Order.-Though the petitioners (accused) in these two revision petitions are different, since the facts in both of them are similar and the prosecutions have been launched on the fact of a common sanction order and as a common question of law arises, both the revision petitions are disposed of by a common judgment. 2. Ramakrishna Reddiar, the accused in C.C. No. 256 of 1974, and Kumaraiya Reddiar, the accused in C.C. No. 257 of 1974, both on the file of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Pondicherry, have preferred Crl.R.C. Nos. 364 of 1975 and 392 of 1975 respectively, questioning the correctness and legality of the judgments rendered in Cr.A. Nos. 47 of 1974 and 45 of 1974 respectively by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Pondicherry, confirming the conviction under section 3(1) of the Pondicherry Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisition of Stocks) Order, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 1967-Order) read with section 7(1)(a)(i) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and the sentence to suffer imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 300 in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months (in each case), but setting aside the order of the trial Magistrate confiscating the paddy seized in excess of the minimum quantity of 40 quintals per individual, permitted to be stocked without any declaration as per the provisions of the order and directing the return of the paddy in kind or its value. 3. Since the entire facts in both the cases are not necessary for the decision of the legal point raised in these two petitions, it would suffice for me to refer only to the gist of the offence which led to the prosecutions. 4.Crl.R.C. No. 364 of 1975.-The petitioner in this case was charged for the violation of the above provisions of the 1967-Order, punishable under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act as mentioned above, on the allegation that on 7th September, 1973 at about 4 p.m. the petitioner residing at No. 6/32, Church Street, Ariyankuppam was found in possession of 201 bags of paddy, each weighing 75 kgs., without declaring the stock to the Authorised Officer (Director of Civil Supplies), Pondicherry. Exhibit P-1 is the mahazar for the seizure of the paddy. Exhibit P-1 is the mahazar for the seizure of the paddy. Exhibit P-2 is the sanction order issued by the Chief Secretary of Pondicherry and Exhibit P-3 is the first information report in Crime No. 179 of 1973 of Mudaliarpet Police Station. To substantiate its case, the prosecution has examined P.Ws. 1 to 5 and filed Exhibits P-1 to P-5. The accused has totally denied his complicity in the crime. He has examined D.Ws. 1 and 2 and marked Exhibits D-1 to D-11 on his side. 5.Crl.R.C. No. 392 of 1975.-The petitioner herein was charged for the violation of the same provisions as mentioned in the other case, on the allegation that on 8th September, 1973 at about 12-15 p.m. the petitioner residing at Church Street, Ariankuppam, was found in possession of 149 bags of paddy weighing about 1178 kgs. without declaring the stock to the Authorised Officer-Director of Civil Supplies, Pondicherry. Exhibit P-1 is the mahazar for the seizure of the paddy and Exhibit P-2 is the search list. Exhibit P-3 is the sanction order issued by the Chief Secretary of Pondicherry and Exhibit P-4 is the first information report in Crime No. 182 of 1973 of Mudaliarpet Police Station. The prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 5 and marked Exhibits P-1 to P-4 mentioned above. The accused in this case also totally denied his complicity in that crime and examined D.Ws. 1 and 2 marked Exhibits D-1 to D-8 on his side. The trial Magistrate in both the cases convicted and sentenced the petitioners and the lower appellate Court confirmed the convictions and sentences but modified the order of confiscation as mentioned above. Hence, these two revision petitions have been filed. 6. The only point urged by Mr. V. Gopinath, learned Counsel for both the revision-petitioners, is that the sanctions accorded in both the cases are defective since the authority concerned did not issue them after applying his mind to the facts of the said cases, which application of mind is a necessary prerequisite for such sanctions and therefore the entire proceedings are vitiated by a manifest illegality and consequently the convictions cannot be sustained. It is seen from the judgments of the lower appellate Court in these cases that the very same point has been raised on behalf of the revision-petitioners, placing reliance on certain decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of India. It is seen from the judgments of the lower appellate Court in these cases that the very same point has been raised on behalf of the revision-petitioners, placing reliance on certain decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of India. But, the lower appellate Court has rejected this point on the ground that the documents viz., Exhibit P-2 in C.C. No. 256 of 1974 and Exhibit P-3 in C.C. No. 257 of 1974 show that the sanction was not hurried and that the sanctioning authority had given it after a period of 1½ months by referring to the letter of the Inspector-General of Police dated 17th January, 1974, and also show that the papers connected therewith were also sent to him in each case and therefore it cannot be said that the sanctioning authority has not applied his mind to the facts of the cases before granting the sanction. The body of the sanction order with reference to both the cases reads as follows: "Read: Inspector-General of Police letter No. D-1 (Misc. /597/73-74 dated 17th January, 1974. Order.