ORDER.-Both these writ petitions can be dealt with by a common judgment, suffice it to note the facts of Writ Petition No. 2644 of 1977. The petitioner (Miss Mary Varghese) was a candidate for admission to the First year M.B.B.S course in Jawaharlal Institute of Post-Graduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (hereinafter referred to as JIPMER) for the academic year 1977-78. She passed the Pre-University examination in first class and obtained distinction in Physics and Chemistry, having secured more than 68 per cent. in Biology. Since she was interested in taking up Medical Profession, she took second group in the Pre-University with the intention of doing M.B.B.S. She applied to the First year M.B.B.S. course in JIPMER. She was given Roll. No. C/9/P and was asked to appear for the entrance examintion on 19th June, 1977. Accordingly, she took the examination and she did well. The admission is based upon the results of the entrance examination. To the 65 seats for the First year course, the seats are distributed as under: Open General 27 Pondy General 11 Pondy S/Cs. 3 Pondy S/Ts. 1 Open S/Cs. 6 Open S/Ts. 2 Government nominations 15 Total &151;&151; 65 &151;&151; The number of applications received against these various categories are as follows: Applications received Candidates appeared Open General .. .. 5873 .. .. 4881 Pondicherry General .. .. 161 .. .. 141 Pondicherry Scheduled Caste .. .. 5 .. .. 5 Pondicherry Scheduled Tribe .. .. Nil .. .. Nil Open Scheduled Caste .. .. 119 .. .. 94 Open Scheduled Tribe .. .. 18 .. .. 13 It requires to be noted at this stage that for these 11 seats in Pondicherry General 144 candidates had taken the examination. Pondicherry General seats are allotted to the following candidates: 1. Native of Pondicherry by virtue of birth; 2. Candidates having continuous residence for five years or more at the time of submission of application form; 3. The wards of Central Government employees including employees of Public Sector undertakings under Central Government posted in the Union Territory of Pondicherry irrespective of the period of their residence in the Union Territory. 2. As I said above, the written entrance examination took place on 19th June, 1977. The results were published on 17th July, 1977. On 29th July, 1977 the petitioner was called for interview. 2. As I said above, the written entrance examination took place on 19th June, 1977. The results were published on 17th July, 1977. On 29th July, 1977 the petitioner was called for interview. She was asked to make ready the money for the payment of admission fees etc. Along with her five others were also called for interview. No marks were allotted in the interview under the rules. Except that the petitioner was placed in the waiting list as No. 3 she was not admitted. Thus having been unable to secure admission to JIPMER she has filed the present writ petition on the following grounds: (1) Under the Admission Rules, reservations have been made in favour of residents of Pondicherry, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Central Government nominees. The practice adopted by the first respondent discloses that an unreasonably large percentage of seats appears to have been reserved for children for the JIPMER staff. This is outside the rules and illegal and void. The classification of children of JIPMER staff as a separate class has no basis and it is violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. (2) The admission based upon the results of the entrance examination is capable of permitting abuse. The candidates past performances are not taken into consideration ; hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (3) The petitioner submits that respondents 3 and 4 came to be selected purely on the basis of their nativity certificates that they were born in Pondicherry. Such a selection would be violative of Article 15 (1) of the Constitution as discrmination based on mere place of birth which is prohibited under Article 15 (1). 3. Thus the prayer is made for declaration declaring that the selection for admission to the First Year M.B.B.S. Course in JIPMER for the academic year 1977-78 as illegal and liable to be struck down and for issue of consequential directions directing the first respondent herein to allot a seat to the petitioner. 4. In the counter-affidavit, the above details relating to the distribution of seats under various heads are mentioned. The classification for Pondicherry general seats as stated by the petitioner is also admitted to be correct. As regards respondents 3 and 4, what is stated in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit is as follows: “Pondicherry General seats are allotted to the following candidates: 1. The classification for Pondicherry general seats as stated by the petitioner is also admitted to be correct. As regards respondents 3 and 4, what is stated in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit is as follows: “Pondicherry General seats are allotted to the following candidates: 1. Native of Pondicherry by virtue of birth; 2. Candidate having continuous residence for five years or more at the time of submission of application form; 3. The wards of Central Government employees including employees of Public Sector undertakings under Central Government posted in the Union Territory of Pondicherry irrespective of the period of their residence in the Union Territory.” These candidates had applied against the Pondicherry General seats and submitted their Nativity Certificates from the Tahsildar, Pondicherry as per paragraph 2-5-1 of the Prospectus. Before admission, it has been the practice every year to send all the applications of the candidates selected as well as in waiting list) against Pondicherry Reserved seats to the Government of Pondicherry for discreet enquiry to satisfy that they are genuine candidates of Pondicherry State. This year also, all the applications of the candidates including those of the two respondents were sent to the Secretary, Education Department, Government of Pondicherry for detailed enquiry and they have confirmed the bona fides of their nativity in Pondicherry State, by letter dated 2nd August, 1977. 5. The entrance examination was conducted and the merit list was put up under the direction and supervision of the Director-General of Health Services, New Delhi. The Deputy Director-General (G) New Delhi was nominated for this year’s admission work and he brought the mark sheet as well as the evaluated answer sheets to this Institute on 14th July, 1977. The merit list of the candidates on the basis of the marks at the entrance examination was prepared on 15th July, 1977. The answer sheets of about 300 candidates in the order of merit were re-checked to. ensure that there is no mistake in the merit list. After re-checking the answer sheets, the final merit list was prepared under the direct supervision of the Deputy Director-General of Health Services (G) New Delhi. The list of selected candidates was put up in the notice board on 16th July, 1977 and not on 17th July,1977 as stated by the petitioner. The selected candidates were called for interview on 28th July, 1977, and the interview cards. The list of selected candidates was put up in the notice board on 16th July, 1977 and not on 17th July,1977 as stated by the petitioner. The selected candidates were called for interview on 28th July, 1977, and the interview cards. to selected candidates were despatched on 18th July, 1977. As there was always . possibility that some students from the selected list may not turn up, a few candidates from the waiting list in the order of merit from each of the categories were also called for interview on 29th July, 1977 in order to avoid any delay and fulfil the University requirements as the admission had to be finalised by 31st July, 1977, as per University Regulations. Interview cards for these candidates in the waiting list were despatched on 19th July, 1977. The petitioner Miss Mary Varghese was . No. 4 in the waiting list for Pondicherry general seats and she was called for interview on 29th July, 1977. It was specifically mentioned in the interview memo. that the petitioner is in the waiting list and she will be considered for admission only if vacancy arises. The purpose of the interview is to find out the physical fitness of the candidates and it was made clear in the prospectus that no allocation of marks are given for the interview. In the interview for the regular candidates on 28th July, 1977, one candidate from the Pondicherry General quota namely Shri Satyanarayanan did not attend the interview. The resultant vacancy was filed in from the waiting list candidates, who attended the interview on 29th July, 1977 against the Pondicherry General seats. The first in the waiting list Shri S. Ganesh, who had secured highest marks namely 131 was admitted. The other three candidates, in the waiting list namely Shri Anil Kumar C.G. (Roll No. C/2597/P), Shri M.Venugopalan (Roll No. C/4591/P) and Miss Mary Varghese (Roll No. C/9/P) have all secured 130 marks at the entrance examination. In such case of tie, the Director-General of Health Services had given instructions in his letter No. DD. 6/HA-76-JIPMER, dated 17th July, 1976 that the marks at the qualifying examination should be taken into account for determining the interse merits of the candidates. In such case of tie, the Director-General of Health Services had given instructions in his letter No. DD. 6/HA-76-JIPMER, dated 17th July, 1976 that the marks at the qualifying examination should be taken into account for determining the interse merits of the candidates. Accordingly the marks of these candidates at the qualifying examination were considered and on this basis, the merit list was prepared in which Miss Mary Varghese was last and No. 3 in the order. Details of the marks obtained at the entrance examintion and percentage of marks at the qualifying examination in respect of the waiting list candidates areas follows: S.No. Name of the candidates Entrance Examination marks. Qualifying Examination marks. 