JUDGMENT : M.P. Saxena, J. The facts giving rise to this petition are that Jwala Prasad, opposite party No. 2, is the father of Sri Narain, opposite party No. 3 and grandfather of Mahendra Kumar and Surendra Kumar. On 1-9-1971 Jwala Prasad moved an application u/s 3 of the erstwhile U.P. Act III of 1947 for eviction of the Petitioner from a shop situate in Fatehabad district Agra. It was alleged that the shop was bonafide required for establishing his aforesaid two grand sons in the business of selling Ghee. During the pendency of the application the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act) came into force. Consequently the application u/s 3 was heard as an application u/s 21 of the new Act and was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on 16-8-1973. Jwala Prasad filed an appeal before the District Judge, Agra, u/s 22 of the new Act. It was transferred to the court of the IV Additional District Judge, Agra. While the appeal was pending there a family partition took place through registered deed dated 29-12-1973 and the shop fell in the share of Sri Narain, opposite party No. 3. Therefore, on 14-10-1974 Sri Narain moved an application before the learned Additional District Judge for leave to continue the appeal. The Petitioner filed objections. The learned Additional District Judge allowed the application on the ground that at the time the application u/s 3 was presented Jwala Prasad was Karta of joint Hindu family consisting of himself, his son and two grand sons. After partition Sri Narain, being the father of Mahendra Kumar and Surendra Kumar, became Karta of the family & was entitled to proceed with the appeal. According to him, it was not a case of substitution on assignment but it was a case of impleading a person so as to continue the proceedings and it could be permitted u/s 151, Code of Civil Procedure. The operative portion of the order passed by him runs as follows: I, therefore, allow this application to the extent that Sri Narain may be impleaded as one of the co-Appellants to continue the proceedings. Regarding factum of partition, the parties are directed to put in their proofs.... A date was fixed for filing documents and affidavits. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the said order. 2. Regarding factum of partition, the parties are directed to put in their proofs.... A date was fixed for filing documents and affidavits. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the said order. 2. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has vehemently contended that the application dated 14-10-1974 moved by Sri Narain was in substance an application for substitution which is not warranted by any provision of the new Act. According to him, the Act permits substitution only of heirs of a deceased party vide Section 34(4). It is also urged that the provisions of the CPC have limited application to cases under the new Act. Order I Rule 10 and Order 41 Rule 20 which permit addition of a party are not applicable to cases under this Act. Aid of Section 151 of the CPC can not be invoked for that purpose-because this provision does not confer any new powers but simply saves inherent powers of the court. In this connection reliance is placed on the case of Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and Others, AIR 1964 SC 993 . 3. I have given my anxious consideration to the whole matter and in my judgment the contention does not carry much force. It may be stated at the very outset that Sri Narain is alleged to have received the shop in partition and his position is not that of transferee who cannot apply for release under provisions of the new Act unless a period of 3 years has expired from the date of transfer. In V.N. Sarin Vs. Ajit Kumar Poplai, AIR 1966 SC 432 it has been held that partition really means that whereas initially all the co-sharers had subsisting title to the totality of the property of the family jointly that joint title is transformed by partition into separate title of the individual co-parceners in respect of several items; of property allotted to them respectively. As this is true nature of partition, the partition of an undivided Hindu family property cannot mean transfer of the property to the individual co-parceners. 4. In order to judge the merit of the main contention it will be proper to refer to the relevant provisions of the new Act. Section 34 relates to the powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them. 4. In order to judge the merit of the main contention it will be proper to refer to the relevant provisions of the new Act. Section 34 relates to the powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them. It states that the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or any (appellate or revising authorities) shall, for the purpose of holding any enquiry or hearing (in appeal or revision) under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely, (a) to (f).... (g) In other matters which may be prescribed. 5. Sub-section (4) of this section lays down that where any party to any proceeding for the determination of standard rent of or for eviction from a building, dies during the pendency of the proceeding such proceeding may be continued in the case of the landlord or tenant by his heirs or legal representatives. Obviously in the instant case Sri Narain did not move that application for substitution as an heir of the deceased-landlord. The original landlord, namely, Jwala Prasad is still alive. The application was simply for permission to proceed with the appeal because as a result of partition the property had fallen in his share. 