Judgment.-This second appeal concerns the proper construction of a deed of sale of an item of immovable property. The purchaser in this case was the Church of South India Trust Association. The seller was one Annathai Ambrose. The sale was effected on 3rd September, 1957 for a lumpsum consideration of Rs. 10,000. The subject of sale was a block of punja land in Goripalayam in Madurai Town. The land was in T.S. No. 157112. The whole of that survey number was of the extent of 1 acre and 21 cents. The whole of it belonged to the vendor, Annathai Ambrose. Under the conveyance, however, she sold to the Church Association only a part of T.S. No. 1571 j2 as therein described. The deed was drawn up in Tamil. It had a schedule which gave both the extent of the land and its boundaries. The extent, as mentioned in the sale deed, was 46 cents or about 20,000 square feet. The boundaries described in the schedule were with reference to the then existing landmarks. On the northern and eastern sides of the land in question there were other lands belonging to third parties, and they carried their own distinct survey numbers. In the schedule to the sale deed they were so described. The boundaries on the southern and western sides could not, however, be so described. For both these boundaries fell in Annathai Ambrose’s own land, bearing the same survey number, namely, T.S. No. 1571 2. No plan or sketch was attached to the sale deed to demarcate the boundaries, especially the southern and western boundaries. 2. At the time of the execution of this sale deed, a Town-Planning Scheme had already been prepared for Chinna Chokkikulam Extension and Bibikulam Extension in Madurai Town. Both the Schemes covered, inter alia, portions of T.S. No. 157112. According to the Schemes, provision had been made for laying two Scheme roads, one running east to west and the other running north to south. Portions of these roads were planned to be laid over T. S. No. 157112. Annathai Ambrose had already given, or promised to give, to the Town-Planning authority such part of her land in T.S. No. 157112 as would be necessary to lay those Scheme roads. When Annathai Ambrose effected her conveyance in favour of the Church Association, the Scheme roads had not actually came into being. Annathai Ambrose had already given, or promised to give, to the Town-Planning authority such part of her land in T.S. No. 157112 as would be necessary to lay those Scheme roads. When Annathai Ambrose effected her conveyance in favour of the Church Association, the Scheme roads had not actually came into being. But it was apparently agreed between the parties that the two proposed Scheme roads should constitute the southern and western boundaries of the land sold. The schedule attached to the sale deed accordingly described the two boundaries thus: “On the south by that part of the land bearing T.S. No. 1571|2 given by the vendor for Chinna Chokkikulam Scheme Road, E-3 E-3 ; and on the west by the portion of the land given by the vendor for the Bibikulam Scheme Road, PP”. 3. The problem raised before me is whether the description contained in the sale deed fixing the southern and western boundaries in the manner aforesaid is definite and identifiable? A related question, which has also to be answered, is whether the extent stated in the sale deed should prevail over the boundaries, which were described, as aforesaid, in the sale deed? 4. These were also the two questions which had figured in the two Courts below. The questions arose because one Joshua claimed that a certain extent of land in the same T.S. No. 157112 belonged to him as a Pastor. He claimed title thereto under a gift deed made by the same Annathai Ambrose on 3rd May, 1917. This was nearly ten years after the purchase effected by the Church Association. On the strength of this gift deed in his favour Joshua had made excavations, dug a well and put up fences in what the Church Association claimed to be the southern part of their own land in the same survey number. Joshus, however, maintained that the plot of land gifted to him by Annathai Ambrose was different and did not form part of the land which the Church Association had purchased earlier. The upshot of this controversy was the filing of a suit by the Church Association against both Joshua and Annathai Ambrose for recovery of possession and also for mandatory injunction. Both the Courts below upheld Joshua’s claim. They expressed the view that what Annathai Ambrose had sold to the Church Association was only 46 cents in T.S. No. 157112. The upshot of this controversy was the filing of a suit by the Church Association against both Joshua and Annathai Ambrose for recovery of possession and also for mandatory injunction. Both the Courts below upheld Joshua’s claim. They expressed the view that what Annathai Ambrose had sold to the Church Association was only 46 cents in T.S. No. 157112. They further held that the subject-matter of the sale could not be properly identified with reference to the southern and western boundaries. They characterised the description of these boundaries in the sale deed as uncertain, imprecise and indefinite, for the reason that as on the date of the sale deed no actual roads had at all come into (existence and what were described in the schedule to the sale deed were only proposed roads under a paper Scheme. On this reasoning both the Courts below dismissed the suit. In this second appeal the Church Association challenges the validity of this conclusion. It may be mentioned that by this time both Joshua and Annathai Ambrose had died, and Annathai Ambrose’s heirs now figure as respondents to the second appeal. 