Kishori Lal v. Union of India — 1977 DIGILAW 394 (RAJ)

D.P. GUPTA, J.—The petitioner Kishori Lal was initially appointed as a literate cleaner in the Western Railway in the year 1945. He was gradually promoted to higher posts and in the year 1970 he was working on the post of a Loco Inspector at Abu Road. On February 13, 1970 the Divisional Superintendent, Western Railway Ajmer, who is admittedly the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner, issued to him a memorandum along with a charge sheet and a statement of allegations. It Was alleged that the petitioner was guilty of serious misconduct on account of his irresponsible and irregular working and neglect of duty on his part. The statement of allegations furnished to the petitioner along with the charge sheet contained nine grounds. A disciplinary enquiry was conducted in which seven persons were examined as witnesses on behalf of the Department and the petitioner produced two witnesses in his defence. The Enquiring Officer submitted his report to the Disciplinary Authority in which he held that all the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. On January 4, 1971 the Disciplinary Authority issued a notice to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause as to why the proposed punishment of removal from service be not Imposed upon him. After considering the reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice, the Disciplinary Authority by its order dated March 19, 1971 imposed the penalty of permanent reduction to the post of Steam Driver grade (c) in the grade of Rs. 150-240 (A) upon the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Chief Mechanical Engineer, Western Railway, Bombay, who accepted the appeal on the ground that certain material which was not placed on the record of the enquiry, viz, the confidential reports should not have been relied upon in imposing the penalty upon the petitioner. The Chief Mechanical Engineer (E), therefore, cancelled the order passed by the Divisional Superintendent, Ajmer and remitted the matter back to him for processing the same further without relying on the documents-statements which did not form part of the enquiry proceedings. Thereupon, the Divisional Superintendent considered the matter afresh and passed a fresh order on April 24, 1972 awarding the same penalty to the petitioner of permanent reduction to the post of Steam Driver grade (c). This order was communicated to the petitioner vide Memorandum dated May 1, 1972 (Annexure 5). Thereupon, the Divisional Superintendent considered the matter afresh and passed a fresh order on April 24, 1972 awarding the same penalty to the petitioner of permanent reduction to the post of Steam Driver grade (c). This order was communicated to the petitioner vide Memorandum dated May 1, 1972 (Annexure 5). The petitioner again filed an appeal against the last mentioned order passed by the Divisional Superintendent, but this time the Chief Mechanical Engineer (E) by his order dated September 8, 1972 dismissed the petitioners appeal. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Divisional Superintendent, Ajmer dated May 1, 1972 and the appellate order as communicated to him vide memorandum dated September 27,1972 in this writ petition. 2. The first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority while holding the petitioner guilty of the charges of misconduct and those given by the Appellate Authority, viz, the Chief Mechanical Engineer (E), while dismissing the appeal of the petitioner, ought to have been communicated to the petitioner and that serious prejudice was caused to him on account of non-communication of the reasons contained in the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. In the writ petition, the petitioner has taken the ground that no reasons were recorded by the Disciplinary Authority while passing a fresh order imposing penalty upon him. But the respondents produced a copy of the detailed order passed by the Divisional Superintendent on April 24, 1972 along with their reply to the writ petition. It was on the basis of the aforesaid order of the Divisional Superintendent dated April 24, 1972 (Annex-ure R. 1) that the communication dated May 1, 1972 was sent to the petitioner, intimating him that the penalty of reduction to the post of Steam Driver Grade (C) permanently was imposed upon him on account of serious misconduct. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was seriously prejudiced in his defence as no effective appeal could be maintained by him against the order imposing penalty upon him in the absence of communication to him of the reasons contained in the order Annexure R. 1. Learned counsel has relied upon the decision of this Court in Khilari Versus Union of India (1). Learned counsel has relied upon the decision of this Court in Khilari Versus Union of India (1). The counsel for the Railway Administration, on the other hand, argued that when the Disciplinary Authority was in agreement with the findings arrived at by the Enquiring Officer with regard to the charges against the petitioner, it was not necessary for him to communicate the reasons in respect of the order imposing penalty upon the petitioner. It was further argued by learned counsel for the respondents that the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in its fresh order Annexure R. 1 are substantially the same as were recorded on the earlier occasion, in the order dated March 19, 1971 except the objectionable part thereof, in which extraneous matter contained in the confidential reports of the petitioner was considered. It was also submitted by him that the petitioner was very well aware of the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in its order dated April 24, 1972 (Annexure R. 1) as in his appeal dated June 21, 1972 the petitioner himself had stated that the fresh order issued on May 1, 1972 is based upon those very findings of the Divisional Superintendent which was found bad by the Appellate Authority on the earlier occasion and which have been set aside in appeal. 