1. Shri Anil Kumar C.C. .. .. 130 72.5% 2. Shri M. Venugopalan .. .. 130 71.2% 3. Miss Mary Varghese .. .. 130 70.4% 6. After the interview of the waiting list cancidates was over on 29th July, 1977, the merit lists of these candidates were also published on the same day. The whole procedure was as per admission rules and regulations and not contrary to the admission rules, as stated by the petitioner. In the result, it is submitted that there is no illegality or irregularity or impropriety in the process of selection for admission. There is no error of law or jurisdiction in the said selection and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. A reply affidavit has been filed re" iterating most of the statements contained in the main affidavit. It is further stated that the Nativity, viz., birth cannot be a fact of discrimination, since it is violative of Article 15. 8. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the petitioner, argues the following: It is admitted that the reservation for Pondicherry General is based upon three factors: 1. Nativity: By nativity it is mentioned place of birth. 2. The residence of the candidate for five years or more at Pondicherry at the time of submission of the application form. 3. The wards of Central Government employees including employees of Public Sector undertakings under the Central Government posted in the Union Territory of Pondicherry irrespective of the period of their residence in the Union Territory. The petitioner does not attack categories 2 and 3, viz., based on residence for five years and the wards of Central Government employees. 3. The wards of Central Government employees including employees of Public Sector undertakings under the Central Government posted in the Union Territory of Pondicherry irrespective of the period of their residence in the Union Territory. The petitioner does not attack categories 2 and 3, viz., based on residence for five years and the wards of Central Government employees. However, where reservation is made on the ground of birth, it is violative of Article 15 of the Constitution. If that test is applied, respondents 3 and 4 having been selected on the ground of place of birth, their selections-will have to be set aside. It is true that the selection was on the basis of an entrance test. Nevertheless, where in the ultimate selection, their marks were considered only as against the Pondicherry General seats and they were able to secure admission solely on the ground of place of birth, it is violative of Article 15. In support of this submission, learned counsel relies upon the decision reported in State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon.1In that case, place of birth in rural area was held to be violative of Article 15. 9. This argument of Mr. K.K. Venugopal is met by T. Chengalvaroyan, learned counsel for the respondent stating that this is a case of an admission to an educational institution, viz., Medical College. In such a case, it is only Article 29 that will govern to the exclusion of Article 15. The framers of the Constitution have deliberately omitted the ground of discrimination viz., place of birth from Article 29. In such a case, therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to complain of discrimination on the ground of violation of Article 15. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court specifically dealt with this question and answered that Article 29 (2) would exclude Article 15 (1). That was reported in University of Madras v. ShantaBai2. The same view was taken in State of Bombay v. Bombay Educational Society3. In interpreting these two decisions a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Joseph Thomas v. State of Kerla4, holds that in matters of admission to educational Institution, it is only the infraction of Article 29 that could be complained of. 10. The same view was taken in State of Bombay v. Bombay Educational Society3. In interpreting these two decisions a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Joseph Thomas v. State of Kerla4, holds that in matters of admission to educational Institution, it is only the infraction of Article 29 that could be complained of. 10. It is further urged that the reservation under various categories is only to enable the choice to be drawn from various sources and at the time of application there is no discrimination whatsoever. In such a case, no fundamental right of the petitioner is violated as laid down in State of Andhra Pradesh v. U.S.V. Balaram.5 11. Under Rule 4-5 of the Prospectus admission is based upon merit only. In this case, since respondents 3 and 4 secured higher marks, they came to be selected, whereas both the petitioners got less marks and therefore they were placed in the waiting list. In any event, inasmuch as the petitioners have chosen to apply under the rules, merely because they were not ultimately selected, they are estopped from contending that the rules under which they sought admission are discriminatory in character. Support is derived for this argument from Narasappa v. Shaik Hazrat6. 12. Necessarily having regard to the various arguments raised by Mr. T. Chengalvaroyan, by way of counter to the petitioners’ solitary contention Mr. K.K. Venugopal had to reply somewhat elaborately. It is his submission that each fundamental right acts in its own sphere without either determining or diminishing the other. It can no longer be urged that Article 29 alone should govern the right of a person to seek admission to an educational institution. If a Law, or a Rule or even an administrative direction violates any one of the Articles guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, this Court has to strike it down. In other words, the Law or the administrative direction will have to stand the test of each and every fundamental right, be it Article 14, 15 or 29. No doubt in the decision reported in University of Madras v. Shanta Bai7, the question arose with reference to admission to Medical College, whether Article 29 (2) alone would govern the right of the petitioner and that question came to be answered in the affirmative. No doubt in the decision reported in University of Madras v. Shanta Bai7, the question arose with reference to admission to Medical College, whether Article 29 (2) alone would govern the right of the petitioner and that question came to be answered in the affirmative. But since then the law has taken a different and a definite course holding to the contrary. In Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India8, the reservation of seat to an educational institution on the ground of residence was tested as against Articles 14, 15 and 29 of the Constitution. 13. Again in State of U.P. v. Pradip Tindon1, it was categorically laid down in paragraph 29 that the reservation on the ground of place of birth would be violative of Article 15 and a similar contention as raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, was in fact raised by the learned Attorney-General and the ultimate answer was given testing it on the touchstone of Article 15. 14. A careful reading of the decision in State of Bombay v. Bombay Educational Society2, would clearly show that it is not an authority for the proposition that Article 29 (2) excludes the application of Article 15 (1). A passage from that decision has been torn out of the context by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Joseph Thomas v. State of Kerala3, to render a finding that it is only Article 29 that applies in matters of admission to educational institution. That judgment is not binding on this Court. It has only persuasive force. In any event, that cannot be held to be good law, having regard to the two Supreme Court decisions cited, viz., Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India4and State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon 1 . Manju v. State5, is also a case on that point. 15. The last cited decision of the Supreme Court, viz., State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon1, cannot be ignored merely because there is no discussion on this aspect. That is a law laid down by the Supreme Court which is the law of the land in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. This Court cannot ignore that. The decisions reported in T.G. Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu6, and B.M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality7, are authorities which would support this submission. 16. That is a law laid down by the Supreme Court which is the law of the land in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. This Court cannot ignore that. The decisions reported in T.G. Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu6, and B.M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality7, are authorities which would support this submission. 16. This again cannot be tested on the ground of reasonableness because once there is infraction of Article 15, the petitioner is well entitled to succeed. Assuming it has to be tested on the ground of reasonableness, what exactly is the rationale for this kind of reservation. One can well understand reservation being made in favour of the wards of Central Government employees or on the ground of residence to enable the local residents to have higher education without much difficulty. But merely because a person who was born there long ago, if he is enabled to get classified under the Pondicherry General seat, certainly that will be unreasonable. In other words, there is no nexus between this reservation and the reasonableness. 