JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the III Additional District Judge, Etah dated 8-5-1975. By the aforesaid judgment the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority allowing the application filed under section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (herein. after referred to as U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972), was allowed. 2. Briefly stated, the facts are these : The petitioner admittedly is the owner of a house situated in Etah. She filed an application under section 21 of U P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for the release of the premises against the opposite party No. 2 on the ground that the premises was required by her husband for the purposes of his professional requirement. The petitioner also asserted that as the respondent No. 2 had constructed a residential building in Etah, therefore, he did not require the premises in question for his residence. The application was resisted by the opposite party No. 2. He denied that the need of the applicant was bonafide. He further asserted that the house alleged to have been constructed by him was not residential, therefore, the claim of the petitioner that the opposite party No. 2 could shift to that house was not justified. 3. The trial court allowed the application on the finding that the need of the applicant was genuine. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority an appeal was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge allowed the appeal by the impugned order. Hence this petition. 4. One of the points urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition was that as the opposite party had constructed a residential building in the same city where the premises in question is situated, therefore, the applicant is entitled to get her application allowed under section 21 of the Act as of right. The sub-mission of the learned counsel was that Explanation I to Section 21 provided for a conclusive presumption about the bona fide requirement of the premises in question by the petitioner, hence the court below committed an error in examining the question of the bona fide need of the petitioner and in holding to the contrary. The sub-mission of the learned counsel was that Explanation I to Section 21 provided for a conclusive presumption about the bona fide requirement of the premises in question by the petitioner, hence the court below committed an error in examining the question of the bona fide need of the petitioner and in holding to the contrary. The submission made appears to be well founded. 5. Section 21 of the Act provides that the Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exist. One of the grounds mentioned is the bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord. It is, therefore, for a landlord to succeed in an application filed under section 21 to prove his bona fide requirement of the premises. It, however, appears that the Legislature provided for the conclusive presumption by adding an Explanation to the proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act about bona fide requirement of the premises mentioned in the Explanation. The explanation previously had four sub-clauses. Now after the amendment made by U.P. Act No. 25 of 1976, two of the sub-clauses have been left out. One of them is contained in sub clause (i) while the other is sub-clause (iii). We are concerned in this case with sub-clause (i). The same reads as under : "Where the tenant or any member of his family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after requisition a residential building in the same city, municipality notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained." A bare reading of this sub-clause would show that where a tenant constructs a residential building in the same city, he is precluded from raising the objection relating to the bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord. The necessary result of this sub clause is that the need of the landlord about the house will be deemed to be genuine. Consequently, the court is precluded from examining the question of bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord and to reject his application in case he finds that the same is not bona fide. The necessary result of this sub clause is that the need of the landlord about the house will be deemed to be genuine. Consequently, the court is precluded from examining the question of bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord and to reject his application in case he finds that the same is not bona fide. As a matter of fact, the landlord is not required in such a case to adduce any evidence in support of his bona fide requirement. The presumption of the need being conclusive, the court is bound to draw the same in his favour and to proceed on that basis. As already said, such a presumption can be-drawn only in the case where the tenant has made a residential building. Therefore, if the building constructed by him is not a residential building this presumption would not be available. 6. It may be relevant to point out that sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act also makes a similar provision. Section 12 deals with the case of a deemed vacancy. Sub-section (3) provides that in a case where a tenant constructs his own residential house, the house in his occupation as a tenant would be deemed to be vacant. It appears to me that the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party, which was to the effect that a landlord is required to establish his need even in a case where the tenant has constructed a residential building, is not correct. The Legislature deliberately did not want a tenant who constructs his own residential house to continue to remain in occupation of the house obtained by him on rent. In these circumstances, the court below was not right in examining the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord and in holding that as her need was not genuine, the application was liable to be rejected. The lower appellate court ought to have examined the question whether the opposite party No. 2, had constructed a residential building If he would have come to the conclusion that the opposite party No. 2 did not construct a residential house, only then he could proceed to examine the question of bona fide requirement. It fell into error in omitting to consider the relevant aspect of the question and in deciding the appeal without examining the same. 7. It fell into error in omitting to consider the relevant aspect of the question and in deciding the appeal without examining the same. 7. In the result, the writ petition succeeds land is allowed. The order of the District Judge Dated 8th May, 1975 is quashed. The Additional District Judge is directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of observations made above. There will be no order as to the costs.