3 I have considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel in this respect. There can be no doubt that disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature and it is necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to record sufficient reasons for its conclusions regarding the misconduct of an employee and further that such reasons should be communicated to the employee concerned. In Ram Khilari vs. Union of India (1) this Court held that it was incumbent upon the competent Disciplinary Authority to set out the reasons which led it to reach the conclusion that the alleged misconduct on the part of the concerned delinquent employee was proved and that the imposition of penalty was justified in the facts and circumstances of each case. Following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/S Travancore Rayons Ltd. vs. The Union of India (2) were relied upon in this context : "In this case the communication from the Central Government gave no reasons in support of the orders, the appellant Company is merely intimated thereby that the Government of India did not see any reasons to interfere "with the order in appeal". The communication does not disclose the points" which were considered, and the reasons for rejecting them. This is a totally unsatisfactory method of disposal of a case in exercise of the judicial power vested in the Central Government. Necessity to give sufficient reasons which disclose proper appreciation of the problem to be solved, and the mental process by which the conclusion is reached in cases where a non-judicial authority exercises judicial functions, is obvious. When judicial power" is exercised by an authority normally performing executive or administrative functions, this Court would require to be satisfied that the decision has been reached after due consideration of the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations of policy or expediency. The Court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two grounds: One, that the party aggrieved in a proceeding before the High Court or this Court, has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous: the other, that the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power ". It was also held in Ram Khilaris case that not only the reasons for holding the employee guilty of some misconduct should be recorded by the concerned Disciplinary Authority, but such reasons should also be communicated to the affected party and that non-communication of reasons in respect of an order passed by an Administrative Authority, which is required to act in a quasi-judicial manner, could not be supported on the ground that the reasons could be extracted from the file, although not communicated to the concerned delinquent employee. 4. 4. In M/S Ajanta Industries vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi (3) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have made the following observations, which are relevant this respect:— " Communication of the order is an absolutely essential requirement since the assessee is then immediately made aware of the reasons which impelled the authorities to pass the order...............it is submitted, on behalf of the Revenue, that the very fact that reasons are recorded in the file, although these are not communicated to the assessee, fully meets the requirement of Section 127(1). We are unable to accept this submission...............The person for recording of reasons in the order and making these reasons known to the assessee is to enable an opportunity to the assessee to approach the High Court under its writ jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution and even to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in an appropriate case for challenging the order, inter alia, either on the ground that it is malafide or arbitrary or that it is based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations...............when Law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order affecting prejudicially the interests of any person, who can challenge the order in Court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice on account of ommission to communicate the reasons is not expiated. " 5. In Ram Khilaris case the facts were that the petitioner, who were railway employees, were removed or dismissed from service without holding any enquiry by the concerned Disciplinary Authorities for taking part in All India Strike of Railwaymen, which took place in May 1974, on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in accordance with the prescribed rules. In some of those cases, the Disciplinary Authorities concerned did not record any reasons for holding the delinquent employees guilty of the charges of serious misconduct, while in the case of some employees although the concerned Disciplinary Authorities had recorded the reasons for holding that the employees concerned had committed serious misconduct, yet such reasons were not communicated to the concerned employee$. In those cases as no enquiry was held either by the Disciplinary Authority or by any Enquiring Officer appointed by such Authority, the question of the Disciplinary Authority concurring with the report of the Enquiring Officer did not arise. In those cases as no enquiry was held either by the Disciplinary Authority or by any Enquiring Officer appointed by such Authority, the question of the Disciplinary Authority concurring with the report of the Enquiring Officer did not arise. In the aforesaid circumstances, it was held that the concerned Disciplinary Authorities should have recorded the reasons which led them to arrive at the conclusion that the concerned employees were guilty of the charges of serious misconduct and further that the reasons so recorded by the Disciplinary Authority should be communicated to the concerned employee so that the order could be challenged by the aggrieved person, either by way of an appeal or by approaching this court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. As already mentioned above, in the present case the Disciplinary Authority had appointed an Enquiring Officer, who conducted an enquiry into the charges of serious misconduct levelled against the petitioner and the finding recorded by the Enquiring Officer (a copy of Which has been produced by the petitioner on record and is marked Annexure 12) was supplied to the petitioner along with the order of Disciplinary Authority dated March 19, 1971 and the memorandum dated March 20, 1971. In cases where the Disciplinary Authority concurs with the finding arrived at by the Enquiring Officer, it may not be necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to record its reasons separately but in cases where the Disciplinary Authority differs from the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiring Officer it would be necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to record its reasons for coming to a contrary conclusion. 