JUDGMENT MADAN MOHAN PRASAD, J. 1. This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for the purpose of quashing the prosecution of the petitioner on charges framed under sections 363 and 342 of the Indian Penal Cede. 2. It appears that one Lalan Prasad (subsequently made co-accused with the petitioner) gave a written report at the police station wherein he alleged that he found at the Buxar railway station platform a girl aged 13 or 14 years along with a person; that with some of his friends named therein including the petitioner he started from the railway station with the aforesaid girl and the person accompanying her but the informant lost his way and thus also the company of others that they met Kali Prasad in the early hours of the morning and the latter told him that he bad sexual relationship with that girl that the informant and Kali both went on a rickshaw where they found the girl and she was brought back to the railway station the girl was then taken to the house of one Paras, then she was taken to the house of Kali Prasad where the informant, his neighbors and Kali had again sexual intercourse with the girl that the girl was then taken on a rickshaw and entrusted to one Naqui Iman and Narsingh and the informant and others returned to their houses. Omitting the other details given by him it is necessary to state that the informant further said that since the police had arrested Paras and another Ratan Lal he feared that the matter would leak out and so, on the advice of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, he bad come to the Thana and given the written report aforesaid. 3. On this basis the first information report was drawn up by the police and the present case was instituted. After the investigation, charge sheet was submitted under the aforesaid sections, cognizance was taken and subsequently charges were framed as stated above on the 14th of August, 1976 on the basis of the materials contained in the case diary and the application of the petitioner for being discharge was rejected. 4. After the investigation, charge sheet was submitted under the aforesaid sections, cognizance was taken and subsequently charges were framed as stated above on the 14th of August, 1976 on the basis of the materials contained in the case diary and the application of the petitioner for being discharge was rejected. 4. The present prosecution is sought to be quashed mainly on the ground that there is neither any legal evidence to be found in the case diary nor is there likelihood of any legal evidence being available justifying the prosecution of the petitioner. 5. Firstly, it has been urged that it would appear from the diary that no legal evidence bas been collected to implicate the present petitioner. It bas been urged that the only material available in this prosecution is the statement of the co-accused Lalan Prasad which was the first information on the basis of which the present case was instituted. It is said that this is not legal evidence and this being the only material available no conviction can at all be based thereon. Before I enter into the question as to whether or not it is legal evidence, the earlier question which arises is whether that is the only material. In this respect it has been stated that during the course of investigation a rickshaw puller Subhas was examined who spoke about the complicity of other accused but not of this petitioner. It also appears that the aforesaid girl was said to be the daughter of prostitute who was examined and the mother of the prostitute also was examined. There statements before the police did not disclose any material against the petitioner. Their statements, on the other hand, disclosed that the girl had been kidnapped by her maid servant. It is further said that the father of the aforesaid girl was not examined nor was the kidnapped girl herself traced with the result that she could not be examined. Even the aforesaid maid–servant has not been traced or examined. Learned counsel for the State has gone through the diary and stated that the statement of the petitioner in this connection is correct, there being no material against him except the statement of Lalan Prasad. 6. The question, therefore, is as to what is the value of the aforesaid statements. I have already referred to the statements which are relevant and material. 6. The question, therefore, is as to what is the value of the aforesaid statements. I have already referred to the statements which are relevant and material. It is obvious that the aforesaid statements implicate the informant as much as they do to any body else named therein. It is thus clear that they are self inculpatory statements and also inculpatory of other accused persons. Obviously, the aforesaid statements are confessional in nature. They are direct statements of guilt of the maker of the statements as also direct statements about the guilt of other accused. 7. The next relevant thing to notice is that the aforesaid statements were made to a police officer who, treating them as the first information report instituted a case on their basis. The question thus arises as to whether a confession made before a police officer in the circumstances aforesaid, can be treated to be legal evidence. The point need not detain me long. It is well settled that a confession made to police officer by a person even at a time when he is not an accused even if he be subsequently, implicated as an accused of an offence is not admissible in evidence. There was a time when it was doubtful as to whether a confession made by a person not at that time as accused, before the police, was hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. Now this point has been settled by the decision of the Supreme Court and no different view is left to be taken by this court. I would first refer in this connection to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Agnoo Nagesia vs. State of Bihar, 1965 B.L.J.R. 865. In the aforesaid case the first information of the offence, as in the present case, was lodged by the accused himself and it was reduced to writing and on that basis the case was instituted. Their Lordships, in this connection, laid down that if the information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under section 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under section 21 of the Evidence Act, and is relevant, see Faddi vs. State of M.P., Cr. If the information is a non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under section 21 of the Evidence Act, and is relevant, see Faddi vs. State of M.P., Cr. A. 210/63 Dated 24.1.1964, Nisar Ali vs. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 366 and Dal Singh vs. King Emperor, 44 I.A. 137. But a confessional first information report to a police officer cannot be used against the accused in view of section 25 of the Evidence Act. 8. Another decision which would be relevant is to be found in the case of Madegouda vs. State, A.I.R. 1957 Mys. 50. In that case it was held by a Division Bench of Mysore High Court that a statement of an accused made to the police before he was actually implicated and the statement was recorded as a first information, it was inadmissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act, amounting as it did to a confession. In the case of Probhoo vs. State of U.P., 1962 B.L.J.R. 924 (S.C.) on information given by another person, the police had started investigation of an offence during the course of which the appellant was interrogated and he had made certain statements and produced from his house a Kulhari, a shirt and a Dhoti which were blood stained. The question was whether the statements made by him would be admissible in evidence. What is noticeable is that at the relevant time the appellant had not been made an accused but merely suspicion had been aroused against him. The learned Judges discarded the confessional statements on the ground of being hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. No further decisions need be cited in support of the aforesaid proposition. Obviously, therefore the statements of Lalan Prasad would not be admissible against him and to that extent that would not be legal evidence. 9. The question is as to whether the aforesaid statements of the co-accused were legal evidence against the other accused including the present petitioner. Section 30 of the Evidence Act, enables statement of a co-accused to be taken into consideration against another accused. It will however, be important to notice that according to a well-settled view of the Jaw on the point, confession of a co-accused is merely a material which can be taken into consideration by the court if there is other substantial material against him. It will however, be important to notice that according to a well-settled view of the Jaw on the point, confession of a co-accused is merely a material which can be taken into consideration by the court if there is other substantial material against him. In other words, a confession can be used for the purpose of corroboration of other evidence on record. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra & another vs. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 381, that under section of the Evidence Act, confession of a co-accused can only be taken into consideration but it is not in itself a substantive evidence. The confession being only a material which can be taken into consideration, it is obvious that no conviction of accused can be based merely and solely on the confession of a co-accused. Strictly speaking, therefore, the confession of a co-accused is no evidence against the other accused but is only a material which can be taken into consideration along with other evidence, if any. 10. It is obvious from what I have mentioned earlier that in this case there is absolutely no evidence collected against the petitioner except the confessional statement of the co-accused and the latter itself would not be legal evidence, strictly speaking, but only u material to be taken into consideration along with other evidence, if any. The police investigation did not bring out any material his not said on behalf of the prosecution that there is likelihood of new materials coming up during the course of trial. In any case, there was no material before the Magistrate on the basis of which he could frame the charges. In the complete absence of any evidence, framing of charge must be held to be improper and illegal. As stated earlier, it is not being shown by the prosecution that there is any evidence against the petitioner which would be worthwhile noticing that the occurrence is said to have taken place in October, 1970, nearly six years and a half have gone by since then. Neither the girl who could have given evidence nor any person who could have given evidence against the petitioner has been traced or examined. In such circumstances obviously, there is no likelihood of any legal evidence being produced against the petitioner. Neither the girl who could have given evidence nor any person who could have given evidence against the petitioner has been traced or examined. In such circumstances obviously, there is no likelihood of any legal evidence being produced against the petitioner. The prosecution of this petitioner on the charge of aforesaid would thus amount to an abuse of the processes of the court. In the circumstances aforesaid, I would quash the charges and the prosecution so far this petitioner is concerned. 11. In the result, the application is allowed. Application allowed.