17. The law is well settled that waiver cannot be pleaded as far as fundamental rights are concerned. Only when the petitioner is not selected, he can come up to this Court and complain that the method of selection or the basis of selection, or even the rules relating to selection or even the basis of reservation is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to a citizen (like the petitioner) under Part III of the Constitution. 18. No doubt, the selection is based purely on the performance in the entrance examination. Where the petitioner had secured such high marks as to qualify her to be the first in the waiting list and where her legitimate seat had gone to persons like respondents 3 and 4 who came to be selected ultimately on the ground of place of birth, they will go out of the selection for Pondicherry General, in which case in those two vacancies caused by respondents 3 and 4, both the petitioners will have to be selected because the petitioners are 1 and 3 in the waiting list. The second in the waiting list (M. Venugopalan) not having submitted his certificate relating to his residence cannot come under the category of Pondicherry General. 19. I have already narrated the admitted facts. The second in the waiting list (M. Venugopalan) not having submitted his certificate relating to his residence cannot come under the category of Pondicherry General. 19. I have already narrated the admitted facts. Let me now go to the Prospectus, which contains the rules relating to selection to the First Year Integrated M.B.B.S. course. Paragraph 2-1 of the Prospectus states- "Sixty-five students will be admitted during 1977-78 to the First Year Integrated M.B.B.S. course. These 65 seats are distributed as under: Open General 27 Pondicherry General 11 Pondicherry Scheduled Castes 3 Pondicherry Scheduled Tribes 1 Open Scheduled Castes 6 Open Scheduled Tribes 2 Government nominations: Subject to fulfilment of basic requirements laid down vide paras. 3-2, 3-3 and 3-4 15 &151;&151; 65 &151;&151; Paragraph 2-5-1 reads:- "The Pondicherry Nativity/Residence Certificate should be obtained from the Tahsildar of the Commune concerned accompanied by Birth Certificate of the candidate." Paragraph 3-2 dealing with eligibility for admission, states thus:- "Candidates for admission to the first year of the Integrated Course in Medicine should have completed the age of sixteen years on 31st December, i.e., they should have been born not later than 1st January, 1962. Request for exemption from the prescribed age-limit will not be considered and such applications will be rejected." The basis and method of admission are contained in paragraph 4. Paragraph 4-1 reads:- "All the candidates who have applied for admission and who are found eligible will be required to take at their own cost, the Entrance examination to be conducted by the Institute during the first week of June, 1977. The actual date of the examination will be communicated to the candidates through the Admit Cards (Hall Tickets). The examination will be conducted in four centres, viz., Pondicherry, Hyderabad, Delhi and Bombay. The examination will be conducted in a particular centre only if there are sufficient number of candidates for these centres; otherwise candidates will be allotted to the other centres in order of preference given in the application form. So, the candidates are required to give their choice for three centres in order of preference, as required in item No. 10 of the application form." Paragraph 4-5 is to the following effect: "Admissions will be made entirely on the basis of merit in the Entrance Examination." After this entrance examination, what is to be done is contained in paragraph 4-6. Item 4 of this paragraph is Pondicherry General seats. Under this ‘Pondicherry General seats’, what exactly would come, can be deciphered from the application form. That contains nativity or residence certificate. That requirement is in accordance with paragraphs 2-5 and 2-5-1, which read: "2-5. Candidates applying against the seats reserved for Pondicherry General (including the Scheduled Castes Tribes) quota, should specifically mention in the application form in Sl. No. 9 that he/she applies against the quota on the basis of Nativity or continuous residence for five years or more, at the time of submission of application form. False residence certificates produced by the candidates, if any, are liable for rejection of their applications summarily. 2-5-1. The Pondicherry Nativity Residence Certificate should be obtained from the Tahsildar of the Commune concerned accompanied by Birth Certificate of the candidate." 20. Therefore three categories fall under this group of Pondicherry General. They are:- (1) Nativity, or place of birth; (2) continuous residence for five years or more; (3) wards of Central Government employees. Though the place of birth is not as such used in the prospectus, the counter-affidavit in paragraph 7 clearly admits so. It is stated: "Pondicherry General seats are allotted to the following candidates:- 1. Natives of Pondicherry territorial area by virtue of birth. 2. Candidates having continuous residence for five years or more in Pondicherry at the time of submission of application form. 3. The wards of Central Government employees including employees of Public Sector Undertakings under Central Government posted in the Union Territory of Pondicherry irrespective of the period of their residence in the Union Territory." 21. I have already made note of the limited arguments of Mr. K. K. Venugopal that be does not question the candidates falling under categories 2 and 3, viz., residence for five years and the wards of the Central Government employees being brought under this group of Pondicherry General. His only attack is on those belonging to the category as natives of Pondicherry. In other words, by virtue of their birth, if they are brought under this group of Pondicherry General, it will be violative of Article 15 of the Constitution of India. This attack is warded off by the learned counsel for the respondents with the shield of Article 29 (2). 22. In other words, by virtue of their birth, if they are brought under this group of Pondicherry General, it will be violative of Article 15 of the Constitution of India. This attack is warded off by the learned counsel for the respondents with the shield of Article 29 (2). 22. Thus the major question that falls for my determination is, in matters relating to admission to educational institution, is it only Article 29 that will give protection and not others? 23. The fundamental rights claimed under Part III of the Constitution, if could be compared to a crown, each of the rights guaranteed therein is a priceless gem emitting its own radiance. One does not either diminish or dullen the lustre of another. All of them conjointly add to the grandeur of the crown. If this background is kept in mind, the scope of the discussion can be narrowed down. Articles 14 to 16 occur under the title "Right to equality ". Article 14 provides the light and the manifestations of various shades are found in Articles 15, 16 and 29. In other words, Article 14 is the genus relating to equality while the other Articles are the species. It also requires to be noted at this stage that Article 15 underwent an amendment in 1951 by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951, as a result of which clause (4) came to be added, which reads:- "Nothing in this Article or in Clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." 24. Article 29 occurs under the heading "Cultural and Educational Rights" and the marginal note reads:- "Protection of Interests of minorities". Article 29 reads:- (1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same. (2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them." 25. A mere reading of Articles 15 and 29 will show that sex and place of birth occurring under Article 15 do not find a place in Article 29. A mere reading of Articles 15 and 29 will show that sex and place of birth occurring under Article 15 do not find a place in Article 29. Why in carrying out an amendment to Article 15, Article 29 (2) came to be mentioned is also a point worthy to be taken note of. 26. In Anjali v. State of West Bengal1the question arose whether Article 29 (2) should be read as controlled by Article 15 (1) and the Division Bench answered as follows:- "Some argument appears to have been addressed to Bose, J., on Article 29 (2) and the learned Judge has held that the Article should be read as controlled by Article 15 (1) which is of a general character and covers all matters. Before assenting to that provision, I should require to consider the matter further when a proper occasion arises. Article 29 (2) deals specifically with denial of admission into educational institutions maintained by the State and it may not be without significance that it does not mention sex as one of the grounds on which such admission may not be denied. The framers of the Constitution may have thought that because of the physical and mental differences between men and women and considerations incidental thereto, exclusion of men from certain institutions serving women only and vice versa would not be hostile or unreasonable discrimination. It is true while formerly Article 29 (2) was, in form at least, an independent provision concerned with the particular subject of admission into educational institutions, it has now been linked up, to a certain extent, with Article 15, since Clause (4), added to the last Article, authorises special provision for the advancement of educationally backward