5. Mr. T. R. Mani for the appellant argues that while the Church Association had lost in both the Courts below, that was because the matter had not been approached by either of them from a proper legal perspective. He said that the precise identity of the property purchased by the Church Association from. Annathai Ambrose was capable of being ascertained on a construction of the document of conveyance. While describing the property sold the deed sets out the four boundaries thereto. These, according to Mr. Mani, accurately, defined what was the subject-matter of the sale. The deed, no doubt, mentioned the extent, but it was only appropriate as indicated by the word Mr. Mani further pointed out that the property conveyed under the deed was not a whole survey number, but only a part of it and there was no mention of its measurements on the four sides, nor was any plan attached to the sale deed. In these circumstances, Mr. Mani contended that reliance must be placed wholly on the boundaries given in the document to determine the precise subject-matter of the conveyance. 6. In these circumstances, Mr. Mani contended that reliance must be placed wholly on the boundaries given in the document to determine the precise subject-matter of the conveyance. 6. The principle of construction of grants made under instruments in writing seems to be now well-settled not only in this country, but in many other systems as well. The principle accords with common sense and might be stated, broadly, thus: The subject-matter of the grant would depend on the intention of the parties as expressed in the relative conveyance deed. Where the deed sets out the extent and measurements correctly, there can be no difficulty in determining the subject-matter of the grant. But where no measurements are given or the extent mentioned in the deed is either vague or is only a rough and ready approximation, one has to look to other indications in the deed in order to fix the identity of the property which is the subject of the grant. If the deed in question sets out the boundaries of the property conveyed, then these boundaries will have to be accepted as a clear reflection of the intention of the grantor and they will conclude not only the exact positioning of the property conveyed, but also its True extent. The boundaries given in the deed will also, in such cases, prevail over the measurements given in the deed, if these are given as approximations. 7. These, as I understand the law, are the guidelines for the construction of written grants. During arguments as might be expected, there was no dearth of citation of case-law on the point under discussion. The cases referred to by learned counsel were not many, but they had a wide range. One of them, for instance, dealt with the position under the Ottoman law, and the decision was that of the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee were disposing of an appeal from the then Supreme Court of Palestine, and in the course of their judgment they had occasion to draw a parallel between the Ottoman law and the English rules of construction bearing on the same subject. Learned counsel for the respondents brought to my notice a recent decision of a learned single Judge of this Court which is noteworthy, if I may say so with respect, for its catalogue of case-law to date. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents brought to my notice a recent decision of a learned single Judge of this Court which is noteworthy, if I may say so with respect, for its catalogue of case-law to date. 8. But before I draw upon the authorities in some more detail, I think I may mention an argument or two addressed by learned counsel for the respondents with special reference to the facts of this case. He said ,in the first place1, that on the pleadings subscribed to by the plaintiff Association themselves, there was no case at all in the suit for the respondents to meet. He explained by saying that even according to the plaint averments the property purchased "by the Church Association was only of "the extent of 46 cents. If this were so, then, the land subsequently obtained by Joshua under the gift from Annathai Ambrose could not touch, much less overlap, the plaintiff’s property at any point or to any extent. It seems to me, however, that the arugment, so put, is "based on a misreading of the plaintiff’s pleadings. I have perused the plaint and the schedule thereto and also looked into the sketch attached to the plaint. I am satisfied that the plaintiff Association had not given up their case at all anywhere in their pleadings. On the contrary, their case had always been that the property purchased by them under the sale deed dated 3rd September, 1957 cannot be confined to 46 cents alone merely for the reason that the deed mentions that figure, but that the true extent of the land conveyed must be ascertained by reference to the boundaries of the property conveyed under the instrument. 9. Turning from the pleadings in the case to the concerned deed of sale, the respondents’ learned counsel submitted that the schedule to the deed clearly evinced an intention to pass the title only in’ respect of 46 cents. According to learned counsel, the figure mentioned was by no means an approximation. He conceded that there was a rider "approximately" in the schedule, but he explained it by saying that it referred not to 46 cents but to another calculation found in the sale deed, namely, 20,000 square feet. This argument seems to me to be based on a mis-conception. He conceded that there was a rider "approximately" in the schedule, but he explained it by saying that it referred not to 46 cents but to another calculation found in the sale deed, namely, 20,000 square feet. This argument seems to me to be based on a mis-conception. There are two measurements given in the sale deed, one in terms of cents and the other in terms of square feet. The sale deed also employs the qualifying adjective or approximately, in connection with the area of the land sold. In my view, there is no acceptable reason why the parties should have intended the qualification "approximately" to apply to one calculation and not to the other, both of which are found cheek by jowl with each other in the schedule to the sale deed. Nor is this all. In a contemporaneous receipt passed by the vendor in favour of the plaintiff Association, the qualifying adjective "approximately" is found employed by the vendor with reference to both the measurements, the one given on the basis of cents and the other on the basis of square feet. The obvious inference must, accordingly, be that the reference in the sale deed to 46 cents is merely an approximation, not intended to be a true guide to the correct extent of the entire subject-matter of the sale. We have, therefore, to face the question: which is to prevail in this sale deed, the boundaries or the extent? 