JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - The landlord's petition for quashing the order dated 13.1.1975 passed by the learned District Judge, Muzaffarnagar. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this petition are that Chaman Lal, father of the petitioner, was owner of the house No. 33 situate in Mohalla Kaharan in the city of Mazaffarnagar. He used to run flour mill in a portion of this house. Sometime after he sold the entire business to Devendra Kumar and Smt. Urmila Devi, wife of the brother of Devender Kumar and Smt. Urmila Devi, wife of the brother of Devender Kumar (opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2). These persons took the premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 30 on 17.11.1973 and began to run flour mill purchases by them. Sometime after, Chaman Lal died leaving behind a son, the petitioner, who became the landlord of the disputed accommodation. The petitioner moved an application under Section 16 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 for release of the building on the ground the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 had vacated it and started flour mill in another shop lying in front of the disputed shop. It was also alleged that the shop was bonafide required by him for his own use. On 21.12.1973 the Inspector went on the spot and gave a report stating that the premises were still in possession of the tenants and flour mill was being run. However, he found that the electric connection was disconnected more than a year back. On 17.12.1973 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer released the premises in favour of the landlord. Till this date the tenant had no notice of these proceedings. On 21.12.1973 the landlord moved an application for delivery of possession with the allegations that the premises in dispute were still locked by the tenants. On this application notices were ordered to be issued. A notice dated 21.12.1973 was given to one Jugal Kishore for service and he reported that Devendra Kumar was not available and his servant had refused to take the notice. The endorsement did not bear any date. Thereafter the landlord moved an application for police aid and ultimately took possession of the premises on 16.5.1974 after breaking open the locks. On 20th of May 1974, the tenants opposite parties Nos. The endorsement did not bear any date. Thereafter the landlord moved an application for police aid and ultimately took possession of the premises on 16.5.1974 after breaking open the locks. On 20th of May 1974, the tenants opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 moved an application under Section 16(5) of the new Act for review of that order. It was alleged that the premises were not vacant and that they got no notices of the proceedings of release. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application by holding that the accommodation was vacant and its possession was lawfully delivered. Aggrieved by this order the tenants filed an appeal under Section 18 of the Act, as it stood at that time. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the tenanted accommodation had neither fallen vacant nor it could be deemed to be vacant on the date the application for release was made or the release order was passed. He also held that the landlord himself had disconnected the electric connection and they were left with no option but to start their business in another shop adjacent to the accommodation in dispute but all through they remained in possession of the disputed shop and their machine etc. were lying in it. He also held that the landlord had kept the tenants in ignorance about the proceedings of release and obtained release order behind their back. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the release order dated 17.3.1973 was vacated. It was also ordered that the tenants shall be put back in the same position in which they were before the release order. 3. The landlord has filed this petition for quashing the said order passed by the learned District Judge. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the both sides and have given my anxious consideration to the whole matter. The primary question for consideration is whether the shop had fallen vacant or should be deemed to have fallen vacant when the release order was passed. So far as the factual position of vacancy is concerned, an Inspector was deputed were lying in this shop. The landlord also asserted that the shop was locked by the tenants. He had also filed a suit No. 340 of 1970 for ejectment of the tenant. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that factually the shop was not vacant. 5. The landlord also asserted that the shop was locked by the tenants. He had also filed a suit No. 340 of 1970 for ejectment of the tenant. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that factually the shop was not vacant. 5. Another question may arise whether the shop will be deemed to be vacant within the meaning of Section 12 of the Act. This section lays down that a landlord or a tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy building or part thereof if he has substantially removed his effects therefrom or has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family. Sub-clause (2) of it further lays down that in the case of a non-residential building where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. In the instant case sub-clause (2) does not apply at all because the tenants are not alleged to have admitted any one as a partner. Considerable reliance is placed on sub-clause (1) which says that a tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building if he has substantially removed his effect therefrom. A heavy burden lay on the landlord to prove that the tenants have substantially remove his effects from this shop. The Prescribed Authority's order does not discuss any material on the basis of which he may have arrived at the conclusion that the shop has become vacant. It merely says that the shop has become vacant and is released in favour of the landlord. The learned