classes. Such provision may obviously be a provision, reserving certain educational institutions for the backward classes or reserving a certain number of seats for them, with the consequence of denying admission to other classes and, therefore, the clause suggests that the subject of admission to educational institutions is not outside the ambit of Article 15. Such provision may obviously be a provision, reserving certain educational institutions for the backward classes or reserving a certain number of seats for them, with the consequence of denying admission to other classes and, therefore, the clause suggests that the subject of admission to educational institutions is not outside the ambit of Article 15. It may, however, be said that Article 15 (4) has been added as an exception to that part of Article 15 (1), which forbids discrimination on the ground of race or caste and as an amendment of that part of Article 29 (2) which forbids denial of admission into educational institutions on the same grounds; but since no such provision regarding educational institutions has been made in Article 15 in the case of the ground of sex, Article 29 (2) in so far as it does not mention sex as a forbidden ground of discrimination in regard to admission into educational institutions, remains unaffected. The matter is not free from difficulty, but I would prefer not to express any final opinion on it, since, even on the view that Article 29 (2) is controlled by Article 15 (1), the appellant has no case." 27. The leading pronouncement which deals with the inter-relation between these two Articles is State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society1. The Bombay Government in its Education Department, issued an order requiring all primary and secondary schools within the State teaching through the medium of English not to admit in future "any pupil other than a pupil belonging to a section of citizens the language of which is English, namely Anglo-Indians and citizens of non-Asiatic descent. The validity of the order was questioned by students not belonging to Anglo-Indian community or being of Asiatic descent, as also by an Anglo-Indian School teaching through the medium of English. Therein two questions arose for determination: namely, (1) as to the right of students who are not Anglo-Indians or who are of Asiatic descent to be admitted to a recognised Anglo-Indian School which imparts education through the medium of English, and (2) as to the right of the said recognized Anglo-Indian School to admit non-Anglo-Indian students and students of Asiatic descent. It was held thus: "The learned Attorney-General then falls back upon two contentions to avoid the applicability of Article 29 (2). It was held thus: "The learned Attorney-General then falls back upon two contentions to avoid the applicability of Article 29 (2). In the first place he contends that Article 29 (2) does not confer any fundamental right on all citizens generally but guarantees the rights of citizens of minority groups by providing that they must not be denied admission to educational institutions maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them, and he refers us to the marginal note to the Article. This is certainly a new contention put forward before us for the first time. It does not appear to have been specifically taken in the affidavits in opposition filed in the High Court and there is no indication in the judgment under appeal that it was advanced in this form before the High Court. Nor was this point specifically made a ground of appeal in the petition for leave to appeal to this Court. Apart from this, the contention appears to us to be devoid of merit. Article 29 (1) gives protection to any section of the citizens having a distinct language, script or culture by guaranteeing their right to conserve the same. Article 30 (1) secures to all minorities, whether based on religion or language, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Now suppose the State maintains an educational institution to help conserving the distinct language, script or culture of a section of the citizens or makes grants-in-aid of an educational institution established by a minority community based on religion or language to conserve their distinct language, script or culture. Who can claim the protection of Article 29 (2) in the matter of admission into any such institution? Surely the citizens of the very section whose language, script or culture is sought to be conserved by the institution or the citizens who belong to the very minority group which has established and is administering the institution, do not need any protection against themselves and therefore Article 29 (2) is not designed for the protection of this section or this minority. Nor do we see any reason to limit Article 29 (2) to citizens belonging to a minority group other than the section or the minorities referred to in Article 29 (1) or Article 30 (1), for the citizens, who do not belong to any minority group, may quite conceivably need this protection just as much as the citizens of such other minority groups. If it is urged that the citizens of the majority group are amply protected by Article 15 and do not require the protection of Article 29 (2), then there are several obvious answers to that argument. The language of Article 29 (2) is wide and unqualified and may well cover all citizens whether they belong to the majority or minority group. Article 15 protects all citizens against the State whereas the protection of Article 29 (2) extends against the State or anybody who denies the right conferred by it. Further Article 15 protects all citizens against discrimination generally but Article 29 (2) is a protection against a particular species of wrong namely denial of admission into educational institutions of the specified kind. In the next place Article 15 is quite general and wide in its terms and applies to all citizens, whether they belong to the majority or minority groups, and gives protection to all the citizens against discrimination by the State on certain specific grounds. Article 29 (2) confers a special right on citizens for admission into educational institutions maintained or aided by the State. To limit this right only to citizens belonging to minority groups will be to provide a double protection for such citizens and to hold that the citizens of the majority groups have no special educational rights in the nature of a right to be admitted into an educational institution for the maintenance of which they make contributions by way of taxes. We see no cogent reason for such discrimination. The heading under which Articles 29 and 30 are grouped together — namely ‘Cultural and Educational Rights’ — is quite general and does not in terms contemplate such differentiation. If the fact that the institution is maintained or aided out of State funds is the basis of this guaranteed right then all citizens, irrespective of whether they belong to the majority or minority groups, are alike entitled to the protection of this fundamental right. If the fact that the institution is maintained or aided out of State funds is the basis of this guaranteed right then all citizens, irrespective of whether they belong to the majority or minority groups, are alike entitled to the protection of this fundamental right. In view of all these considerations the marginal note alone, on which the Attorney-General relies cannot be read as controlling the plain meaning of the language in which Article 29 (2) has been couched. Indeed in The State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan1, this Court has already held as follows:- “It will be noticed that while clause (1) protects the language, script or culture of a section of the citizens, clause (2) guarantees the fundamental right of any individual citizen. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. In our judgment this part of the contention of the learned Attorney-General cannot be sustained.” It is this case which is very much pressed into service by Mr. T. Chengalvaroyan, learned counsel for the respondents. On the passage above extracted, he forcibly argues that it is only the infraction of Article 29 (2) that can be complained of. I am unable to accept this contention. A careful reading of the above passage in my view, shows that this decision is an authority for the proposition that even citizens belonging to majority community can complain of the violation of Article 29 (2). The decision nowhere says that to the exclusion of Article 15 only Article 29 (2) would govern. 