7. In Tara Chand vs. Delhi Municipality (4) the Law on the subject has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under:— "...... 7. In Tara Chand vs. Delhi Municipality (4) the Law on the subject has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under:— "...... although it may be necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to record its provisional conclusions in the notice calling upon the delinquent officer to show cause why the proposed punishment be not imposed upon him if it differs from the findings arrived at by the Enquiring Officer with regard to the charge, it is not obligatory to do so in case the Disciplinary Authority concurs with the findings of the Enquiring Officer ............We would like to make it clear that while it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder. It would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons. It cannot also, in our opinion, be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. Every case, we think, has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances." 8. Their Lordships held in Tarachands case (4) that the following observations made by them in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India (5) contained a correct statement of law : "Ordinarily, the appellate or revisional tribunal shall give its own reasons succinctly but in a case of affirmance where the original tribunal gives adequate reasons, the appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those reasons." 9. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also quoted with approval the folio-wing observations made by them in State of Madras vs. A.R. Srinivasan (6) : "In dealing with the question as to whether it is obligatory on the State Government to give reasons in support of the order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer, we cannot overlook the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against such a delinquent officer begin with an enquiry conducted by an officer appointed in that behalf. That enquiry is followed by a report and the Public Service Commission is consulted where necessary. Having regard to the material which is thus made available to the State Government and which is made available to the delinquent officer also, it seems to us somewhat unreasonable to suggest that the State Government must record its reasons why it accepts the findings of the Tribunal. It is conceivable that if the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal, which may be in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer, it should give reasons why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal though even in such a case, it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate. But where the State Government agree with the findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinquent officer, we do not think as a matter of law, it could be said that the State Government cannot impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal unless it gives reasons to show why the said findings were accepted by it. The proceedings are, no doubt, quasi-judicial, but having regard to the manner in which these enquiries are conducted, we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record reasons in every case." Thus, the law in this respect is well settled and if the Enquiring Officer has recorded his findings against the delinquent employee and the Disciplinary Authority merely concurred with the findings arrived at by the Enquiring Officer, it is not incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to record its reasons for accepting the findings arrived at by the Enquiring Officer. 10. But what the learned counsel for the petitioner argues in the present case is that as the Disciplinary Authority had, as a matter of fact, recorded its findings in its order dated April 24, 1972 (Annexure R. 1) the same should have been communicated to the petitioner. 10. But what the learned counsel for the petitioner argues in the present case is that as the Disciplinary Authority had, as a matter of fact, recorded its findings in its order dated April 24, 1972 (Annexure R. 1) the same should have been communicated to the petitioner. In my view, if the Disciplinary Authority records its reasons separately, even while concurring with the findings recorded by the Enquiring Officer and, does not entirely rely upon the report of the Enquiring Officer, then the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority should ordinarily be communicated to the delinquent employee, as such reasons would be in the nature of additional or supplementary grounds for holding the delinquent employee guilty of the charges levelled against him. But in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it appears to me for the reasons stated hereinafter that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on account of the non-communication of the order recorded by the Divisional Superintendent, dated April 24, 1972 (Annexure R.l). In the first place, the Disciplinary Authority has concurred with the finding arrived at by the Enquiring Officer, who held that the petitioner was guilty of the charge of serious misconduct levelled against him. In the second place, the fresh order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated April 24, 1972 was almost a repetition of his earlier order passed on March 19, 1971 except the objectionable part thereof, relating to confidential reports. It appears from a perusal of the order Annexure R. 1 dated April 24. 