Judgement DHARMADHIKARI, J.:- The father of the petitioners, namely, Yeshwanta, was the original tenant from the year 1951-52 of the field S. No. 19/1, area 19 acres 32 gunthas of village Murdapur, Tahsil Chikhali, District Buldana. One Gopal son of Laxman was the original landholder who had leased out this field. By virtue of the provisions of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, Yeshwanta became the protected lessee of the said land. Thereafter Yesh­wanta had surrendered the tenancy and had also parted with the possession of the land in favour of the tenure-holder Gopal in the year 1956. The field in question was purchased by Trimbak, father of the respondents, vide register­ed sale deed dated 16-8-1956, for a con­sideration of Rs. 2,500/-. After this sale took place, Yeshwanta applied for re­storation of tenancy and possession under S. 10 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act). His application in that behalf was dismissed by the Tahsildar, vide order dated 10-10-1962. Being ag­grieved by the said order, he filed an appeal which was allowed by the Appel­late Court on 30-9-1963 and the revision application filed against the said order was dismissed by the Maharashtra Re­venue Tribunal on 30-6-1964. A special civil application was also filed before this Court challenging the said order but it was also dismissed and ultimate­ly Yeshwanta was placed in possession of the field in question on 4-4-1965. The original tenant Yeshwanta died on 3-5-1965 arid the present petitioners are his legal representatives. 2. Thereafter, the present respon­dents-landholders applied for possession of the said field, vide application dated 30-8-1968 purported to have been filed under Ss. 21, 43 (14-A) and 36 (2) of the Tenancy Act on the ground that since the petitioners-tenants had not exercised their right within the period prescribed by S. 50 of that Act, the land was deem­ed to have been surrendered in favour of the respondents-landholders. Subse­quently on 10-12-1968 an amendment application was filed before the Tenancy Naib Tahsildar by the respondents-tenure-holders contending that in the partition the said laid had fallen to the share of Eknath alone and therefore, the other respondents were mere formal parties. The said amendment applica­tion was allowed. It appears that the vendee Trimbak also died and there­fore, his legal representatives, namely, the present respondents had instituted these proceedings. The said amendment applica­tion was allowed. It appears that the vendee Trimbak also died and there­fore, his legal representatives, namely, the present respondents had instituted these proceedings. The tenancy Naib Tahsildar, Chikhali, vide order dated 6-1-1969, allowed the application of the respondents-landlords and directed that the petitioners should hand over posses­sion of the said land to respondent Eknath. Being aggrieved by this order, the present petitioners filed an appeal before the Deputy Collector, Land Re­forms, Buldana. The Deputy Collector, vide his order dated 15-4-1969, allowed the appeal and set aside the order pass­ed by the Tenancy Naib Tahsildar. Being aggrieved by this order, the respondent-tenure-holders filed a revision petition before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, vide its order dated 15-10-1970, allowed the revision petition and restored the order passed by the Tenancy Naib Tahsildar directing the petitioners-tenants to put respondent Eknath in pos­session of the suit field. It is this order which is challenged in this writ petition by the petitioners-tenants. 3. Initially when the matter came up for hearing before a single Judge of this Court, the learned Judge after hearing the matter directed that the petition should be placed before a Divi­sion Bench so that the questions raised and involved in this writ petition are authoritatively examined and settled. It appears from the referring order that the learned Judge came to the conclu­sion that an earlier decision of this Court in Govinda v. Udhao (1972) Mah LJ 588 : ( AIR 1972 Bom 169 ) requires reconsideration in view of the weighty submissions made before him. In view of this referring order, this writ peti­tion is placed before us for hearing and disposal. 4. Shri J. N. Chandurkar, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended before us that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Govind v. Udhao, 1972 Mah LJ 588 : ( AIR 1972 Bom 169 ) is the only possible view having regard to the provisions of Ss. 50, 43 (14-A) and 21 of the Tenancy Act. According to Shri Chandurkar, on a proper construction of these various provisions it is quite obvious that the landlord is not entitled to resume pos­session of the land unless an order is passed in that behalf under S. 36 (2) of the Tenancy Act. 50, 43 (14-A) and 21 of the Tenancy Act. According to Shri Chandurkar, on a proper construction of these various provisions it is quite obvious that the landlord is not entitled to resume pos­session of the land unless an order is passed in that behalf under S. 36 (2) of the Tenancy Act. In the present case, an application for possession was filed by the landlord beyond the prescribed period of two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the tend accrued to him and therefore, the application filed by him was liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. He further contended that the view taken by the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal that un­less an order is passed by the competent authority under S. 21, there is no cause of action for obtaining possession under S. 36, is obviously incorrect. He fur­ther contended that from a bare reading of the application as filed by the landlord, it is quite clear that he has filed the said application both under S. 36 as well as under S. 21 of the Tenancy Act and, therefore, the appli­cation which is filed beyond the period of two years from the date when the right to obtain possession accrued to him was liable to be dismissed being filed beyond the period of limitation. 