28. To add to our difficulty, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Joseph Thomas v. State of Kerala1, in interpreting this decision held in paragraphs 7 and 8 as follows: — “Article 29 (2) of the Constitution provides: ‘No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them’. ‘Sex’ and ‘place of birth’ which occur in Article 15 (1) do not occur in Article 29 (2). ‘Sex’ and ‘place of birth’ which occur in Article 15 (1) do not occur in Article 29 (2). In University of Madras v. Shantha Bai2, it was held that Article 29 (2) is a special provision and that it is that Article and not Articlel5 (1) which will prevail in matters of admission into educational institutions: ‘Now, it will be seen that while Article 15 (1) enacts a general principle, Article 29 (2) deals with a particular topic, viz., admission to educational institutions. If the principle generalia ‘specialibus non derogant is to apply the controlling provision would be 29 (2) and not 15 (1). It should also be noted that the language of Article 29 (2) is significantly different from that of Article 15 (1). Thus as pointed out by the learned Advocate-General while Article 15 (1) prohibits discrimination on the ground ‘inter alia’ of ‘place of birth’ these words are omitted in Article 29 (2). The omission is clearly deliberate and there is a purpose behind it. A State might be minded to open an institution for the advancement of knowledge in a particular region which might be backward and for carrying out this object it might restrict admission into the institution to persons of the locality. If persons from other and more advanced regions are to insist on being admitted and the restriction in favour of persons who belong to the locality is to be rejected as inconsistent with Article 15 (1), the result would be that persons in the locality might be prevented for all time from improving their lot. It is to avoid such consequence that ‘place of birth’ which is included in Article 15 (1) would appear to have been omitted in Article 29 (2). In the same manner the omission of ‘sex’ in Article 29 (2) would appear to be a deliberate departure from the language of Article 15 (1) and its object must have been to leave it to the educational authorities to make their own rules suited to the conditions and to force on them an obligation to. admit women. In the view we have taken as to the meaning of Exhibit P-4 it is unnecessary for us to decide this question. It may, however, be pointed out that the Madras view apparently drives some support from the following passage in State of Bombay v. Bombay Educational Society3. admit women. In the view we have taken as to the meaning of Exhibit P-4 it is unnecessary for us to decide this question. It may, however, be pointed out that the Madras view apparently drives some support from the following passage in State of Bombay v. Bombay Educational Society3. Article 15 protects all citizens against discrimination generally but Article 29 (2) is a protection against a particular species of wrong namely denial of admission into educational institutions of the specified kind.” ‘ However, it requires to be noted that one of the decisions relied on by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court is University of Madras v. Shanta Bai4, which really poses a problem before me. This is the sheet anchor of the learned counsel for the respondents. Therein the three contentions urged on behalf of the appellant, i.e., University of Madras, were: (i) Article 15 (1) prohibits discrimination only by the State; the University of Madras is not a State and its directions are therefore unaffected by the operation of Article 15 (1) ; (it) The right of a citizen to get admission into an educational institution is governed not by Article 15 (1), but by Article 29 and that Article does not prohibit any restriction based on the ground of sex; (iii) The directions given by the University do not deny the right of women to be admitted into co-leges but only regulates the exercise of that right and that having regard to the nature of the right, the restrictions are reasonable and not discriminatory. 29. The decision on the second contention came to be laid down at page 435 thus: "It is also urged on behalf of the appellant that the matter is governed not by Article 15 (1), but by Article 29 (2) which runs as follows: ‘No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them’. This Article does not prohibit refusal of admission to educational institutions on the ground of sex and if that is the governing provision, then the educational authorities are within their rights 3n declining to admit the petitioner. This Article does not prohibit refusal of admission to educational institutions on the ground of sex and if that is the governing provision, then the educational authorities are within their rights 3n declining to admit the petitioner. The argument which found favour with Subba Rao, J., was that Article 29 (2) did not expressly authorise any discrimination on the ground of sex, that It was only by implication that an inference could be made that there could be an exclusion on the ground of sex, that no such implication should be made as that would run counter to the clear language of Article 15(1) and that the omission to specify sex as a ground of refusal in Article 29 (2) might be explained on the ground that its inclusion would conflict with Article 15 (3) which saves special provisions made by the State for women and children. Now, it will be seen that while Article 15 (1) enacts a general principle, Article 29 (2) deals with a particular topic, viz., admission to educational institutions. If the principle generalia specialibus non derogant is to apply, the controlling provision would be Article 29 (2) and not 15 (1). It should also be noted that the language of Article 29 (2) is significantly different from that of Article 15 (1). Thus, as pointed out by the learned Advocate-General, while Article 15 (1) prohibits discrimination on the ground inter alia of ‘place of birth’ these words are omitted in Article 29 (2). The omission is clearly deliberate and there is a purpose behind it. A State might be minded to open an institution for the advancement of knowledge in a particular region which might be backward and for carrying out this object it might restrict admission into the institution to persons of the locality. If persons from other and more advanced regions are to insist on being admitted and the restriction in favour of persons who belong to the locality is to be rejected as inconsistent with Article 15 (1), the result would be that persons in the locality might be prevented for all time from improving their lot. It is to avoid such consequence that ‘place of birth’ which is included in Article 15 (1) would appear to have been omitted in Article 29 (2). It is to avoid such consequence that ‘place of birth’ which is included in Article 15 (1) would appear to have been omitted in Article 29 (2). In the same manner the omission of ‘sex’ in Article 29 (2) would appear to be a deliberate departure from the language of Article 15 (1) and its object must have been to leave it to the educational authorities to make their own rules suited to the conditions and not to force on them an obligation to admit women. Some argument was addressed before us on the exact significance of Article 15 (3) which enacts that- ‘nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children’ The true scope of Article 15 (3) is that notwithstanding Article 15 (1) it will be lawful for the State to establish educational institutions solely for women and that the exclusion of men students from such institutions would not contravene Article 15 (1). That is not inconsistent with the authorities of educational institutions, not falling within Article 15 (3), from being clothed with power to admit or exclude women students from those institutions. The combined effect of both Article 15 (3) and Article 29 (2) is that while men students have no right of admission in other colleges it is a matter within the regulation of the authorities of those colleges. In Anjali v. State of West Bengal1, Bose, J., was of the view that Article 29 (2) would be controlled by Article 15 (1). But on appeal, the learned Judges left the point open. We are of opinion that Article 29 (2) is a special article and is the controlling provision when the question relates to the admission to colleges.“ 30. On the first contention it was held that the regulations of the University of Madras, which is State-aided and not State-maintained are not within the prohibition enacted under Article 15 (1). The decision on the first contention alone would have been enough to dispose of the appeal. Nevertheless it proceeded to render a finding on the second contention which I have extracted above. There is no gainsaying that this decision fully supports Mr. T. Chengalvaroyan and that is the reason why I said it is a sheet-anchor. 31. The decision on the first contention alone would have been enough to dispose of the appeal. Nevertheless it proceeded to render a finding on the second contention which I have extracted above. There is no gainsaying that this decision fully supports Mr. T. Chengalvaroyan and that is the reason why I said it is a sheet-anchor. 31. This view of the Division Bench is not in accord with the later decisions of the Supreme Court as will be seen below: Mr. K.K. Venugopal is right in his submission that since this decision of the Madras High Court the law has taken a definite and a different course holding that in matters of this kind violation of Articles 14, 15 and 29 can be complained of. First of all, in all the decisions which relate to admission to Medical Colleges the rule or the selection came to be struck down because they violate Article 15 (vide A Periakaruppan v. State of Tamil Nadu2, P. Rajendran v. State of Madras3, R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore4, Balaji v. State of Mysore5and State of Andhra Pradesh v. U.S.V. Balaram6. 32. In Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India7, the reservation on the basis of residence with regard to admission to-Medical College was tested in the light of Articles 14, 15 and 29. That is clear from the passage occurring at paragraph 5:- ”Before the High Court only two questions were raised. The first was whether the provision for reservation of seats was unconstitutional. The second was whether the nominations to the reserved seats had been made contrary to the rules. Mr. Misra, has amplified the first submission by urging that the reservation of seats of admission to the Medical College was not based on any reasonable classification and suffered from the vice of discrimination. According to him such reservation was hit by Article 14 read with clauses (1) and (4) of Article 15 and clause (2) of Article 29 of the Constitution.