1972, passed by the Disciplinary Authority after remand, that it is substantially the same as the earlier order Annexure 11, dated March 19, 1971, except that the entries in the confidential reports which were relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority on the earlier occasion do not appear to have been considered while passing the fresh order dated April 24, 1972 and no reference has been made in the latter order to the said confidential reports. In the third place, it also appears that the petitioner was fully alive in respect of the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, while passing the fresh order Annexure R. 1, dated April 24, 1972. In the third place, it also appears that the petitioner was fully alive in respect of the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, while passing the fresh order Annexure R. 1, dated April 24, 1972. In para 8 of the writ petition it has been stated by the petitioner:— "Thereafter the petitioner proceeded to submit an application in the Appellate Authority CME, Western Railway and stated that since the order of the Disciplinary Authority is a mere repetition of its previous order made on 20-3-1971 and so the grounds raised in the petitioners appeal still hold good." Moreover, in the representation of the petitioner, dated July 18, 1972, which has been reproduced in the writ petition, the petitioner stated:— "The fresh NIP issued on 1-5-1972 is as mentioned in it is based upon those findings of D.S. whose orders based upon the same were found bad by the Appellate Authority. These findings and the orders have since been set aside and cancelled in an appeal. Hence those findings and the repeated orders in the NIP case not have any force of principles, justice or valid grounds." 11. These averments made by the petitioner go to show that he was fully aware of the fact that the fresh order passed by the Disciplinary Authority did not contain any thing new but was almost the same as was passed earlier on March 19, 1971, deleting the portion relating to the confidential reports of earlier years, which was objected to by the Appellate Authority. It would have been no doubt proper that a copy of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority on April 24, 1972 (Ex. R 1) should have been supplied to the petitioner along with the communication dated May 1, 1972. But in view of the facts and circumstances referred to above, I fail to find that any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on account of the non-supply to him of a copy of the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated April 24, 1972. The respondents submitted a copy of the aforesaid order along with their reply to the writ petition filed on August 11, 1975 and the petitioner has not stated by way of rejoinder that the said order Ex.R.l contained any thing different or in addition to the earlier order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated March 19, 1971 (Ex. The respondents submitted a copy of the aforesaid order along with their reply to the writ petition filed on August 11, 1975 and the petitioner has not stated by way of rejoinder that the said order Ex.R.l contained any thing different or in addition to the earlier order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated March 19, 1971 (Ex. 11), except that the objectionable matter therefrom has been removed while passing the later order dated April 24, 1972. Learned counsel for the petitioner was also unable to point out, at the time of hearing of the writ petition, as to in what manner the order dated April 24, 1972 was different from the earlier order dated March 19, 1971, except for the deletion of the objectionable portion from paras 11 and 17 thereof, relating to the confidential reports of earlier years. I have also gone through the Disciplinary Authority on March 19, 1971 and April 24, 1972 and have found that they are sub-tantially the same except that the matter relating to the confidential reports of earlier years does not find place in the subsequent order dated April 24,1972. In this view of the matter, I do not feel that any useful purpose would be served now by remanding the matter to the Departmental Authorities for supplying a copy of the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated April 24, 1972 to the petitioner, as it is apparent that the petitioner was fully aware of the contents of the order Ex.R.l dated April 24, 1972 and no prejudice appears to have been caused to the petitioner due to the non-supply of a copy thereof to him. I am, therefore, not inclined to set aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority, the operative portion of which was communicated to the petitioner by memorandum dated May 1, 1972 (Ex. 5). 12. So far as the contention of the learned counsel that the order of the Appellate Authority was not communicated to the petitioner or that the same was not speaking order, it would be sufficient to observe that a copy of the order passed by the Appellate Authority viz. 5). 12. So far as the contention of the learned counsel that the order of the Appellate Authority was not communicated to the petitioner or that the same was not speaking order, it would be sufficient to observe that a copy of the order passed by the Appellate Authority viz. the Chief Mechanical Engineer (E), Western Railway, dated September 8, 1972 has been placed on the record by the respondents as Ex.R.6 and that the order communicated to the petitioner on September 27, 1972 (Ex.6) substantially reproduces the relevant portion of the order of the Appellate Authority dated September 18, 1972 and as such the ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a complete copy of the said order passed by the Appellate Authority was not communicated to the petitioner is devoid of any force. As the Appellate Authority has merely concurred with the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority, it was not necessary for it to pass an elaborate order. As the order passed by the Appellate Authority was merely an order of affirmation, it was sufficient for the said authority to express its concurrence with the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority. Thus, the procedure adopted in the present case is in consonance with the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tara Chand Khatris case (4). The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, has no merit and is repelled. 