5. On the other hand, it is contended By Shri R. R. Deshpande and Shri A. P. Moharil that by virtue of S. 50 of the Tenancy Act, if the tenant fails to exer­cise his right of purchase within one year, then by virtue of S. 43 (14-A), the land is deemed to have been surrender­ed to the landlord. In view of this deemed surrender of the land, no fur­ther proceedings under S. 36 are at all contemplated. Section 43 (14-A) of the Tenancy Act in clear terms lays down that only sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 21 and Chap. VII of the Act will apply to such a case because the land is deemed to be surrendered by the tenant under S. 20. It is open to the Tahsildar to hold an in­quiry under S. 21 (1) and (2) for finding out as to whether the landlord is en­titled to retain the laid which is deem­ed to be surrendered. VII of the Act will apply to such a case because the land is deemed to be surrendered by the tenant under S. 20. It is open to the Tahsildar to hold an in­quiry under S. 21 (1) and (2) for finding out as to whether the landlord is en­titled to retain the laid which is deem­ed to be surrendered. Once such in­quiry to held under S. 21, no further order under S. 36 (2) is necessary. Shri Deshpande further contended that even assuming that the order under S. 36 (2) is necessary, then also the cause of action for filing such an application will accrue to the landlord after completion of the inquiry contemplated by Sec­tion 21 (1) and (2). It will be that date on which the right to obtain possession of the land will be deemed to have ac­crued to the landlord and, therefore, the view taken by the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal that the application was not barred by limi­tation is perfectly legal and correct. It was further contended by Shri Desh­pande that to a case governed by S. 50 of the Tenancy Act, only the first part of S. 43 (14-A) will apply and the latter part of the said section which makes the provisions of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 21 and Chap. VII of the Act applicable to such a deemed surrender, will not apply. According to him, the phraseology used, in sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 clearly indi­cates that since there is a failure to exercise the right conferred upon the tenant by S. 50, the land itself stands surrendered. Therefore, it is further contended by him that once the land it­self is surrendered, then the landlord is entitled to take possession of the same without any order from any of the au­thorities contemplated by the Tenancy Act. In view of this, according to Shri Deshpande, as a matter of fact the ap­plication for possession itself was not necessary though it was filed by the landlord by way of abundant caution. 6. From the rival contentions raised before us, therefore, it is quite clear that the counsel for both the parties agreed that the provisions of S. 43 (14-A) of the Tenancy Act will apply even to a case which is governed by S. 50. 6. From the rival contentions raised before us, therefore, it is quite clear that the counsel for both the parties agreed that the provisions of S. 43 (14-A) of the Tenancy Act will apply even to a case which is governed by S. 50. The only dispute raised before us by Shri Deshpande on behalf of the landlord is that only the first part of the said sub­section will apply and not the latter part. It is not possible for us to accept this interpretation put forward by Shri Deshpande that the latter part of the sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 will not apply to such a case. It is quite clear from a bare reading of S. 50 that the said sec­tion has application to the cases where the tenancy is restored under Ss. 7, 10, 21, 52 or 128-A or is created by a land­lord after the date specified in sub-s. (1) of S. 49-A. The date specified in Sec­tion 49-A (1) is 1st April 1963. In the case before us it is an admitted position that possession was restored to the ori­ginal tenant Yeshwanta on 4-4-1965 after the date specified in S. 49-A (1). It is further clear from the admitted facts in the present case that in this case pos­session was restored to the tenant after the amended provisions of S. 50 came into force. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the provisions of S. 50 as amended will govern the present case. Section 50 as amended reads as follows: " Where a tenancy is restored under Ss. 7, 10, 21, 52 or 128-A or is created by a landlord not being a landlord with­in the meaning of Chap. III-A in any area after the date specified in sub-sec­tion (1) of S. 49-A, every tenant holding land under such tenancy and cultivating it personally shall be entitled to pur­chase within one year from the com­mencement or as the case may be, the restoration of the tenancy so much of such land as he may be entitled to pur­chase under S. 41 and the provisions of Ss. 41 to 44 (both inclusive) shall mutatis mutandis apply to such purchase." From a bare reading of S. 50, therefore, it is quite clear that if a tenant whose possession is restored under S. 10 after 1st April 1963 does not exercise his right of purchase within one year from the said date of restoration, then the provi­sions of S. 43 (14-A) will apply to his case mutatis mutandis. Section 43 (14-A) of the Tenancy Act reads as under : " If a tenant fails to exercise his right of purchase under S. 41 in respect of any land or the purchase of any land becomes ineffective, the land shall be deemed to have been surrendered to the landlord, and thereupon, the provisions of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 21 and Chap­ter VII shall apply to such land as if the land was surrendered by the tenant under S. 20." From a bare reading of this sub-sec­tion, it is clear that in its turn it makes the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21 and Chapter VII applicable to a case of deemed surrender as if the land was surrendered by the tenant under S. 20. Section 20 of the Tenancy Act deals with the termination of tennancy by surrender. This contemplates a voluntary surrender executed by a tenant in writing which is duly verified by the Tahsildar in the prescribed man­ner. Obviously the surrender contem­plated by S. 43 (14-A) is not a surrender executed in writing as contemplated by S. 20 and this was the reason why a fiction was created by the Legislature in sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43. It is well-settled that a deeming fiction should be carried to its logical conclusion. The words " as if" are used in sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 to make the scheme relating to surren­der applicable. 7. Then come sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21 which read as under: " 21. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where a tenancy is termi­nated by surrender under S. 20, the landlord shall be entitled to retain so much only of such land as will prevent the total area which he cultivates per­sonally, whether as tenure-holder or tenant, or both from exceeding three family holdings. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where a tenancy is termi­nated by surrender under S. 20, the landlord shall be entitled to retain so much only of such land as will prevent the total area which he cultivates per­sonally, whether as tenure-holder or tenant, or both from exceeding three family holdings. (2) The Tahsildar shall hold an in­quiry and declare whether the whole, or what part (if any) of the land surrender­ed the landlord is entitled to retain un­der sub-sec. (1), and notwithstanding anything in that sub-section, he may adjust by reduction or increase the area of any such part to be retained, but only so as to ensure that such part is not a fragment. The tahsildar shall declare any land surrendered, which the landlord is not entitled to retain under the provi­sions aforesaid, to be surplus land." Section 21 as a whole deals with the land or portion thereof which the land­lord is not entitled to retain on surren­der as a result of which the land is de­clared as surplus. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 21, therefore, lay down that the landlord will not be entitled to retain in his possession land exceeding three family holdings, whether as tenure-holder or as tenant, and for this purpose an inquiry under sub-sec. (2) of S. 21 is contemplated. If on inquiry the Tahsildar finds that there is surplus land, then a declaration in that behalf is called for. The result of this declaration will be that the authorities will be entitled to assume management of this land under Chapter VII of the Tenancy Act. Chap­ter VII of the Tenancy Act deals with assumption of management of surplus lands. By sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 this Chapter is also made applicable to the lands which are deemed to be surren­dered. Therefore, in our opinion, all these sections will have to be read to­gether and construed harmoniously. 8. It is a well-settled rule of inter­pretation that the Court is entitled and indeed bound, when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute, to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light on the intention of the Legislature, and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be alone and apart from the rest of the Act. The statute must be read as a whole and every provision in the statute must be construed with reference to the context and other clauses in the statute so as, as far as possible to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute: See Hubli Municipality v. Subba Rao ( AIR 1976 SC 1398 ). Therefore, in our opinion, it is not possible to read S. 50 or sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 in isolation. On the contrary, it will have to be read and construed with reference to the context of other clauses in the statute to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute and that too keeping in view the aims and objects of the legislation. This Court had an occasion to consider the salient features of the Tenancy Act in Harikishan v. Krishnaji, 1976 Mah. LJ 537: (AIR 1977 Bom 331). After no­ticing the various provisions of the Ten­ancy Act, in para. 4 (of Mah LJ) : (para. 4 of AIR) the Full Bench observed: " Certain salient features of the Act shall have to be borne in mind to as­certain the true impact of these condi­tions. The right of the landlords to re­sume their lands under the ordinary law of the land is subjected to several limi­tations under the Act. This piece of legislation reflects the agrarian policy of the State formulated in compliance with the Directive Principles of the Constitu­tion. Firstly, the underlying object is to eliminate the absentee landlord from the scene step by step and ensure trans­fer of the land to the tiller finally. Se­condly, the rights of the persons per­sonally cultivating the land are prefer­red and precedence is given to them in all respects till the ownership gets trans­ferred to them. Thirdly some of the pro­visions of the Act are based on the hypothesis that an area of three family holdings satisfies the needs of an agri­culturist family, absorbs its cultivating capacity, enables it to concentrate and improve the yield of the land and dis­courages it from exploiting the labour of others. This limit also appears to have been aimed at preventing the concentra­tion of land in the same hands and faci­litating distribution of such surplus land on lease to the needy under S. 84 of the Act. The Act itself does not provide directly for acquiring land in excess of three family holdings from the holders. This limit also appears to have been aimed at preventing the concentra­tion of land in the same hands and faci­litating distribution of such surplus land on lease to the needy under S. 84 of the Act. The Act itself does not provide directly for acquiring land in excess of three family holdings from the holders. However, acquisition of ownership by the tenant, under Ss. 42, 46 and 49-A or resumption of land from the tenant in addition to other restrictions is limited to such area as would, together with the land already under personal cultivation, not exceed the area of three family hold­ings. Even after surrender of land by the tenant, the landlord is not permitted under S. 21 to retain area more than is necessary to make up the total of three family holdings for his personal cultiva­tion, the remaining area being treated as surplus. Fourthly, after the Tillers' Day all lands excepting the categories cover­ed by Chapters IV to VI are intended to be statutorily disposed of either by transferring the same to the tenants as owners to make up the total of three family holdings for their personal culti­vation under S. 42 or 49-A (4), or failing that, to restore to the landlord under S. 43 (14-A) read with S. 46 and Ss. 21 and 49-A (5) read with S. 21, and failing that, to transfer to the pool of surplus land for disposal under S. 84 of the Act." 9. Therefore, while construing the various provisions, the scheme of the Act as a whole will have to be consider­ed. If even after surrender of land by a tenant, the landlord is not permitted to retain area more than is necessary to make up the total of three family holdings for his cultivation, in view of the provisions of S. 21 of the Tenancy Act, then in our opinion, it will not be proper to construe that the landlord can be per­mitted to retain area more than three family holdings in cases of deemed sur­renders. If the Legislature in its wis­dom has treated the surrender under S. 43 (14-A) as if the land was surren­dered by the tenant under S. 20, and while doing so it also made a specific mention of sub-secs. If the Legislature in its wis­dom has treated the surrender under S. 43 (14-A) as if the land was surren­dered by the tenant under S. 20, and while doing so it also made a specific mention of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21 and Chapter VII of the Act by further laying down that these provisions shall apply to such deemed surrender also, then, in our opinion, it will not be cor­rect to say that only the first part of sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 will apply to the cases governed by S. 50. Once it is held or conceded that the provisions of sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 will apply to a case governed by S. 50 also, then, in our opinion, the necessary and natural con­sequences resulting from the said appli­cation must also enure. 