“ 33. On the facts of the particular case, it came to be held in paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows:- ”Article 29 (2) may be read first. It says, no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on ground only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. It says, no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on ground only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Under clause (1) of Article 15 the State cannot discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them Clause (4) however, provides that nothing in the Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the scheduled castes and tribes. According to Mr. Misra, the categories (c) to (h) contained in rule 4 relating to eligibility for admission for whom seats are reserved do not fall within the exception contained in clause (4) Article 15. The persons in these categories, it is said, cannot be regarded as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens nor can it be supposed that all of them must belong to scheduled castes and tribes. We are unable to see how Article 15 (1) can be invoked in the present case. The rules do not discriminate between any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Nor is Articles 29 (2) of any assistance to the appellants. They are not being denied admission into the Medical College on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. This brings us to Article 14. It is claimed that merit should be the sole criterion and as soon as other factors like those mentioned in clauses (c) to (A) to Rule 4 are introduced, discrimination becomes apparent." Therefore, this case did consider whether such a reservation, would be violative of Article 15 as well as Article 29 (2). In other words, it did not say that Article 29 (2) would ever exclude Article 15. 34. The more direct authority is Stale of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon1; that also related to admission to Medical; College, wherein the combined pre-medical test for admission to five medical colleges at Allahabad, Kanpur, Meerut, Agra and Jhansi for the year 1971 was challenged. The total number of seats was 758. 26 seats were reserved for the nominees of the Government of India under various heads. 732 seats were available to be filled in through the combined pre-medical test. The total number of seats was 758. 26 seats were reserved for the nominees of the Government of India under various heads. 732 seats were available to be filled in through the combined pre-medical test. 368 seats were open to general competition. 89 seats were reserved for rural areas. 23 seats for hill areas and 23 seats for Uttrakhand division. The reservations for the rural, hill and Uttrakhand areas were challenged as unconstitutional. 35. One of the two contentions raised by the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the State was that the classification has not been made only on the basis of place of birth as is evident from the State affidavit. If this classification be neither within the vice of Article 15 (1) or Article 29(2), then the classification of rural, hill and Uttrakhand areas can be justified on the basis of reasonable sources for the purpose of admission to medical colleges. The sources are the rural, hill and Uttrakhand areas which form geographical or territorial basis. In paragraphs 12 and 13 it was held: "Article 15 (1) states that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. The Attorney-General (submitted that the reservation was not on grounds only of place of birth or caste. Articles 29 (2) states that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. It is said by the Attorney-General that inasmuch as place of birth is not mentioned in Article 29 (2), the reservations in the present case would not offend Article 29 (2). The Attorney-General submitted that the reservations in the present case were not on ground of place of birth, but on ground of residence, and, therefore, the reservations would not fall within the mischief of either Article 15 (1) or Article 29 (2). Article 15 (4) was added by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951. The object of the amendment was to bring; Articles 15 and 29 in line with Article 16 (4). Article 15 (4) was added by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951. The object of the amendment was to bring; Articles 15 and 29 in line with Article 16 (4). Article 16 (4) states that nothing in that Article shall prevent the State from making any provisions for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the services under the State. In the State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan2, the reservation of seats for non-Brahmins, backward Hindus, Brahmins, Harijans, Anglo Indians and Indian Christians and Muslims was held to offend Articles 15 (1) and 29 (2). This Court pointed out that the omission of a clause like Article 16 (4) from Article 29 indicated the intention of the Constitution-makers not to introduce communal consideration in matters of admission to educational institutions." Ultimately, in paragraph 29 the finding was: "The incident of birth in rural areas is made the basic qualification. No. reservation can be made on the basis of place of birth, as this would offend Article 15." 36. These are the two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, which has decided the law of the land. In fact, Article 141 of the Constitution says:- “The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India.” 37. It may be argued that this point as was decided in University of Madras v. Shanta Bai1 was not decided by the Supreme Court after a full discussion. Therefore, the question would arise whether these two decisions of the Supreme Court could be ignored in the absence of detailed discussion. My answer should be in the negative and I am also fortified for my conclusion by referring to T.G. Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu2. Therefore, the question would arise whether these two decisions of the Supreme Court could be ignored in the absence of detailed discussion. My answer should be in the negative and I am also fortified for my conclusion by referring to T.G. Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu2. At page 978 it was held: “The argument of the appellants is that prior to the decision in R.C. Cooper’s case3, it was not possible to challenge Chapter IV-A of the Act as violative of Article 19 (1)(f ) owing to the decision of this Court that Article 19 (f) could not be invoked when a case fell within Article 31 and that was the reason why this Court in all the previous decisions relating to the validity of Chapter IV-A proceeded on an examination of the argument whether there was infringement of Article 19 (1) (g) and clause (1) of that Article could not possibly be invoked. We are unable to hold that there is much substance in this argument. Bhanji Munji 4 , and other decisions which followed it were based mainly on an examination of the inter-relationship between Article 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 (2). There is no question of any acquisition or requisition in Chapter IV-A of the Act. The relevant decision for the purpose of these cases was only the one given in Kochunni’s case5, after which no doubt was left that the authority of law seeking to deprive a person of his property otherwise than by way of acquisition or requisition was open to challenge on the ground that it constituted infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (f). It was, therefore, open to those affected by the provisions of Chapter IV-A to have agitated before this Court the question which is being raised now based on the guarantee embodied in Article 19(l) (f) which was never done. It is apparently too late in the day now to pursue this line of argument. In this connection we may refer to the observations of this Court in Md. Ayub Khan v. Commissioner of Police, Madras,6according to which even if certain aspects of a question were not brought to the notice of the Court it would decline to enter upon re-examination of the question since the decision had been followed in other cases. In this connection we may refer to the observations of this Court in Md. Ayub Khan v. Commissioner of Police, Madras,6according to which even if certain aspects of a question were not brought to the notice of the Court it would decline to enter upon re-examination of the question since the decision had been followed in other cases. In Smt. Somananti v. State of Punjab7 a. contention was raised that in none of the decisions the argument advanced in that case that a law may be protected from an attack under Article 31 (2) but it would be still open to challenge under Article 19 (1) (f), had been examined or considered. Therefore, the decision of the Court was invited in the light of that argument. This contention, however, was repelled by the following observations at page 794: ‘The binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided.‘” 38. Again in B. M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality8in paragraph 4 it was held that a decision of the Supreme Court was binding on the High Court and the High Court could not ignore it because they thought that relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court. Therefore, I have to necessarily follow the law as laid down by the Supreme Court. 39. For the sake of completion, let me also refer to the decision in Manju v. State1. At page 38 the very question that is under consideration came up for decision. In paragraphs 81 to 83 it was held: “One of the contentions on behalf of the opposite parties was that the only Article which could be considered in deciding the validity of restrictions on admissions to educational institutions in Article 29 (2) of the Constitution which lays down — ”No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.