13. Then the learned counsel argued that the enquiry against the petitioner began on June 6, 1970 and ended on October 13, 1970 and that the Disciplinary Authority has considered extraneous material inasmuch as it has referred to the comments of the DME (D), and also the comments of Shri S. N. Kapoor in respect of the allegation No. 1 contained in the statement of allegations dated February 13, 1970. The reply of the learned counsel appearing for the Railway Administration is that after the enquiry was over the petitioner submitted written submissions about the existence of the diary prior to February 10, 1970. Shri Kapoor, Assistant Loco Foreman, Abu Road and DME(D) were directed to find out as to whether there were any diaries in existence in respect of the period after the alleged diary produced by the petitioner or earlier thereto. Shri Kapoor, Assistant Loco Foreman, Abu Road and DME(D) were directed to find out as to whether there were any diaries in existence in respect of the period after the alleged diary produced by the petitioner or earlier thereto. Both Shri Kapoor and the DME (D) reported that there was no diary in existence even after February 11, 1971. It thus appears that no extraneous material was considered by the Disciplinary Authority besides that which was on the record. However, the as sertion of the petitioner about the existence of the diaries was sought to be verified from the concerned officers. If the petitioner was allowed to submit a written representation or arguments after the enquiry was over, the concerned authorities were not at fault in offering their comments in respect of the assertion made by the petitioner in his written representation and to state that no diary was ever maintained at the lobby. Even if the contention of the learned counsel be accepted that some extraneous meterial has been considered by the Disciplinary Authority such as the comments of Shri S.N. Kapoor, Assistant Loco Foreman and the DME (D), then also only the finding of the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the allegation No. 1 could be held to be vitiated on that ground. The Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have found the petitioner guilty of all the nine allegations specified in the statement of allegations (Ex.2) and even if the finding in respect of allegation No. 1 may be ignored, then the finding of the Departmental Authorities in respect of eight other allegations remains unaffected. It is settled law that even if the findings of the Departmental Authorities in respect of some of the charges appear to be unjustified or unsustainable, yet if the other findings of the Departmental Authorities are unassailable, then this Court would not justified in asking the Departmental Authorities to reconsider their order because this court is not called upon to decide as to whether the penalty imposed upon the delinquent employee is appropriate or not having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established, so long as the penalty imposed is justified by the Rules. The decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Bidhya Bhushan(7), Railway Board, New Delhi vs. Niranjan Singh(8) and Union of India vs. Sardar Bahadur(9) may be cited in support of the aforesaid proposition. In Niranjansinghs case(8) the order of removal of an employee was passed on two charges, one of which was found to be unsustainable by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, yet it was held by their Lordships that if the order in an enquiry under Article 311 of the Constitution can be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment imposed can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment in question. Similarly, in Sardar Bahadurs case (9) it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in case the order of the punishing authority can be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether the charge proved alone would have weighed with the Disciplinary Authority in imposing punishment, because the Court was not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed was appropriate or not if the misdemeanour was established, so long as it was justified by the Rules. In my view, the other allegations made against the petitioner in the statement of allegations and which have been held to be proved by the Enquiring Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority amount to substantial misconduct, even if the finding of the departmental authorities in respect of allegation No. 1 is ignored. In view of the aforesaid decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the order imposing penalty passed by the departmental authorities cannot be interfered with by this Court in the above mentioned circumstances. 14. The case of the Railway Administration is that Mr. Kapoor gave his comments on the theory advanced by the petitioner that a diary was maintained by him, on October 14, 1970 and the petitioner submitted his final representation in the shape of written arguments on October 18,1970. The comments of DME (D) referred to in the order of the Disciplinary Authority are in the nature of a reply to the written arguments submitted by the petitioner. The comments of DME (D) referred to in the order of the Disciplinary Authority are in the nature of a reply to the written arguments submitted by the petitioner. If the written arguments or the so called representation submitted by the petitioner could be taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority, there is no reason why the reply to such written arguments submitted by the Department should have been ignored. Thus, this submission of the learned counsel also fails. 15. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the administration did not supply the petitioner with a list of witnesses along with the allegations of charges and that Rule 9(3) (ii) (b) of the relevant rules was not complied with. It is not denied by the respondents that a separate list of witnesses was not supplied to the petitioner along with the charge-sheet, but the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the Railway Administration is that the names of the witnesses who were desired to be produced on behalf of the Railway Administration were clearly mentioned along with each charge or allegation and as such no prejudice was caused to the petitioner on account of the fact that a separate list of witnesses was not supplied to him. The petitioner has mentioned at page 9 of the writ petition the names of seven witnesses who appeared on behalf of the Railway Administration at the departmental enquiry against the petitioner. A perusal of the statement of allegations (Ex.2) shows that the names of R.C. Saxena, driver, Shanker D. Driver, and Mishrilal were specifically referred to in respect of the respective charges, as also AME (Diesel) and ALF have also been referred to in the statement of allegations Only the names of two witnesses, namely Punamchand-driver and Gopilal—Loco attendant, do not find place in the statement of allegations. The respondents have placed before this Court copies of the statements of the aforesaid two witnesses recorded during the course of the disciplinary enquiry. In the first place, it appears that no objection was raised by the petitioner when these witnesses were examined that their names were not previously disclosed to him. The respondents have placed before this Court copies of the statements of the aforesaid two witnesses recorded during the course of the disciplinary enquiry. In the first place, it appears that no objection was raised by the petitioner when these witnesses were examined that their names were not previously disclosed to him. In the second place, the statements of Gopilal and Punamchand witnesses have not been relied upon by the Enquiring Officer or the Disciplinary Authority in support of the conclusions arrived at by them and it cannot be said that any material prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on account of the lapse of the department in this respect. The Enquiring Officer and the Disciplinary Authority have decided the matter, ignoring the statements of Punamchand and Gopilal witnesses and have not relied upon their statements and as such it is difficult to understand as to how the petitioner could be prejudiced in this case on account of the fact that the names of these two witnesses were not disclosed to him earlier. The names of other five witnesses, as I have already pointed out above, were duly disclosed to the petitioner and have been mentioned in the statement of allegations. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner was not aware of the fact that those five persons would be examined as witnesses on behalf of the Railway Administration in the departmental enquiry against him and in the absence of any material prejudice, the enquiry proceedings cannot be held to be vitiated on this ground. 16. It was lastly urged by the learned counsel that the allegations contained in para 3 of the statement of allegations were vague and as such the departmental enquiry was improper, and the petitioner was not able to produce his defence properly on account of the vagueness of the said allegation and relied upon the decision in Management of the Northern Railway Co operative Credit Society Ltd. vs. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan (10) in support of this contention. In the aforesaid case, the charge-sheet issued against the delinquent employee contained five charges all of whom were held to be clearly vague, inasmuch as no details of the said charges were supplied to the employee concerned and in that view of the matter it was held that the employee was unable to show cause against the charges served on him on the ground of vagueness thereof and he was prejudiced on account of the omission to disclose the material in support of those charges. I have carefully looked into the statement of allegations (Ex 2.) supplied to the petitioner and find that although the opening part of allegation No. 3 is of general nature, yet the later part of the said allegation No. 3 refers to three specific events relating to October 6, 1969, October 7, 1969 and October 10, 1969 on the basis of which the earlier general observation is said to have been justified in the statement of allegations. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has been held guilty of the general accusation contained in allegation No. 3 as well as in respect of the three specific instances, mentioned in the latter part of the said allegation and that as general part was vague the entire finding is vitiated. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. At any rate the petitioner has been found guilty of a serious misconduct in respect of the three specific allegations included in the allegation No. 3 viz. that on October 6, 1969, October 7, 1969 and October 10, 1969 he did not travel at all or did not travel for the entire distance on the locos of the trains worked by R.C. Saxena and Shanker D. drivers while he submitted bills claiming allowance for having travelled in the aforesaid locos on the foot-plate. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the departmental proceedings against the petitioner can be held to be vitiated on the ground that the allegations were vague. It may also be pointed out in this connection that there were other allegations contained in the statement of allegations (Ex. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the departmental proceedings against the petitioner can be held to be vitiated on the ground that the allegations were vague. It may also be pointed out in this connection that there were other allegations contained in the statement of allegations (Ex. 2) besides allegation No. 3, the second part of which cannot be said to be vague in any sense of the term and as the petitioner has been held guilty of other allegations as well in respect of the latter part of allegation No. 3, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority imposing penalty upon the petitioner does not call for any interference by this Court. In the very nature of things, this Court in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot interfere with the orders lawfully passed in disciplinary proceedings merely on the basis of technicalities which did not cause any serious prejudice to the delinquent official concerned. 17. No other point was argued before me. 18. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs of these proceedings.