Short Note : 1. The short point involved in the revision was whether the amount found due towards arrears of rent and damages already adjudicated and ascertained under a decree of the Civil Court as subsisting on the appointed day i.e. 15-8-1973 would be covered by the term "debt" as defined in M.P. Anusuchit Jati Evam Anusuchit Jan Jati Rini Sahayata Adhiniyam, 1967. Held : From the bare reading of the definition of the term 'debt' as given in the Act it is appellant that the definition of the word 'debt' is inclusive and therefore, the term 'debt' apart from what it ordinarily means under the general law may include by fiction such other liabilities also which may actually not be regarded as debt under the law or according to the common meaning as attributed to the Term 'debt'. The language used while defining the term 'debt' is specific in saying that the term 'debt' includes all liabilities owing to a creditor in cash or kind payable under a decree or order of a Civil Court or otherwise, By using the words "all liabilities', it is apparent that the legislature intended to include even such other liabilities which may not be actually in the nature of loan as commonly understood. According to the scheme of the Act, all liabilities have been first included in the definition of the term 'debt' and thereafter whatever was sought to be excepted Was separately exempted by section 6 of the Act, This clearly indicates that while giving an inclusive definition of the term 'debt' covering 'all liabilities', the legislature was aware of the fact that the definition so given will include even such liabilities which have been specifically excepted by making a provision in section 6 of the act. No doubt in the present case, the relationship in its inception was of landlord and tenant under a contract of tenancy and not of creditor and debtor, but ultimately under the contract, rent became due and the same was not paid, it became a debt as it was undoubtedly a sum of money payable by the tenant who became a debtor to the landlord for the said amount. However, if such liability would have been exempted under section 6 of the Act, which does exempt certain specific, liabilities, the position would have been different and the Act" would not have been applicable at all. However, if such liability would have been exempted under section 6 of the Act, which does exempt certain specific, liabilities, the position would have been different and the Act" would not have been applicable at all. Similarly, when the amount of mesne profits was adjudicated and settled and the same became due under a decree, the decretal liability having been also specifically included became a debt unless specifically exempted. Chandanmal v. Sambhaji Bhai, 24 MPLC 214, Sadashiv Rao v. Naina 1969 MPLJ SN 42, poonaji v, Moti, 1973 MPLJ SN 130, relied on. Balaram v. Roopabai, 1973 MPLJ SN 132 distinguished. 2. The learned Counsel for the applicant decree-holder, further contended that while construing the scope of the definition of the term 'debt' even though it is an inclusive definition, the aims and objects of the enactment should be kept in view, He pointed out that in the aims and objects, as published in M P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 5-4-1967 at page 1360, it is clearly mentioned that the legislation in question was made in order to protect the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from the clutches of the money lenders who lend money to them on exorbitant rate of interest. It is true that it has been so stated in the aims and objects and the preamble of the Act mentions that the legislation was for relieving the indebtedness of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, But exact correspondence between the preamble and the enactment is not always necessary, The enactment may go beyond or it may fall short of what has been indicated in the aims and objects or the preamble. The aims and objects and the preamble can be called in aid, but they are not meant for creating ambiguity when it is not at all in the plain language of the enactment. The Courts are riot expected to fit up the lacuna by inserting something in the enactment which is not there. Unless the legislature exempts certain liabilities, the Courts cannot provide for the same in the garb of interpretation by calling in aid the preamble or the aims and objects of the enactment even when it is strongly felt that such an exemption should have been made. A.G. v. Prince Ernest Augustus, 1957 (1) All. Unless the legislature exempts certain liabilities, the Courts cannot provide for the same in the garb of interpretation by calling in aid the preamble or the aims and objects of the enactment even when it is strongly felt that such an exemption should have been made. A.G. v. Prince Ernest Augustus, 1957 (1) All. England Law Reports 49, Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition & Development) Act, 1957, S. 4, and M. P. Gramin Rin Vimuki Tatha Sthagan Adhiniyam, 1975 referred to. Revision dismissed.