District Judge in appeal against the order of review has discussed everything in detail. In the first place, the Inspector had inspected the shop and found machine etc. lying in this shop. Even if some of the parts of the machine was sent for repairs to the machine the tenants cannot be said to have substantially removed their effects within the meaning of sub-clause (a). The landlord took absolutely no steps to show that what was actually lying in the shop was sufficient hold that it should be deemed to be vacant. Even if some of the parts of the machine was sent for repairs to the machine the tenants cannot be said to have substantially removed their effects within the meaning of sub-clause (a). The landlord took absolutely no steps to show that what was actually lying in the shop was sufficient hold that it should be deemed to be vacant. He could very well have got a commissioner appointed for this purpose but for reasons best known to him he did not choose to do so. Emphasis laid on two facts. Firstly, that the tenants have started the same business in an adjoining shop, so far as this statement is concerned, the tenants did not deny it and gave out that they were compelled to do so because the landlord had disconnected electric connection. Not an iota of evidence was given to show that some machine which was installed in the premises was removed to the new shop and, as such the disputed premises should be deemed to have fallen vacant. Therefore, on this score benefit of sub-clause (a) of the Section 12 cannot be given. 6. In the second place, it is urged that the tenants are not running the flour mill in the disputed premises for want of electricity and they should be deemed to have vacated it. It has also no force because the tenants' electric connection was disconnected by the landlord himself and it prevented them from carrying on business in this shop. Unless the landlord established that the tenants have substantially removed their effects from the shop, it cannot be deemed to have fallen vacant. The learned District Judge was, therefore, correct in holding that the shop has not fallen vacant and cannot legally be released in favour of the landlord. 7. Lastly, it is urged that the review application, should not have been allowed because after the release the circumstances have changed and the review order cannot be given effect to. It is based on two grounds. In the first place, it is contended that after the release the landlord took possession of the shop, renovated and remodelled it and made it a part of the residential accommodation and now it is not possible to deliver possession of the same to the tenants nor it can be used as a shop. I have gone through the affidavits filed by the parties in this connection. I have gone through the affidavits filed by the parties in this connection. The petitioner's affidavit states that he has renovated and remodeled the shop included it in his residential portion by closing the door opening towards the road and has opened a new door towards the inner side. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of the tenants shows that the landlord has simply closed the outer door to include the shop in the residential portion. It is categorically denied that the landlord has renovated or remodelled the shop. For reasons best known to the landlord he did not choose to have a commissioner appointed to inspect the disputed property and report what changes have been effected in it. If the shop has been renovated and remodelled he must have obtained sanction of the Municipal Board and the plan sanctioned could be filed but it was not done. The landlord did not even give details of the changes alleged to have been effected. There is nothing to suggest that dimensions have changed. If only the repairs have been done that cannot change the nature of the property. Similarly closing of the door towards the road and opening a new door in the inner portion cannot be registered as a material change which may interfere with the delivery of possession to the tenants. Before putting them in possession the landlord can once again open the door towards the road and close the door which they have opened in the inner side . If he thinks that he has made any improvements in the shop he can have the rent fixed by agreement or apply for fixation of standard rent. The manner in which the landlord ousted the tenants cannot be encouraged. He kept the tenants in utter ignorance of the release proceedings and after obtaining an ex parte release order evicted them with the help of police. He did not wait for further developments but included the shop in the residential portion by closing the door towards the road and opening a new door towards the inner side. The tenants were left with no option but to apply for review under Section 16(5). They had to fight upto this stage and suffer loss of their business. Therefore, on this ground the order of the learned District Judge cannot be interfered with. 8. The tenants were left with no option but to apply for review under Section 16(5). They had to fight upto this stage and suffer loss of their business. Therefore, on this ground the order of the learned District Judge cannot be interfered with. 8. In the second place it is urged that the tenants have taken another shop in front of the disputed shop and are running flour mill in it. Since they have acquired another shop they are not entitled to regain possession of the shop in dispute. It has also no force because the said shop in the tenancy of Arjun brother of Devender Kumar, opposite party as found by the Inspector. There is nothing to show since when he is a tenant of that shop. It is true that a flour mill is being run in that shop but it is not clear to whom the machine etc. filled therein belong. If on account of disconnection of electric connection in the disputed shop Arjun Kumar has allowed his wife and brother to run flour mill in his shop purely as a temporary measure the right of the tenants to regain possession of disputed shop cannot be denied. 9. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs on parties.