JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) THESE revision petitions filed under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, have been brought before us upon a reference under Sec. 9 of the High Court Act, ( 2 ) THE preliminary question that falls to be determined relates to the maintainability of the petitions. For a proper decision on the question, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the legislative enactments. ( 3 ) THE Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (Act No. 22 of 1961) which is the principal Act in question, was exacted to provide tor the control of rents and evictions and for the leasing of buildings etc. It came into forc3 on 31st December, 1961. Ss. 21, 48 and 50 provide procedure to contol eviction of tenants and. obligation of landlords. To put it shortly, if a landlord wants eviction of his tenant, he could move the Munsiff Court on any one of the grounds set out under S. 21. The order of the Munsiff Court was appealablt to the District Judge under S. 48, with a further revision to the High Court under S. 50. The decision of the Dist Judge in the appeal, subject to. the decision of the High Court u/s. 50, was thus made final as provided by S. 48 (6 ). But, the scheme of the principal Act was substantially altered by the Kar rent Control (Amend) Ordee, 1975 (Ordce No. 3 of 1975) promulgated on 22nd May 1975. The Ordinance deleted S. 48 (1) and for S. 50, a new Section was substituted. It, however, made provision for disposal of pending proceedings. The provisions of the Ordinance were re-enacted by the Karnataka rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act No. 31 of 1975) which we will call as "the amending Act". This amending Act was retrospectively brought into force from the date of the Ordinance. ( 4 ) ALL the orders, perhaps except one challenged in these petitions, were made by the District Judge after the Ordinance was brought into force. The lone exception, however, makes little difference on the position of law, since it is admitted that all these revision petitions were preferred under S. 50 of the principal Act, when that section was no longer in the statute book. The question is, whether these petitions are maintainable. The lone exception, however, makes little difference on the position of law, since it is admitted that all these revision petitions were preferred under S. 50 of the principal Act, when that section was no longer in the statute book. The question is, whether these petitions are maintainable. For reasons' that follow, the answer to the question, in our opinion, must be in the negative. ' ( 5 ) FOR the petitioners, reliance is placed on S. 48 (6 ). It reads :"48 (6 ). Subject to any decision of the High Court under S. 50, the decision of the District Juage shall be final, and an order of the court or the Controller, shall subject to the decision of the relevant appellate authority under this Act, cr of the High Court under S. 50, be final and shall, not be liable to be called in question in any court of law whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or revision". It is urged that although S. 43 has been deleted by the amending Act, since the decision of the District Judge in tiie appeal has been made final subject to the decision of this Court under S. 50, the petitioners could invoke the revisional jurisdiction to challenge the correctness or legality of the appellate orders, it is true that by S. 48 (6), a finality is attached to the decision of the District Judge subject to the decision of the High Court under S. 50. But the revisionai jurisdiction was not conferred on this Court by S. 48 (6 ). It was admittedly comerred by S. 50 of the Principal Act. The petitioners cannot invoice the revisionai power when the section conferring such power is no longer in the statute book. The matter perhaps would have been different if these petitions were pending in this Court when the ordinance came into force. ( 6 ) WE may notice in this contest, one other argument advanced by sri P. Ganapathy Bhat (Intervener ). Relying upon the preamble of the amending Act, learned counsel urged that the amending Act is of limited scope. According to him, it has partially amended S. 50 of the principal act. ( 6 ) WE may notice in this contest, one other argument advanced by sri P. Ganapathy Bhat (Intervener ). Relying upon the preamble of the amending Act, learned counsel urged that the amending Act is of limited scope. According to him, it has partially amended S. 50 of the principal act. It has never taken away the right of any aggrieved party to move this Court under S. 50 of the principal Act challenging the appellate order of the District Judge in the matters pending when the Ordinance came into force. Further, he relied upon Ss. 8 and 9 of the amending Act, and also on the scope of S. 50 as now substituted. ( 7 ) WE are quite unable to accept the argument. We do not find anything in the recitals of the preamble to limit the scope of the amending act as contended for. The object of the amending Act and the mischief to be remedied are not described in the preamble. It only states that it is expedient further to amend the principal Act. The said preamble, therefore, is of little assistance to construe the enacting parts. That apart, the preamble can be a legitimate aid to construing the enacting provisions when the words are ambiguous or reasonably capable of two interpretations. But if the enacting words admit of only one construction, that construction, as lord Normand said in Attorney-General v, H. R. H. Prince Ernest Angustus of Hanover , 1957 AC, 486 at 488, will receive effect even If it is inconsistent with the preamble. In our opinion, there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the amending act. It not only deals with the procedural aspect, but also affects substantial rights of the parties. The legislative intent to that effect is very clear if one looks into its provisions. We may now briefly refer to the relevant provisions. S. 50 as substituted reads :"50. Revision.-The High Court may at any time call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Civil judge under this Act or any order passed by the Controller under ss. 14 15, 16 or 17 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. 14 15, 16 or 17 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. (2) The District Judge may, at any time call for and examine any order passed at proceeding taken by the Court of Munsiff referred to in sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of S. 3 for the purpose of satisfying himself aa to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. (3) The costs of and incidental to all proceedings before the high Court or the District Judge shall be in the discretion of the High court or the District Judge, as the case may be". Now, by the above section, the High Court has revisional power only in respect of an order passed or proceedings taken by the Court of Civil judge or any order passed by the Controller under Ss. 14 15 16 or 17. The district Judge has been given like power, but against any order passed or proceeding taken by the Munsiff Court. The amending Act also provides tor the pending matters initiated under the principal Act. S. 8 (1) deals with the disposal of pending proceedings before certain Munsiff Courts. S. 8 (2) provides for disposal of pending appeals before the District Judge. S. 8 (2) states that they shall be heard and decided by the District Judge as if S. 48 has not been omitted. Likewise, S. 8 (3) directs that the revision petition before the High Court shall be disposed of as if S. 50 of the principal act has not been substituted. Then comes S. 9 providing remedies to those who but for the omission of S. 48, could have preferred appeal to the district Judge. It states that such persons could prefer a revision to the high Court if it if an order under Ss. 14 15 18 or 17 and to the District judge if it is an order of the Munsiff Court. It also directs that such petition shall be disposed of as if it is revision under sub-sec (1) or (2) of S. 50 as substituted by the amending Act. 14 15 18 or 17 and to the District judge if it is an order of the Munsiff Court. It also directs that such petition shall be disposed of as if it is revision under sub-sec (1) or (2) of S. 50 as substituted by the amending Act. The amending Act thui provides an integrated scheme for the expeditious control of rents and evictions without a remedy of appeal to any aggrieved party. Those who have already availed of that right of appeal under the principal Act, have not been given any further remedy. The omission to provide for auch cases appears to us to be deliberate. We, therefore, hold that these petitions are not maintainable. ( 8 ) AT this stage, Counsel for the petitioners sought leave to convert the petitions under S. 115 of the CPC. Since Counsel for the respondents did not object, we grant leave as prayed for, and will proceed to examine the merits of the matters accordingly. --- *** --- .