Short Note : 1. The plaintiff's case that the suit house was not liable to attachment or sale was on the basis that the suit house was an ancestral property in which all the three sons of Parasram, namely, Kashidas, Kalyandas and Laldas had equal shares while the decree which is being executed was only against Laldas. Thus, he pleaded that the suit house was not the exclusive property of Laldas and his other two brothers had shares in that and the suit house could not be attached or sold in execution of a decree against him. 2. The trial Court decreed the suit by holding that the suit house was joint family property of all the three brothers which was not subjected to partition. The appeal filed by defendant No. 1 before the lower appellate Court having been dismissed, he has now come up in the present second appeal. 3. But it is a matter between the parties whether to divide the entire property or leave a part thereof as joint. There cannot be any hard and fast rule in that regard. No doubt, in such a case when it is pleaded, as in the present case by the plaintiffs, that the suit house had remained joint the burden lay on them to prove that it was so. The plaintiffs adduced oral evidence in that regard. Murlidhar (PW-1) in his evidence stated that he is diving in that house and no further questions were put to him to belie that statement of his. It is also apparent from the fact that a house in the city of Burhanpur could not have been given in partition to Laldas since it is clear from the evidence of the parties that, that was the most valuable property possessed by all the three brothers. It may be that at the time of partition, which was effected in the year 1967, they could not decide about the house and it was kept as a joint family property without subjecting it to partition. It is unthinkable that such a valuable property could have been given by the other two brothers to Laldas alone, there being no other immovable property which the other two could get. It is unthinkable that such a valuable property could have been given by the other two brothers to Laldas alone, there being no other immovable property which the other two could get. In the circumstances, the entries appearing in the name of Laldas or his sons in the documents (Ex.P-1 to D-5) do not in any manner whittle the effect of the agreement (Ex.P-2). As both the Courts below have considered the point involved here and came to the conclusion that the suit house remained the joint property of all the three brothers without there being any partition. I shall be most reluctant to interfere with the same at the second appellate stage which in the circumstances, would be a finding of fact not open to challenge, there being no perversity in the appreciation of the evidence. AIR 1959 SC 1204 relied on. Appeal dismissed.