Short Note : 1. Respondent M/s. Gharpure, Engineers and Builders, were given a contract by the State Government for construction of a bridge. Dispute having arisen, the same Was referred to arbitrators as per Clause 17 of the contract. The arbitrators gave their award on 30-7-1976. The contractor caused the award to be filed in Court on 18-8-1976, The Court ordered issuance of notice under section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act to the parties. The notice to the State Government was served upon the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. (B. and R.) National Highway, Rewa Division, on 26-8-1976. 2. On 13-10-1976, the Government Pleader appeared for the State Government duly authorised by the Executive Engineer and got the case adjourned for arguments. The case was listed on 28-10-1976 and was adjourned to 8-11-1976. Nothing was done on those dates. On 22-11-1976, the State Government filed objection under section 30 of the Arbitration Act. On this date, the Government Pleader filed a fresh power signed by the Deputy Secretary, P.W.D. 3. The question arose whether the objection had been filed within time. The relevant article of the Limitation Act governing the matter is Article 119 (b) prescribing a period of 30 days from the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award. 4. The trial Court has refused to entertain the objection being barred by time. Aggrieved by the order, the State Government has come up in appeal. 5. The learned Government Pleader' argued that service of the notice upon the Executive Engineer was no service of notice on the State Government. As envisaged by section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the notice should either have been served upon the Secretary, P.W.D. or upon the Collector. It was submitted that the Government Pleader's appearance on the authority of the Executive Engineer could not be treated as appearance for and on behalf of the State Government. The real appearance for and On behalf of the State Government was when the Government Pleader obtained full instructions and power from the Deputy Secretary. That took place on' 22-11-1976 and the objection filed on that day could not be thrown out. 6. The contention from the other side is that the original contract was signed for and on behalf of the Governor by the Executive Engineer. He was the Officer who was a party before the arbitrators. That took place on' 22-11-1976 and the objection filed on that day could not be thrown out. 6. The contention from the other side is that the original contract was signed for and on behalf of the Governor by the Executive Engineer. He was the Officer who was a party before the arbitrators. He was the person fully cognizant of the facts of the case and was the officer-in-charge within the meaning of Order 27, rule 2, CPC. Attention was invited to rule 141 of the Law Department Manual. Explanation appended to that rule read with rule 150, the counsel said, would make the position clear (hat the Executive Engineer was the executive officer primarily concerned with the case and, therefore, an officer-in• charge authorised ex-officio to act for the State Government in the Judicial Proceeding. 7. It would be legitimate to presume, the counsel argued, that the Executive Engineer after receiving notice contacted the Government, sought instructions, engaged and instructed the Government Pleader and entered appearance. The appearance of the Government Pleader could by no stretch of imagination be called appearance for and on behalf of the Executive Engineer since the party to the proceeding was the State Government and not the Executive Engineer. The Executive Engineer presumably' was appointed officer- in-charge for the purposes of the proceedings and that being so, the counsel submitted, the Government obtained full knowledge of the filing of the award through the Government Pleader on 13-10-1976. The Government Pleader as defined under Cl. (7) of S. 2 was an agent for the Government to receive process, the counsel said, and intimation of the filing of the award which he obtained on 13-10-1976, was intimation to the State Government. (Reference was made to Order 27, Rules 4 and 8-B of the Code of Civil Procedure me.) 8. The counsel for the contractor then canvassed that firstly notice to the Executive Engineer was a good notice to the Stale Government, the Executive Engineer being ex-office authorised to act for the Government; secondly. the Executive Engineer must be presumed to have contracted the State Government and sought instructions prior to 13-10-1976 and the State Government thereby acquired knowledge of the filing of the award and thirdly, the appearance of the Government Pleader on the 13th October, 1976 for and on behalf of the State Government was in itself a notice of the filing of the award. The objection filed on 22-11-1976 was, therefore, clearly barred by time. Reliance was placed on Nilkanth v. Kashinath. AIR 1962 SC 666 , Chhotelal v. Jamnadas, 1962 JLJ 471 = AIR 1963 MP 20 , and State v. Daulat Kumari, AIR 1969 Patna 25.] 9. Held : The contention of the counsel for the contractor must prevail on all the three counts. Notice to the Evecutive Engineer was a notice to the State Government, he being ex-officio authorised to act for the Government. The relevant provisions of the Law Department Manual have been referred to above. Even otherwise, in the matter of contract it was the Executive Engineer who had signed the contract for and on behalf of the Governor, it was he who was ex-officio party to the arbitration proceedings and, therefore, in tile know of the award, and it was he through whom the Court gave intimation of the filing of the award. 10. M/s. C. Lyall and Company v. Union of India, ILR (1973) 1 Delhi 905 cited by the Government Advocate does not seem to take a contrary view. Notice generally has to be served upon the Secretary to the Government. But if the Government have by Rules, as in the present case, authorised any other officer to act for the Government in judicial proceedings, notice could be served upon him. At any rate, notice to the Government Pleader as defined in the Rule 8-B of Order 27, CPC is notice to the State Government, Government Pleader being an agent to receive process under Rule 4 of' Order 27, M/S.C. Lyall’s authority fully supports the contractor. Even if period of limitation were to be reckoned from 13-10-1976, the date on which the Government Pleader appeared in Court for the State Government, the objection filed on 22-11-1976 was barred by 10 days. As argued by the learned counsel for the contractor, the State Government had presumably received intimation of the filing of the award much prior to 13-10-1976. The Executive Engineer had received notice on 26-8-1976 and must have passed it on to the State Government soon thereafter. It was for the State Government to disclose how and when they obtained information of the filing of the award if not through the Executive Engineer. The Executive Engineer had received notice on 26-8-1976 and must have passed it on to the State Government soon thereafter. It was for the State Government to disclose how and when they obtained information of the filing of the award if not through the Executive Engineer. The State Government could possibly make out a case for condonation of delay in filing the objection if they could lay facts before the Court that the Executive Engineer slept over the notice and so did the Government Pleader. But no application was made because the facts were rather inconvenient. Appeal dismissed.