JUDGMENT M. P. Saxena, J. - This is a tenants' petition arising out of proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Act). 2. The house in dispute situate in the city of Banda is ancestral property of Bihari Lal, opposite party No. 3. It was let out to the petitioner in 1954. The opposite party No. 3 applied for release of this house under Section 21 of the new Act on the ground that he was posted as head clerk in the office of the Civil Surgeon, Banda, in 1970 and was going to retire on 19th of August, 1974. His family consisted of several members and he was living with them in a Government quarter which he would be required to vacate on retirement. He wanted the house in dispute to be released for his own bonafide need. 3. It was also alleged that the tenant had several other houses at his disposal and no inconvenience would be caused to him if he was required to vacate the house in dispute. 4. The tenant contested that application, inter alia, on the grounds that the landlord alone was not competent to apply for release; that his wife owned a house in Karvi in which she was living with her sons and the landlord had no need for disputed accommodation; that the landlord had other houses at his disposal and he had not bonafide need for this house and that the houses alleged to be available to him (the tenant) actually belonged to his mother and brother's wife respectively and he could not shift in those houses. He also gave out that considered hardship would be caused to him if he was required to vacate to the house in dispute. 5. After going through the material on the record, the learned prescribed Authority held that the need of the landlord was bonafide inasmuch as he was going to retire shortly and shall have to vacate the Government quarter. Besides it, two houses were available to the tenant and no inconvenience would be caused to him. Accordingly the release application was allowed. 6. The tenant filed an appeal under Section 22 of the new Act which was dismissed by the learned second Additional District Judge, Banda. Hence this writ petition. 7. Besides it, two houses were available to the tenant and no inconvenience would be caused to him. Accordingly the release application was allowed. 6. The tenant filed an appeal under Section 22 of the new Act which was dismissed by the learned second Additional District Judge, Banda. Hence this writ petition. 7. There is no controversy that the house in dispute is ancestral property of the opposite party No. 3 and it was let out to the petitioner on a monthly rent at Rs. 12 in 1954. There is also no dispute that since 1970 the opposite party No. 3 is posted as head clerk in the civil Surgeon's office at Banda. He was to retire on 19th of August, 1974 at the age of 55 but he appears to have been granted extension and will now be retiring on 31st of August, 1977, on completion of 58 years. There also no controversy that at present he is occupying a Government quarter which he will be required to vacate on retirement. The application for release was moved on 25.5.1973 i.e. before the Amendment Act 28 of 1976 came into force and sub-section (1-A) was incorporated in Section 21 of the new Act. The landlord appears to have claimed release on the basis of Explanation (ii) to Section 21(i) as it existed at that time. This Explanation read as follows : "Where the landlord was engaged in any profession, trade, calling or employment away from the city, municipality, notified area, or town area within which the building is situate and by reason of the cessation of such engagement he needs the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes, such need shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of clause (a). 8. The learned lower authorities appear to have allowed release application by expanding the benefit of this Explanation. In my judgment there was manifest error of law on their part by giving the benefit of this provisions because only that landlord who was engaged in any employment away from the city and by reason of cessation of his engagement required by building for occupation by himself was entitled to the benefit of this Explanation. In the instant case the opposite party No. 3 is admittedly employed as head clerk in the civil Surgeons' office in the city of Banda and not away from the city. In the instant case the opposite party No. 3 is admittedly employed as head clerk in the civil Surgeons' office in the city of Banda and not away from the city. Therefore, benefit of this Explanation could not be available to him. 9. The learned counsel for the opposite party No. 3 now contends that under the present Act an analogous provisions has been enacted in Section 21(1-A) and on account of this change in the events the order is liable to be maintained. I am reluctant to subscribe even to this view because sub-section (1-A) reads : "Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, the prescribed authority shall on the application of a landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment. Provided that an application under this sub-section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction on such application, shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation. (2) ................. Explanation ................. 10. Sub-section (3) lays down that no order shall be made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) or sub-section (2) except after giving to the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. There can be no manner of doubt that Section (1-A) is not analogous to Explanation (ii). Secondly, an application for release of a house under sub-section (1-A) is to be moved within one year before the expected date of cessation of employment. In the instant case the opposite party No. 3 moved an application on 25.5.1973 when his retirement, according to his own showing, is going to take place on 31.8.1977. Therefore, the application was premature. A similar situation was considered in the case of Smt. P. Dayal v. VII Additional District Judge and others, 1977 All. R.C. 291. A landlord had moved an application for release of her accommodation on the ground that her husband was going to retire and she would require the building for her own use. Therefore, the application was premature. A similar situation was considered in the case of Smt. P. Dayal v. VII Additional District Judge and others, 1977 All. R.C. 291. A landlord had moved an application for release of her accommodation on the ground that her husband was going to retire and she would require the building for her own use. It transpired that the husband was going to retire several years after as in the instant case. The application was held to be premature. It was also argued in that case that the landlady's husband had actually retire during the pendency of the proceedings and it was open to the Court to take that fact into consideration. It did not impress the Court inasmuch as the tenant got no change to meet the new circumstances. The landlady, therefore, was held to be not entitled to release of that house on that ground. It was, however, observed, that she could move a fresh application on the basis of the new development that may have taken place. The present case is on all fours with the facts of that case inasmuch as the application for release was moved about 4 years before the retirement of the opposite party No. 3 and it was premature. The tenant got no opportunity to resist that application in the light of Section 21(1-A). Therefore, the release of the house cannot be maintained on that basis. The opposite party No. 23 will, however, be liberty to move a fresh application on the basis of the new developments. 11. The learned counsel for the opposite party has banked on Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) and has urged on its basis that the tenant has got three houses at his disposal and he was not entitled to file any objection to the release application. Even this contention is not tenable because one house situate in Mohalla Balkhandi Naka admittedly belongs to the mother of the tenant. She is living separately from him and it cannot be said to be available to the tenant. The second house situate in Mohalla Banyaota Balkhandi Naka has been purchased by the wife of tenants' brother who cannot be regarded as a member of the family of the tenant. Therefore, that house also cannot be said to be available to the petitioner. 12. The second house situate in Mohalla Banyaota Balkhandi Naka has been purchased by the wife of tenants' brother who cannot be regarded as a member of the family of the tenant. Therefore, that house also cannot be said to be available to the petitioner. 12. It is further argued that the petitioner has built a house in Nimipar during the pendency of the proceedings and on this score also he is not entitled to contest the release matter. I find no force in this contention because the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner makes it clear that in order to take immediate possession over the land purchased by him he has built a small room outside the limits of municipal board Banda. It is not at all sufficient for his needs now it can be used for residential purposes. Benefit of Explanation (i) can be claimed by a landlord only when a tenant or a member of his family has built or otherwise acquired a 'residential building' in the same city. That the room constructed by the tenant is sufficient for residential purposes is not at all borne out from the material on the record. 13. Lastly, it is urged that the application could be treated under Section 21(1)(a) of the new Act and if bonafide requirement and hardship were made out in favour of the landlord the premises could be released. There can be no manner of doubt about it but in the instant case the landlord himself furnished no material for comparison. As a matter of fact he claimed the benefit of Explanation (ii) and did not want comparison to be done. Therefore, the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge did not enter into the merit of this question. The orders passed by them cannot, therefore, be sustained. 14. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 16.3.1974 and 29.1.1975 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the second Additional District Judge, Banda, are quashed. No order as to costs.