-In exercise of the powers conferred under clause 5(6) of the Pondicherry Paddy and Rice (Declaration and requisitioning of Stocks) Order, 1967, sanction of the Lieutenant Governor is accorded to the launching of Prosecution against the offenders viz., Thiruvalargal Ramakrishna Raddiar in Crl. No. 179 of 1973 and Kumariya Reddiar in Crl. No. 182 of 1973 Ariyankuppam for violation of clause 3 of the said order and punishable under section 7(1) of Essential Commodities Act, 1955. (BY ORDER OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR.) Sd. M.A. Chandramouli, Chief Secretary to Government. To The Inspector-General of Police, Pondicherry (WE) The papers connected with the above case are returned herewith. Their receipt may kindly be acknowledged". The learned Counsel would draw the attention of this Court to the fact that there is no specific mention in the said order that the entire papers connected with both the cases were actually perused or looked into by the sanctioning authority or that the sanctioning authority had satisfied himself about the truth of the allegations made by the prosecuting agency in both the cases before according sanction. This order shows that the sanction was accorded in exercise of the powers conferred under clause 5 (6) of the 1967-Order and that the papers connected with the above cases were returned back to the Inspector-General of Police. This order shows that the sanction was accorded in exercise of the powers conferred under clause 5 (6) of the 1967-Order and that the papers connected with the above cases were returned back to the Inspector-General of Police. Therefore, the inference is that the papers connected with both the cases had been sent to the sanctioning authority. But, that itself would not be indicative of the fact that the authority had gone through the entire documents and applied his mind. Further, the totality of the evidence in respect of the sanction order is only the evidence given by the Inspector of Police, Mudaliarpet who has merely stated that Exhibit P-2 in C.C. No. 256 of 1974 (Exhibit P-3 in C.C. No. 257 of 1974) is the sanction order issued by the Chief Secretary of Pondicherry. No official from the office of the Chief Secretariat, Pondicherry has been examined on behalf the prosecution to testify to the fact that the sanctioning authority applied his mind by actually perusing the records and then accorded the sanction. The learned Counsel argues that the sanction order in question is vitiated inasmuch as it has not been shown by the prosecution that the sanction was accorded in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged, either by pointing out that the sanction order refers on the face of it to the actual facts constituting the offence charged, or by adducing extraneous evidence showing that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority and that the said authority applied his mind to those facts before according the sanction. The learned Counsel placed reliance on a plethora of cases, of which I shall refer to a few. 7. The question of sanction was dealt with by the Privy Council in the case of Gokul Chand Dwarakadas Morarka v. The King1. That case related to a sanction under clause 23 of the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1943, which provided that no prosecution for the contravention of any of the provisions of the order would be instituted without the previous sanction of the Provincial Government. In that context the Privy Council observed thus: "In their Lordships’ view, in order to comply with the provisions of clause 23, it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged. In that context the Privy Council observed thus: "In their Lordships’ view, in order to comply with the provisions of clause 23, it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged. It is plainly desirable that the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction, but this is not essential since clause 23 does not require the sanction to be in any particular form, nor even to be its writing. But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority". The principle laid down above has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in its various decisions. In Biswabhusan Naik v. The State of Orissa1, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the question of sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, has observed thus: “It is no more necessary for the sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, to be in any particular form, or in writing or for it to set out the facts in respect of which it is given than it was under clause 23 of the order which their Lordships were considering. The desirability of such a course is obvious because when the facts are not set out in the sanction proof has to be given aliunde that sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged, but an omission to do so is not fatal so long as the facts can be, and are, proved in some other way”. It is to be noted that in the above case the High Court had found that the ‘facts to which the sanction related were duly placed before the proper sanctioning authority. It was in those circumstances, the Supreme Court observed that an omission to adduce extraneous evidence was not fatal so long as the facts could be proved in some other way. It was in those circumstances, the Supreme Court observed that an omission to adduce extraneous evidence was not fatal so long as the facts could be proved in some other way. The Supreme Court, in P.C. Jashi and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh2, pointed out as follows: “Mere production of a document which sets out the names of the persons to be prosecuted and the provisions of the statute alleged to be contravened, and purporting to bear the signature of an officer competent to grant the sanction where such sanction is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction does not invest the Court with jurisdiction to try the offence. If the facts which constitute the charge do not appear on the face of the sanction, it must be established by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the authority competent to grant the sanction and that the authority applied his mind to those facts before giving sanction”. In State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand3. The Supreme Court observed thus: “So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, we find that the position of law is that the burden of proof that the requisite sanction had