JUDGMENT : M.P. Saxena, J. This is a tenant's petition arising out of proceedings u/s 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter called the Act). 2. Briefly stated the facts are that the opposite party No. 1 is the owner and landlord of the land bounded as below: North : Gali South : Road East : Shop of Angan West : House of Lai Kallimal The opposite party No. 1 moved an application u/s 21 of the new Act against a number of his tenants for release of the said land and a room built thereon. It was alleged that he along with his wife, who are medical practitioners, want to construct a Nursing Home and the disputed land is most suitable for this purpose. 3. The application was contested by the present Petitioner in respect of the land let out to her. The application for release was resisted on a number of grounds. On 13th of December, 1972 she moved an application before the Prescribed Authority stating that only land was let out to her and a chhappar was constructed by her over this land. Boundary walls were also constructed and as such the land cannot be treated as building within the meaning of the Act and the application u/s 21 is not maintainable. 4. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application for release. In respect of the plea of maintainability of the application he said: The O.P. alleged through an application that as only a chhappar (hut) stands on the plot in question, it is not covered by the definition of the word 'building' and the provisions of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 are therefore, not applicable to it. The applicant contested this application and gave out that a room stands on the land which is bounded by a pucca wall. From the certified copy of the order in Misc. Case No. 36/64 instituted by the father of the O.Ps. against the applicant and others reveals that Sri Ram Saran Das through whom the O.Ps. had inherited the tenancy rights moved an application u/s 7-C of the U.P. Act III of 1947 regarding the deposit of rent in court in respect of this land. In case there had been no room on the land it could not have fallen within the purview of Act III of 1947 and the O.Ps. had inherited the tenancy rights moved an application u/s 7-C of the U.P. Act III of 1947 regarding the deposit of rent in court in respect of this land. In case there had been no room on the land it could not have fallen within the purview of Act III of 1947 and the O.Ps. could not have moved an application u/s 7-C of that Act. From this as also other evidence on record I am satisfied that the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 are applicable to the premises and the application u/s 21 is maintainable. The application submitted by the O.Ps. in this regard is rejected. 5. The tenant filed an appeal u/s 22 of the new Act but unsuccessfully. It was again pressed from her side that the application u/s 21 is not maintainable but the learned District Judge negatived it by observing: The first point urged before me by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the premises in question did not amount to a building as defined in Section 3(i) of the Act and, therefore, proceeding u/s 21 of the Act could not be taken for release of the premises. In this connection it has been pointed out that the premises in question consists of a room and open land bounded by a boundary wall. The boundary wall has a gate also. Before the Prescribed Authority this plea was not taken by the tenant Appellant specifically. The learned Counsel for the landlord-Respondent pointed out that the tenant had deposited rent u/s 7-C of U.P. Act III of 1947. Hence it was not open to the Appellant to turn round and say that the premises was not a building within the meaning of Section 3(i) of the Act. The learned Counsel for the landlord-Respondent orally offered during the course of arguments that the Appellant may give a statement to the effect that the premises did not amount to a building within the aforesaid provisions and his client would not proceed with the application u/s 21 of the Act and would take steps for ejectment of the tenant through the Civil Court. The learned Counsel for the Appellant was not prepared to give such a statement. In the grounds of appeal also this plea was not taken up specifically. The learned Counsel for the Appellant was not prepared to give such a statement. In the grounds of appeal also this plea was not taken up specifically. In this view of the matter I am not prepared to accept this contention of the tenant-Appellant and overrule it. The tenant has filed this writ petition reiterating the plea that the application u/s 21 was not maintainable and the learned District Judge committed mainfest error of law by applying the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have given my anxious consideration to the whole matter. Obviously the application for release was moved u/s 21 of the new Act. Sub-section (1) of this section lays down that the Prescribed Authority may on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the grounds stated therein are established. It makes it absolutely clear that an application u/s 21 can be moved only in respect of building under tenancy. Section 3(i) of the new Act defines 'building' as follows: Building" means a residential or a non-residential roofed structure and includes- 1. any land (including any garden) garages and outhouses appurtenant to such building; 2. any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building; 3. any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. Since Section 21 relates to eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy, the definition of the word 'tenant' also deserves to be reproduced. Section 3(a) says that the 'tenant' in relation to a building, means a person by whom its rent is payable and on the tenant's death in the case of a residential building, such only of his heirs as normally reside with him in the building at the time of his death and in the case of a non-residential building, his heirs. The explanation appended to it goes on to say that an occupant of a room in a hotel or lodging house shall not be deemed to be a tenant. 8. The crucial point that arises for consideration is whether the property for the release of which the application u/s 21 was moved falls within the ambit of the expression 'building under tenancy'. 