‘ The contention was that this specific provision relating to admissions into such institutions, prevents the use of Articles 15 and 14 of the Constitution for considering the validity of restrictions on admissions to such colleges. Article 29 (2) restricts bars struck by it to those on one of the four grounds mentioned there or to a combination of these only. Hence it was submitted, bars could be imposed, without any let or hindrance by the State Government on grounds such as residence or sex or nature of service of the parents as Article 14 or 15 (1) did not come into play at all in such cases. 82. We are unable to accept the correctness of this extreme submission placed before us on behalf of the opposite parties, relying on the maxim, generalia speciaibus, non de ogant which was thus explained in Barker v. Edger2: ‘When the Legislature has given its attention to a separate subject and made provision for it the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly.‘ It will be seen that this statement puts the principle on no higher footing than that of a presumption of noninterference with the special provision and that too where the general enactment is subsequent to the special enactment. This is not the position here on the provisions we have to construe. 83. We may also point out that in P. Rajendran v. State of Mysore3although the district-wise distribution of seats was held not to violate Article 15 (1) of the Constitution, yet, it was held that it was struck by Article 14 of the Constitution. Similarly, in D. P. Joshi’s case4 , it was held that Article 14 and not Article 15 (1) of the Constitution was violated. In Chitra Ghosh’s case5, the question whether the reservations on residential grounds were struck by any of the three Articles 14, 15 or 29 of the Constitution was considered and decided on the assumption that each of these three Articles could be separately applied and that the restrictions under consideration were not to be judged merely by reference to Article 29 (2) of the Constitution. Furthermore, we may point out that Article 15 (f) of the Constitution introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951, as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam6deals with both Article 29 (2) and Article 15 (1) of the Constitution together. Furthermore, we may point out that Article 15 (f) of the Constitution introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951, as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam6deals with both Article 29 (2) and Article 15 (1) of the Constitution together. Hence the principle of interpretation applicable here is obviously that the provisions of Articles 14, and 15 and 29 (2) must be read together and as a whole. In other words, Article 14 lays down a principle of general application in all cases. Articles 15 (1) and 29 (2) were to be considered as merely amplifications or special application of the general principle contained in Article 14 of the Constitution, but they do not displace or exclude a test by applying Article 14 in those cases which fall outside Article 29 (2) of the Constitution. This means, in our opinion, that the protections conferred by Article 29 (2) of the Constitution do not exhaust those conferred upon citizens seeking entry into educational institutions mentioned there. The result is that even though a bar to admission to such an educational institution may not be struck by Article 29 (2), yet, it may have to pass the tests imposed by Articles 14, and 15 (1) of the Constitution also before it can be held to be valid.“ 40. If the argument of Mr. T. Chengalvaroyan is accepted that only Article 29 (2) would govern not only Article 15 would get excluded, by the same line of reasoning, Article 14 also would get excluded, which in effect would mean the species obliterates the genus or the shade would envelope the light. 41. Support for this view can also be derived from R.C. Cooper v. Union of India1. In dealing with the property right, whether it could be challenged both under Article 19 (1) (f) and 31, it was held in paragraphs 61, 62 and 64 thus: ”In dealing with the argument that Article 31(2) is a- complete code relating to infringement of the right to property by compulsory acquisition and the validity of the law is not liable to be tested in the light of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed thereby it is necessary to bear in mind the enunciation of the guarantee of fundamental rights which has taken different forms. In some cases it is an express declaration of a guaranteed right. ‘Articles 29, 30 (1), 26, 25 and 32; in others to ensure protection of individual rights they take specific forms of restrictions on State action-legislative or executive-Articles 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22 (1), 27 and 28; in some others it takes the form of a positive declaration and simultaneously enunciates the restriction thereon; Articles 19 (1) and 19 (2) to (6); in some cases, it arises as an implication from the delimitation of the authority of the State, e.g., Articles 31(l)and 31 (2); in still others it takes the form of a general prohibition against the State as well as others; Articles 17, 25 and 24. The enunciation of rights either express or by implication does not follow a uniform pattern. But one thread runs through them; they seek to protect the rights of the individual or groups of individuals against infringement of those rights within specific limits, Part III of the Constitution weaves a pattern of guarantee on the texture of basic human rights The guarantees delimit the protection of those rights in their allotted fields ; they do not attempt to enunciate distinct rights.‘ “ 42. We are therefore unable to hold that the challenge to the validity of the provision for acquisition is liable to be tested only on the ground of non-compliance with Article 31 (2). Article 31 (2) requires that it must be acquired under a law with characteristics set out in that Article. Formal compliance with the conditions under Article 31 (2) is not sufficient to negative the protection of the guarantee of the right to property. Acquisition must be under the authority of a law and the expression ‘Law’ means a law which is within the competence of the Legislature and does not impair the guarantee of the rights in Part III. ”We are unable, therefore, to agree that Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 (2) are mutually exclusive. * * * * We have found it necessary to examine the rationale of the two lines of authority and determine whether there is. anything in the Constitution which justifies this apparently inconsistent development of the law. ”We are unable, therefore, to agree that Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 (2) are mutually exclusive. * * * * We have found it necessary to examine the rationale of the two lines of authority and determine whether there is. anything in the Constitution which justifies this apparently inconsistent development of the law. In our judgment, the assumption in A. K. Gopalan’s case2that certain Articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters and in determining whether there is infringement of the individual’s guaranteed rights, the object and the form of the State action alone need be considered and effect of the laws on fundamental rights of the individual in general will be ignored cannot be accepted as correct. We hold that the validity of ‘law’ which authorises deprivation of property and ‘a law which authorises compulsory acquisition of property for a public purpose must be adjudged by the application of the same tests. A citizen may claim in an appropriate case that the law authorising compulsory acquisition of property imposes fetters upon his right to hold property which are not reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. It is immaterial that the scope for such challenge may be attenuated because of the nature of the law of acquisition which providing as it does for expropriation of property of the individual for public purpose may be presumed to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public.“ Therefore, the old theory that one fundamental rule excludes another has clearly been given a go bye. The same principle has been applied to a case of preventive detention as seen from Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal1In paragraph 12 it was held thus: "The next question which then arises for consideration is whether section 3 of the Act in so far as it empowers the detaining authority to exercise the power of detention on the basis of its subjective satisfaction imposes unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights of the petitioner under clauses (a) to (d) and (g) to Article 19 (1) and is, therefore, ultra vires and void. The view taken by the majority in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras2, was that Article 22 is a self-contained Code, and therefore, a law of preventive detention does not have to satisfy the requirements of Articles 14, 19 and 21. The view taken by the majority in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras2, was that Article 22 is a self-contained Code, and therefore, a law of preventive detention does not have to satisfy the requirements of Articles 14, 19 and 21. This view came to be considered by this Court in three subsequent decisions to all of which one of us (P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) was a party. In Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India3it was held by a majority of Judges, only Ray, J., as he then was, dissenting that though a law of preventive detention may pass the test of