been obtained rests upon the prosecution. Such burden includes proof that the sanctioning authority had given the sanction in reference to the facts on which the proposed prosecution was to be based. These facts might appear on the face of the sanction or it might be proved by independent evidence that sanction was accorded for prosecution after those facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority”. The quintessence of the above decisions can be summarily stated as follows: Sanction to prosecute is a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution. Otherwise, there is a legal impediment to the prosecution. In a case of sanction, the sanctioning authority should have applied his mind to the facts of the case before according sanction. To put it in other words, it is not a mere empty formality, because the giving of sanction confers jurisdiction on the Court to try the case and if the sanction is invalid, it affects the competent jurisdiction of the Court to try the case for such offences. 8. The Government in exercising this power, have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. 8. The Government in exercising this power, have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. They are not concerned merely to see that evidence disclosed a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. They can refuse sanction on any around which commends itself to them. Looked at as a matter of substance, it is plain that the Government cannot adequately discharge its legal obligation of deciding whether to five or withhold sanction without a knowledge of the facts of the case. 9. The burden of proof that the requisite sanction has been obtained rests upon the prosecution, which burden includes proof that the sanction has reference to the facts on which proposed prosecution is to be based. These facts may appear either on the face of the sanction or should be explicitly proved by independent evidence. 10. Now let us examine the sanction order and the evidence of P.W. 5 and see whether the sanction is valid or not. Admittedly, it is a common order with reference to both the cases. The body of the letter does not disclose that the sanctioning authority perused the papers and applied his mind to those facts before giving sanction. The learned Public Prosecutor would rely on the reference portion of the order which reads: "Read: Inspector-General of Police Letter ........ dated 17th January, 1974". and the endorsement made at the bottom of the order reading. ‘The papers connected with the above cases are returned herewith", and contend that a combined reading of these two portions would unambiguously show that the sanctioning authority perused the documents and applied his mind to the facts of the case and only thereafter the sanction was given, and therefore the validity of the sanction order cannot in any way be challenged. He relied on a decision in Major Som Nath v. Union of India and another1, where the Supreme Court found the sanction in that case to be valid, because the facts and circumstances therein were sufficient to indicate that the authorities had the offence in their contemplation. But, in the present case, the facts and circumstances are not sufficient to show that the authority had applied his mind to the facts of the cases on the basis of which the accused were proposed to be charged. But, in the present case, the facts and circumstances are not sufficient to show that the authority had applied his mind to the facts of the cases on the basis of which the accused were proposed to be charged. It may be that all the papers connected with both the cases and the letter of the Inspector-General of Police relating to those cases had been sent to the sanctioning authority. But, the mere production of the documents before the sanctioning authority by itself would not go to show that the sanctioning authority had perused the documents and applied his mind to the facts contained therein. These is absolutely 10 evidence to show what were the contents of the letter sent by the Inspector-General of Police, nor is the said letter produced before the Court. Therefore, the Court cannot draw an inference that the said letter contained all the facts that were necessary to enable the sanctioning authority to accord sanction. The view of the lower appellate Court taken on this aspect is totally incorrect since it stands unsupported by the evidence on record. When it does not appear on the face of the sanction that the sanctioning authority applied his mind in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court cited above, the prosecution must establish by extraneous evidence that the sanction was accorded by the sanctioning authority after all those facts had been placed before the authority and that the said authority applied his mind. As indicated above, de hors the evidence of P.W. 5, there is on other evidence to prove that the materials were placed before the authority. P.W. 5’s evidence is not based on any direct information or knowledge. The one line evidence given by P.W. 5 is that "Exhibit P-2 is the sanction order issued by Chief Secretary of Pondy". This answer cannot be tantamount to the extraneous evidence required for the purpose. Hence, I hold that the prosecution has failed to satisfy that the sanction order in question is legally a valid one, which is a pre-requisite condition for conferring jurisdiction on the criminal Court to try the case and that the lower appellate Court has committed a manifest illegality by taking a wrong view of the matter. In the circumstances, the decision in Som Nath’s Case1, is not helpful to the prosecution. 11. In the circumstances, the decision in Som Nath’s Case1, is not helpful to the prosecution. 11. In the result, the sanction order in both the cases is not a valid one and as such the prosecution based on the said document cannot be sustained. Accordingly, I allow both the revision petitions and set aside the convictions and the sentences of the petitioners in both the cases and acquit them of the offence. Fine amounts, if paid, shall be refunded to the petitioner.