Judgment 1. The defendants 1st party are the petitioners, the petition being directed against the order dated the 4th of June, 1976 passed by the 1st Subordi-nate Judge, Chapra in partition suit No. 235 of 1969, The petitioners being ag-grieved by the order of the learned Subordinate Judge directing them, who are the sons and legal representatives of Anant Singh, defendant No. 1 in the suit (now deceased), to render accounts qua receivers. 2. The facts are short and simple. The point of law involved is, to my mind, plain. Opposite party No. 1 instituted the aforesaid partition suit for partition of one sixth share in Schedule I property and one fourth share in Schedule IV properties. The suit was contested. During the dependence of the suit, an applica-tion for appointment of a receiver was filed. Shorn of all details, the petitioners father Anant Singh, who as already stated was defendant No. 1 in the suit was appointed the sole receiver in respect of Schedule IV properties. The case of the petitioners predecessor in interest was that Schedule IV properties were his self acquired properties and could not form the subject-matter of partition. By a judgment and preliminary decree dated the 4th of June, 1973 the suit was disposed of by the learned ordinate Judge holding that Schedule IV properties were the exclusive and acquired properties of defendant No.1 with regard to the rest of the properties in suit a decree for partition was passed except one plot that however; is imma-terial for the purpose of this case. Against the aforesaid preliminary decree the plaintiff opposite party No. 1 has preferred an appeal in this court being first appeal No. 390 of 1973. The petition-era or their predecessor-in -interest Anant Singh had not submitted accounts for some period before the suit was dis-posed of. The court below, even after the preliminary decree, has called upon the petitioner to render proper accounts with regard to Schedule IV properties in respect of which the plaintiffs suit has been dismissed. 3. Mr. Prem Lal, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the receiver is put in possession of any property for the benefit of the party which ultimately succeeds in a suit. 3. Mr. Prem Lal, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the receiver is put in possession of any property for the benefit of the party which ultimately succeeds in a suit. The petitioners, having succeeded in respect of Schedule IV properties, with which alone we are concerned, there could not be any jurisdiction in the trial court to call upon the petitioners to ren-der any accounts. The reason advanced is that even after the rendition of accounts whatever credit or debit balance remains, it will enure to the benefit or otherwise of the petitioners themselves. The argument seems prima facie attrac-tive. Nonetheless, as Homles said, quot-ed in Province and Function of Law at page 167, law is not logic, but actual life of law is experience. And. as Lord Halsbury once said "Law is not logical Science." Life of law is not logic by experience. The object and purpose of appointment of a receiver is mainly the preservation of the subject-matter of litigation pending a judicial determina-tion of the rights of the parties thereto. But can it be ignored that a receiver is an officer or representative of the court and subject to its order his possession is the possession of the court by its receiver? Learned counsel for the petition-er urged that the appointment of a re-ceiver is for the benefit of the party ultimately succeeding in the suit. That may be so. Nonetheless, as Lord Watson pointed out in In re Prem Lal Mullick, (1895) 22 Ind App 203 : ILR 22 Cal 1011 although a receiver has been appointed to administer the estate, he is merely the officer of the court and the estate must, for all legal purposes, be regarded as being in manibus curiae: It is extrava-gant to suggest that the court has not sim-ple jurisdiction without the aid of a pending process to require accounts from its own officer. The law relating to Receivers by Woodroffe, 4th Edition page 63 ex-pounds the proposition of law in very succinct terms:- "The Receiver being the officer of the court from which he derives his appoint-ment, his possession is exclusively the possession of the court, the property be-ing regarded as in the custody of the law, in gramic legis for the benefit of whoever may be ultimately determined to be entitled thereto." The last portion of the proposition ex-tracted above was pressed into service by learned counsel for the petitioners forgetful of the more fundamental prin-ciple posited in the first part of it. In this context, it is worthwhile to notice what the Supreme Court has said in the case of Hiralal Patni V/s. Loonkaran Sethiya, AIR 1962 SC 21 . Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for the court held as follows: "The law may briefly be stated thus: (1) if a receiver is appointed in a suit until judgment, the appointment is brought to an end by the judgment in the action; (2) if a receiver is appointed in a suit without his tenure being ex-pressly defined, he will continue to be receiver till he is discharged; (3) but after the final disposal of the suit as between the parties to the litigation, the receiver functions are terminated, he would still be answerable to the court as its officer till he is finally discharged; (4) the Court has ample power to continue the receiver even after the final decree if the exigen-cies of the case so require." It is not the case of either party that the receiver in the instant case was appoint-ed during the dependence of the suit only. In that view of the matter, he would continue to be receiver till he is discharged. In that view of the matter, he would continue to be receiver till he is discharged. It necessarily follows that the petitioners continue to be receivers vice the deceased defendant No. 1 till they are discharged, and it is nobodys case that they had not yet been discharged a Bench of this Court in the case of Rambhushan Das V/s. Shree Ramji Lakshmanji ( AIR 1963 Pat 122 ) relying upon the de-cision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hiralal Patni (supra) held that the receiver being an officer of the court and being in possession of the estate in a fiduciary capacity, the court has juris-diction even after disposal of the suit to compel him to submit accounts of his dealings with the estate. With regard to the aforesaid submission of Mr. Lall that the petitioners having been declared by the trial Court in the preliminary de-cree to be the exclusive owners of the Schedule IV properties, there ought not to be any liability attached to them to render any accounts in respect of such properties, reliance was placed upon the decisions in the cases of Haragopal Nanday Chowdhry V/s. Deonaiti Pd. Singh, (AIR 1945 Pat 404), Jabbar Ali Sardar V/s. Manmohan Pandey, AIR 1929 Cal 110 and P. Lakshmi Reddy V/s. L. Lakshi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 . The facts of the instant case do not warrant the application of the principle set out in these decisions. On a careful consideration of the law on the subject, the relevant principles of law to be applied in such cases are: (i) the receiver comes in possession of a property as an officer of the court by virtue of his appointment by the court in that behalf, (ii) such property is custodia legis concomitant with the appoint-ment of the receiver, (iii) the depend-ence of a suit in the trial Court, unless there be a specific order of the court to the contrary, sanctions the continuance of a receiver to remain in possession of such property even after its disposal by the trial court until he is discharged and (iv) the liability for rendering accounts after the disposal of the suit in the trial court does not cease ipso jure. Testing these principles logically, what difference would it make to the petitioners if they render accounts? Testing these principles logically, what difference would it make to the petitioners if they render accounts? for, if they eventually succeed in the appeal or until they are discharged as receiver, all the benefits of the decree including the usufructs or the credit balance of the properties in ques-tion will accrue to the petitioners. 4 For the reasons aforesaid, I am constrained to hold that there is no merit in this application. It is accordingly dis-missed and the rule is discharged. No costs.