10. However, it was contended by Shri R. R. Deshpande that even if it is assumed that the provisions of S. 21 (1) (2) of the Tenancy Act will apply to such a case from this an inference can­not be drawn that the landlord cannot take possession of the land unless an order contemplated by S. 36 (2) is pass­ed. According to him, the phraseology used in sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 clearly indicates that the land will itself stand surrendered. In this context, he has relied upon the phraseology used in Sec­tion 20 wherein an expression is used " A tenant may terminate the tenancy at any time by surrendering his interest as a tenant in favour of the landlord" . Ac­cording to Shri Deshpande, S. 20 deals with the termination of tenancy by sur­rendering the interest of a tenant in fav­our of the landlord whereas by sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43, the land itself is deemed to be surrendered to the land­lord. This cannot be equated with sur­rendering of the interest in the land. In our opinion, the distinction drawn by the learned counsel in that behalf is most artificial. By sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 it­self the Legislature in the clearest terms had declared that the said deeming sur­render will be treated as if the land was surrendered by the tenant under S. 20. The Legislature has further clarified its intention by stating that the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21 and Chapter VII of the Tenancy Act shall apply to such deemed surrender also. The Legislature has further clarified its intention by stating that the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21 and Chapter VII of the Tenancy Act shall apply to such deemed surrender also. If the said surrender is to be treated as if it is a surrender under S. 20 and the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21 are to apply to such a surrender, then, in our opinion, though different phraseo­logies are used in these sections, they will have to be given the same meaning. Surrender of interest in the land and surrender of land will mean the same thing for all practical purposes. If this is so, in our opinion, the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21 will apply with all force to the deemed surrender which is covered by sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 of the Tenancy Act. 11. Section 36 of the Tenancy Act deals with the procedure of taking pos­session. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 lays down a prohibition on the landlord in the mat­ter of resumption of possession of any land held by a tenant. Sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 36 of the Tenancy Act are as under: " 36. (1) A tenant or an agricultural labourer/or artisan entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house or site used for any allied pursuit under any of the provisions of this Act or as a result of eviction in contravention of sub-s. (2) may apply in writing for such possession to the Tahsildar. The application shall be made in such form as may be prescribed and within a period of three years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land, dwel­ling house or site is deemed to have ac­crued to the tenant, agricultural labour­er or artisan, as the case may be. (2) Save as otherwise provided in sub-sec. (3-A), no landlord shall obtain pos­session of any land, dwelling house or site used for any allied pursuit held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar. (2) Save as otherwise provided in sub-sec. (3-A), no landlord shall obtain pos­session of any land, dwelling house or site used for any allied pursuit held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar. For obtaining such order he shall make an application in the prescribed form and within a period of two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land, dwel­ling house or site, as the case may be, is deemed to have accrued to him." From a bare reading of sub-sec. (2) it is clear that the landlord cannot obtain possession of any land held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar. For obtaining such an order he must file an application in the prescribed form within a period of two years from the date on which the right to obtain posses­sion of the land is deemed to have ac­crued to him. Sub-sec. (1) deals with the procedure of taking possession so far as the tenant is concerned. In case the tenant is dispossessed of any land as a result of eviction which is in contraven­tion of sub-sec. (2), then he has a right to obtain possession of the land under sub-sec. (1). The jurisdiction of the civil court to settle, decide or deal with the matters which the Tahsildar is required to settle, decide or deal with under the Act is barred by Ss. 124 and 125 of the Act. Section 120 deals with the sum­mary eviction but it has no application to the cases which are governed by S. 36. The question as to whether a landlord is entitled to take possession of the land as a result of surrender under S. 20 without taking recourse to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 fell for conside­ration of this Court in Madhao v. Maha­rashtra Revenue Tribunal, 1970 Mah LJ 991: ( AIR 1971 Bom 106 ) (FB) After reviewing the whole case law the Full Bench came to the conclusion that S. 36 (2) is plenary and controls S. 20. Thus, without an order of the Tahsildar for possession a tenant does not cease to be a tenant even though he has handed over possession of the land he held as a tenant and even though the surrender is verified under the proviso to S. 20 read with R. 11. Thus, without an order of the Tahsildar for possession a tenant does not cease to be a tenant even though he has handed over possession of the land he held as a tenant and even though the surrender is verified under the proviso to S. 20 read with R. 11. In this context, a reference could usefully be made to the observa­tions of the Full Bench in paras. 11, 12 and 18 of the said decision: " 11. All that S. 20 says is that the tenancy is terminated upon the tenant surrendering his interest as a tenant in favour of the landlord. We have already shown that the definition includes in the word tenant a person who is in lawful possession or cultivation. Such a person would by the mere fact of possession be a tenant but he would thereby enter into a statutory relationship with the land­lord, and all that S. 20 says is that by any act of surrender on his part it is that statutory relationship which is put to an end to. But the section does not say that he will cease to be a tenant. Indeed, he cannot cease to be a tenant so long as he continues in possession be­cause being in lawful possession he is deemed to be a tenant Section 20 does not speak of possession at all. Therefore, in the case of a deemed tenant, S. 20 cannot possibly have the result of mak­ing the tenant cease to be a tenant un­less an order taking away his possession is also passed. Without making any pro­vision, as regards the essential ingredi­ent in the definition of tenant, viz., possession, we cannot accept that S. 20 alters the position of a tenant qua ten­ant. We will show a little later that the same is the position in regard to various other provisions of the Act which regu­late the relationship of landlord and tenant, but none of these provisions, while regulating the relationship, make any provision for possession. The sub­ject of possession, is relegated to a sepa­rate section, and dealt with as an exclu­sive subject, and that is in S. 36, and so we turn to consider its provisions. 