8. The crucial point that arises for consideration is whether the property for the release of which the application u/s 21 was moved falls within the ambit of the expression 'building under tenancy'. A perusal of the Petitioner's own application u/s 21 makes it clear that he nowhere described it as a building. In all the paragraphs except paragraph 9 he was inclined to call it as land. Even at the foot of the application where boundaries were given these boundaries were alleged to be of the land and not of any building. In para 9 it was stated that the land in dispute covered about 350 sq. yards and most of it was lying vacant. Only in a portion of it one Kothri is situate. By this Kothri or by the existence of the boundary walls around the land, the learned District Judge was inclined to hold that it falls within the definition of 'building'. There is not a word in para 9 of the application u/s 21 to show that the' Kothri was constructed by the landlord and was let out by him. There is much less evidence on the record to show that the alleged Kothri which the tenant described only as a thatch, was constructed by the tenant with the consent of the landlord or any rent was agreed to be paid in respect thereof. According to both the parties, the rent was payable only in respect of the land. Therefore, the thatch or the Kothri, if erected by the tenant, could not form part of the tenanted accommodation and could not be treated as a building in his tenancy for the purpose of Section 21. Even factually when only land was let out it could not be treated as a building within the meaning of this word as given in Act XIII of 1972. it will not be out of place to refer to the case of Narain Chand Das v. Panna Lal 1969 AWR 52 in which the landlord had let out a piece of tand to the tenant and permitted him to construct a tin shed etc. The tenant was allowed to take away materials of construction at the time when he left the land. It was held that the land does not become an accommodation within the meaning of the Act. The tenant was allowed to take away materials of construction at the time when he left the land. It was held that the land does not become an accommodation within the meaning of the Act. In the instant case if the landlord is not the owner of the room or the thatch and there was also no agreement with the tenant that he would be entitled to this room or thatch at the time the land was vacated by him the landlord cannot lay his hands on it and cannot on its basis convert the land into building. 9. The learned District Judge had taken four factors into consideration in order to hold that this land is building. In the first place, he was of opinion that the plea of maintainability of the application was not raised before the Prescribed Authority and the same was not considered by him. Therefore, it will be presumed that the property in dispute is a building. It was absolutely wrong assertion of fact inasmuch as the tenant had given an application specifically raising a plea regarding maintainability of the application. In that application she had stated the ground on which the plea was based. As stated above, the Prescribed Authority had applied its mind to this question. 10. In the second place, the learned District Judge was inclined to hold that this plea was not raised in the grounds of appeal and in its absence the tenant cannot claim its advantage. It was also a wrong approach inasmuch as the learned District Judge himself permitted this plea to be raised and he addressed himself on this point at length. 11. In the third place, he attached much importance to the unwillingness of the learned Counsel for the tenant to give his statement that the property in dispute is a land. There is no such law under which a counsel for a parry can be compelled to give a particular statement. Even if the learned Counsel for the Petitioner refused to give that statement no adverse inference could be raised against the party regarding the nature of the property. It had to be proved as a fact. 12. Lastly, the learned District Judge attached great importance to the fact that in proceedings u/s 7-C the tenant had deposited rent of this property. According to him, Section 7-C applied only to accommodation or building. It had to be proved as a fact. 12. Lastly, the learned District Judge attached great importance to the fact that in proceedings u/s 7-C the tenant had deposited rent of this property. According to him, Section 7-C applied only to accommodation or building. By depositing rent the tenant will be deemed to have admitted that the property in dispute was building. It was also a wrong approach to the case inasmuch as no rights of the parties are decided u/s 7-C. In Shanti Devi v. Chandramukhi 1967 ALJ 788 it has been held that when the rent is deposited u/s 7-C the court becomes a sort of custodian of the amount but it does not have to decide whether any dispute or doubt has arisen as to the person entitled to receive the rent. It is for the Court hearing the suit for ejectment to decide whether the tenant was entitled to make a deposit u/s 7(c). If the property in dispute is not a building as defined under the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 it cannot become a building merely because the tenant deposited rent: u/s 7-C. No party can confer jurisdiction on a court by consent. 1974 ALJ 14 : Sheo Ji Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation. The application for release was not at all maintainable u/s 21 of the new Act and should have been rejected. Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them Bharat Singh and Another Vs. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405 and Chikkam Koreswara Rao Vs. Chikkam SubbaRao and Others, AIR 1971 SC 1542 . An admission is not conclusive and can be shown to be of erroneous nature Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, AIR 1956 SC 593 and N.B.C. Balajiwala v. G.V. Gosabhi AIR 1969 SC 100. In the instant case it is clear that only land was let out to the tenant liven if the boundary walls were erected by the landlord the land could not become a building. The thatch was raised by the tenant himself. Therefore, if he deposited rent u/s 7-C it was under an erroneous belief that it was building. Hence the deposit: could not be used as an admission. 13. The thatch was raised by the tenant himself. Therefore, if he deposited rent u/s 7-C it was under an erroneous belief that it was building. Hence the deposit: could not be used as an admission. 13. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 24-7-1973 and 9-1-1975 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge, Bulandshahr, respectively are quashed. Costs on parties.