6. It may further be stated that Order 1 Rule 10 and Order 41 Rule 20 were not, strictly speaking, applicable to this case and aid had to be taken of Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. The crucial point that arises for consideration is whether it could be done. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has strenuously urged that there being no provision to cover such a situation the necessary inference would be that the Act prohibited such persons from proceeding with the case. I am reluctant to subscribe to this view because Section 34, as reproduced above, clearly lays down that the provisions of the CPC can be invoked for the matters specified thereunder as well as for any other matter which may be prescribed. So far as the last clause is concerned, Rule 22 farmed under the said Act enumerated other matters to which the revisions of the CPC can be made applicable. So far as the last clause is concerned, Rule 22 farmed under the said Act enumerated other matters to which the revisions of the CPC can be made applicable. Clause (f) lays down that power referred to in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be exercised to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the authority concerned. The principle laid down in the case of Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar (ibid) is not fully applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case an ex parte decree was passed against Defendant and he sought to have the decree set aside u/s 151, Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that Order IX Rule 7 and Order IX Rule 13 between them exhaust the whole gamut of situations that might arise owing to non-appearance of Defendant during the course of trial. Where specific provision provides a remedy powers u/s 151 CPC cannot be involved. In the instant case there is no denying the fact that there is no provision in the new Act to cover the situation which has arisen as a result of partition in the family of Jwala Prasad. The property is said to have passed to Sri Narain and only two courses are open to either he should be made a party to the pending proceedings and allowed to proceed with them or he should move another application u/s 21 for release. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that in the absence of any provision in the new Act regarding impleadment of a new party it will be deemed to have been prohibited, is not tenable. The Court has in many cases, where the circumstances require it, acted upon the assumption of the possession of an inherent power to act ex debto justitioe and to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists. This question was considered in the case of AIG Insurance Co. v. S.P. Maheshwari AIR 1960 Mad 482 and it was held that in administering justice prescribed by a Code there will always be case and circumstances which are not covered by the express provisions of the Code wherein justice has to be done. This question was considered in the case of AIG Insurance Co. v. S.P. Maheshwari AIR 1960 Mad 482 and it was held that in administering justice prescribed by a Code there will always be case and circumstances which are not covered by the express provisions of the Code wherein justice has to be done. The reason is that the legislature can foresee only the most natural and ordinary events and no rules can regulate all ordinary events and no rule can regulate for all times to come so as to make express provision against all inconveniences which are infinite in number and so that their dispositions shall express all the cases that may probably happen. The prescribed rules of procedure may be abused or so used as to give a mere formality, the significance of substantive effect and thus obstruct instead of facilitating the administration of justice. It was further held that it cannot be said that in the above circumstances courts have no power to do justice or redress a wrong merely because no express provision of the Code or reported decision of a Court can be found to meet the requirements of a case. Reliance was placed on the following observation of Mahmood, J. in Nar Singh Das v. Mangal Dubey ILR 5 All. 163: Courts are not to act upon principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code but on the converse principle, that every procedure is to be understood as permissive till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle prohibitions cannot be presumed. It will thus be clear that mere absence of a specific provision to cover the situation before us will not necessarily mean that the statute intended to prohibit any remedy in this connection. It will not be out of place to mention here that courts and tribunals are constituted to do justice between the parties within the confines of statutory limitations and undue emphasis on technicalities or enlarging their scope would cramp their power, diminish their effectiveness and defeat the very purpose for which they are constituted - S.M. Banerji Vs. Sri Krishna Agarwal, AIR 1960 SC 368 . Sri Krishna Agarwal, AIR 1960 SC 368 . Therefore, every court whether a civil court or otherwise must, in the absence