10. On this question, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the principle that the boundaries should prevail over the extent mentioned in the document in a matter where the two were in conflict, cannot be applied in this case for the reason that the crucial boundaries were themselves indefinite and uncertain. According to the learned counsel, it was only in cases where the description of the boundaries was clear cut as against an inaccurate, inconsistent or confused statement of the extent or area that one is free to determine the subject-matter of sale by reference to the boundaries, but where the boundaries themselves are not easily determinable by reference to what is contained in the sale deed, the subject-matter of the sale has got to be fixed with reference only to the extent mentioned in this sale deed. Turning to the present case, learned counsel for the respondents said that the boundaries mentioned in the sale deed cannot be adopted, as the test, because two of the boundaries mentioned in the schedule, namely, the southern and the western, which are very material, are not clearly stated, but are indefinite and uncertain. It was further stated that those boundaries were imaginary and non-existent. It may be recalled that these two boundaries were rendered in the sale deed with reference to the two proposed Scheme roads under the Municipal Town-Planning Schemes. It is common ground that at the time of the sale by Annathai Ambrose in favour of the Church Association under deed dated 3rd September, 1957, the Scheme roads did not exist at all, and they were to become realities only several years afterwards, in 1966 or so. Learned counsel founded his argument on this factual consideration and said that since the two roads mentioned in the sale deed as the southern . and western boundaries were roads only on paper, they cannot be regarded as a clear cut indication to fix the location and the area of the property sold. Learned counsel cited the judgment of Natesan, J., in Kamakshi Ammal v. Ranganathan Chettiar1 , and relied on the ‘following observation: “For a sale deed of an extent identified by boundaries, it is essential that the boundaries must be well defined and identifiable”. The respondents’ learned counsel said that in this case the southern and the western boundaries were neither well defined nor identifiable for they were roads which were simply non-existent at the time of the execution of the sale deed. 11. I cannot accept these arguments as tenable. I agree, with respect, with Natesan, J., that the boundaries, if they are to be relied on as an over-riding aid to the construction of a property-schedule must be clear cut and well-defined. But I do not accept the argument of counsel that merely because the roads mentioned in the sale deed were but Scheme roads and had no physical existence at the date of the sale deed, the description of the boundaries was anytheless certain of definite. 12. But I do not accept the argument of counsel that merely because the roads mentioned in the sale deed were but Scheme roads and had no physical existence at the date of the sale deed, the description of the boundaries was anytheless certain of definite. 12. In the written statement filed by Joshua and Annathai Ambrose in the suit it was, inter alia, pleaded that the Scheme roads mentioned in the sale deed dated 3rd September, 1957 were only tentative and in the final Town-Planning Scheme the Scheme roads got shifted and realigned. But no evidence was given to make good this allegation either by summoning the town-planning-records or by examining the Town Surveyor. We must, therefore, proceed on the footing that the Scheme roads, E-3 E-3 running east to west and F-F running north to south, which were mentioned in the sale deed as forming the southern and western boundaries respectively were not altered either in blue print or in implementation. Besides, the sale deed did not describe the two boundaries as roads, but as land forming part of T. S. No. 1571/2 and belonging to the vender and which she had given for the purpose of formation of the Scheme roads. In order to fix precisely the boundaries so described all that was required was to refer to the blue print of the Town-Planning Schemes and then demarcate the boundaries for the suit property in T. S. No. 1571/2 along the same lines proposed for the Scheme roads. That there could be no room for doubt in drawing the boundaries on the land with reference to the blue print of the Scheme roads under the Town-Planning Scheme is found from the report of the Commissioner whom the trial Court had appointed for the purpose of identifying the property. The Commissioner with the assistance of the Town Surveyor had produced a neat sketch of the suit property with clear boundaries on all sides enclosing it. He also produced a report wherein he was able to describe the boundaries in words. In these events, it seems to me quite inapposite to dub as uncertain and undefinable the description of the southern and the western boundaries of the suit property as mentioned in the sale deed dated 3rd September, 1957. 13. He also produced a report wherein he was able to describe the boundaries in words. In these events, it seems to me quite inapposite to dub as uncertain and undefinable the description of the southern and the western boundaries of the suit property as mentioned in the sale deed dated 3rd September, 1957. 