Article 22, it has yet to satisfy the requirements of other fundamental rights such as Article 19. The ratio of the majority judgment in R. C Cooper’s case 3 , was explained in clear and categorical terms by Shelat, J., speaking on behalf of seven judges in Sambhu Math Sarkar v. State of West Bengal4 The learned Judge said:- ‘In Gopalan’s case5 the majority Court had held that Article 22 was a self contained Code and therefore a law of preventive detention did not have to satisfy the requirements of Articles 19, 14 and 21. The view of Fazl Ali, J., on the other hand, was that preventive detention was a direct breach of the right under Article 19 (1) (a) and (d) and that a law providing for preventive detention had to be subject to such judicial review as is obtainable under clause (5) of that Article. In R.C. Cooper’s case3the aforesaid premises of the majority in Gopalan’s case5 was disapproved and therefore it no longer holds the field. In R.C. Cooper’s case3the aforesaid premises of the majority in Gopalan’s case5 was disapproved and therefore it no longer holds the field. Though Cooper’s case3, dealt with the interrelationship of Article 19 and Article 31, the basic “approach to construing the fundamental rights guaranteed in the different provisions of the Constitution adopted in this case held the major premise of the majority in Gopalan’s case5to be incorrect.” Subsequently in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal6, a Bench of five Judges, after referring to the decisions in A. K. Gopalan’s case5and R. C. Cooper’s case3and pointing out the context in which R. C. Cooper’s case3held that the acquisition of property directly impugned on the right of the bank to carry on business, other than banking, guaranteed under Article 19 and Article 31 (2) was not a protection against the infringement of that guaranteed right, proceeded on the assumption that the Act which is for preventive detention has to be tested in regard to its reasonableness with reference to Article 19. That decision accepted and applied the ratio in Shambu Nath Sarkar’s case1as well as R. C. Cooper’s case2 to both of which Ray, C.J., was a party. This question, thus, stands concluded and a final seal is put on this controversy and in view of these decisions, it is not open to any one now to contend that a law of preventive detention, “which falls within Article 22, does not have to meet the requirement of Article 14 or Article19. Indeed, in Haradhan Saha’s case3this Court proceeded to consider the challenge of Article 19 to the validity of the Act and held that the Act did not violate any of the constitutional guarantees embodied in Article 19 and was valid. Since this Court negatived the challenge to the validity of the Act on the ground of infraction of Article 19 and upheld it as a valid piece of legislation in Haradhan Saha’s case3the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate the same question merely on the ground that some argument directed against the constitutional validity of the Act under Article 19 was not advanced or considered by the Court in that case. The decision in Haradhan Saha’s case,3 must be regarded as having finally laid at rest any question as to the constitutional validity of the Act on the ground of challenge under Article 19.” 43. The decision in Haradhan Saha’s case,3 must be regarded as having finally laid at rest any question as to the constitutional validity of the Act on the ground of challenge under Article 19.” 43. Thus I conclude that the basis of grouping under the head “Pondicherry General”, wherein one of the categories mentioned in “Nativity in Pondicherry” is clearly violative of Article 15. Once this position is arrived at, there is no need for me to test the reasonableness of the rule. Even then merely because a person who was born 10 or 15 years ago in Pondicherry, how could he be preferred to admission in Medical College at Pondicherry? He might have ceased to have any connection with Pondicherry at all, exception for “the accident of his birth”. One can well understand that the persons having residence at Pondicherry being given encouragement to get admission in the local Medical College. Equally it may be considered reasonable for the wards of the Central Government employees working in Pondicherry to gain admission on that score. But Mr. K. K. Venugopal is not attacking the categorisation concerning these two. Therefore, it cannot even be said that this classification based upon the nativity which is admitted to be the place of birth could ever be held reasonable. 44. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. T. Chengalvaroyan, that these are the sources from which the selection is drawn. The vice in allowing candidates to enter the compartment of “Pondicherry General” on the ground of place of birth, is clearly violative of Article 15, as I have held above Nor can it be contended that neither at the time of the application nor at the time of selection discrimination ever operated. If those persons cannot be validly grouped under “Pondicherry General” their selection will have to necessarily be set aside. 45. Only when that candidate applied under the existing rule and does not get selected, he could be considered to be an aggrieved person and not until then. Therefore, it is not open to the respondents to argue that even before the application, this complaint relating to discrimination on the ground of place of birth could have been made. 45. Only when that candidate applied under the existing rule and does not get selected, he could be considered to be an aggrieved person and not until then. Therefore, it is not open to the respondents to argue that even before the application, this complaint relating to discrimination on the ground of place of birth could have been made. Nor again is there any force in the contention that because the petitioner chose to apply under the rules he would be estopped from questioning the validity of selection, since it is well settled there is no waiver of fundamental rights. (Vide Dasaratharama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh1). As and when he is aggrieved alone, he can complain of violation of any one of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. Therefore Narasappa v. Shaik Hazhat2, relied on by Mr. T. Chengalvaroyan is of no assistance to him. 46. Turning to the facts of these two cases, it has already been seen that 11 persons came to be distributed under the group “Pondicherry General”. Three seats distributed under the headings “Pondicherry Scheduled Caste” and one seat under the heading “Pondicherry Scheduled Tribe” were not filled and therefore they were taken under the group “Pondicherry General”. Thus, the total became 15. As against those 15 the following were selected, as seen from Appendix A of the counter:- Pondicherry General Merit List Seats 11. S.No. Roll No. Name of the Candidate Marks obtained Remarks 1. C/907/D Sanjeev Kumar Gupta 173 2. C/1215/P Manjunath, H. S. 157 3. C/1606/P Rohit Bhargava 153 4. C/1363/P Suparna Gupta (Miss) 150 Nationality Certificate. 5. C/2150/F Satyanarayana, P. 147 Marks did not join. 6. C/613/P Punam Sood (Miss) 140 62.3% 7. C/1218/F Rajaraman,T. 140 marks 8. C/3484/P Sridhar, K. 140 marks 9. C/303/P Ashok Puri 138 marks 10. C/94/P Rita Sanyal (Miss) 136 11. C/7/P Latha Prasannan (Miss) 134 12. C/1524/P John Britto-R. 133 marks 13. C/1214/P Palaniswamy, H. 132 65.3% 14. C/2163/P Abdul Hamide @ Abduoul Moulk 132 71.1% 15. C/731/F Uthrapathy, M. 131 74.7 16. C/678/P Ganesh, S. 131 65.7 17. C/2597/P Anil Kumar, C. C. 150 72.5 18. C/4591/P Venugopalan, M. 130 71.2 19. C/9/P Miss Mary Varghese. 130 70.4 Since item No. 5, P. Satyanarayana did not join, item No. 16 S. Ganesh was selected. C/2163/P Abdul Hamide @ Abduoul Moulk 132 71.1% 15. C/731/F Uthrapathy, M. 131 74.7 16. C/678/P Ganesh, S. 131 65.7 17. C/2597/P Anil Kumar, C. C. 150 72.5 18. C/4591/P Venugopalan, M. 130 71.2 19. C/9/P Miss Mary Varghese. 130 70.4 Since item No. 5, P. Satyanarayana did not join, item No. 16 S. Ganesh was selected. It is admitted that item No. 1 Sanjeev Kumar Gupta, 4th respondent, and item No. 4 Suparna Gupta, the 3rd respondent came to be selected under this group of “ Pondicherry General” solely on the ground of their nativity in Pondicherry (nativity meaning only place of birth). Their selection will have to necessarily be set aside in view of what I held above. That means two vacancies would occur. The first of the vacancies will go to item No. 17, Anil Kumar C. C. petitioner in W.P. No. 3198 of 1977. The next person in the waiting list is M. Venugopalan. Admittedly, he did not produce the necessary certificate relating to his residence. Therefore he cannot be placed in the waiting list at all. That means item No. 19, Miss Mary Varghese (petitioner in W.P. No. 2644/77) will get selected. It is also the common case that only these three were placed in the waiting list. 47. I should not fail to take note of the fact that the selection as stated in paragraph 4-5 of the prospectus is made entirely on the basis of the merit in the entrance examination. It is only on that basis Appendix A has come to be prepared. But where the ultimate selection of respondents 3 and 4 is based upon nativity, meaning place of birth, theirs will have to be necessarily set aside being violative of Article 15. 48. In the result these writ petitions will stand allowed with costs. Counsel’s fee Rs. 250 one set. 49. The setting aside of the selection of respondents 3 and 4 does not prevent the authorities concerned from accommodating the claims of these two respondents, either by admitting in the group ‘Open General’ on the basis of marks, or by the increase of seats, whichever is found feasible. S.J. ----- Petitions allowed.