of express provisions in the Code for that purpose, be deemed to possess as inherent in its very constitution all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice. It is for this purpose that In Section 34 of the new Act it is provided that the provisions of the Code can be applied to any other matter which may be prescribed and in Rule 22 it has been specifically stated that the power referred to in Section 151 of the Code can be exercised to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned. In the present case the ends of justice will be served more by permitting Sri Narain to proceed with the appeal than by driving him to file another petition u/s 21 of the Act. Multiplicity of proceedings has got to be avoided. The aforesaid discussion makes it clear that powers u/s 151, CPC can be exercised for the ends of justice and more so when there is no specific prohibition regarding the exercise of that power in a particular situation. 7. As stated above, Sri Narain had not moved that application for substitution in place of Jwala Prasad. He had simply prayed for leave to continue the appeal. The learned Additional District Judge instead of specifically allowing him to proceed with the appeal directed that he may be impleaded as co-Appellant with Jwala Prasad. The tenant has been given an opportunity to contest the factum of partition. This has been done so that the en tire controversy between the parties may be set at rest in this appeal. If the factum of partition is not established Jwala Prasad will be entitled to prosecute the appeal. On the other hand, if partition is proved Sri Narain should have a right to claim the relief without initiating fresh proceedings on the same ground. Therefore, his impleadment will amply serve the ends of justice. 8. In Debi Das Vs. State, AIR 1954 All 9 the question arose whether a person can be impleaded as a party in appeal u/s 151, Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, his impleadment will amply serve the ends of justice. 8. In Debi Das Vs. State, AIR 1954 All 9 the question arose whether a person can be impleaded as a party in appeal u/s 151, Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that the law is well settled that under the inherent powers of the Court it can implead any person where it considers that addition of that party is in the interest of justice and even where a party may not be a necessary party but merely a proper party his name can be added. Reliance was placed on the case of AIR 1941 16 (Federal Court) in which it was held that the language of Order 41 Rule 20 does not show that it is exclusive or exhaustive so as to deprive a court of any inherent power which it may possess and can exercise in special circumstances and which has been saved by Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Reference may also be made to the case of Dhani Devi Vs. Sant Bihari and Others, AIR 1970 SC 759 . In that case an applicant died after moving an application for permit to ply vehicles. Section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 did not deal with the situation arising on the death of an applicant nor it prescribed any time for the making of an application for substitution of the successors. It was held that in the absence of any statute or statutory rule the Regional Transport Authority may devise any reasonable procedure for dealing with the situation He has power to substitute the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles in place of the deceased applicant and to allow the successor to prosecute the application. As the relief sought for in that application is dependent upon and related to the possession of the vehicles, the application is capable of being revived at the instance of person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles. The rival applicants, if necessary, be given suitable opportunity to file objections against the grant of permit to the successor. This principle can be applied with advantage to the instant case also. Complications will arise if Sri Narain is not permitted to be impleaded. If it is found that Jwala Prasad has ceased to have any interest in the property his appeal is bound to be rejected. This principle can be applied with advantage to the instant case also. Complications will arise if Sri Narain is not permitted to be impleaded. If it is found that Jwala Prasad has ceased to have any interest in the property his appeal is bound to be rejected. If Sri Narain moves a second application on the same grounds, the principle of res judicata may stare him in the face. On the other hand, if he is impleaded as co-Appellant in this appeal no prejudice will be caused to the tenant inasmuch as he has already set out his defence in detail and has further been afforded an opportunity to contest the right of Sri Narain to proceed with the appeal. In these circumstances the ends of justice will be fully served if Sri Narain is also impleaded as co-Appellant. The impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge does not suffer from any error of law. 10. It may further be stated that the order passed by the learned District Judge was purely discretionary u/s 151, CPC and the writ petition does not lie against such an order - K.V. Raja Lakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore AIR 1967 SC 993 . 11. In the result the writ petition is dismissed with costs on parties.