufficient for himself and his family. The plaintiff's family, at the material time, consisted of his wife, three sons with their wives and eight grand-children, one unmarried daughter, one invalid brother besides a whole time maid servant. For want of accommodation in the said premises the two sons of the plaintiff with their respective families had been living in rented houses while his third son was in United Kingdom and was expected to return with his wife and children. The plaintiff, an old man of 88 years had been compelled to live in the suit premises with his wife, unmarried daughter invalid brother and a whole time maid servant with great difficulty. The plaintiff accordingly required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. The tenancy was determined by a combined notice of suit expiring with June 1967 and the suit was instituted as the defendant even on service of notice failed to vacate the suit premises as required. 2. THE suit was contested by the defendant by filing a written statement and it was stated therein that the plaintiff had sufficient accommodation in his possession for his family members who resided with him. It was stated that the two sons for a long time lived separately with their respective families while the third son was living abroad with his family. The defendant denied that the plaintiff also reasonably required the suit premises for his sons and their families. The notice to quit was invalid and the real intention of the plaintiff was to let the suit premises at higher rent as the rent originally Rs. 15/- was ultimately fixed at rs. 38. 50 P. The other portion of the ground floor had been let out to another tenant for a long time. The notice to quit was invalid and the real intention of the plaintiff was to let the suit premises at higher rent as the rent originally Rs. 15/- was ultimately fixed at rs. 38. 50 P. The other portion of the ground floor had been let out to another tenant for a long time. The suit in the circumstances should be dismissed. At the trial the plaintiff's eldest son gave evidence stating that the plaintiff who was the owner of the premises was completely bed-ridden. It was further stated that the family of the plaintiff consisted of the persons referred to in the plaint and the deponent with his family had been forced for shortage of accommodation to live in rented house with rent of rs. 125/- per month which he was finding difficult to meet after his retirement. For financial difficulty the second brother who was a businessman also wanted to live in the suit property and all of them wanted to look after their old and infirm father and to reside in this house. The third brother was in temporary employment in U. K. but he left this country for shortage of accommodation. It further transpired that while the defendant had been in occupation of the front portion of the ground and first floor, the plaintiff was in occupation of the back portion of the first floor and the back portion of the ground floor having two rooms was tenanted. The suggestion that the sons after their marriage were living separately was denied The second son also gave evidence to say that the premises 19b, Dr. Rajendra road was the only house owned by the plaintiff and the sons had no other house of their own. He further stated that he left the suit property six months prior to the institution of the suit due to shortage of accommodation. Due to fall of business income this deponent, it was stated: was finding it impossible to maintain separate establishment and they all wanted to live together in this house. The defendant in his evidence denied that the sons wanted to live with the father as they had been living separately for over 20/22 years and accordingly the plaintiff did not reasonably require the suit premises for the use and occupation of himself and his family. 3. The defendant in his evidence denied that the sons wanted to live with the father as they had been living separately for over 20/22 years and accordingly the plaintiff did not reasonably require the suit premises for the use and occupation of himself and his family. 3. THE trial court on consideration of evidence came to the finding that the plaintiff required the suit premises for the use and occupation of himself and his family members. The notice was held to be legal and sufficient and duly served. The suit was accordingly decreed. 4. ON appeal the appellate court held that the sons were competent witnesses sufficiently able to depose to the facts of the case on behalf of their father who was unable to depose on account of his advanced age and illness. There was enough evidence to indicate that the two sons wanted to live together with their father and there were cogent reasons for the sons desire to live in the plaintiff's premises instead of rented premises for their financial difficulty while there was no evidence that the third son would return to the country. The plaintiff's requirement, it was held, included the requirement of his sons, particularly of those financially dependent on him and merely because they left the father's residence at one. time on becoming economically independent, they did not cease to be members of his family. It was further held that the sons were not in possession of a reasonably suitable accommodation as provided in Clause (ff) of Section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act 1956. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The present appeal is against this decision. As the hearing of the appeal commenced counsel for the appellant submitted that there has been material change of events which should be taken note of while deciding the appeal. With the leave of court, the parties filed affidavits in support of their respective cases which have been placed before me for consideration. There is no dispute that the plaintiff his wife and the dependent brother had died during the tendency of the proceedings and the three sons have been substituted in the appeal in the place of the plaintiff. With the leave of court, the parties filed affidavits in support of their respective cases which have been placed before me for consideration. There is no dispute that the plaintiff his wife and the dependent brother had died during the tendency of the proceedings and the three sons have been substituted in the appeal in the place of the plaintiff. In his affidavit of september 20, 1977, the appellant stated that the unmarried daughter of the plaintiff had been married in the meantime and was living elsewhere while the tenant of the back portion of the ground floor had also vacated and the possession thereof was delivered to the landlords. In the affidavit of the respondents it was stated that one married sister of the substituted plaintiffs with her family of three members tad to be accommodated in the back portion of the ground floor for financial and other reasons. The eldest sons family consists of himself, his wile, one daughter and two major sons while the second sons' family consists of himself, his wife, three major sons and one daughter. The two rooms in occupation of the original plaintiff is now in possession of the second son of the eldest son of the plaintiff while the other room is used as a drawing room, in his supplementary affidavit of September 30,,1977 the appellant has reiterated his allegations in his earlier affidavit and submitted that the substituted plaintiffs have no right to continue the ejectment proceedings. 