12. Reading S. 36 it is clear from the language of sub-sec. (1) that it is sub­ject to sub-sec. (2). The scheme of the section shows that really it is sub-sec. 12. Reading S. 36 it is clear from the language of sub-sec. (1) that it is sub­ject to sub-sec. (2). The scheme of the section shows that really it is sub-sec. (2) which lays down the general rule which governs the provisions of sub-sec. (1). Sub-sec. (1) gives the right to a tenant entitled to the possession of any land " as a result of eviction in contravention of sub-sec. (2)" to apply in writing for such possession to the Tahsildar, and sub-sec. (2) categorically lays down the general ride that no landlord shall ob­tain possession of any land held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar. In the light of what we have said above we may note that in the entire context of possession the word ' tenancy' is not used in S. 36 but throughout the reference is only to ' ten­ant' . The concept of possession has rele­vance only to the definition of ' tenant' because it includes ' deemed tenants' . Thus reading sub-secs. (1) and (2) toge­ther, it is clear that no landlord can ever obtain possession of tenant' s land with­out an order granting him possession passed by the Tahsildar and the tenant is given the right where his possession is thus taken away to apply in writing for such possession to the Tahsildar. We can see no reason why, if possession is thus taken away because a tenant has surrendered his tenancy, the provisions of S. 36 would not be attracted. * * * * 18. The provisions of S. 20 read with the provisions of S. 36 (1) and (2) there­fore show that although the tenancy of a tenant may be terminated by a valid surrender by the tenant surrendering his interest as a tenant in favour of the land­lord, and although the surrender may be verified as required by the proviso to S. 20 by the Tahsildar and possession may be with the landlord, still the per­son who was in enjoyment of the land continues as a tenant until an order for possession is made in favour of the land­lord. Although possession may have been given pursuant to a surrender by the tenant, the Act still regards the delivery of possession and the surrender as the acts of a tenant, though there may be a considerable time-lag between the exe­cution of the surrender deed and the delivery of possession. The tenant, des­pite the time-lag, surrenders possession as a tenant, and therefore the provisions of sub-sec. (2) would apply. The land­lord must therefore obtain an order for possession in his favour even though a valid and verified surrender may have been made in his favour and he may be in possession thereof." From these observations of the Full Bench it is quite obvious that the land­lord cannot obtain possession of land without taking recourse to sub-sec. (2) of S. 36. If that is the position in case of a surrender duly executed in writing, then, in our opinion, in view of the pro­visions of sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 which deals with the deemed surrenders, the same principle should apply. Even a sur­render contemplated by sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 is a surrender by a tenant under S. 20. This is the result of the fiction created by the Legislature by using the words ' as if' . This fiction created by the Legislature will have to be given its nor­mal effect and, therefore, the said sur­render is also a surrender as if executed under S. 20 of the Tenancy Act. 12. Precisely this is the view taken by the learned single Judge of this Court in Govinda v. Udhao, 1972 Mah LJ 588: ( AIR 1972 Bom 169 ). As we are in agree­ment with the view taken by the learn­ed single Judge in the said decision, in our opinion, it is not necessary to re­state all the reasons in support of the said view. 13. However, in this context refer­ence could usefully be made to a deci­sion of this Court in K. K. Verma v. Union of India ( AIR 1954 Bom 358 ) which is approved by the Supreme Court in Yeshwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (AIR 1966 SC 620). In paras 4 and 5 of the said decision the Bombay High Court observ­ed as under: " Now, the English law seems to be that when a landlord terminates the tenancy of a tenant, the tenant becomes a tenant on sufferance. In paras 4 and 5 of the said decision the Bombay High Court observ­ed as under: " Now, the English law seems to be that when a landlord terminates the tenancy of a tenant, the tenant becomes a tenant on sufferance. He occupies that position because the landlord has not expressed his agreement or disagreement with the tenant continuing in possession. But as soon as the landlord expresses his clear intention that the tenant should not continue, then the possession of the tenant becomes wrongful against the landlord and the tenant is in the posi­tion of a trespasser. The well-known authority on Landlord and Tenant, by Kill and Redman, 11th Edn., at p. 493, states: ' After the determination of the ten­ancy any act of the landlord showing an intention to take possession is sufficient to revest the possession in him so that the tenant becomes a trespasser.' It seems to us that the author has ad­visedly emphasised the fact that the act of the landlord showing his intention should be after the determination of the tenancy. But Mr. Desai says that this only applies to cases where a tenancy runs out by efflux of time, but this would not apply to a case where a land­lord gives a notice to quit and in the notice itself he makes it clear that he wants possession of the premises. Mr. Desai says that if the landlord has ex­pressed that intention in the notice, then on the termination of the tenancy by reason of the notice the possession of the tenant becomes wrongful and he be­comes trespasser. In this particular case Mr. Desai says that the notice to quit makes it clear that the landlord wanted possession on the termination of the tenancy and therefore, according to Mr. Desai, the respondent became a trespasser on 1st August, the tenancy having expired on July 31. Now, no authority has been cit­ed to us which has laid down that in the case of a termination of a tenancy by a notice an act of the landlord antecedent to the termination of the tenancy would vest the property in him immediately after the termination of the tenancy and the tenant would become a trespasser. Now, no authority has been cit­ed to us which has laid down that in the