13. It may be that at the time of the sale deed the Scheme roads E-3 E-3 and F-F were only paper roads. But so too are survey numbers, which are only paper numbers, in a manner of speaking. One has to identify the surveyed lands with reference to survey numbers if one has to do it accurately. In the case of survey numbers, there are survey records. In the present case, the blue print and Scheme with the Town-Planning authorities do the function of survey maps and survey records. I remarked earlier that the sale deed itself did not contain any sketch or plan delineating the property by its boundaries. But two of its boundaries, the northern and the eastern, were easily identifiable by reference to other survey numbers. The other two boundaries, in my view, are no less identifiable for the fact that one has to go to the town-planning records rather than to the survey records to do That. The Equator is often described ,as an imaginary line, but for all that it is not difficult to fix its course at any point where it runs, if it became necessary. In the sale deed in question “in the present case, even if one describes the Scheme roads as imaginary, the place where they were proposed to be laid were by no means non-existent. They were very much real, and the vendor must have known the place well enough when she described the boundaries in terms thereof. I must, therefore, reject the contention that the narration of boundaries in this sale deed suffers from uncertainty and vagueness. 14. I had earlier referred, in passing, to a decision of the Privy Council, on a similar point arising under the Ottoman law. I regard that decision as particularly relevant in the context of the present case. The decision of the Judicial Committee is reported as P. K. A. B. Co-operative Society v. Government of Palestine1 . 14. I had earlier referred, in passing, to a decision of the Privy Council, on a similar point arising under the Ottoman law. I regard that decision as particularly relevant in the context of the present case. The decision of the Judicial Committee is reported as P. K. A. B. Co-operative Society v. Government of Palestine1 . The question in that case was whether the extent of a given grant was to be fixed by the boundaries or by the area as stated therein. The boundaries were not physically recognisable boundaries at the time of the grant, but on the basis of the indications in the deed of grant, they were subsequently demarcated. The Privy Council accepted the findings in regardto the fixation of the boundaries as decisive and proceeded to examine the question whether the extent of the grant could be fixed by those boundaries, or by the area as stated in the document Their Lordships decided that the principle of preferring a description by fixed boundaries to a conflicting description by area was applicable to the construction of the grant in question. Drawing parallels between English law and other systems, the Judicial Committee observed: "In English law the statement as to area therein would be rejected as falsa demonstration and their Lordships’ attention has not been called to, nor are they aware of, any provision of Ottoman law to the contrary effect. On these grounds they hold that what was granted in 1882 was what was contained by the boundaries as now determined." 15. It may be observed that in the Privy Council case, as in the instant case, the boundaries described in the deed of grant were not, at the moment of the grant, physically perceivable in the property conveyed. Nevertheless the principle, as stated by the Judicial Committee, would seem to be that if the boundaries mentioned in the deed, although not discernible at that time physically are yet capable of being subsequently demarcated from what is stated in the deed itself, then the description in the document, such as it contained, might be enough to invoke the principle that boundaries of the property conveyed will prevail over a conflicting description of its extent. 16. On the general proposition of law which attributes over-riding importance to boundaries as opposed to an inconsistent description of the extent of the property conveyed, Mr. 16. On the general proposition of law which attributes over-riding importance to boundaries as opposed to an inconsistent description of the extent of the property conveyed, Mr. Mani cited two decisions, both of this Court. The earlier decision is that of a Division Bench reported in Subbayya Chakkiliyan v. Muthiah Goundou1 . In that case it was laid down that ordinarily when a piece of land is sold with definite boundaries, unless it is very clear from the circumstances of the sale that a smaller extent than what is covered by the boundaries was intended to be sold, the rule of interpretation is that boundaries must prevail as against the measurements. It may be observed that the sale deed in the present case not only mentions the extent ever so approximately; it also lacks particulars of measurements. I regard, therefore, the ruling of the Division Bench as applicable a fortiori to the present case. 17. Mr. T. R. Mani also referred to a recent decision in Siviseshamuthu v. Gopalakrishna2 , wherein a learned single Judge of this Court, after citing the earlier authorities on the subject, reiterated the legal position to the effect that where the property sold is part of a definite survey number and in the relevant sale deed the exact boundaries of the part sold are given whereas the area mentioned is only approximate, the description by boundaries should prevail in ascertaining the actual property sold under the document. 18. It seems to me that the difficulties, if any, in this branch of the law relating to construction of grants lie, not so much in the ascertainment of principles, but in their application. In the present case both the Courts below had apparently consulted the authorities. Nevertheless they had arrived at wrong conclusions. This was because their approach to the case on hand was based on two cardinal misconceptions, namely, (i) that the description of the extent of the land sold under the conveyance was definite and (ii) that the boundaries set out in the sale deed were indefinite and uncertain. I have shown that on both aspects the Courts below had made a wrong approach. This had led to their misapplying the principles of construction to the suit document. 19. I have shown that on both aspects the Courts below had made a wrong approach. This had led to their misapplying the principles of construction to the suit document. 19. For the reasons stated above, I allow the second appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below and decree the suit as prayed for with costs here.