5. MR. Mallick learned counsel for the appellant firstly submitted that there was no acceptable evidence of requirement before the Court on basis where of the decree for recovery of possession could be passed. It was said that to prove the plaintiff's own requirement, it was incumbent OIL the plaintiff himself to depose in the proceedings. This contention is totally unacceptable. The law does not require that the plaintiff himself must appear in court to support his case. Any one who is competent to depose to the facts of the cases is a competent witness in an action though in some cases it may be desirable or necessary for the plaintiff himself to depose. In the present case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff himself to depose. In the present was ailing. Any one who is competent to depose to the facts of the cases is a competent witness in an action though in some cases it may be desirable or necessary for the plaintiff himself to depose. In the present case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff himself to depose. In the present was ailing. It is obvious that it was not possible for the plaintiff since deceased to examine himself even on commission except at great inconvenience to him or risk. The sons of the plaintiff, for whose use and occupation also the suit premises were required, are competent witnesses and they had been cross-examined at length. There is therefore no ground for any prejudice to the defendant and the evidence of the said sons is admissible and acceptable in law and the courts are entitled to consider the same in deciding the case. 6. MR. Dutt learned counsel for the plaintiffs respondents submitted that the appeal is not maintainable as the daughters as heirs of the plaintiff were left out at the time of substitution. This objection was not taken earlier and it appears that the estate has been sufficiently represented by the substituted heirs. Accordingly it does not appear that the failure; to bring all heirs on record is a fatal defect and the decree as may be passed by this court in this appeal will be binding on all heirs and legal representatives of the plaintiff. The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that though some portion of the property fell vacant, the sons whose requirement was pleaded did not occupy the same, so that it was obvious that the alleged requirement was not bonafide. It is stated in the affidavit on behalf of the respondent that one married sister who came to attend to her parents was residing in the said portion with her family for financial and other reasons. Similarly the portion occupied by the original plaintiff, was being occupied now by one of his grandsons. I do not think these facts in any way affect the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement. Similarly the portion occupied by the original plaintiff, was being occupied now by one of his grandsons. I do not think these facts in any way affect the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement. It may not be possible for the sons to shift their family in piece meal, which will be no solution of the problem while sister's possession, who is also a co-owner of the property as it appears, is unavoidable as has been alleged though it came as a subsequent event during the proceedings which the court is bound to take into consideration. 7. THE formidable contention of mr. Mallick is that the plaintiff's requirement of the premises perished with the death of the plaintiff as was held in Phoolrani Vs. Sk. Naubat Rai a. I. R. 1973. S. C. 2110. In this case the court took the view that requirement of the premises for the residence of himself and his family is the personal requirement of the landlord and such personal requirement must perish with him when the continuation of the proceedings require determination of wholly different and distinct issues. 8. IN Puspa Lata Vs. Dinesh chandra 85 CIJ 74, in considering the earlier Rent Control Act, 1948 P. B. Mukharjee J. (as he then was) held that the expression his own does not necessarily mean of the particular individual alone but must be interpreted to include the individual's family and dependents and such person or persons who may be essential and necessary for the purpose of such occupation. The Supreme Court in Shantilal Vs. Chimanlal A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 2358 did not accept the proposition of law laid down Phoolrani's case particularly in the context of the provisions of the Delhi Act. It was laid down as a proposition of law as follows :- "we are unable to take the view that the requirement of the occupation of members of the family of the original landlord was his requirement and cased to be the requirement 6f the members of his family on his death. After the death of the original landlord the senior member of his family takes his place and is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his occupation and the occupation of the other members of the family. After the death of the original landlord the senior member of his family takes his place and is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his occupation and the occupation of the other members of the family. " In view of the above decision and of the liberal interpretation given by this Court, it is no longer possible to contend that the cause of the action of the suit perished with the death of the original landlord. On the contrary the sons as substituted heirs were fully competent to carry on the proceeding as the cause of action survived on the heirs, particularly when the requirement pleaded was the requirement of the family members of the original plaintiff. 9. THE last contention is that the original plaintiff; in his plaint did not plead that he was not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation as required under section 13 (1) (ff) of the Act. This provision was not there when the suit was instituted and was introduced by Amendment Act of 1969 with retrospective effect. The Supreme Act in B. Banerjee Vs. Anita Pan A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1146 gave opportunity to the plaintiff to amend his plaint in view of the above legislation retrospective operation whereof was declared valid in disagreement with the view of this court, with further opportunity to parties to adduce evidence in support, and in rebuttal, as the fact was not made an issue in the trial proceedings. Mr. Mallick submitted that the same procedure should be followed and the plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend the plaint and prove, the case that they were not in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation. 10. WHILE normally the procedure as suggested should be followed, in this case there is evidence by P. W. 2 stating that the original plaintiff or the sons had no other house property for such accommodation. In view of the said averment which was not challenged, I am reluctant to delay the ten year old proceedings further, particularly when there is no averment in the supplementary affidavits filed by the defendant indicating that the plaintiff's were possession of any reasonable accommodation. The contention that the sons have reasonably suitable accommodation in rented houses, is unacceptable as rented accommodation cannot be a reasonably suitable accommodation when one has a house of his own where he intends to reside. The contention that the sons have reasonably suitable accommodation in rented houses, is unacceptable as rented accommodation cannot be a reasonably suitable accommodation when one has a house of his own where he intends to reside. This is more so in the context of the financial obligation to pay rent which the plaintiffs find it difficult to meet. For all these reasons, all contentions raised by the appellant fail and the appeal accordingly is dismissed without any order as to costs in the circumstances.