case of a termination of a tenancy by a notice an act of the landlord antecedent to the termination of the tenancy would vest the property in him immediately after the termination of the tenancy and the tenant would become a trespasser. The statement of the law just referred to in Hill and Redman on Landlord and Tenant would rather go to show that in every case a landlord must express his intention by some act which is subse­quent to the termination of the tenancy and the reason for that seems to be clear because after the termination of the tenancy, - however the tenancy may be terminated, - there is as it were a neutral position created. The landlord may consent to the tenant continuing, may accept rent from him, in which case the tenant would become a tenant at will. He may, on the other hand, make it clear that he does not want the tenant to continue in possession in which case the tenancy on sufferance which was created by the termination of the ten­ancy would cease and the tenant would become a trespasser. But, in our opinion, the position in English law is unnecessary to be consi­dered because, as we shall present­ly point out, the law in India is essential­ly different, and even assuming Mr. Desai is right that under the English law on the facts of this case the tenant became a trespasser, the same position would not arise under the Indian law. Under the Indian law, the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is pro­tected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical and that pos­session is protected by statute. Under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under S. 9 and claim possession against the true owner. Therefore, our law makes a clear and sharp distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant. Therefore, our law makes a clear and sharp distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant. Whereas the trespasser' s possession is never juridical and never protected by law, the posses­sion of an erstwhile tenant is juridical and is protected by law. Therefore, as far as the Indian Law is concerned, an erstwhile tenant can never become a trespasser. It may or may not be that in English Law in certain circumstances he can become a trespasser and it does seem that the landlord can enter the pre­mises and deprive the erstwhile tenant of his possession, but in India a landlord can only eject his erstwhile tenant by re­course to law and by obtaining a decree for ejectment. Therefore, when we are construing the expression ' unauthorised person' , we must assume that the Legislature knew the distinction that was drawn in law between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant, and therefore, what we have to decide is whether in using the expression ' unauthorised person' the legisla­ture was only contemplating ' trespas­sers' in the sense in which that word is understood in Indian Law or was also contemplating an erstwhile tenant who ceased to be a tenant by reason of the termination of his tenancy. (5) Now, there is no doubt that the respondent entered into these premises under a proper title, that his occupation was authorised and that his possession after the termination of the tenancy, as already pointed out, was a juridical pos­session. On the other hand, in the case of a trespasser from its very inception his possession is unlawful and at no point of time could it be said of a trespasser that his possession was juridical. In our opinion, the Legislature was not so much emphasizing the point of time when it used the expression ' any person is in unauthorised occupation' as the nature of the possession of the person referred to in that sub-clause. ' Is' obivously is used in the present perfect tense rather than in the present tense and ' is in un­authorised occupation' means that the occupation was unauthorised to start with and continued to be unauthorised throughout the time that the person was in possession. ' Is' obivously is used in the present perfect tense rather than in the present tense and ' is in un­authorised occupation' means that the occupation was unauthorised to start with and continued to be unauthorised throughout the time that the person was in possession. As we have already pointed out, that this is a penal statute and therefore it would not be proper to give a wider interpretation to the expression ' unautho­rised occupation' if a narrower interpre­tation was possible, and in our opinion, the Legislature never intended that a person who entered with title and whose title came to an end and who continued in possession which possession was a juridical possession protected by law was a person of whom it could be said that he was in unauthorised occupation of Government premises. It may be pointed out that the Limitation Act also clearly makes a distinction between the possession of an erstwhile tenant and a trespasser. If a landlord wants to eject his tenant whose tenancy has been terminated, the article which applies is Art. 139, where­as when an owner wants to proceed against a trespasser, the article which would apply is Art. 144. Therefore, our law in its different aspects has always considered the position of an erstwhile tenant to be different from that of a trespasser, and what Mr. Desai is at pains to do is to equate the position of a tenant whose tenancy has been termi­nated with that of a trespasser. In our opinion, unless the Legislature had given indication of a clear intention that by the expression ' unauthorised occupation' it meant not only persons who had no title at all but also persons who had title at the inception and whose title came to an end, it would not be proper to give an interpretation to the expres­sion ' unauthorised occupation' which would run counter to the principles of law which have been accepted in this country." 14. However, reliance was placed by Shri R. R. Deshpande upon another de­cision of the Supreme Court in Trustees of A. M. B. of Padra v. K. I. Shankarbhai ( AIR 1976 SC 965 ) and it was contended that in view of the deemed surrender it was open to the landlord to terminate the tenancy by issuing a proper notice and thereafter to recover possession of the property through the civil court. In substance, therefore, it was contended by him that once the tenancy comes to an end in view of the deemed surrender, the landlord need not take recourse to the provisions of S. 36 (2) of the Act but can file a civil suit for obtaining posses­sion. He further contended that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Madhao v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, 1970 Mah LJ 991 : ( AIR 1971 Bom 106 ) is, therefore, no more good law. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. The appellants in the case before the Supreme Court were trustees of public religious trusts registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. There was no dispute between the parties that the appellants were entitled to institute a suit for recovery of possession of the property in view of the certificate issu­ed by the Deputy Collector under S. 88-B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultu­ral Lands Act, 1948, and in that context the provisions of S. 4-B of the Bombay Tenancy Act fell for consideration be­fore the Supreme Court. Section 88-B of the Bombay Tenancy Act as applicable to Gujarat Region, provided for exemption from certain provisions of the Act to the land held by the trust. The pro­visions of S. 29 of the Bombay Tenancy Act which are similar to the provisions of S. 36 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act are not applicable to such tenancies in view of the provisions of S. 88-B of the Bombay Tenancy Act as applicable to Gujarat Region or S. 129 of the Vidar­bha Tenancy Act. Therefore, that was a case where the Supreme Court was con­cerned with a case which was governed by S. 129 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act to which S. 36 itself was not applicable. In this view of the matter, in our opin­ion, the said decision of the Supreme Court is obviously distinguishable. By virtue of S. 129 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act the provisions of S. 36 are not ap­plicable to the properties held by a trust. If the provisions of S. 36 (2) are not applicable, then obviously the landlord is not prohibited from obtaining possession under the common law. But this will not be the position in cases to which sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 applies. If the provisions of S. 36 (2) are not applicable, then obviously the landlord is not prohibited from obtaining possession under the common law. But this will not be the position in cases to which sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 applies. In such cases, the landlord is not permitted to obtain possession of any land held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar under S. 36 (2) of the Act and, there­fore, to such a case the law laid down by the Full Bench in Madhao v. Maha­rashtra Revenue Tribunal (cit. sup.) will obviously apply. 15. Once it is held that the landlord is not entitled to obtain possession of the land unless he files an application under S. 36 (2) of the Tenancy Act, then obviously the landlord will have to file such an application in the prescribed form and within a period of two years from the date on which the right to ob­tain possession of the land is deemed to have accrued to him. According to Shri Deshpande, the right to obtain posses­sion of the land will be deemed to have accrued to the landlord after a finding is recorded by the Tahsildar in an in­quiry contemplated under S. 21 (1) and (2). According to Shri Deshpande, unless a decision in that behalf is given by the Tahsildar, a right to obtain possession itself will not accrue to the landlord and, therefore, the period of two years should be counted from the date of the order passed by the Tahsildar under sub-sec. (2) of S. 21. In substance, there­fore, according to the learned counsel, two independent and separate inquiries are contemplated before possession is delivered to the landlord. It is not possible for us to put such a construction on the provisions of these sub-sections. By sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 only sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21 are made ap­plicable to the cases of deemed surren­der. Other sub-sections of S. 21, namely, sub-sees. (3), (4) and (5), are not applic­able to a case of deemed surrender which is covered by sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43. Therefore, it is quite obvious that prima facie an order directing restora­tion of possession cannot be passed by the Tahsildar under the proceedings un­der S. 21, sub-secs. (1) and (2). It deals with the declaration of surplus and which the landlord is not entitled to re­tain. (14-A) of S. 43. Therefore, it is quite obvious that prima facie an order directing restora­tion of possession cannot be passed by the Tahsildar under the proceedings un­der S. 21, sub-secs. (1) and (2). It deals with the declaration of surplus and which the landlord is not entitled to re­tain. The expression used, namely, " en­titled to retain possession" is also signi­ficant. Where there is a deemed surren­der because of the failure on the part of the tenant to exercise his right to pur­chase within one year from the com­mencement of the tenancy or the restora­tion of the land, obviously the right to obtain possession will accrue on such failure. In a given case where the ten­ancy itself is disputed by the landlord, there might be a dispute about the date of commencement of the tenancy itself. But where there is no such dispute, then the right to obtain possession will obvi­ously accrue after the expiry of the period of one year when the tenant be­comes entitled to purchase the land from the date of the commencement of the tenancy or restoration of tenancy. The tenant is entitled to purchase so much of such land as he may be entitled to purchase under S. 41 and then the pro­visions of Ss. 41 to 44 (both inclusive) shall apply to such a purchase mutatis mutandis. The words used in the brac­kets in S. 50, namely, ' both inclusive' make it clear that the provisions of Ss. 41 to 44 including S. 43 shall apply to such a purchase. Sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 is a part and parcel of that section. It creates a deeming fiction so far as surrender are concerned. In effect, to such a surrender of land the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (S) of S. 21 will apply as if the land was surrendered by the tenant under S. 20. If in a case of surrender under S. 20 the landlord cannot obtain possession without taking recourse to the provisions of S. 36 (2), then, in our opinion, the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 cannot be construed as an empty formality. The authority, namely, the Tahsildar, while acting under sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 is not mearly a post office meant for passing a consequential order resulting from a declaration made by the Tahsildar under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21. (2) of S. 36 cannot be construed as an empty formality. The authority, namely, the Tahsildar, while acting under sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 is not mearly a post office meant for passing a consequential order resulting from a declaration made by the Tahsildar under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21. Proceeding under S. 36 (2) are not merely execution proceedings. The authority contemplated by S. 21 and S. 36 (2) is the same. If this is so, then while even passing an order regarding restoration of possession under sub-s. (2) of S. 36, the Tahsildar is obliged to con­sider the principle laid down in sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 21. In view of this, in our opinion, the learned single Judge of this Court was right in observing in Govinda v. Udhao, 1972 Mah LJ 588 : ( AIR 1972 Bom 169 ) as follows (at page 177 of AIR) :- " In a given case a landlord may not be entitled to the whole or any part of the land in respect of which the statu­tory surrender had operated. An inquiry is required to be made whether any part of the land becomes surplus land. The proper forum for making such an en­quiry is the Tahsildar and the proceed­ing in which such an inquiry could be made is the proceeding initiated by the landlord asking for possession. The pro­visions of S. 120 (c) are by themselves of a summary nature and if a detailed inquiry is contemplated by provisions of S. 21 (1) and (2) then that inquiry could only be made by the Tahsildar. If the construction canvassed on behalf of the landlord is accepted, then there will be no forum in which the inquiry contem­plated by S. 21 (1) and (2) could be made. It is not, therefore, possible for me to accept the contention that because of the fiction in sub-sec. (14-A) of S. 43 the tenant becomes a trespasser and no order for possession is necessary under S. 36 (2) of the Tenancy Act." In our view, on a proper reading of Sec­tions 50 and 43 (14-A) of the Tenancy Act the right to obtain possession will be deemed to have accrued to the land-lord as soon as there is failure on the part of the tenant to purchase land within one year as contemplated by Section 20. The period of limitation of two years will, therefore, start running from that date. This is not a case where rightly or wrongly the landlord had instituted proceedings under S. 21 (1) and (2) of the Act for seeking a declaration as to how much land he is entitled to retain. In a given case, if such proceeding are instituted diligently and in good faith, the matter might stand on a different footing. But in this case we are not concerned with such a contingency. In this case, the land-holders have chosen to file the application under S. 36 (2) of the Act. Admittedly in the present case, the application filed by the landlords is not within the period of two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land is deem­ed to have accrued to them in view of the provisions of S. 50 read with S. 43 (14-A) of the Tenancy Act, On this short ground, therefore, the application filed by the landlords was liable to be dismissed. 16. However, a contention was raised by Shri Deshpande that as a result of this interpretation very curious conse­quences might follow. According to Shri Deshpande, the landlord will lose his right to obtain possession for all time if he had not applied for obtaining possession under sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 within the time prescribed, but the tenant will continue to be in possession without any corresponding liability for payment of rent etc., as his tenancy is deemed to be surrendered statutorily. In our opin­ion, the apprehension expressed by Shri Deshpande in this behalf is without foundation. As observed by a Full Bench of this Court in Nethram v. Shaokerlal, 1966 Mah LJ 790 : ( AIR 1968 Bom 13 ), a tenant is liable to pay rent to the land­holder until an order for delivery of pos­session is passed by the appropriate Revenue Authority on the land-holder' s application for possession pursuant to the termination of tenancy by notice. The same principle will apply even to the cases where the tenancy is terminated by surrender or is deemed to be termi­nated as a result of deemed surrender. The possession of the tenant even after the deemed surrender is protected by the statute itself. Though he is not a tenant at will, he continues to be a tenant whose possession is protected by the statute. The possession of the tenant even after the deemed surrender is protected by the statute itself. Though he is not a tenant at will, he continues to be a tenant whose possession is protected by the statute. If the tenant remains in possession after the determination of the lease the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant con­tinuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his consent. In such a case, on the one side there should be an offer of taking a new lease evident by the lease remaining in possession of the property after his lease is deemed to be terminat­ed, and on the other side there must be a definite consent to the continuance of possession by the landlord. This involves a bilateral act. Where possession is pro­tected by the statute and the statutory tenancy is created, it cannot be equated with the tenancy at will. His possession is juridical and is protected by statute. This is the position in view of the provisions of the Tenancy Act, which is a special law. Such a statutory protection is obviously governed by other relevant provision of the Act. Of course, there is no prohibition against the landlord entering into a fresh contract of tenancy with a tenant whose right of occupation is determined and who remains in occu­pation by virtue of the statutory immunity. Occupation of the field by a tenant whose tenancy has come to an end in view of the deemed surrender is still protected by virtue of the provisions of S. 36 (2) of the Tenancy Act. The Sta­tute protects his possession so long as the conditions which will justify the lessor in obtaining an order of eviction against him do not exist. Once by virtue of the other provisions of the Act the landlord gets a fresh right to obtain pos­session, then it cannot be said that the tenant cannot be ousted at all. If this is so, then the corresponding obligation resulting from such a possession must automatically follow. The tenant is not allowed to retain the land without any corresponding liability regarding pay­ment of rent etc. In case of default in that behalf, the right of the landlord is not wholly lost. If this is so, then the corresponding obligation resulting from such a possession must automatically follow. The tenant is not allowed to retain the land without any corresponding liability regarding pay­ment of rent etc. In case of default in that behalf, the right of the landlord is not wholly lost. Such position is contem­plated in case of lands which are exempted under S. 129 of the Tenancy Act also. In any case, if there is cases omissus, then it is for the Legislature rather than the Courts to remedy the defect or remove the lacuna. In our opinion, there­fore, the apprehension expressed by Shri Deshpande in that behalf cannot be taken into consideration while constru­ing the provisions of S. 50 of the Act. 17. In the result, therefore, the peti­tion is allowed, the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal dated 15-10-1970 is set aside and the applica­tion filed by the landlord under S. 36 of the Tenancy Act is dismissed as barred by limitation. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.