( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act') preferred by the tenants is directed against the judgment and decree dt. 21-9-1974 in HRCA. 30 of 1974 on the file of the Court of the II Addl Dist Judge, Belgaum, affirming the order of eviction dt. 30-3-1974 made in HRC. 36 of 1966 on the file of the ii Additional Munsiff, Belgaum. ( 2 ) IN the said HRC. 36 of 1966, respondents herein instituted proceedings for the eviction of the petitioners, their tenants, from shop premises situate in Khade-Bazaar, Belgaum, on the ground that they required the premises bona fide and reasonably for their own purposes. A quit notice dt. 29-10-1965 (Ext. P4) preceded the institution of the proceedings. ( 3 ) PETITIONERS, while admitting the tenancy resisted the action on grounds, inter alia, that one Mohamad Hashim Ibrahimsab Doni, the predecessor-in-title of the respondents had, on 19-3-1965, instituted like proceedings in RCP. 38 of 1965 for the very same reliefs alleging that he required the said premises for setting up his nephews-respondents herein in business; that the said petition came to be dismissed on merits on 22-10-1965; that subsequently on 27-10-65 the said Mohamad Hashim Ibrahimsab doni purported to make a gift of the premises in question in favour of the respondents under a gift-deed dt. 27-10-1965 (Ext. P10); and that therefore the present proceedings for eviction were not only bereft of bona tides and reasonableness but were also barred on principles of res judicata. It was also contended that, at all events, greater hardship would be caused by making an order granting possession than what would be occasioned by declining eviction. ( 4 ) IN the trial Court the first respondent and one witness on his side tendered evidence in support of the respondents-landlords' case. The first petitioner examined himself in opposition to the claim for eviction. ( 5 ) ON a consideration of the evidence on record the trial Court came to record findings on all the points that arose for determination in favour of the respondents-landlords and against the petitioners and made an order granting possession. The first petitioner examined himself in opposition to the claim for eviction. ( 5 ) ON a consideration of the evidence on record the trial Court came to record findings on all the points that arose for determination in favour of the respondents-landlords and against the petitioners and made an order granting possession. The appeal preferred by the present petitioners having been unsuccessful and the order of eviction having been affirmed in appeal, this civil revision petition has been brought on behalf of the tenants challenging the legality and correctness of the judgment of the appellate Court which had come to affirm the order of eviction granted by the Court of first instance. ( 6 ) SRI W. K. Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has urged the following grounds in support of this petition; (a) that inasmuch as RCP. 38 of 1965 instituted by the respondents' predecessor-in-title putting forth therein the alleged need of his nephews- respondents herein-came to be dismissed on merits, the present proceedings which seek to reagitate the same need must be held to be barred under S. 45 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961; (b) that the findings of the Court below that the need of respondents wag bona fide and reasonable is erroneous; and, (c) that the finding of the Courts below as to the comparative hardship is infirm and requires to be reversed. ( 7 ) POINT (a): Sri W. K. Joshi, relying upon S. 45 of the Act, contended that the issue whether the respondents bona fide and reasonably required the premises concerned in the proceedings for their own use stands concluded by the earlier adjudication in RCP. 38 of 1965; and that the present proceedings which, according to him, raise "between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim" substantially the same issue, requires to be summarily rejected. His argument, as i apprehend it, is that the said Mohamad Hashim Ibrahimsab doni had put forward in the said RCP. 38 of 1965; and that the present proceedings which, according to him, raise "between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim" substantially the same issue, requires to be summarily rejected. His argument, as i apprehend it, is that the said Mohamad Hashim Ibrahimsab doni had put forward in the said RCP. 38/1965 the need of his nephews-the present respondents-in support of his prayer for possession: that the said petition was dismissed on merits; and that the present proceedings which are also based on the alleged bona fide requirement of the very same persons, namely, the respondents herein, must be held to be the proceedings between the "same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim" within the meaning of S. 45 of the 'act'. Sri joshi also adverted to the quick succession of events, namely, that the said RCP. 38 of 1965 was dimissed on 22-10-1965; that the gift-deed by the said Doni in favour of the present respondents came to be executed on 27-10-1965; that the quit notice, Ext. P4, was caused to be issued on 29-10-1965 and the present proceedings instituted on 22-2-1966, and contended that the effort on the part of the respondents was merely to reagitate, in another form, what came to be concluded in RCP. 38 of 1965. ( 8 ) IN RCP. 38 of 1965, the present respondents were not eo-nomine parties. However the then landlord, the said Mohamad Hashim Ibrahim- sab Doni, put forward the requirement of the present respondents as the ground for eviction. ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court in shantilal Thakordas v. Ckimanlal Maganlal Telwala, AIR. 1976 SC. 2358, referring to the language of S. 14 (l) (e) of the Delhi Rent control Act, 1958, which provided for and enabled eviction for personal requirement when premises were shown to be required for the landlord for "occupation as a residence for himself and the members of his family", observed that where a landlord sought eviction on the ground that the premises were required both for himself and the members of his family, the requirement was both his and that of the members of his family and that in such a case, on the death of the landlord the right to sue did survive to the members of the family of the deceased landlord. The earlier view expressed in smt. The earlier view expressed in smt. Phool Rani v. Sh. Muabat Rai Ahluwalia, AIR. 1973 SC. 2110, to the effect that even in such case the requirement of the landlord was his personal requirement and the fact that upon eviction of the tenant, the premises may come to be occupied by the landlord and the members of his family would not make such a requirement any the less a personal requirement was not subscribed to. However the language of the analogous provisions in proviso (h) to sub-sec (1) of S. 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961, provides a ground for eviction where "the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any person for whose benefit the premises are held" etc. The question whether in the context of the particular language of Clause (h) of Section 21 (1) of the Act, the requirement urged in the said RCP. 38 of 1965 was only the personal requirement of the then owner the said Mohamad Hashim Ibrahimsab Doni or whether it was also the requirement of the present respondents appears to me to be immaterial, as in my opinion, it is clear that in any view of the matter the present proceedings for eviction do not attract the provisions of Section 45 of the Act. ( 10 ) IN RCP. 38 of 1965 the Court which tried the matter held that the present respondents for whose or one of whose alleged requirements eviction was sought were already settled in their own business and could not be said to be the dependants of the landlord and that the landlord had no obligation to provide for them which could be recognised as sufficient in law to make their requirement his own. On that view, the Court held that the requirement put forward in that case was not bona fide and reasonable. The appellate Court while affirming the said conclusion observed :"----According to S. 21, CI (h) an eviction can be granted only if the premises are required by the landlord for the occupation of himself or any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust. The landlord could not obviously come within any of these clauses because the premises were not required for his own use and occupation. That was the evidence adduced in the case. Further, the premises was not held for the benefit of his nephews whom he wished to settle in business. The premises were his own and were held for his own benefit. . . . . . . In the previous petition, the ground of the landlord that the petition premises was required for opening a business for his nephews was not adjudicated in the sense the Court did not say that the said ground was false. What tht Court then said was that even if the ground was true the eviction cannot be ordered under s. 21 (l) (h) of the Act for the reasons I have already adverted to. . . . " ( 11 ) THE principle which S. 45 of the 'act' seeks to impart a statutory formulation, is that that estoppel per res judicata operates for, or against, not only the parties, but also those who are privies to them in blood, title, or interest. "privies" include any person who succeeds to the rights or liabilities of the party upon his death or insolvency or who is otherwise identified with his or her estate or interest. A transferee of property which is the subject of litigation, where the property itself is not bound by the judgment cannot be deemed a privy of any party to such litigation and judgment (See: Spencer Bower and Turner "on doctrine of Res judicata" Second Edn, P. 209 ). That apart the present respondents could not have challenged these findings in appeal in their own right. The title in which they are now litigating cannot be said to be the same. In view of these circumstances, the conclusion of the appellate Court that the present proceedings were not barred by S. 45 of the Act requires to be upheld, though on a different reasoning. Accordingly, Point (a) is answered against the petitioners. The title in which they are now litigating cannot be said to be the same. In view of these circumstances, the conclusion of the appellate Court that the present proceedings were not barred by S. 45 of the Act requires to be upheld, though on a different reasoning. Accordingly, Point (a) is answered against the petitioners. ( 12 ) POINT (b): So far as the bona fides and reasonableness of the requirement of the landlords are concerned, the court below held, on a point of fact, that respondents had started a business as carriers of goods in a rented shop of the Belgaum cantonment Board area