Order.- This petition presumably under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure, Code, arises out of an order of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore City, seeking to frame a charge against the petitioners under section, 55(1) (2) (3) read with section 87 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 (hereinafter to be referred to as the ‘Act’). Messrs. Swarna Mahal is said to be a registered firm of partners and their place of business in No. 501, Avenue Road, Bangalore. On 30th July, 1971 the Inspector of Central Excise, Headquarters, Gold Cell, visited the firm shop and upon vertification of the account books maintained by it, with reference to the actual stock of gold, found some shortage in gold. Besides, a certain other consignment of gold ornaments weighing 1,119.16 Gms. was also not taken to the stock register. At the time of the inspection made, P. Radhakrishna, the 2nd petitioner being the principle partner of the firm was present. As a result of that inspection, a Mahazar statement Exhibit P-1 was written and signed by the 2nd petitioner, Subsequently the Collector of Central Excise and Customs issued an authorisation within the meaning of section 97 (1) of the Act in favour of Sri V.A. Shirhattikar, Superintendent of Central Excise, (Legal) Headquarters office, Bangalore and the latter filed the complaint under section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, before the Magistrate. After the institution of the complaint the learned Magistrate followed the procedure laid down under section 252 of the Code, and recorded the evidence produced for prosecution. Besides the mahazar statement, Exhibit P-l, it appears, the 2nd petitioner made two voluntary statements, Exhibits P-2 and P-7. Besides these documents, the learned Magistrate recorded the statement of Sri V.C.John, the Inspector who made the inspection. The 2nd petitioner was also examined as the accused. After considering all this evidence the learned Magistrate was of the opinion that the prosecution case made out as alleged, if remained unrebutted would warrant conviction of the two accused. Accordingly he made an order seeking to frame charges against the two accused. Being aggrieved by this order, the two petitioners have filed the present petition. 2. After considering all this evidence the learned Magistrate was of the opinion that the prosecution case made out as alleged, if remained unrebutted would warrant conviction of the two accused. Accordingly he made an order seeking to frame charges against the two accused. Being aggrieved by this order, the two petitioners have filed the present petition. 2. Subsequent to the making of the order dated 15th June, 1976 seeking to frame a charge against the two accused, the learned Magistrate did frame a charge against them which is under section 55 (1) (2) (3) read with section 87 of the Act. 3. A perusal of sections 253 and 254 of the Criminal Procedure Code, makes it clear that the learned Magistrate was required to take into consideration all the evidence referred to in section 252 of the Code, as well as the statement of the accused if any and in case he found that the prosecution case if unrebutted would warrant conviction of the accused, there was no escape but to frame the charge. Therefore the test before the learned Magistrate was if the prosecution case set up before him, if unrebutted would warrant the the conviction. The learned Counsel for the petitioners rather strenuously contended that such an inference could not be drawn and hence the order seeking to frame a charge is liable to be vitiated. 4. In that connection the learned Counsel pointed out that the authorisation, Exhibit P-8 suffered from an infirmity, in as much as, the officer granting that authorisation did not apply his mind. The learned Counsel proceeded to contend that the authorisation would never the less be a sanction and in order to grant a sanction to prosecute, the application of mind by the sanctioning authority would be rather essential. It would be clear from section 97 of the Act that in its sub-section (1) which is only relevant for the purpose of this case,the expression “previous sanction” is not used. Rather the expression used is “person authorised by him in writing in this behalf”. In sub-section (2) of the same section however the expression used is “previous sanction of the Central Government.” When two distinct expressions are used in the same section, it is to be presumed that different meanings were to be ascribed for the two expressions. Rather the expression used is “person authorised by him in writing in this behalf”. In sub-section (2) of the same section however the expression used is “previous sanction of the Central Government.” When two distinct expressions are used in the same section, it is to be presumed that different meanings were to be ascribed for the two expressions. The act of granting a sanction necessarily implies application of mind, because, previous sanction to institute prosecution is ordinarily granted by a superior officer to safeguard against false and vaxatious prosecutions. Such is not the position in the case of authorisation to enable any person to file a complaint in writing before the Magistrate. Sub-section (1) of section 97 of the Act merely deals with the case of authorisation to an officer to enable him to file a complaint in writing. The expression “Complaint” is defined in section 2 (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code and it means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code. Therefore the ministerial act of filing a complaint is merely to narrate facts before the Magistrate in order to enable him to initiate prosecution. There could be no question of the person applyins his mind or otherwise because it is then left to the Magistrate to initiate further proceeding upon the complaint. The function of granting sanction as I stated before is entirely different. Therefore when the section talks of authorisation to an officer to enable him to file a complaint in writing under its sub-section (1), it does not talk of any previous sanction to be given by such officer. Therefore it would not be correct to say that while granting authorisation the officer was required to apply his mind as to whether any offence under the Act was at all committed. The purpose behind subsection (1) of section 97 of the Act is obviously this, that the Gold Control Officer or any officer superior to him in rank need not be engaged in the ministerial act of drafting a complaint and filing it in the Court. That function can be entrusted to a subordinate officer. The learned Counsel then, contended that the authorisation did not specify a particular section of the Act nor did it specifically mention the name of the 2nd petitioner. That function can be entrusted to a subordinate officer. The learned Counsel then, contended that the authorisation did not specify a particular section of the Act nor did it specifically mention the name of the 2nd petitioner. An contended by the learned Junior Standing Counsel for the Central Government, in fact these details were not required to be given in the authorisation order. It is manifest, the authorisation order was simply directed to enable some other officer to file the complaint before the Magistrate. Besides, it was stated in the authorisation order that the complaint was to be filed ‘‘for offences under the Gold Control Act, 1968“and”in respect of the persons including the petitioner No. 2 who were named in, that order. The description that the complaint was to relate to offence under the Gold Control Act, 1968 and was to be in respect of the persons including the 2nd petitioner, was sufficient and no further details were required to be given. The offence was no doubt under the Act and it was in respect of the petitioner No. 2. In this manner no objection prima facie could be taken against the authorisation. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, then contended that the Mahazar Statement Exhibit P-1 disclosed a discrepancy of 168.990 Gms. while is the complaint it was recited that the discrepancy was of 876.350 Gms. Therefore, the learned Counsel submitted that the complaint was in respect of that discrepancy and not in respect of the discrepancy as shown in the Mahazar Statement Exhibit P-1. With that argument it was contended that no offence could be formulated on the basis of the complaint. As I have stated before, the complaint is only a narration of allegation made in writing to the Magistrate and it is for the Magistrate to infer an offence under the Act from these allegations. In case the discrepancy is found much less than what has been depicted in the complaint, it would nevertheless be a discrepancy which has got to be accounted for by the two petitioners. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that there was no allegation of mens rea in the complaint and therefore the prosecution could not be maintained. Under section 87 of the Act it would be open to the petitioners to point out reasonable causes why they failed to maintain a correct account. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that there was no allegation of mens rea in the complaint and therefore the prosecution could not be maintained. Under section 87 of the Act it would be open to the petitioners to point out reasonable causes why they failed to maintain a correct account. That would be a defence open to them. It is rather premature to consider if they would succeed in making out that defence. The Inspector made the inspection and the Mahazar Statement Exhibit P-1 was recorded. The accounts prescribed under section 55 of the Act were duly examined. The statement of the Inspector as well as the statement of the accused were recorded. All this material if it remains unrebuttcd, would decidedly warrant the conviction. The Court was required to go only to that extent and not beyond it. If after an examination of this material an inference could be drawn in favour of the accused, as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and equally in favour of the prosecution as contended, by the learned Junior Standing Counsel for the Central Government, necessarily a conclusion has to be drawn that the prosecution case as set up if unrebutted would warrant the conviction of the two petitioners. That finding is enough and justifies the order of the learned Magistrate for the framing of the charge. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, also referred to section 93 of the Act and contended that only the Firm which is the licenced dealer should be held responsible. In that connection the argument on behalf of the prosecution was that no doubt the 1st petitioner was the licenced dealer, the 2nd petitioner was in charge of and was responsible to the business of the firm at any rate on that particular day when the inspecticn was conducted. Therefore both the firm as well as the 2nd petitioner would be liable for the offence under section 93 of the Act. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further contended that the 2nd petitioner may have omitted to make a few entries but nevertheless the account as prescribed was maintained ad that would again absolve him from any offence under the Act. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further contended that the 2nd petitioner may have omitted to make a few entries but nevertheless the account as prescribed was maintained ad that would again absolve him from any offence under the Act. For this the reply given on behalf of the prosecution, is that section 55 of the Act talks of “true and complete account” and in case same discrepancy was detected in the entries made regarding to the stock of gold and the actual stock of gold found, by the Inspector, that would be a case of failure to keep a true and complete account. According to the learned Course 1 that by itself will bean offence under section 55 read with section 87 of the Act. The learned Counsel even contended that a question of metis rea will not arise in such a situation. It would of course be open to the two petitioners to say in defence as to why they failed to maintain a true and complete account and there may be a good reason for that as submitted by them and in that case the law will take its own course and they may be acquitted by the learned Magistrate. It would again be besides the point to enter into that controversy at this stage. I may again repeat that the only criterion for framing a charge would be as to whether the prosecution case if unrebutted would warrant the conviction of the two petitioners. 9. The learned Junior Standing Counsel for the Central Government, was also emphatic when he pointed out that under section 397 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, a revision against interlocutory order is prohibited but even then the petitioners have disregarded that provision and chase the forum under section 482 of the said Code, which is not meant to circumvent or obliterate the provisions of the Code. It may be of no doubt that the order framing a charge is an interlocutory order and a bare reading of section 397 (2) of the said Code would indicate that a revision is not maintainable. In. order to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 something move was needed than merely pointing out that some mistake was committed by the Court below while making the impugned order. In. order to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 something move was needed than merely pointing out that some mistake was committed by the Court below while making the impugned order. The element of preventing the abuse of the process of the Court is necessarily to be brought in. If any order can be held to be manifestly incorrect or there is an apparent error on the face of the record something can be stated to infer that the order need be corrected to secure the ends of justice. But to say that an order is incorrect upon the estimate of the learned Counsel would rather be misuse of the power prescribed under section 482 of the Code and the Court would not interfere to set right the mistake. In the instant case for the reasons stated above, it is manifest that the order of the learned Magistrate could neither be considered patently incorrect nor he committed any error as regards the procedure. It is not a case of abuse of the process of the Court nor ends of justice are secured by invoking inherent jurisdiction. Therefore the bar of revision under section 297 (2) of the Code is very much there and in the present case section 482 cannot be invoked in favour of the petitioners. That would be an additional ground for rejecting the petition. 10. In this view of the matter the petition is of no force and the same is dismissed.