in shop belonging to the Cantonment Board as sub-lessees of one A. H. Sheik and they were initially paying a rent of rs. 180 per month which was later increased to Rs. 210 per month. The courts below a;lso accepted the evidence for the respondents that the cantonment Board was insisting on a still higher rent of Rs. 300 pm. Courts below did not also see any merit in the grievance of the petitioners that the respondents had shifted the grounds for eviction from time to time, in that while in the previous proceedings in RCP. 38 of 1965, the alleged requirement, as advanced by their uncle the late Mohamad hashim Ibrahimsab Doni, and as spoken to by one of the respondents in evidence therein was that respondents wanted to open a cloth shop, it now transpires that they seek possession for establishing a motor transport business. In the opinion of the lower appellate Court, the explanation of PW. 1 that on Account of the changed circumstances compelled by passage of time, respondents had had to change the nature of their business, was satisfactory. Similarly, the appellate Court was not impressed by the argument that Khade-Bazaar area of Belgaum in which the premises concerned in these proceedings are situate was not suitable for the transport business. I have been taken through the evidence on record and Sri W. K. Joshi is unable to show how these findings stand vitiated or rendered infirm or unsupportable on the basis of the evidence on record, particularly in view of the circumstance that petitioners did not deny that respondents were really carrying on their business in a rented premises on a rent of Rs. 210 per month. All that the first petitioner, who was examined as DW. 210 per month. All that the first petitioner, who was examined as DW. l, did say was to deny any knowledge on his part in this behalf. Some attempt appears to have been made on the strength of Ext. D1, an extract from CTS. Office pertaining to property CTS. 9000 11 1, that respondents, allegedly, owned 30 to 35 shops in the market area, Belgaum, and that out of the said shops, 4 or 5 were vacant. Respondents sought to rebut this evidence by wholly disclaiming the ownership of the said property. From the evidence it is clear. that the petitioners themselves were not sure as to whom the said property belonged. In view of the vague nature of this evidence and the fact that respondents disclaimed that they had this property in their ownership, the appellate Court did not give credence to the petitioners' version in this behalf. ( 13 ) HAVING regard to these circumstances, it not possible to hold that the findings of the Courts below as to the bona fides and reasonableness of the requirement of the landlords in the present case stand vitiated calling for interference. Sri W. K. Joshi is unable to make good his attack on these findings. Accordingly, Point (b) requires to be answered against the petitioners. ( 14 ) POINT (c): On the question as to comparative hardship, the evidence on the side of the respondents is that in and around Khade-Bazaar area several new buildings have come up. Some particulars of these new buildings were also furnished in the course of the evidence. The first petitioner who was examined as DW. 1 also admitted that several new business shops had come up. In particular, he admitted that there were about 20 shops in K-Bazaar in a building of which one Bichu was stated to be owner. DW. 1 was cross-examined as to the availability of number of shops in the area. On the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court took the view that alternative accommodation was available and that the mere fact that the tenant would be put to some difficulty in rehabilitation or would have to pay higher rents should not prevail over and whittle down the requirement of the landlords which is shown to be otherwise honest and reasonable. Sri Joshi is unable to show how this finding of the appellate Court is erroneous or is unsupported by the evidence on record. In regard to the contention that the landlords had deliberately demolished a shop belonging to them at the corner of Darbar- galli and Khade-Bazaar with a view to be able to plead an artificial want, neither evidence of DW. 1 nor the cross-examination of PW. 1 on the point is such as to justify an inference against the landlords. The first respondent has stated that out of his 13 children, the first and second who are sons are with him in the transport business and that they would require the petition schedule shop for their own requirements and that the rent of Rs. 210 they are paying for the Cantonment shop was causing them hardship. PW. 1, however, admitted that he was also carrying on a business in onions and chillies in another shop owned by him. This circumstance by itself will not affect the claims for possession for the needs of another business which the respondents are carrying in a rented premises. On a consideration of the evidence on record. I am of the opinion that, the conclusion of the Courts below on this point does not call for interference. Therefore, Point (c) also requires to be held against the petitioners. ( 15 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, this civil revision petition fails and is dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances nf the case, I grant time to the petitioner till 1st of September, 1977 to vacate and deliver possession. --- *** --- .